Three Mile Island Unit 2 Reactor Research Articles

Thermal and stress analyses of the reactor pressure vessel lower head of the three mile island unit 2

Thermal and stress analyses were performed using the finite element analysis code ABAQUS to clarify the factors which caused tears in the stainless steel liner of the reactor pressure vessel lower head of the Three Mile Island Unit 2 (TMI-2) reactor pressure vessel during the accident on 28 March 1979. The present analyses covered the events which occurred after approximately 20 tons of molten core material were relocated to the lower head of the reactor pressure vessel. They showed that the tensile stress was highest in the case where the relocated core material consisting of homogeneous UO 2 debris was assumed to attack the lower head and the debris was then quenched. The peak tensile stress was in the vicinity of the welded zone of the penetration nozzle. This result agrees with the findings from the examination of the TMI-2 reactor pressure vessel that major tears in the stainless steel liner were observed around two penetration nozzles of the lower head.

GPU Nuclear Corporation Licensed Operator Requalification Program Using the Penn State Breazeale Nuclear Reactor

A requalification program was established for the Three Mile Island Unit 2 (TMI-2) reactor operators after the March 1979 accident made the TMI-2 reactor inoperable. A series of subcritical/critical experiments was presented in this requalification program using the Penn State Breazeale Reactor. The first five experiments were designed to demonstrate various conditions that might occur in the pressure vessel during the defueling program. Later this requalification program was reduced to presenting two experiments of a similar nature, but having different objectives and methods of presentation. These experiments are presented in detail, showing how this program contributed to the training of the TMI-2 operators and their successful removal of the damaged core from the TMI-2 pressure vessel.

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Characterization of Suspended Particles in Three Mile Island Unit 2 Reactor Coolant Water

On commencing defueling operations in the Three Mile Island Unit 2 (TMI-2) reactor vessel damaged core region, the defueling water cleanup system (DWCS) encountered rapid plugging of its filter media. Characterization of the suspended material was an important task in resolving DWCS filtration difficulties. The characterization of the suspended material involved laboratory analyses of reactor vessel coolant samples collected from May through November 1986. The results of these characterizations indicated that the major elements present in the suspended particles were silver, aluminum, cadmium, iron, indium, silicon, uranium, and zirconium, all of which correspond to the five known source terms in the TMI-2 reactor vessel control rod alloy, zeolite, diatomaceous earth, steel, fuel, and Zircaloy cladding. The particle analysis data indicate that the majority of the particles were <5 {mu}m and many of these suspended particles existed as colloidal particles; hence, these particulates are believed to have been the principal basis for filter plugging. In addition, based on these characterization data and data from previous analyses of reactor components, it was postulated that some mass fraction of the liquefied control rod alloy formed aerosols from mechanical formation due to high-velocity gas interaction with the moving liquid alloy.

A Comparison of Measured Radionuclide Release Rates from Three Mile Island Unit-2 Core Debris for Different Oxygen Chemical Potentials

Chemical and radiochemical analyses of reactor coolant samples taken during defueling of the Three Mile Island Unit-2 (TMI-2) reactor provide relevant data to assist in understanding the solution chemistry of the radionuclides retained within the TMI-2 reactor coolant system. Hydrogen peroxide was added to various plant systems to provide disinfection for microbial contamination and has provided the opportunity to observe radionuclide release under different oxygen chemical potentials. A comparison of the radionuclide release rates with and without hydrogen peroxide has been made for these separate but related cases, i.e., the fuel transfer canal and connecting spent-fuel pool A with the TMI-2 reactor plenum in the fuel transfer canal, core debris grab sample laboratory experiments, and the reactor vessel fluid and associated core debris. Correlation and comparison of these data indicate a physical parameter dependence (surface-to-volume ratio) affecting all radionuclide release; however, selected radionuclides also demonstrate a chemical dependence release under the different oxygen chemical potentials. Chemical and radiochemical analyses of reactor coolant samples taken during defueling of the Three Mile Island Unit-2 (TMI-2) reactor provide relevant data to assist in understanding the solution chemistry of the radionuclides retained within the TMI-2 reactor coolant system.

Passive Surveillance: A Technique to Characterize the Condition of Power and Control Circuits in a Nuclear Plant

This paper reports on progress by EG&G Idaho in examination of electrical circuits exposed to the accident environment at Three Mile Island Unit 2 (TMI-2) during and after the loss-of-coolant accident of March 28, 1979. Interpretations of the data collected suggest that the major functional impact on the electrical circuits (a) occurs very late in time, (b) is caused by moisture intrusion, and (c) can be detected by remote surveillance prior to functional failure. The electrical testing was performed from outside the TMI-2 Reactor Building at the penetrations using a special circuit characterization and diagnostic system developed by EG&G Idaho. This paper concentrates on representative data from those circuits which were recently retested.

Neutron dosimetry with solid-state track recorders in the three-mile island unit-2 reactor cavity

Solid-state track recorder (SSTR) neutron dosimetry has been conducted in the Three-Mile Island Unit-2 (TMI-2) reactor cavity (i.e., the annular gap between the pressure vessel and the biological shield) for nondestructive assessment of the fuel distribution. Two axial stringers were deployed in the annular gap with 17 SSTR dosimeters located on each stringer. SSTR experimental results reveal that neutron streaming, upward from the bottom of the reactor cavity region, dominates the observed neutron intensity. These absolute thermal neutron flux observations are consistent with the presence of a significant amount of fuel debris lying at the bottom of the reactor vessel. A conservative lower bound estimated from these SSTR data implies that at least 2 tonnes of fuel, which is roughly 4 fuel assemblies, is lying at the bottom of the vessel. The existence of significant neutron streaming also explains the high count rate observed with the source range monitors (SRMs) that are located in the TMI-2 reactor cavity.