Vague Theory Research Articles

Underspecification and Communication

It has recently been argued that our use of vague language poses an intractable problem for any account of content and communication on which (i) the things we assert are propositions and (ii) understanding an assertion requires recognizing which proposition the speaker asserted. John MacFarlane has argued that this problem concerning vague language is itself a species of an even more general problem for such traditional accounts—the problem posed by “felicitous” underspecification. Repurposing certain ideas from Allan Gibbard, MacFarlane offers a novel theory of vagueness, plan-expressivism, as an account that can handle both vagueness and such underspecification in communication. In this paper, I argue that despite its many virtues, plan-expressivism fails as a general account of meaning and communication. In particular, I show that when it comes to the problem of felicitous underspecification, plan-expressivism fares no better than the more traditional accounts of content and communication it is intended to replace. Along the way, I argue that the problem of felicitous underspecification puts considerable pressure on an assumption that is at the core of both plan-expressivism and the accounts of its more traditionalist rivals – namely, that in cases of successful linguistic communication, we must always be able to find something – whether a propositional content or a conversational update – that the speaker is intending to share with her audience.

Sequent Calculi for First-order ST\\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \\usepackage{amsmath} \\usepackage{wasysym} \\usepackage{amsfonts} \\usepackage{amssymb} \\usepackage{amsbsy} \\usepackage{mathrsfs} \\usepackage{upgreek} \\setlength{\\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \\begin{document}$$\ extrm{ST}$$\\end{document}

Strict-Tolerant Logic (ST\\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \\usepackage{amsmath} \\usepackage{wasysym} \\usepackage{amsfonts} \\usepackage{amssymb} \\usepackage{amsbsy} \\usepackage{mathrsfs} \\usepackage{upgreek} \\setlength{\\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \\begin{document}$$\ extrm{ST}$$\\end{document}) underpins naïve theories of truth and vagueness (respectively including a fully disquotational truth predicate and an unrestricted tolerance principle) without jettisoning any classically valid laws. The classical sequent calculus without Cut is sometimes advocated as an appropriate proof-theoretic presentation of ST\\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \\usepackage{amsmath} \\usepackage{wasysym} \\usepackage{amsfonts} \\usepackage{amssymb} \\usepackage{amsbsy} \\usepackage{mathrsfs} \\usepackage{upgreek} \\setlength{\\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \\begin{document}$$\ extrm{ST}$$\\end{document}. Unfortunately, there is only a partial correspondence between its derivability relation and the relation of local metainferential ST\\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \\usepackage{amsmath} \\usepackage{wasysym} \\usepackage{amsfonts} \\usepackage{amssymb} \\usepackage{amsbsy} \\usepackage{mathrsfs} \\usepackage{upgreek} \\setlength{\\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \\begin{document}$$\ extrm{ST}$$\\end{document}-validity – these relations coincide only upon the addition of elimination rules and only within the propositional fragment of the calculus, due to the non-invertibility of the quantifier rules. In this paper, we present two calculi for first-order ST\\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \\usepackage{amsmath} \\usepackage{wasysym} \\usepackage{amsfonts} \\usepackage{amssymb} \\usepackage{amsbsy} \\usepackage{mathrsfs} \\usepackage{upgreek} \\setlength{\\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \\begin{document}$$\ extrm{ST}$$\\end{document} with an eye to recapturing this correspondence in full. The first calculus is close in spirit to the Epsilon calculus. The other calculus includes rules for the discharge of sequent-assumptions; moreover, it is normalisable and admits interpolation.

Collaboration of Vague Theory and Mathematical Techniques for Optimizing Healthcare by Recommending Optimal Blockchain Supplier

The Internet of Medical Things (IoMTs) has the potential to revolutionize healthcare delivery by connecting medical devices and applications to healthcare IT systems via the internet. This connectivity enables the collection, transmission, and analysis of patient data, facilitating remote healthcare delivery and enhancing patient outcomes. However, the security and privacy of the data transmitted and stored within IoMT systems remain critical concerns. Blockchain technology offers a promising solution to address these challenges in IoMTs applications. Blockchain provides a decentralized and immutable ledger where transactions, in this case, patient data, are securely recorded and cannot be altered retroactively. This ensures the integrity and confidentiality of sensitive medical information while eliminating the need for a central authority to manage data exchange. This study proposes a comprehensive fuzzy decision-making framework for selecting the best blockchain provider in the IoMT field. The framework comprises two main steps: Determining the relative importance weights of the criteria utilizing the Stepwise Weight Assessment Ratio Analysis (SWARA) method. Determining the most suitable supplier for blockchain services providers employing the Ranking Alternatives with the Fuzzy ROOT Assessment Method (RAM) technique. A comparison between Fuzzy Multi-Criteria Decision-Making (MCDM) methods is employed to ensure the robustness and validity of the proposed framework.

On the importance of being clear about the level of analysis of interest: An illustration using the case of self-compassion.

Theories about within-person (WP) variation are often tested using between-person (BP) research, despite the well-established fact that results may not generalize across levels of analysis. One possible explanation is vague theories that do not specify which level of analysis is of interest. We illustrate such a case using the construct of self-compassion. The factor structure at the BP level has been highly debated, although the theory is actually concerned with relationships at the WP level. Multilevel confirmatory factor analysis was applied to experience-sampling data of self-compassion (N = 213, with n = 4052 measurement occasions). At both levels of analysis, evidence for a two-factor model was found. However, the factors were moderately related at the WP level (r = 0.37, p < 0.001) but largely independent at the BP level (r = 0.04, p = 0.696). Exploratory analyses revealed considerable heterogeneity in the WP relationship among individuals. We discuss how our results provide new impulses to move the debate around self-compassion forward. Lastly, we outline how the WP level-which is of major interest for self-compassion and other constructs in psychology-can guide the conceptualization and assessment to promote advancements of the theory and resulting applications.

A Pragmatic Analysis of Hedges in English Economic News: Taking the Financial Times as an Example

Since Professor L. A. Zadeh put forward the vagueness theory in 1965, a growing number of scholars have used it as a theoretical basis for preliminary discussions on the fuzzy phenomenon in many fields. However, there are not many studies on the analysis of the fuzzy phenomenon in news, especially the study of hedges in English economic news is yet to be enriched. Economic news plays an important role in people's daily lives. Economic news requires accuracy, objectivity, and conciseness, as well as acceptability and politeness. It seems to imply that hedges cannot exist in English economic news. However, the use of hedges in economic news can precisely achieve these purposes. To prove that there are a large number of hedges in economic news and that hedges play an important role in strengthening the credibility of news, avoiding giving details, achieving politeness, and enhancing self-protection, I take the news from the Financial Times as the source and explores the pragmatic function of hedges in English economic news and its specific application by combining the classification of hedges from the perspective of pragmatics, namely, strengthening the credibility, avoiding giving details, enhancing self-protecting and achieving politeness. By analyzing these results, the author hopes to contribute to the further development of economic news theory in English and also to help readers better grasp the essentials of economic news writing.

Defining Definiteness

Epistemicism associates vagueness with ignorance produced by semantic plasticity: the shiftiness of intensions in our language resulting from small changes in usage. The recent literature (Caie 2012; Magidor 2018; Yli-Vakkuri 2016) points to a missing piece in the epistemicist theory of vagueness, namely a clear account of the semantics of the definiteness operator Δ. The fundamentals of the epistemicist theory are well understood. However, the technical work of defining the definiteness operator has proven difficult. There are several desiderata that we would like Δ to satisfy. For instance, we would like the epistemicist notion of ‘definiteness’ to interact well with modal operators and validate intuitive principles like ‘necessarily, if φ is definitely true, then φ is true’. Providing an account that would meet all such desiderata has eluded the epistemicists so far. In this paper, I present a novel version of a multidimensional model inspired by the work of Robert Stalnaker and David Kaplan. Using this model, I provide an account of epistemicist definiteness that meets our desiderata.

Logical Constants and the Sorites Paradox

Logical form is thought to be discovered by keeping fixed the logical constants and allowing the non-logical content in the sentence to vary. The problem of logical constants is the problem of defining what counts as a logical constant. In this paper, I will argue that the concept ’logical constant’ is vague. I demonstrate the vagueness of logical constancy by providing a sorites argument, thereby showing the sorites-susceptibility of the concept. Many prior papers in the literature on logical constants hint at this vagueness, but do not explore how theories of vagueness apply to logical constants. In the second half of this paper, I do just this. I consider approaches to logical constants that resemble nihilism about vagueness and more recent theories that relativize truth to precisifications. Finally, I argue that approaches that accept the potential indeterminate status of putative logical constants are preferable to nihilism or relativism about logical constancy.

Peirce on Vagueness and Common Sense

Abstract: "Issues of Pragmaticism" (1905) contains the only published version of Peirce's doctrine of "critical common-sensism." One of the claims of that doctrine is that common sense beliefs are invariably vague. In this paper, we seek to explain this claim. We begin by providing a philological reconstruction of the drafts of "Issues of Pragmaticism" and a comparison of Peirce's several, successive expositions of critical common-sensism across those drafts. Then we examine Peirce's theory of vagueness; we show that there is both a "subjectal" and a "predicative" variety of vagueness, and that Peirce construes predicative vagueness according to three distinct models. Finally, we assess in what sense, i.e., according to which of the three models, common sense beliefs may be said to be invariably vague.

Peirce on Vagueness and Common Sense

Abstract: "Issues of Pragmaticism" (1905) contains the only published version of Peirce's doctrine of "critical common-sensism." One of the claims of that doctrine is that common sense beliefs are invariably vague. In this paper, we seek to explain this claim. We begin by providing a philological reconstruction of the drafts of "Issues of Pragmaticism" and a comparison of Peirce's several, successive expositions of critical common-sensism across those drafts. Then we examine Peirce's theory of vagueness; we show that there is both a "subjectal" and a "predicative" variety of vagueness, and that Peirce construes predicative vagueness according to three distinct models. Finally, we assess in what sense, i.e., according to which of the three models, common sense beliefs may be said to be invariably vague.

The End of Vagueness: Technological Epistemicism, Surveillance Capitalism, and Explainable Artificial Intelligence

Artificial Intelligence (AI) pervades humanity in 2022, and it is notoriously difficult to understand how certain aspects of it work. There is a movement—Explainable Artificial Intelligence (XAI)—to develop new methods for explaining the behaviours of AI systems. We aim to highlight one important philosophical significance of XAI—it has a role to play in the elimination of vagueness. To show this, consider that the use of AI in what has been labeled surveillance capitalism has resulted in humans quickly gaining the capability to identify and classify most of the occasions in which languages are used. We show that the knowability of this information is incompatible with what a certain theory of vagueness—epistemicism—says about vagueness. We argue that one way the epistemicist could respond to this threat is to claim that this process brought about the end of vagueness. However, we suggest an alternative interpretation, namely that epistemicism is false, but there is a weaker doctrine we dub technological epistemicism, which is the view that vagueness is due to ignorance of linguistic usage, but the ignorance can be overcome. The idea is that knowing more of the relevant data and how to process it enables us to know the semantic values of our words and sentences with higher confidence and precision. Finally, we argue that humans are probably not going to believe what future AI algorithms tell us about the sharp boundaries of our vague words unless the AI involved can be explained in terms understandable by humans. That is, if people are going to accept that AI can tell them about the sharp boundaries of the meanings of their words, then it is going to have to be XAI.

Using Crisis Theory in Dealing With Severe Mental Illness-A Step Toward Normalization?

The perception of mental distress varies with time and culture, e.g., concerning its origin as either social or medical. This may be one reason for the moderate reliability of descriptive psychiatric diagnoses. Additionally, the mechanisms of action of most psychiatric treatments and psychotherapeutic interventions are generally unknown. Thus, these treatments have to be labeled as mostly unspecific even if they help in coping with mental distress. The psychiatric concept of mental disorders therefore has inherent limitations of precision and comprises rather fuzzy boundaries. Against this background, many people question the current process of diagnosing and categorizing mental illnesses. However, many scholars reject new approaches discussed in this context. They rather hold on to traditional diagnostic categories which therefore still play a central role in mental health practice and research and. In order to better understand the adherence to traditional psychiatric concepts, we take a closer look at one of the most widely adopted traditional concepts – the Stress-Vulnerability Model. This model has originally been introduced to tackle some problems of biological psychiatry. However, it has been misapplied with the result of drawing attention preferentially to biological vulnerability instead of a wider array of vulnerability factors including social adversity. Thus, in its current use, the Stress-Vulnerability Model provides only a vague theory for understanding mental phenomena. Therefore, we discuss the advantages and allegedly limited applicability of Crisis Theory as an alternative heuristic model for understanding the nature and development of mental distress. We outline the problems of this theory especially in applying it to severe mental disorders. We finally argue that an understanding of Crisis Theory supported by a systemic approach can be applied to most types of severe psychological disturbances implying that such an understanding may prevent or manage some negative aspects of the psychiatrization of psychosocial problems.

BOOK REVIEW: SALLES, S. Vagueness as Arbitrariness, (Springer, 2021, 206 Pages).

The present paper is a review of Salles’ book Vagueness as Arbitrariness. In the first part I present a summary of each chapter. Chapters 1 to 3 are presented only cursorily. Basically, they offer some preliminary remarks about the problem of vagueness and defend several criteria for evaluating the adequacy of the solutions. Chapters 4 and 5 are discussed in more detail. Chapter 4, because it presents the author’s criticism of the most important theories of vagueness, and Chapter 5, because it presents his own original theory. In the second part, I discuss some plausible shortcomings of the proposed theory.

Making a vague difference: Kagan, Nefsky and the Sorites Paradox

ABSTRACT In collective harm cases, bad consequences follow if enough people act in a certain way even though no such individual act makes a difference for the worse. Global warming, overfishing and Derek Parfit’s famous case of the harmless torturers are some examples of such harm. Shelly Kagan argues that there is a threshold such that one single act might trigger harm in all collective harm cases. Julia Nefsky points to serious shortcomings in Kagan’s argument, but does not show that his conclusion is incorrect. I argue that our best theories of vagueness (the epistemic view of vagueness, three-valued logic, and supervaluationism) entail that there is a threshold in all collective harm cases. However, my analysis points to another problem with Kagan’s argument: the thresholds are not necessarily perceptible. Given the assumption that only perceptible differences matter morally, passing such a threshold does not necessarily trigger morally relevant harm, pace Kagan. Last, I consider two variants of Kagan’s argument and find both problematic. One controversially assumes that observational relations like ‘cannot perceive the difference between’ are transitive. The other problematically assumes that so called triangulation always is possible.

A novel logarithmic operational law and aggregation operators for trapezoidal neutrosophic number with MCGDM skill to determine most harmful virus.

In the current era, the theory of vagueness and multi-criteria group decision making (MCGDM) techniques are extensively applied by the researchers in disjunctive fields like recruitment policies, financial investment, design of the complex circuit, clinical diagnosis of disease, material management, etc. Recently, trapezoidal neutrosophic number (TNN) draws a major awareness to the researchers as it plays an essential role to grab the vagueness and uncertainty of daily life problems. In this article, we have focused, derived and established new logarithmic operational laws of trapezoidal neutrosophic number (TNN) where the logarithmic base μ is a positive real number. Here, logarithmic trapezoidal neutrosophic weighted arithmetic aggregation (Larm) operator and logarithmic trapezoidal neutrosophic weighted geometric aggregation (Lgeo) operator have been introduced using the logarithmic operational law. Furthermore, a new MCGDM approach is being demonstrated with the help of logarithmic operational law and aggregation operators, which has been successfully deployed to solve numerical problems. We have shown the stability and reliability of the proposed technique through sensitivity analysis. Finally, a comparative analysis has been presented to legitimize the rationality and efficiency of our proposed technique with the existing methods.

Vagueness and social ontology: Implications of inquiry resistant borderline cases for social ontological theorising

AbstractThe aim of this paper is to introduce the philosophical concept of vagueness and use it to critique the explanatory scope of social ontology as developed by the Cambridge Social Ontology Group (CSOG), and scholars sympathetic to it. Specifically, we will refer to one of its core theories, the theory of social positioning, to formulate our critique. This theory proposes that human beings and artefacts occupy social positions within emerging social totalities by virtue of receiving community accepted, interdependent, rights and obligations. Vagueness, here, is to be understood as a matter of indeterminacy in borderline cases that pose non‐trivial limitations to social positioning. By this we mean to say that there are instances in social ontological theorising that exclude themselves from proper inquiry due to vague terms found in natural languages. As a consequence of these vague terms, theories in social ontology formulated in such languages face limitations when striving for precisification and accuracy of theories. We further argue that these limitations cannot be overcome, but introduce four theories, namely supervaluationsim, epistemicism, truth degree theories and contextualism, which will allow interested readers to understand why these limitations are present. Finally, we consider the controversial theory of ontic vagueness and outline the implications for social ontology.

On Some Applications of h-generated Fuzzy Implications

In this paper we apply the h-generated fuzzy implications to prove a number of results which are of fundamental importance to the theory of fuzzy and vague functional and multivalued dependencies defined on given scheme. Our research is motivated by the fact that some analogous results already hold true for the families of f- and g-generated fuzzy implications, and the fact that these three collections of implications share many similar mutual properties. While some of the aforementioned implications are introduced in order to be applied in approximate reasoning, the results derived in this paper represent the main tool in the process of automation and are also used to complement the resolution principle. More precisely, the main result of this research states that the fact that some fuzzy (vague) relation instance r, |r| = 2, satisfies some fuzzy (vague) functional or fuzzy (vague) multivalued dependency c /∈ C (under assumption that r satisfies some set C of fuzzy (vague) functional and fuzzy (vague) multivalued dependencies), yields that the fuzzy formula attached to c is valid whenever all of the fuzzy formulas attached to the elements of C are valid. What is more important is that the opposite claim is also proven. Its importance stems from the fact that the verification by hand, which means purely theoretical verification, that C implies c is not required anymore. Now, in order to prove that some C yields some c, it is enough to make the use of the resolution principle, and automatically verify whether or not the set of the attached fuzzy formulas yields the fuzzy formula attached to c. In the case of affirmative answer, the desired dependency follows. The research conducted in this paper represent a natural generalization of our previous research since it includes and considers both, fuzzy and vague theories.

PRAGMATISM AND VAGUENESS: THE VENETIAN LECTURES BY CLAUDINE TIERCELIN (EDITED BY GIOVANNI TUZET)

Reviewed by: Pragmatism and Vagueness: The Venetian Lectures; Edited by Giovanni Tuzet by Claudine Tiercelin David W. Agler Claudine Tiercelin Pragmatism and Vagueness: The Venetian Lectures; Edited by Giovanni Tuzet Mimesis International, 2019, 84 pages, no index. Take a hypothetical sequence of human beings ordered by height from tallest to shortest. Make sure there is no more than a difference of a millimeter between each person and make sure the tallest person is clearly tall and the shortest person is clearly not tall. Now consider the following argument: P1 A person of height n is tall (where n is some arbitrarily large value); P2 For any height n, if n is tall, then n–1mm is tall (if you think a millimeter makes a difference as to whether someone is tall or not, then use a smaller unit of measurement); C Therefore, a person of height n = 1mm is tall. P1 and P2 are intuitively true, C is intuitively false, yet the argument is deductively valid (the conclusion follows by repeated uses of universal elimination and modus ponens). Rejecting P1 seemingly commits one to saying very tall people are not tall (which is absurd) while rejecting P2 seemingly commits one to saying that the predicate "is tall" picks out some precise height n such that an individual of height n is tall while an individual one millimeter shorter is not tall (also absurd). This is the sorites paradox. The paradox is thought to emerge because of the vagueness of predicates like "is tall" and given the ubiquity of vague terms in some of our best theories, vagueness poses a threat to logic and metaphysics. Tiercelin's book analyzes vagueness from a pragmatic perspective. More precisely, this book explains why pragmatists (particularly of the Peircean stripe) ought to take vagueness as a perfection of language, rather than defect, and why taking such a stance requires a commitment to ontological vagueness (vagueness in the world). The book is divided into three lectures corresponding to talks delivered by Tiercelin on 7–9 March 2018 at Ca' Foscari University in Venice. In what follows, I give the reader a sense of each of these lectures and then conclude with a brief critical assessment. Lecture 1 concerns three topics: (i) the unity of pragmatism, (ii) that pragmatists ought to reject the reduction of the vague to the precise, and (iii) that vagueness is a perfection of language since the world itself is vague. Concerning (i), Tiercelin argues that while commentators [End Page 458] have stressed the differences between pragmatists (e.g. James's nominalism vs. Peirce's realism), these differences are overblown. For Tiercelin, there is a common core of positions held by classical pragmatists and many of the commonly cited differences between said pragmatists are illusory. Rather than being divided, pragmatists are united in their commitment to the need for general rules, a non-reductive and non-passive form of empiricism, a stress on the role of practice and action, and a commitment to fallibilism (pp.20–23). With respect to (ii), Tiercelin takes one of the central features of pragmatism to be its opposition to nominalism construed as reductionism (p.15). For Tiercelin, the impetus to reduce is largely due to a lack of attention to some real feature in language, ontology, or knowledge. Anti-reductionists are thus realists insofar as they attend to some reality that has been ignored. Regarding the reduction of the vague to the precise, pragmatists are thus said to be realists about vagueness as they attend to the real features of the world that are vague. Consequently, they ought to reject the view that at least some vague terms can be reduced to precise terms. With respect to (iii), Tiercelin contends that since the source of vagueness is ontological, vagueness in language is a representational perfection of language. This claim is distinctive since vagueness is usually regarded as a defect of some sort. Take the epistemic theory of vagueness (e.g. Williamson 1994). This theory contends that vagueness is due to an epistemic deficiency: we fail to know the precise cut-off of vague terms. With respect to the sorites paradox, the major/quantified...

Topological Models of Columnar Vagueness

This paper intends to further the understanding of the formal properties of (higher-order) vagueness by connecting theories of (higher-order) vagueness with more recent work in topology. First, we provide a “translation” of Bobzien’s account of columnar higher-order vagueness into the logic of topological spaces. Since columnar vagueness is an essential ingredient of her solution to the Sorites paradox, a central problem of any theory of vagueness comes into contact with the modern mathematical theory of topology. Second, Rumfitt’s recent topological reconstruction of Sainsbury’s theory of prototypically defined concepts is shown to lead to the same class of spaces that characterize Bobzien’s account of columnar vagueness, namely, weakly scattered spaces. Rumfitt calls these spaces polar spaces. They turn out to be closely related to Gardenfors’ conceptual spaces, which have come to play an ever more important role in cognitive science and related disciplines. Finally, Williamson’s “logic of clarity” is explicated in terms of a generalized topology (“locology”) that can be considered an alternative to standard topology. Arguably, locology has some conceptual advantages over topology with respect to the conceptualization of a boundary and a borderline. Moreover, in Williamson’s logic of clarity, vague concepts with respect to a notion of a locologically inspired notion of a “slim boundary” are (stably) columnar. Thus, Williamson’s logic of clarity also exhibits a certain affinity for columnar vagueness. In sum, a topological perspective is useful for a conceptual elucidation and unification of central aspects of a variety of contemporary accounts of vagueness.

Closed without boundaries

The paper critically discusses two prominent arguments against closure principles for knowledge. The first one is the “argument from aggregation”, claiming that closure under conjunction has the consequence that, if one individually knows i premises, one also knows their i-fold conjunction—yet, every one of the premises might exhibit interesting positive epistemic properties while the i-fold conjunction might fail to do so. The second one is the “argument from concatenation”, claiming that closure under entailment has the consequence that, if one knows a premise, one also knows each of its remote consequences one arrives at—yet, again, the premise might exhibit interesting positive epistemic properties while some of its remote consequences might fail to do so. The paper firstly observes that the ways in which these two arguments try to establish that the relevant closure principle has the relevant problematic consequence are strikingly similar. They both crucially involve showing that, given the features of the case, the relevant closure principle acts in effect as a soritical principle, which is in turn assumed to lead validly to the relevant problematic consequence. There are however nontransitive logics of vagueness (“tolerant logics”, developed elsewhere by the author) where soritical principles do not have any problematic consequence. Assuming that one of these logics is the correct logic of vagueness, the paper secondly observes that both arguments describe situations where knowledge is arguably vague in the relevant respects, so that a tolerant logic should be used in reasoning about it, with the effect that the relevant soritical principle no longer validly leads to the relevant problematic consequence. This shows an interesting respect in which the gap between validity and good inference that arguably arises in a transitive framework can be bridged in a tolerant one, thereby approximating better certain features of our epistemic lives as finite subjects. Moreover, even for those who do not subscribe to tolerant logics, the paper’s two observations jointly indicate that, for all the arguments from aggregation and concatenation show, the status of the relevant closure principles should be no worse than that assigned by one’s favoured theory of vagueness to soritical principles, which only rarely is plain falsity and can indeed get arbitrarily close to full truth.

Indeterminacy as Indecision, Lecture I: Vagueness and Communication

I can say that a building is tall and you can understand me, even if neither of us has any clear idea exactly how tall a building must be in order to count as tall. This mundane fact poses a problem for the view that successful communication consists in the hearer’s recognition of the proposition a speaker intends to assert. The problem cannot be solved by the epistemicist’s usual appeal to anti-individualism, because the extensions of vague words like ‘tall’ are contextually fluid and can be constrained significantly by speakers’ intentions. The problem can be seen as a special case of a more general problem concerning what King has called “felicitous underspecification.” Traditional theories of vagueness offer nothing that can help with this problem. Appeals to diagonalization do not help either. A more radical solution is needed.