Third-party Punishment Game Research Articles

Avoidance of altruistic punishment: Testing with a situation-selective third-party punishment game

Third-party punishment games have consistently shown that people are willing to bear personal costs to punish others who act selfishly, even as uninvolved observers. However, the traditional third-party punishment game places participants in contrived situations that mandate direct punishment decisions, potentially inflating the prevalence of such actions compared to those observed in more naturalistic settings. In light of this obligatory nature, one might speculate that if given the autonomy to step aside, people could be inclined to forgo punishment rather than penalize unfairness. The present study developed the Situation-Selective Third-Party Punishment Game (SS-TPPG), an experimental paradigm, to investigate whether avoidance of witnessing unfairness stems from a reluctance to make punitive decisions or a desire to avoid observing unfairness altogether. Three studies (total N = 810) consistently revealed that avoidance was driven by both a reluctance to witness unfair treatment and an aversion to administering punishments. Notably, participants who typically avoided observing unfair treatment were inclined to punish when forced to observe it. Furthermore, when given the opportunity to punish indirectly, participants were less likely to avoid observing unfair distributions. These results suggest that the elevated instances of direct punishment noted in the traditional third-party punishment game might be reflective of the game's structure, which constrains participants' ability to avoid witnessing unfair distributions.

Disrupting the Dorsolateral Prefrontal Cortex Attenuates the Difference in Decision-Making for Altruistic Punishment Between the Gain and Loss Contexts.

Altruistic punishment is a primary response to social norms violations; its neural mechanism has also attracted extensive research attention. In the present studies, we applied a low-frequency repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation (rTMS) to the bilateral dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) while participants engaged in a modified Ultimatum Game (Study 1) and third-party punishment game (Study 2) to explore how the bilateral DLPFC disruption affects people's perception of violation of fairness norms and altruistic punishment decision in the gain and loss contexts. Typically, punishers intervene more often against and show more social outrage towards Dictators/Proposers who unfairly distribute losses than those who unfairly share gains. We found that disrupting the function of the left DLPFC in the second-party punishment and the bilateral DLPFC in the third-party punishment with rTMS effectively obliterated this difference, making participants punish unfairly shared gains as often as they usually would punish unfairly shared losses. In the altruistic punishment of maintaining the social fairness norms, the inhibition of the right DLPFC function will affect the deviation of individual information integration ability; the inhibition of the left DLPFC function will affect the assessment of the degree of violation of fairness norms and weaken impulse control, leading to attenuate the moderating effect of gain and loss contexts on altruistic punishment. Our findings emphasize that DLPFC is closely related to altruistic punishment and provide causal neuroscientific evidence.

Group membership and adolescents' third-party punishment: a moderated chain mediation model.

Third-party punishment (TPP) reflects people's social preference for fairness norms and is fundamental to maintaining fairness norms on a large scale. Several empirical studies have shown that the offender's group membership impacts TPP, but the detailed mechanisms have yet to be fully elucidated. The current study used the third-party punishment game task to explore the relationship between group membership, perceived unfairness, anger, and adolescents' TPP. A total of 306 teenagers aged 12 to 15 were chosen as subjects through cluster sampling. The results showed that group membership (classmate vs. stranger) and gender can affect adolescents' TPP together, which manifests as adolescents enacting significantly harsher punishments on strangers than on classmates, especially for boys. Group membership indirectly affects TPP through the mediating effects of perceived unfairness, anger and through a chain mediation of perceived unfairness and anger. Moreover, gender positively moderate the relationship between group membership and perceived unfairness. Specifically, group membership significantly affects boys' perceived unfairness, but cannot predict girls' perceived unfairness. The above results can be used to guide adolescents toward appropriate justice concepts and moral awareness, thus enhancing TPP.

The Impact of Punishment Level and Distribution Ratio on Second Party in Third-Party Punishment Game

The third-party punishment game (TPP) was popular for its enormous influence on real-life judicial problems and the current justice system. After mimicking a third-party game for each participant, the study collected data from the second party and tested the likeableness of the third party and the extent to which the second party punished or rewarded the third party. Most results were calculated by SPSS, and results showed that (i) the second party is more likely to rate a higher level of likeableness and justice for the third party for each level of punishment (ii) if the third party enforces a high level of punishment, the second party is more likely to compensate with a greater amount (iii) if the third party chooses the low level of punishment, the second party is more likely to punish. Overall, the experiment demonstrates how the second parties attitudes to third parties were influenced by the punishment level, the distribution ratio and third parties intervention intentions.

Neurocomputational Substrates Underlying the Effect of Identifiability on Third-Party Punishment.

The identifiable target effect refers to the preference for helping identified victims and punishing identifiable perpetrators compared with equivalent but unidentifiable counterparts. The identifiable target effect is often attributed to the heightened moral emotions evoked by identified targets. However, the specific neurocognitive processes that mediate and/or modulate this effect remain largely unknown. Here, we combined a third-party punishment game with brain imaging and computational modeling to unravel the neurocomputational underpinnings of the identifiable transgressor effect. Human participants (males and females) acted as bystanders and punished identified or anonymous wrongdoers. Participants were more punitive toward identified wrongdoers than anonymous wrongdoers because they took a vicarious perspective of victims and adopted lower reference points of inequity (i.e., more stringent norms) in the identified context than in the unidentified context. Accordingly, there were larger activity of the ventral anterior insula, more distinct multivariate neural patterns in the dorsal anterior insula and dorsal anterior cingulate cortex, and lower strength between ventral anterior insula and dorsolateral PFC and between dorsal anterior insula and ventral striatum connectivity in response to identified transgressors than anonymous transgressors. These findings implicate the interplay of expectancy violations, emotions, and self-interest in the identifiability effect. Last, individual differences in the identifiability effect were associated with empathic concern/social dominance orientation, activity in the precuneus/cuneus and temporo-parietal junction, and intrinsic functional connectivity of the dorsolateral PFC. Together, our work is the first to uncover the neurocomputational processes mediating identifiable transgressor effect and to characterize psychophysiological profiles modulating the effect.SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT The identifiable target effect, more help to identified victims or stronger punishment to identifiable perpetrators, is common in daily life. We examined the neurocomputational mechanisms mediating/modulating the identifiability effect on third-party punishment by bridging literature from economics and cognitive neuroscience. Our findings reveal that identifiable transgressor effect is mediated by lower reference points of inequity (i.e., more stringent norms), which might be associated with a stronger involvement of the emotion processes and a weaker engagement of the analytic/deliberate processes. Furthermore, personality traits, altered brain activity, and intrinsic functional connectivity contribute to the individual variance in the identifiability effect. Overall, our study advances the understanding of the identifiability effect by shedding light on its component processes and modulating factors.

Third-party punishers who express emotions are trusted more.

Third party punishment (TPP) is thought to be crucial to the evolution and maintenance of human cooperation. However, this type of punishment is often not rewarded, perhaps because punishers' underlying motives are unclear. We propose that the expression of moral emotions could solve this problem by advertising such motives. In each of three experiments (n = 1711), a third-party punishment game was followed by a trust game. Third parties expressed anger or disgust instead of, or in addition to, financial punishment. Results showed that third parties who expressed these emotions were trusted more than those who didn't express (Experiment 1), and more than those who financially punished (Experiment 2). Moreover, third parties who expressed while financially punishing were trusted more than those who punished without expressing (Experiment 3). Findings suggest that emotion expression might play a role in the evolution and maintenance of cooperation by facilitating TPP.

Punishment in the public goods game is evaluated negatively irrespective of non-cooperators' motivation.

The evolution of human cooperation toward strangers remains puzzling. While the punishment of non-cooperators is a possible explanation, whether punishments can help cooperation evolve depends on how people evaluate punishers. Thus, it is of vital importance to elucidate the perception of punishers. Previous studies have found that punishment is evaluated differently in different contexts; punishers are negatively and positively evaluated in the public goods game with punishment (PGG-P) and in the third-party punishment game (TPP), respectively. To disentangle the mixed evidence, our research focused on motivations for non-cooperation and examined whether different motivations for non-cooperation could explain the inconsistent findings. We hypothesized that people positively evaluate punishers when they punish those who non-cooperated to exploit others (greed), e.g., in a TPP situation. Contrastingly, people negatively evaluate punishers when they punish those who non-cooperated to avoid exploitation (fear), e.g., in a PGG-P situation. If so, in either game, punishers would be evaluated positively in situations where greed dominates, and negatively in situations where fear dominates the non-cooperation motivation. To test this, we conducted two online experiments with hypothetical scenarios in which the decision-making order was used to manipulate the motivations of non-cooperators. The results of Study 1 (N = 240) using only PGG-P and Study 2 (N = 602) using both PGG-P and TPP showed that the non-cooperation motivation did not have a significant effect on the evaluations of punishers and non-punishers. Punishers (vs non-punishers) were evaluated negatively in PGG-P and positively in TPP regardless of the decision-making order of non-cooperation. We discussed the role of higher-order information in the evaluation of punishment.

Association Between Polymorphism (5-HTTLPR) of the Serotonin Transporter Gene and Behavioral Response to Unfair Distribution.

Behavioral responses to unfair distribution have been measured mainly using the Ultimatum Game (UG). Recent studies examining the biological basis of behavioral responses to unfair distribution have focused attention on the role of the serotonin transporter gene. However, studies, to date, have been conducted on non-Asians, and it has not been confirmed whether similar results can be seen in other ethnic groups. It has also been shown that behavioral responses to unfair distribution are not only seen in the case of victims themselves but also in the case of third parties not directly affected. This study aimed to determine whether the results of the previous study would be replicated in an Asian population and whether the serotonin transporter gene would also be associated with behavior toward unfair distribution by third parties. We examined the association between polymorphisms (5-HTTLPR) of the serotonin transporter gene and participants’ behavior in the UG and the third-party punishment game (TPPG). The results did not show an association between punishment for unfair proposals in the TPPG and genetic polymorphisms, while participants with the SL/LL genotype were more likely to reject unfair offers in the UG than those with the SS genotype. These results indicate that 5-HTTLPR is associated with behavior when unfair intentions are directed at oneself.

Fairness and Altruism Among High School Students - A Global Study in Behavioral Economics

Understanding differences in economic decision-making between populations is critical in a global economy. The purpose of this study was to determine what factors affect high school students’ (the next generation of leaders) altruistic tendencies. My hypothesis was that the economic system of a student’s country would affect their degree of altruism and fairness. Specifically, students living in socialist countries would tend to act fairer and more generously in economic decision-making since the basis of socialist ideology is economic equality. This novel study of teenagers globally was conducted using three classic behavioral economics experiments (the Dictator Game, Ultimatum Game, and Third-Party Punishment Game) translated into an electronic survey including demographic questions. The anonymous surveys were distributed to teenage students in five countries with different socio-economic systems (Malawi, Taiwan, Tanzania, UAE, and USA). The analyses of the responses (n=201) supported my hypothesis. The mean altruism score of more socialist countries (18.3) was significantly higher than capitalist countries (11). Additionally, there were significant correlations between altruism and religiosity and gender. Those who reported practicing religion every day were significantly less altruistic than those that practiced religion infrequently. Data also showed that females in the study were more altruistic than males. These data indicate that country, religiosity, and gender affect perceptions of fairness and should be considerations in multi-national / multi-cultural negotiations, transactions and other interactions. A longitudinal study would further our understanding of how these differences may change as teenagers transition to adulthood and experience more economic and cross-cultural interactions.

Does unfairness sound wrong? A cross-domain investigation of expectations in music and social decision-making.

This study was interested in investigating the existence of a shared psychological mechanism for the processing of expectations across domains. The literature on music and language shows that violations of expectations produce similar neural responses and violating the expectation in one domain may influence the processing of stimuli in the other domain. Like music and language, our social world is governed by a system of inherent rules or norms, such as fairness. The study therefore aimed to draw a parallel to the social domain and investigate whether a manipulation of melodic expectation can influence the processing of higher-level expectations of fairness. Specifically, we aimed to investigate whether the presence of an unexpected melody enhances or reduces participants' sensitivity to the violations of fairness and the behavioural reactions associated with these. We embedded a manipulation of melodic expectation within a social decision-making paradigm, whereby musically expected and unexpected stimuli will be simultaneously presented with fair and unfair divisions in a third-party altruistic punishment game. Behavioural and electroencephalographic responses were recorded. Results from the pre-planned analyses show that participants are less likely to punish when melodies are more unexpected and that violations of fairness norms elicit medial frontal negativity (MFN)-life effects. Because no significant interactions between melodic expectancy and fairness of the division were found, results fail to provide evidence of a shared mechanism for the processing of expectations. Exploratory analyses show two additional effects: (i) unfair divisions elicit an early attentional component (P2), probably associated with stimulus saliency, and (ii) mid-value divisions elicit a late MFN-like component, probably reflecting stimulus ambiguity. Future studies could build on these results to further investigate the effect of the cross-domain influence of music on the processing of social stimuli on these early and late components.

The Evaluation of Second- and Third-Party Punishers

Although punishment can promote cooperative behavior, the evolution of punishment requires benefits which override the cost. One possible source of the benefit of punishing uncooperative behavior is obtaining a positive evaluation. This study compares evaluations of punishers and non-punishers. Two hundred and thirty-four undergraduate students participated in two studies. Study 1 revealed that, in the public goods game, punishers were not positively evaluated, while punishers were positively evaluated in the third-party punishment game. In Study 2, where the non-cooperator was a participant of a public goods game, we manipulated the punishers participation in the game. The results showed that punishers received no positive evaluations, regardless of their participation in the game, indicating that negative evaluation may not be a reaction toward aggression with retaliatory intentions.

Brain responses to social punishment: a meta-analysis

Many studies suggest that social punishment is beneficial for cooperation and consequently maintaining the social norms in society. Neuroimaging and brain stimulation studies show that the brain regions which respond to violations of social norms, the understanding of the mind of others and the executive functions, are involved during social punishment. Despite the rising number of studies on social punishment, the concordant map of activations - the set of key regions responsible for the general brain response to social punishment - is still unknown. By using coordinate-based fMRI meta-analysis, the present study examined the concordant map of neural activations associated with various social punishment tasks. A total of 17 articles with 18 contrasts including 383 participants, equalling 191 foci were included in activation likelihood estimation (ALE) analysis. The majority of the studies (61%) employed the widely used neuroeconomic paradigms, such as fairness-related norm tasks (Ultimatum Game, third-party punishment game), while the remaining tasks reported criminal scenarios evaluation and social rejection tasks. The analysis revealed concordant activation in the bilateral claustrum, right interior frontal and left superior frontal gyri. This study provides an integrative view on brain responses to social punishment.

The role of ventromedial prefrontal cortex and temporo-parietal junction in third-party punishment behavior

Third parties punish, sacrificing personal interests, offenders who violate either fairness or cooperation norms. This behavior is defined altruistic punishment and the degree of punishment typically increases with the severity of the norm violation. An opposite and apparently paradoxical behavior, namely anti-social punishment, is the tendency to spend own money to punish cooperative or fair behaviors. Previous fMRI studies correlated punishment behavior with increased activation of brain areas belonging to the reward system (e.g. the ventromedial prefrontal cortex, VMPFC), the mentalizing (e.g. the temporoparietal junction, TPJ) and central-executive networks. In the present study, we aimed at investigating the causal role of VMPFC and TPJ in punishment behaviors through the application of anodal transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS).Sixty healthy participants were randomly assigned to three tDCS conditions: (1) anodal tDCS over VMPFC, (2) anodal tDCS over right TPJ (rTPJ), (3) sham stimulation. At the end of the stimulation, participants played a third-party punishment game, consisting in viewing a series of fair or unfair monetary allocations between unknown proposers and recipients. Participants were asked whether and how much they would punish the proposers using their own monetary endowment. To test membership effects, proposers and recipients could be either Italian or Chinese.Anodal tDCS over VMPFC increased altruistic punishment behavior whereas anodal tDCS over rTPJ increased anti-social punishment choices compared with sham condition, while membership did not influence participant's choices. Our results support the idea that the two types of punishment behaviors rely upon different brain regions, suggesting that reward and mentalizing systems underlie, respectively, altruistic and anti-social punishment behaviors.

The development of egalitarian norm enforcement in childhood and adolescence

The equal division of goods is a long-existing social norm present in societies around the world. In order to ensure that the egalitarian norm is followed, people engage in costly enforcement of norm-violating behavior. Despite its importance, little is known about the emergence of this enforcement and how it develops over time. Therefore, we take the most commonly-used third-party punishment game where a third party is added to a dictator game, adapt it for children and run an experiment with 9–18 year-old children and adolescents. We show that already at 9–10 years of age, a small but non-negligible proportion of subjects are costly enforcing the egalitarian norm. We find that this behavior then strongly develops in the following years: The proportion of egalitarian norm enforcers increases, becoming the most common behavioral type with 11–12 years of age, and the punishers’ behavior fully develops until 13–14 years of age. Following those developmental changes, the enforcing behavior remains stable until adulthood. We find that some norm enforcers do not only punish selfish, but also generous deviations from the egalitarian norm. Looking at the dictators’ behavior, we observe that they increase their transfer in the direction of the egalitarian norm primarily in the same period as we observe developmental changes on the punishers’ side.

Behavioural Differences and Neural Substrates of Altruistic and Spiteful Punishment

Altruistic punishment following social norm violations promotes human cooperation. However, experimental evidence indicates that some forms of punishment are spiteful rather than altruistic. Using two types of punishment games and seven non-strategic games, we identified strong behavioural differences between altruistic and spiteful punishers. Altruistic punishers who rejected unfair offers in the ultimatum game and punished norm violators in the third-party punishment game behaved pro-socially in various non-strategic games. Spiteful punishers who rejected unfair offers in the ultimatum game but did not punish norm violators in the third-party punishment game behaved selfishly in non-strategic games. In addition, the left caudate nucleus was larger in spiteful punishers than in altruistic punishers. These findings are in contrast to the previous assumption that altruistic punishers derive pleasure from enforcement of fairness norms, and suggest that spiteful punishers derive pleasure from seeing the target experience negative consequences.

The psychology of deterrence explains why group membership matters for third-party punishment

Abstract Humans regularly intervene in others' conflicts as third-parties. This has been studied using the third-party punishment game: A third-party can pay a cost to punish another player (the dictator) who treated someone else poorly. Because the game is anonymous and one-shot, punishers are thought to have no strategic reasons to intervene. Nonetheless, punishers often punish dictators who treat others poorly. This result is central to a controversy over human social evolution: Did third-party punishment evolve to maintain group norms or to deter others from acting against one's interests? This paper provides a critical test. We manipulate the ingroup/outgroup composition of the players while simultaneously measuring the inferences punishers make about how the dictator would treat them personally. The group norm predictions were falsified, as outgroup defectors were punished most harshly, not ingroup defectors (as predicted by ingroup fairness norms) and not outgroup members generally (as predicted by norms of parochialism). The deterrence predictions were validated: Punishers punished the most when they inferred that they would be treated the worst by dictators, especially when better treatment would be expected given ingroup/outgroup composition.

From good institutions to generous citizens: Top-down incentives to cooperate promote subsequent prosociality but not norm enforcement

What makes people willing to pay costs to help others, and to punish others’ selfishness? Why does the extent of such behaviors vary markedly across cultures? To shed light on these questions, we explore the role of formal institutions in shaping individuals’ prosociality and punishment. In Study 1 (N=707), American participants who reported living under higher quality cooperation-enforcing institutions (police and courts) gave significantly more in a Dictator Game (DG), but did not punish significantly more in a Third-Party Punishment Game (TPPG). In Study 1R (N=1705), we replicated the positive relationship between reported institutional quality and DG giving observed in Study 1. In Study 2 (N=516), we experimentally manipulated institutional quality in a repeated Public Goods Game with a centralized punishment institution. Consistent with the correlational results of Study 1 and 1R, we found that centralized punishment led to significantly more prosociality in a subsequent DG compared to a no-punishment control, but had no significant direct effect on subsequent TPPG punishment (only an indirect effect via increased DG giving). Thus we present convergent evidence that the quality of institutions one is exposed to “spills over” to subsequent prosociality but not punishment. These findings support a theory of social heuristics, suggest boundary conditions on spillover effects of cooperation, and demonstrate the power of effective institutions for instilling habits of virtue and creating cultures of cooperation.

From Good Institutions to Good Norms: Top-Down Incentives to Cooperate Foster Prosociality But Not Norm Enforcement

What makes people willing to pay costs to help others, and to punish others’ selfishness? Why does the extent of such behaviors vary markedly across cultures? To shed light on these questions, we explore the role of formal institutions in shaping individuals’ prosociality and punishment. In Study 1 (N=707), we found that the quality of institutions enforcing cooperativeness (police and courts) that participants reported being exposed to in daily life was positively associated with Dictator Game (DG) giving, but had little relationship with punishment in a Third-Party Punishment Game (TPPG). In Study 2 (N=516), we experimentally manipulated institutional quality in a repeated Public Goods Game with a centralized punishment institution. Consistent with Study 1’s correlational results, we found that centralized punishment led to significantly more prosociality in a subsequent DG compared to a no-punishment control, but had no significant direct effect on subsequent TPPG punishment (only an indirect effect via increased DG giving). Thus we present convergent evidence that the quality of institutions one is exposed to “spills over” to subsequent prosociality but not punishment. These findings support a theory of social heuristics, suggest boundary conditions on spillover effects of cooperation, and demonstrate the power of effective institutions for instilling habits of virtue and creating cultures of cooperation.

Group Membership Modulates the Neural Circuitry Underlying Third Party Punishment.

This research aims to explore the neural correlates involved in altruistic punishment, parochial altruism and anti-social punishment, using the Third-Party Punishment (TPP) game. In particular, this study considered these punishment behaviors in in-group vs. out-group game settings, to compare how people behave with members of their own national group and with members of another national group. The results showed that participants act altruistically to protect in-group members. This study indicates that norm violation in in-group (but not in out-group) settings results in increased activity in the medial prefrontal cortex and temporo-parietal junction, brain regions involved in the mentalizing network, as the third-party attempts to understand or justify in-group members’ behavior. Finally, exploratory analysis during anti-social punishment behavior showed brain activation recruitment of the ventromedial prefrontal cortex, an area associated with altered regulation of emotions.

Third-party punishment: altruistic and anti-social behaviours in in-group and out-group settings

ABSTRACTThis study aims at exploring the decision-making process involved in third-party punishment (TPP) within an economic frame, using the TPP game. We investigated altruistic punishment, that is, the behaviour of spending one's own money, with no personal gain, to punish those who violate the norms of cooperation. We analysed this behaviour, in an in-group and out-group game setting, to compare how individuals behave with members of their own group (in-group) and with members of another group (out-group). In particular, groups were defined on a real nationality basis (Chinese or Italian). Our results showed altruistic punishment behaviour in both experimental groups and this tendency emerged as more prominent when faced with unfair play towards a member of one's own group. Furthermore, both groups exhibited a propensity for anti-social punishment behaviour: many participants spent small amounts of money to punish fair behaviour, regardless of national group membership.