Three-party Game Research Articles

A Three-Party Game Based on Trust for IoT Task Delegation in an Untrusted Environment

With the rapid development of technologies and applications, extending from trusted environments to untrusted environments is the development trend of Internet of Things (IoT) applications. Due to the limited resources of nodes and the rise of edge computing, more and more IoT applications are required to have task delegation functions. Delegating IoT tasks in untrusted environments has to solve two problems: First, how to evaluate the trustworthiness of nodes so that requesters can delegate tasks to trusted providers; the second is how to ensure the successful implementation of the task delegation between the requester and the provider. While trust models are often used to solve the first problem, the lack of ability to describe transactions between the requester and the provider makes them unsuitable for solving the second problem. In recent years, game theory has been more applied to task delegation. By setting appropriate utility functions, game theory can ensure the successful implementation of task delegation. However, since it is unable to evaluate the trustworthiness of nodes, game theory cannot solve the first problem. This paper combines the advantages of trust models and game theory to construct a game of three-party task delegation based on trust to explore a solution to problems of IoT task delegation in an untrusted environment. Finally, aiming at the problem that setting essential parameter values of trust models is empirical and experimental, this paper theoretically discusses how to set these values in an untrusted environment.

Environmental liability insurance, green innovation, and mediation effect study

This paper begins by establishing a three-party game model involving three key players: the insurer, the firm, and the government. This model is used to analyze the utility of each party in various scenarios, one of which encourages green innovation within the firm. According to this model, when the insurer rejects insurance coverage and the government maintains a neutral stance on environmental liability insurance, the firm may opt to engage in green innovation. Green innovation fundamentally serves as a mechanism to mitigate environmental pollution risks stemming from the firm’s operational processes. In cases where the insurer declines underwriting, it becomes rational for the firm to enhance its risk management through green innovation, which can be viewed as a mitigating factor in the context of environmental liability insurance. To comprehensively examine the overall impact of environmental liability insurance on the green innovation endeavors of firms, we use a mediation effect model utilizing firm-level data from heavily polluting industries. This paper delves into the intricate relationship between environmental liability insurance and the capacity of heavily polluting firms to engage in green innovation, along with the mediating influence of financing constraints between these two factors. The findings of this analysis suggest that the acquisition of environmental liability insurance enhances the green innovation capabilities of firms operating in heavily polluting industries by alleviating financing constraints, serving as a mediating factor in this regard.

Game Theory Applications in Equilibrium Water Pricing of Multiple Regional Sources and Users

China has been facing a contradiction between its water supply and demand for a long time, and it is urgent that it builds a “water-saving society”. Previous research on water pricing mainly focused on the policy level, only considering the supply and demand sides and ignoring the participation of local governments. Due to the inconsistent approval mechanisms, different times of cost formation, and lack of a scientific pricing relationship between multiple water sources and multiple users, with the current water pricing in China, it is difficult to solve the complex problem of water resource allocation. This study aimed to promote the qualitative supply of water and the reuse of reclaimed water, achieve a high-quality and low-cost water supply, and explore the role of water-pricing mechanisms in the regulation of multi-source water supply configurations. The mechanism of regulation is constructed for the complex, multi-source, multi-user water resource system, and a three-party game model is established among local governments, water supply enterprises, and water users. A reasonable pricing system with a rational price relationship is obtained, and Pinghu City in Zhejiang Province is taken as the research area. The prices of the external water supply to residential users, non-resident users, and special users are 4.48 CNY/m3, 6.28 CNY/m3, and 7.12 CNY/m3. The external supply prices for resident users, non-resident users, and special users are 3.81 CNY/m3, 5.25 CNY/m3, and 6.05 CNY/m3. The external supply price for non-resident users is 2.62 CNY/m3 for reclaimed water. The results of the study showed that when the government’s contribution did not exceed the amount that it would have been without the inclusion of recycled water and the annual payment of water users did not exceed their ability to pay, the income of water suppliers increased by 69%. The three balanced objectives of rational water resource configuration by the local government, reasonable profit for the water supply enterprise, and reasonable payment by water users have been achieved. This study provides theoretical and methodological support for the implementation of water pricing for multi-source and multi-user water supplies in water-scarce areas.

Analysis of Labor Relations in Private Enterprises A Three-party Game Based on Overtime Work

At present, China has successively introduced multiple laws and regulations to prevent employees from being forced to work overtime. However, this situation is still serious in private enterprises, which has led to gradually tense labor relations. Starting from the issue of overtime, this article constructs a game model between government regulatory departments, enterprises, and employees, explores the impact of government regulation on the labor management relationship of private enterprises, and uses evolutionary games to analyze the stability of the strategies of the three parties. The result shows that there is a stable equilibrium solution in the tripartite game: private enterprises arrange employees to work overtime normally, employees take the initiative to work overtime, and the government's project management department strictly supervises them. Among them, strict supervision by labor supervision agencies plays an important role in balancing labor management relations, therefore, certain incentive measures should be given to labor supervision agencies to ensure their strict supervision; Private enterprises should strictly abide by market order, proactively reduce the burden on employees, and avoid forcing employees to work overtime excessively; Employees should maintain a good work attitude and promote the development of common interests with private enterprises.

A stochastic and time-delay evolutionary game of food safety regulation under central government punishment mechanism

Food safety is a pressing issue affecting public health, and strengthening food safety regulation has become a widespread consensus. This study addresses the three-party game involving food production enterprises, third-party testing agencies, and government regulatory authorities. Considering the influence of random disturbances and time delays on the strategy-choosing and behavioral evolution of game players, a three-party stochastic evolutionary game model for food safety regulation with time delays is established. The stability of the model is analyzed by using Lyapunov's method, and the strategy evolution of the game players is investigated while combining numerical simulations. The study shows that the net benefit of the players' expected strategies is key in determining whether the overall game system can reach the optimal equilibrium. The level of penalties imposed by the central government on local government regulators is key to food safety. The main factors influencing the strategy-choosing of game players are the level of penalties imposed by the local government regulators on third-party testing agencies, together with the supervision costs of the local government regulators. Random disturbances have a certain impact on strategy-choosing of the game players, with a greater impact on testing agencies, followed by food production enterprises, and a weaker impact on government regulatory authorities. The time delay factors exhibit a certain delay effect on the evolutionary path of strategy-choosing among the game players, which aligns with the actual situation. The findings of the study have implications for food safety regulation.

A prediction model for rumor user propagation behavior based on sparse representation and transfer learning

This paper introduces a prediction model rooted in sparse representation and transfer learning, with the primary objective of predicting user behavior during rumor propagation. Users' behavior is dynamic, and rumor, rumor-refuting, and rumor-promoting messages interact dynamically, according to the model. Firstly, this paper proposes to compensate for the low performance of propagation prediction models due to data sparsity at the beginning of rumor topics' lifes. Transfer learning is used to compensate for the data sparsity problem at the beginning of the topic. To map the rumor topic space effectively, a low-rank dense vectorization algorithm based on sparse representation is proposed. Finally, to mine the potential impact of multiple types of information on users, a model based on three-party game theory is constructed. It considers the complex interaction between rumor, rumor-refuting, and rumor-promoting information in the propagation of rumor. Additionally, this paper develops a model of dynamic user behavior prediction using Rumor-Attention-Mechanism-Graph-Attention (RAM-GAT) to predict rumor propagation. Experiments demonstrate that our model can effectively mine the interaction influence between multiple types of information. It can accurately predict user behavior when initial data is insufficient. In addition, rumor propagation patterns and trends are revealed.

Research on Green Development Decision Making of Logistics Enterprises Based on Three-Party Game

The concept of green logistics entails minimizing the ecological impact of logistical resources, enhancing the environmental quality within the logistics sector, and optimizing resource utilization to foster sustainable development in social economic production and consumption. Promoting green transportation is not only a positive reflection of the concepts of environmental protection and green development, but also an effective means for traditional logistics enterprises to reduce operating costs, win competitive advantages, and achieve transformation and upgrading. This paper takes logistics enterprises facing green transformation and development decisions as the research object, and puts forward an evolutionary game model between logistics companies, government, and community. The evolution path of logistics enterprises’ green transformation development strategy choice under different conditions is analyzed in detail. The results show that, under the conditions of the government’s incentive and supervision and the public’s choice of green consumption, logistics enterprises are more inclined to green transformation development. Different levels of public choice and different levels of government regulation also make different corporate strategy choices. Therefore, it is suggested that the government provide policy, technical channels, funds, and other support for logistics companies promoting green logistics, and actively publicize the concept of green consumption in the market.

Research on the strategy for improving the utility of government social media information based on a multi-agent game model

Government social media (GSM) has become an important tool for government departments to open information, guide public opinion and interact with the government and the people. However, the operation and maintenance of some GSM are not standardised, and the content published is inconsistent with identity positioning, resulting in the realistic dilemma of low utility of GSM information. The purpose of this study is to explore the effective strategies to improve the effectiveness of GSM information. The research is from the perspective of information economics, this article uses evolutionary game theory to build a tripartite evolutionary game model comprising GSM operations departments, government regulators and users in order to explore the evolution process of tripartite game behaviours and the influence of subject behaviour selection on information utility. It subsequently conducts a solution and numerical simulation to demonstrate the influence of different factors on the game results. The experimental results show that there are four situations in which the utility of GSM information affects the evolution and stability strategy of the subject and that changes in different parameter values have significant effects on the results of the three-party game. The evolution trend of the subject behaviour can be changed by increasing the regulatory means of rewards and punishments and establishing an efficient operation mechanism for GSM, thus promoting system convergence to the ideal state. The results of this study can provide references and suggestions for government departments to effectively enhance the effectiveness of GSM information and promote the healthy development of GSM.

A Supply Chain Evolution Model with Three-Party Game in the Context of Digital Economy

A Supply Chain Evolution Model with Three-Party Game in the Context of Digital Economy

Rent-seeking analysis of carbon emission verification based on game theory and prospect theory from the perspective of multi-participation

Emissions trading system (ETS) is an important tool to promote carbon emission reduction. Accurate emission data is the basis for the comprehensive benefits of ETS. However, carbon emission companies and third-party verification agencies conspired to falsify carbon emission reports. Therefore, this paper builds a three-party game model among carbon emission companies, third-party verification agencies and the government to study rent-seeking behaviors. Moreover, the prospect theory is introduced to characterize the bounded rationality of the participants to make the game process closer to reality. On this basis, the strategy evolution trend of participants under the influence of various factors is analyzed. Finally, simulation analysis is carried out under the background of Shenzhen ETS, and suggestions are put forward for the government to develop the carbon emission report re-verification mechanism. The results show that: 1) Driven by economic benefits, carbon emission companies and third-party verification agencies have high rent-seeking intentions, which do not change with the re-verification policy; 2) Higher review probability can effectively inhibit rent-seeking behavior; 3) The choice of government strategy is related to the success rate and the cost of re-verification, and the income and penalty of rent-seeking, and these factors have obvious thresholds.

Three-Party Evolutionary Game Analysis of IoT Platform Knowledge Hiding Under Organization Participation from the Perspective of Stakeholders

The 21st century is an era of rapid development of high-tech industry. Through continuous collection and sharing of data, IoT technology connected by things has penetrated into every aspect of human life. Modern organizations find that they increasingly rely on knowledge and information sharing and interconnection to enhance their innovation and development capabilities. Therefore, this paper studies the strategic decision-making of knowledge sharing among employees on the IoT platform drawing on evolutionary game theory, this paper constructs a three-party game model composed of “organization-knowledge sharers-knowledge seekers” from the perspective of stakeholders, and discusses the strategic choice of organization and employee behavior under the dynamic decision mechanism and when the game reaches equilibrium and stability. Moreover, this paper uses MATLAB 2016a to simulate the model. The results show that under the premise of higher organizational rewards, synergistic benefits, high-shared extra income, knowledge-sharing preferences, incentive preferences of the organization, the system is easier to reach the ideal state. With the smaller cost of sharing and incentive, organization and employees are more willing to be motivators and sharers, while the incentive degree of organization should be controlled within a reasonable range. This paper can provide specific theoretical and practical guidance for the practice of organizational knowledge management.

Evolutionary game analysis of information service quality control of e-commerce platforms under information ecology

Due to the information asymmetry and imperfect supervision system, the problem of information service quality of e-commerce platforms is becoming increasingly prominent. Based on the perspective of information ecology, this paper constructs a three-party evolutionary game model including merchants, e-commerce platforms and governments, and analyzes the dynamic process of the three-party game under bounded rationality, thereby characterizing the behavior and optimal strategies of information service quality control. We carry out numerical simulation using data of the Pinduoduo platform. The results show that the cost of each party, control strength of e-commerce platforms, proportion of margin deducted and other factors are important factors affecting the quality of information service; Only when the sum of the costs of passive management of e-commerce platforms, penalties for merchants, and the additional revenue generated from the active management exceeds the cost of the active management of the e-commerce platforms, it ensures effective control over the quality of information service in a stable market environment. Finally, some suggestions are put forward to optimize the e-commerce information service quality control.

Tripartite Evolutionary Game Analysis and Mode Selection of Reward-Based Crowdfunding From the Perspective of Value Co-Creation

Crowdfunding refers to releasing fund-raising projects and raising funds through the Internet. To explore the relationship between platform resource investment and value creation in interactive learning between initiators and supporters, this article constructs a three-party game model among the platform, supporters, and the initiator, based on evolutionary game theory, and then obtains the replicator dynamics function of the player and analyzes the evolution trend. Further, this article analyzes the optimal pricing decision of the platform and the initiator under different crowdfunding modes and its optimal mode. The results show that there are two Evolutionary Stable Strategies that are accepted by three players under certain parameters, and the equilibrium point remains stable under external interference. When the net income of initiators participating in value co-creation increases, it can promote the crowdfunding platform to actively participate in the value co-creation process, while it will inhibit the participation of the platform when the net loss of initiators participating in value co-creation increases. In addition, although supporters will also be affected by the willingness of the platform to participate in value co-creation, the willingness of initiators to participate has a greater impact on supporters. As for the mode selection, when the platform does not provide fee preference, considering that the prices of the initiators in the crowdfunding period are the same, single-stage crowdfunding is the dominant mode, and the income of the platform and the initiators is also higher than that under the two-stage crowdfunding. When the product price in the single-stage crowdfunding period is lower than that in the two-stage sales period, the two-stage crowdfunding is the best choice for the initiator.

A Study on Enhancing the Information Security of Urban Traffic Control Systems Using Evolutionary Game Theory

In recent years, there has been significant development in intelligent technologies for urban traffic control, such as smart city and vehicle-to-everything (V2X) communication. These advancements aim to provide more efficient and convenient services to participants in urban transportation. As the urban traffic control (UTC) system integrates with various networks and physical infrastructure, the potential threats of malicious attacks and breaches pose significant risks to the safety of individuals and their properties. To address this issue, this academic paper focuses on studying the network structure of the UTC system. A signal security game model is constructed based on the concepts of evolutionary game theory (EGT), involving three parties: attackers, upper computers (UC), and traffic signal machines (TSM). The model aims to analyze the evolutionary stability of the strategies chosen by each party, and to explore the relationships between various factors and the strategy choices of the three parties. Furthermore, the stability of equilibrium points in the three-party game system is analyzed using the Liapunov method. The conditions in which UC and TSM, dependent on detection rates and defense costs, choose to abandon defense at pure-strategy equilibrium points were obtained. Finally, MATLAB is utilized for simulation analysis to validate the impact of attack costs, defense costs, and detection rates on the information security of UTC systems.

Analysis of the dynamic evolution process of the digital transformation of renewable energy enterprises based on the cooperative and evolutionary game model

Based on the cooperative-evolutionary game model, this paper studies the dynamic evolution process of the digital transformation strategy selection of renewable energy power plants and renewable energy selling enterprises under government supervision. Renewable energy power plants, renewable energy selling enterprises, and the government are taken as the game players. The Shapley value based on the cooperation game distributes the cooperation benefits brought about by the digital transformation of enterprises and analyses the dynamic evolution process of the strategy of the three-party game players based on evolutionary game theory. Then, based on the system dynamics model, Anylogic and Vensim software are used to simulate the cooperative evolutionary game model, and a sensitivity analysis of the key factors affecting the system stability is carried out. The results show that the "digital transformation" of renewable-energy power plants and renewable-energy selling enterprises will bring about cooperation benefits and promote their joint promotion of digital transformation. Government incentives can accelerate the digital transformation of renewable energy companies. The increase in economic, environmental, and social benefits brought about by the digital transformation of renewable energy enterprises promotes the speed of the digital transformation of renewable energy power plants and renewable energy selling enterprises.

Analysis of Enterprise Data-Driven Innovation Diffusion Supervision System Based on the Perspective of Green Supply Chain

To promote the market substitution of digital innovation technology and green products and alleviate the pressure of energy and environment, a three-party evolutionary game model of innovation diffusion based on core manufacturers, affiliated enterprises and the government is established in the article to explore the adjustment of the three-party game strategy of core manufacturers and affiliated enterprises under government supervision, and then analyze the optimal stability conditions that are conducive to the innovation diffusion of digital innovation technology. It is found that the core manufacturers would choose the diffusion strategy of digital innovation technology, which would take the initiative to adopt the diffused digital innovation technology due to cost considerations, without easily choosing independent research and development (hereafter R&D strategy); the reward and punishment mechanism made by the government for core manufacturers' digital innovation technology diffusion could effectively promote technology diffusion in the market.

Game-theoretic approach to understanding status transition dynamics and employee performance enhancement in organizations

To foster high-quality economic development, it is critical to not only enhance the “hard environment,” such as infrastructure, but also to make significant strides in the “soft environment,” such as the relationship between government and businesses. This study posits that the government, industry associations, and enterprises should collectively participate in fostering a “cordial and clean” government-business relationship. By resolving the equilibrium solution of the three-party game, it has been identified that achieving the goal of constructing a cordial and clean government-business relationship and aligning with the ambitions of enterprises necessitates policy guidance and a balance of interests among the government, industry associations, and enterprises. The research also contributes to the beneficial exploration of game theory, by constructing a network model from the perspective of public management and integrating it with the practice of local administrative reform. This integration is particularly relevant for industry associations, and their systematic analysis further enhances the practical applicability of the research.

Retracted: The Equilibrium Mechanism of Interest Distribution in Farmland Transfer: Based on the Perspective of the Three-Party Game

Retracted: The Equilibrium Mechanism of Interest Distribution in Farmland Transfer: Based on the Perspective of the Three-Party Game

Co-Evolutionary Mechanism of Stakeholders’ Strategies in Comprehensive Agricultural Water Price Reform: The View of Evolutionary Game Based on Prospect Theory

In today’s world, the contradiction between water supply and demand is becoming increasingly pronounced, with a particular emphasis on the severe shortage of water for agricultural purposes. As a result, it has become imperative to promote the comprehensive reform of agricultural water pricing and increase water conservation awareness among water users. However, during the actual promotion process, the conflicting interests among stakeholders often create a behavioral game that seriously hinders the effective implementation of the agricultural water price reform. Therefore, it is crucial to address this conflict of interest and find ways to overcome it in order to ensure the successful implementation of the agricultural water pricing reform. In order to explore the dynamic evolution process of the behavior and decision making of the stakeholders in the comprehensive agricultural water price reform and the influencing factors and to propose relevant strategies to effectively promote the reform. This article constructs a three-party game model based on MA-PT theory with the government, farmers, and water supply units as the main subjects, solves the equation with the perceived benefit matrix instead of the traditional benefit matrix, and calculates the objective conditions for reaching the steady state. The simulation results show that the behavioral decision of the game subject to participate in the reform will be influenced by their perception of gains and losses, and there is a mutual influence between the three strategic choices. Therefore, the reform of agricultural water prices should consider the affordability of farmers and water supply units. The government appropriately adopts a reward system to encourage farmers and water supply units to actively participate in the reform to play a positive role and appropriate penalties for promoting the reform, the early realization of the reform goals, and the development of water-saving agriculture.

Research on game strategy of underwater attack and defense process in typical situation

Aiming at the problem of underwater attack and defense in typical situations, a mathematical model of three-party attack and defense problem composed of torpedo, submarines and anti-torpedo torpedo is established. Under the condition of considering three-party game confrontation, the three-party game problem is transformed into the pursuit and escape game problem between the submarine and torpedo, and the interception and evasion game problem between the submarine launched ATT and the torpedo. Based on the optimal control theory and differential game theory, the three-party optimal game problem is studied, and the three-party game performance evaluation function is designed based on the optimal performance of the two parties of pursuit and escape and the two parties of interception and evasion. According to the optimal necessary condition of the bilateral extremum, the strategy of pursuing, escaping, blocking and avoiding in the three-party game is deduced. The effectiveness of the game strategy designed in the underwater attack and defense process is verified by simulations. The results show that the game strategy can improve the effects of submarine escape, anti-torpedo torpedo interception and torpedo attack.