Third-party Compensation Research Articles

The effect of third-party intervention on normative behavior of bystanders: An explanation of the social norm cueing effect

Third-party interventions play a crucial role in upholding social norms and have evolutionary implications for human societies. Nevertheless, research on the effects of third-party interventions, particularly third-party compensation, on bystanders' norm compliance remains scarce. We conducted two studies to explore how third-party interventions affect bystanders' adherence to social norms and the underlying mechanisms, focusing on the perception of social norms. Study 1 examined the effects of third-party interventions, presented as group summary information, on bystanders using the dictator game paradigm. The findings revealed that both third-party punishment and compensation positively affected bystanders' fairness, with norm perceptions serving as a mediating factor. Employing a similar paradigm to Study 1, Study 2 assessed the effect of third-party interventions conveyed through individual behavior information on bystanders. The results showed that the effect of third-party interventions on bystanders' fairness depended on how representative the interventions were perceived to be. We conclude that both third-party compensation and third-party punishment can encourage bystanders to conform to social norms by shaping their norm perceptions. The findings suggest a novel method for reinforcing social norms, potentially signaling a shift from retributive to restorative justice approaches.

Neural mechanisms of the mood effects on third-party responses to injustice after unfair experiences.

Behavioral decision theory argues that humans can adjust their third‐party responses (e.g., punishment and compensation) to injustice by integrating unfair experiences. Typically, the mood plays an important role in such a decision‐making process. However, the underlying neurocognitive bases remain largely unclear. We first employ a modified third‐party justice game in which an allocator split an amount of money between oneself and a receiver. The participants can reapportion the money as observers by choosing from the following three costly options: compensate the receiver, accept the current allocation, or punish the allocator. Then, a second‐party pseudo interaction is conducted where participants receive more (i.e., advantageous unfair experience) or less (i.e., disadvantageous unfair experience) than others. Finally, participants perform the third‐party justice game again after unfair experiences. Here, we use functional near‐infrared spectroscopy (fNIRS) to measure participants' brain activities during third‐party responses to injustice. We find participants compensate more to the receiver after advantageous unfair experience, which involved enhanced positive emotion, weakened sense of unfairness, and is linked with increased activity in the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (rDLPFC). In contrast, participants punish more on the allocator after disadvantageous unfair experience, which might primarily stem from their negative emotional responses, strong sense of unfairness, and is associated with significantly decreased activity in the rDLPFC. Our results suggest that third‐party compensation and punishment involved differential psychological and neural bases. Our findings highlight the crucial roles of second‐party unfair experiences and the corresponding mood responses in third‐party responses to unfairness, and unravel the intermediate neural architecture.

Reputational and cooperative benefits of third-party compensation

Although third-party punishment helps sustain group cooperation, might victim compensation provide third parties with superior reputational benefits? Across 24 studies (N = 21,296), we provide a comprehensive examination of the consequences of the choice between punishment and compensation. What do people infer from, and how do they respond to, the choice of punishment versus compensation? Across various contexts ranging from economic games, to workplace injustice, to people’s own personal experience of witnessing third-party responses in their daily lives, we find that compensating victims leads to greater reputational and partner choice benefits relative to punishing perpetrators. In fact, even people who themselves prefer to punish still prefer social partners who compensate. We also find that the signal that is sent via third-party compensating is an honest signal—people who choose to compensate rather than punish score lower on measures of trait Machiavellianism, narcissism, and psychopathy. Furthermore, we find that the personal decision of whether to compensate or punish is influenced by both injunctive and descriptive norms. These findings provide an extensive analysis of the causes and consequences of third-party responding to moral violations.

Setting the Edge: How the NCAA Can Defend Amateurism by Allowing Third-Party Compensation

Part I of this Note describes the NCAA’s formation and its contemporary model. It also discusses the antitrust and labor law challenges the NCAA has faced inlitigation over its existing approach. Part II explores the twin challenges posed by the Fair Pay to Play Act, which cannot be sufficiently addressed through a unilateral NCAA response. The first challenge is the inconsistency in state laws, which undermines any NCAA response that seeks to impose a uniform set of rules across the country. The second is that the Fair Pay to Play Act fails to address existing legal challenges to the NCAA’s amateur model. Therefore, even if the NCAA accepts a change in the status quo, it misses an opportunity to address the increasingly uncertain broader legal status of its restrictions on college athlete compensation.
 In response to these challenges, Part III contends that the NCAA should more urgently pursue a comprehensive federal legislative compromise that sacrificesrestrictions on NIL compensation in return for statutory protections from further labor and antitrust litigation. This type of federal legislation would have theadditional benefit of preempting state laws on the subject, thus maintaining a uniform system of rules. By losing the battle to win the war, the NCAA will be well positioned for continued viability in the coming decades

How Cortisol Reactivity Influences Prosocial Decision-Making: The Moderating Role of Sex and Empathic Concern.

The fight and flight theory and the tend-and-befriend theory suggest two opposite behavioral stress responses, and heterogeneous research results revealed the importance of taking sex into account. The experiment was designed to investigate the effect of stress-related cortisol reactivity on subsequent prosocial decision-making behaviors, and the moderating role of sex and empathic concern (EC) in the process. Sixty-one healthy students (34 women, 27 men) underwent the Trier Social Stress Test for Groups (TSST-G) or the control condition. Subsequently, participants completed three economic tasks—the dictator game, the ultimatum game, and the third-party compensation game. Statistical analyses revealed a significant main effect of cortisol reactivity on individuals’ third-party compensation behaviorssex. A sex-specific effect of stress-related cortisol change on prosocial behaviors was found, with men behaving more generously in the dictator game as stress-related cortisol reactivity increased. Furthermore, the level of EC was found to moderate the association between stress-related cortisol change and prosocial behaviors, that individuals with a low level of EC reported more generosity and third-party compensation behaviors. Overall, the present study contributes to a better understanding of the behavioral stress responses, that individuals whose hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal (HPA) axis are highly activated in response to stress would exhibit tend-and-befriend responses, but only among men and those with a low level of EC.

International Maritime Organisation Conventions as Incorporated under Kuwaiti Law

Abstract The International Maritime Organisation (IMO) is part of the UN entities. IMO Conventions focus on the human and technical aspects of shipping, including safety. Kuwait has ratified not only key IMO Conventions, but also other widely covered conventions in the fields of safety of life at sea, safe navigation, prevention of marine pollution, and third-party liability and compensation for maritime claims. This article is an attempt to address briefly the ratified conventions and their implementation (or effectiveness) under Kuwaiti law. Matters such as whether it is essential to incorporate new IMO Conventions and their amendments into Kuwaiti law will be considered.

Intergroup Bias Influences Third-Party Punishment and Compensation: In-group Relationships Attenuate Altruistic Punishment

Intergroup relationships can impact on a third party's willingness to punish a violator, but few researchers have explored how intergroup relationships affect third-party compensation tendencies. We recruited 163 participants to observe a dictator game, and then choose either to punish the dictator or compensate the recipient, each of whom could be from the participant's in-group or out-group. Third parties often chose not to punish in-group dictators and to compensate both in-group victims and out-group victims. When out-group members transgressed against the in-group, participants punished these out-group members just as often as they compensated the in-group recipients, although they punished out-group dictators more harshly than others overall. However, when both proposer and recipient came from the out-group, participants often did not intervene. We also found that third-party punishment and compensation were related to individual differences in participants' trait empathy and Machiavellianism. Our findings shed light on the modulating effect of intergroup relationships on third-party altruistic decisions.

Punish the Perpetrator or Compensate the Victim? Gain vs. Loss Context Modulate Third-Party Altruistic Behaviors.

Third-party punishment and third-party compensation are primary responses to observed norms violations. Previous studies mostly investigated these behaviors in gain rather than loss context, and few study made direct comparison between these two behaviors. We conducted three experiments to investigate third-party punishment and third-party compensation in the gain and loss context. Participants observed two persons playing Dictator Game to share an amount of gain or loss, and the proposer would propose unfair distribution sometimes. In Study 1A, participants should decide whether they wanted to punish proposer. In Study 1B, participants decided to compensate the recipient or to do nothing. This two experiments explored how gain and loss contexts might affect the willingness to altruistically punish a perpetrator, or to compensate a victim of unfairness. Results suggested that both third-party punishment and compensation were stronger in the loss context. Study 2 directly compare third-party punishment and third-party compensation in the both contexts, by allowing participants choosing between punishment, compensation and keeping. Participants chose compensation more often than punishment in the loss context, and chose more punishments in the gain context. Empathic concern partly explained between-context differences of altruistic compensation and punishment. Our findings provide insights on modulating effect of context on third-party altruistic decisions.

Costly third-party interventions: The role of incidental anger and attention focus in punishment of the perpetrator and compensation of the victim

Costly third-party interventions have been regarded as hallmarks of moral behavior, because they are unlikely to be motivated by self-interest. This research investigated the cognitive and emotional processes underlying two types of costly third-party interventions by manipulating incidental emotions and attention focus. In Study 1, we investigated the effect of incidental anger on third-party punishment decisions. Study 2 addressed the effect of incidental anger on third-party compensation decisions. In both studies, participants were induced to either an angry or neutral emotion and then had to wait or were distracted before engaging in third-party interventions. In Study 1, angry participants punished highly unequal distributions significantly more than those in the neutral emotion condition. In Study 2, angry participants compensated highly unfair distributions significantly less than those in a neutral emotion. In both studies, the effect of incidental anger was only significant in the wait, not the distraction condition. Study 3 again focused on third-party compensation decisions. Participants were induced to either a self-focused anger or an other-focused anger emotion, and attention focus (wait, distraction) was manipulated experimentally. Those in the other-focused anger condition compensated significantly more than participants in the self-focused anger condition. These results indicate that (self-focused) incidental anger led to antagonistic responses. Incidental anger was only associated with higher third-party compensation when it included a focus on a suffering other. For incidental emotions to bias subsequent decisions requires attentional resources.

MTM: Improving positioning and integration

MTM: Improving positioning and integration

Transvaginal hysterectomy: rationale and surgical approach.

Abdominal hysterectomy is performed in the United States at a 3:1 ratio over vaginal hysterectomy, despite evidence that vaginal hysterectomy offers advantages over abdominal hysterectomy with regard to operative time, complication rates, recovery, return to daily activities, and overall costs of treatment. In fact, the predominance of the abdominal approach may be based on factors other than clinical considerations, including resident training, use of limited or obsolete guidelines, greater third-party compensation for abdominal procedures, a presumption rather than a confirmation that pathology exists that contraindicates a vaginal approach, and misconceptions about the safety and cost of vaginal hysterectomy. A number of studies spanning several years demonstrate that the use of more systematic guidelines for selecting the route of hysterectomy results in a major shift toward the vaginal approach. Evidence also shows that transvaginal hysterectomy is both feasible and optimum for types of patients who have long been considered inappropriate candidates for the vaginal route. New instrumentation facilitates the vaginal approach and contributes to improved hemostasis and decreased operative time. Included here is a step-by-step approach to determining appropriate candidates for the vaginal approach via assessment of access, uterus size, and extent of pathology.

Nonconsequentialist decisions

AbstractAccording to a simple form of consequentialism, we should base decisions on our judgments about their consequences for achieving our goals. Our goals give us reason to endorse consequentialism as a standard of decision making. Alternative standards invariably lead to consequences that are less good in this sense. Yet some people knowingly follow decision rules that violate consequentialism. For example, they prefer harmful omissions to less harmful acts, they favor the status quo over alternatives they would otherwise judge to be belter, they provide third-party compensation on the basis of the cause of an injury rather than the benefit from the compensation, they ignore deterrent effects in decisions about punishment, and they resist coercive reforms they judge to be beneficial. I suggest that nonconsequentialist principles arise from overgeneralizing rules that are consistent with consequentialism in a limited set of cases. Commitment to such rules is detached from their original purposes. The existence of such nonconsequentialist decision biases has implications for philosophical and experimental methodology, the relation between psychology and public policy, and education.

Chilling and hastening: The influence of third-party power and interests on negotiation

This study simulated an organizational dispute to test two hypotheses derived from the strategic choice model of mediation about the influence of third-party power and interests on negotiation. The first hypothesis was that third-party compensation—the capacity to offer negotiators positive benefits—would produce a “chilling effect,” i.e., reduced concessions and greater negotiator hostility, especially when negotiators believed that the third party had a stake in the outcome of negotiation. The second hypothesis was that third-party pressure—the capacity to expunge negotiator benefits—would produce a “hastening effect,” i.e., greater concessions and cooperativeness between negotiators, especially when negotiators believed that the third party had no stake in the outcome. Both hypotheses were supported. The results suggest that negotiators sometimes use concession making as a strategy to affect the behavior of powerful third parties—either to elicit positive benefits or to avoid the loss of benefits—depending on their beliefs about what the mediator has at stake. Also, the results suggest that the strategic choice model of mediation is useful for understanding negotiator behavior as well as mediator behavior.

PRINCIPLE AND PRAGMATISM IN THE COMPENSATION DEBATE

If there is a single principle explaining the relation between tort liability and other systems of compensating the injured and disabled, its content has never been clear on either side of the Atlantic. On the American side, 50 different jurisdictions and legislatures have produced 50 different bodies of law, and, at least in theory, 50 different relations. On the British side, according to Jane Stapleton's Disease and the Compensation Debate,' the absence of such legal Balkanization has not enabled the search for principle to fare very much better. Misfortune may be handled in a variety of ways: by reimbursing loss through tort or other third-party compensation schemes; through social insurance and welfare programmes; or by leaving victims to deal with misfortune themselves through the purchase of first-party insurance, reliance on familial or charitable support, adjustment to a change of fortune, or simply by suffering. In practice we use these approaches in different combinations to deal with different kinds of misfortune. Stapleton argues that the tort and social insurance systems have drawn an unprincipled distinction between injuries and disabilities, readily providing compensation for the victims of traumatic accidents but too often leaving the victims of disease to deal with that misfortune through their own devices.

ASHP statement on third-party compensation for clinical services by pharmacists

Journal Article ASHP statement on third-party compensation for clinical services by pharmacists Get access American Journal of Hospital Pharmacy, Volume 42, Issue 7, 1 July 1985, Pages 1580–1581, https://doi.org/10.1093/ajhp/42.7.1580 Published: 01 July 1985

Financial Compensation for Evaluation and Therapy of Children With Developmental Disabilities

A developmental disability is defined as an abnormality beginning in fetal life or early childhood which precludes or significantly impedes normal physical and/or mental development. Included in this definition are mental retardation, cerebral palsy, and other neurologically handicapping conditions, deafness, speech disorders, blindness, mental illness, autism, and disorders of comprehension or effective use of language. Diagnosis and therapy of a developmental disability frequently require efforts of many disciplines (i.e., medicine, occupational and physical therapy, psychology, nursing, social service, speech pathology, and audiology). It is essential that appropriate financial compensation be provided by third-party payers for the services performed by all these disciplines. Non-physicians should receive compensation from thirdparty payers only if the diagnostic and theticapeuic measures are prescribed by a physician. The most effective care for developmentally disabled persons necessitates coordination, staffing, and follow-up efforts. Physicians must receive third-party compensation for these efforts as well as for counseling and visits to schools on behalf of these patients. Such activities are all appropriate extensoins of the physician's primary care role in the diagnosis and management of developmental disabilities in children.