Theory Of Practical Rationality Research Articles

When what routinely happens conflicts with what ought to be done: a scenario-based assessment of secondary mathematics teachers’ decisions

ABSTRACT This study analyses an online scenario-based instrument in which secondary mathematics teachers from across the United States were presented with episodes of mathematics instruction and then asked to make a decision at a critical juncture. The theory of practical rationality suggests that the decisions of mathematics teachers can be understood as the enactment of norms, (i.e., the expected actions in the classroom) or the response to professional obligations. Our scenarios explore this theory by providing teachers with the opportunity to breach the norms of instruction and to provide a justification for their choice. We present an analysis of responses from 360 secondary mathematics teachers that provides evidence of the use of professional obligations to justify breaches of norms of instruction in geometry and algebra classrooms. Further, we show how these teachers’ willingness to take a non-normative action varies with the nature of the norm and the professional obligation at stake.

On self-governance over time

ABSTRACT In Planning, Time, and Self-Governanace, Bratman argues that the notion of self-governance plays an important role in grounding the rational principles such as means-ends coherence in the synchronic case, and principles of stability and coherence through time in the case of self-governance over time. In this paper, I grant Bratman’s claim for the synchronic case, however I argue that it is not clear that one can extend the reasoning to the diachronic case. More specifically, I raise a number of doubts about whether any notion of diachronic self-governance can play the role in the theory of practical rationality that Bratman assigns to it.

Anti-metaphysical foundation of contemporary theory of natural law: Theory of law and practical rationality in works of John Mitchel Finnis

The contemporary natural law theory was grounded in the philosophical and the jurisprudential work of Australian legal and moral philosopher John Mitchell Finnis. He reaffirmed the natural law and also corrected some of false notions about it which were dominant through the history of legal philosophy. Finnis moral and legal philosophy could be understood by the specific theoretical figure - moral argument for law. This theoretical concept implies unity of two mutually connected moments which are necessary for a philosophical treatment of any socially relevant phenomena: methodological and epistemological as well as practical. The meeting point of these two philosophically relevant dimensions is theory of practical rationality exposed in the philosophy of John Mitchell Finnis. By grounding his concept of natural law on the theory of practical rationality, John Finnis historically contextualize it. He made some sort of specific anti metaphysical concept of natural law theory that is alternative to the classical natural law as well as to the legal positivism, which mainly exposed in the legal theories of Hans Kelsen and H.L.A Hart.

Minimalism about Intention: A Modest Defense

Intentions have recently played a starring role in theories of practical rationality. Michael Bratman’s Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999) brought to everyone’s attention the importance of plans, general intentions, etc. in the life of a rational agent and argued for various requirements governing intentions, especially future-directed intentions. At the same time, there has been a general tendency to formulate more traditional principles of practical rationality in terms of intentions. Intentions, but not actions, seem to be under the rational control of the agent.In ‘Minimalism about Intention’, I first explain and motivate a general deflationist view of intention I call ‘minimalism’ about intentions. Minimalism contrasts with more robust views of intention, and in particular views that imply the existence of intention specific rational requirements; that is, rational requirements governing intentions that are not simple consequences of rational requirements on actions. I then distinguish four different types of putative rational requirements that are incompatible with minimalism. I argue that three of these requirement are supposed to be based on what I call ‘internal’ grounds. I then argue that these grounds are incapable of justifying any kind of rational requirement that is incompatible with minimalism. Detailed examination of the fourth type of putative requirement is left for another occasion, as it is supposed to be based on an entire different kind of justification (what I call ‘external’ grounds); however, I briefly sketch some reasons to be skeptical that this kind of justification would succeed. In sum, this paper tries to show that minimalism about intention turns out to be a rather plausible and compelling view.

The Interplay of Intention and Reason

In a series of essays David Gauthier develops a two-tier pragmatic theory of practical rationality and argues, within that theory, for a distinctive account of the rationality of following through with prior assurances or threats. His discussion suggests that certain kinds of temporally extended agency play a special role in one’s temporally extended life going well. I argue that a related idea about diachronic self-governance puts us in a position to explain a sense in which an accepted deliberative standard can be self-reinforcing. And this gives us resources to adjust Gauthier’s theory in response to a basic challenge.

How Should I Be? A Defense of Platonic Rational Egoism

There has been a long tradition of interpreting Plato as a rational egoist. Over the past few decades, however, some scholars have challenged this reading. While Rational Egoism appeals to many ordinary folk, in sophisticated philosophical circles it has fallen out of favor as a general and complete account of the nature of reasons for action. I argue that while the theory of practical rationality that is often equated with rational egoism—a view that I call ‘Simple-Minded Rational Egoism'—is neither plausible nor endorsed by Plato in his Republic, there is a more complex version of Rational Egoism to which Plato is indeed committed. Moreover, such a conception of practical rationality is not vulnerable to the standard set of objections that contemporary philosophers have made against Rational Egoism.

Review Article

Joseph Raz's new book, Between Authority and Interpretation, collects his most important papers in the philosophy of law and the theory of practical rationality from the mid-1990s to the mid-2000s. In these papers, Raz not only advances earlier theses but also breaks new ground in a number of areas. I focus on three of Raz's topics here: theories of law, separability and necessity, and the normativity of law. While I am generally sympathetic to Raz's thinking on these topics, I raise some room for doubt – especially with regard to his pessimism about finding a uniquely best theory of law and the relationship between law and morality.

Philippa Foot's Theory of Natural Goodness

Philippa Foot's book, Natural Goodness, involves a large project including a theory of natural goodness, a theory of the virtues, and a theory of practical rationality. Natural goodness is the foundation for the rest and is used to support a more or less traditional list of the virtues and a theory of reasons for action. Though Foot's doctrine of natural goodness may provide an account of some sort of goodness, I argue that it is not adequate as a foundation for practical rationality or as a defense of more or less traditional virtues.

Practical Rationality in Social Science Explanation

Terrence Kelly argues for a theory of practical rationality to explain and handle the issue of residential segregation in the United States. Kelly claims that theories of “racism as irrational” and rational choice are not explanatorily adequate in this regard. I argue that the theory of practical rationality is also not adequate because by allowing agents to offer accounts of their calculated behaviour, it allows little appraisal of the behaviour itself. I argue instead that better explanations could be offered by appeal to ethical theory.

Audi on Substantive vs Instrumental Rationality

The Architecture of Reason aims to develop a unified theory of theoretical and practical rationality along (moderate) foundationalist lines. The structure of practical reason, Audi argues, is closely parallel to that of theoretical reason: just as rationality of inferential beliefs ultimately rests on rationality of basic beliefs, so too rationality of instrumental and of corresponding actions ultimately rests on rationality of intrinsic desires. Intrinsic are (defeasibly) rational if they are well-grounded in certain objectively valuable features of experience, much as basic beliefs are (defeasibly) justified, and thus rational, if they are well-grounded in certain perceptual or intuitive features of experience. Though Audi's theory of prac tical rationality does not strictly require axiological experientialism (the view that only states of experience have intrinsic value), in point of fact it is the experientially grounded rationality of intrinsic desire that chiefly con cerns [him] in accounting for foundations of practical (100). This normative sort of foundationalism, Audi holds, is to be distinguished from merely motivational foundationalism; latter is compatible with certain instrumental accounts of rationality which view intrinsic as ultimate motivational states capable, via appropriate beliefs, of conferring rationality on actions they motivate without themselves being properly regarded as rational (though they may be regarded as natural). The normative founda tionalism that Audi proposes to defend in opposition to instrumentalism about practical reason holds not only that rational action must ultimately be well-grounded in rational intrinsic desires, but that there are substantive cri teria for rationality of intrinsic desires (81).l My aim in this discussion note is to raise some concerns about Audi's claim to have established a nor matively and substantively foundational alternative to instrumentalism, and thus to have provided a unified foundational account of rationality. In closing,

Practical rationality for pluralists about the good

I argue that if a normative theory of practical rationality is to represent an adequate and coherent response to a plurality of incommensurable goods, it cannot be a maximising theory. It will have to be a theory that recognises two responses to goods as morally licit – promotion and respect – and one as morally illicit – violation. This result has a number of interesting corollaries, some of which I indicate. Perhaps the most interesting is that it makes the existence of a plurality of incommensurable goods incompatible with consequentialism.

Apie plonąjį praktinį racionalumą ir jo pastorinimus

Straipsnyje supažindinama su sprendimų teorijos eksplikuojama formaliojo racionalumo samprata, aptariamos jos modifikacijos, kurias ši samprata patiria, kai sprendimų teorija savo reikmėms naudojasi socialiniai mokslininkai ir filosofai. Šių modifikacijų rezultatas vadinamas „storąja“, „standžiąja“, „tankiąja“ arba „plačiąja“ racionalumo samprata. Sprendimų teorija yra veiksmų racionalaus pasirinkimo teorija. Racionaliu čia vadinamas pasirinkimas veiksmo, kuris maksimizuoja veikėjo laukiamą naudą. Straipsnyje taip pat parodoma, kuo skiriasi tos formaliosios racionalumo teorijos „storinimo“ strategijos, kuriomis naudojasi socialiniai mokslininkai, nuo tų, kurias taiko filosofai. Apžvelgiamos konceptualios sąsajos tarp formaliosios praktinio racionalumo sampratos ir tos, kuri tradiciškai yra praktinės filosofijos (etikos) dėmesio centre (ji straipsnyje vadinama absoliučiojo praktinio racionalumo vardu). Straipsnyje pristatoma „santykinio praktinio racionalumo“ vardu pavadinta praktinio racionalumo samprata, kurios kontūrai paskutiniaisiais dešimtmečiais ryškėja analitinėje veiklos bei socialinėje filosofijoje.

Rational preference: Decision theory as a theory of practical rationality

In general, the technical apparatus of decision theory is well developed. It has loads of theorems, and they can be proved from axioms. Many of the theorems are interesting, and useful both from a philosophical and a practical perspective. But decision theory does not have a well agreed upon interpretation. Its technical terms, in particular, ‘utility’ and ‘preference’ do not have a single clear and uncontroversial meaning. How to interpret these terms depends, of course, on what purposes in pursuit of which one wants to put decision theory to use. One might want to use it as a model of economic decision-making, in order to predict the behavior of corporations or of the stock market. In that case, it might be useful to interpret the technical term ‘utility’ as meaning money profit. Decision theory would then be an empirical theory. I want to look into the question of what ‘utility’ could mean, if we want decision theory to function as a theory of practical rationality. I want to know whether it makes good sense to think of practical rationality as fully or even partly accounted for by decision theory. I shall lay my cards on the table: I hope it does make good sense to think of it that way. For, I think, if Humeans are right about practical rationality, then decision theory must play a very large part in their account. And I think Humeanism has very strong attractions.

Collective ldentities and Citizenship

Abstract In the following I try to show that there is an attractive notion of citizenship which is independent of any kind of collective identity. Citizenship is understood as one form of social interaction. It is argued that in order to understand social interaction adequately, it is necessary to introduce a structural theory of practical rationality, to the extent this conception of citizenship is based on the theory of structural rationality.

Justice and Aristotelian Practical Reason

Whose Justice? Which Rationality? maintains that the central questions of moral and political philosophy can be settled only from the standpoint of a philosophical tradition. The truths about justice are those that accord with a successful tradition, one that can solve all the problems raised by its external and internal critics and explain the plausibility and mistakes of its rivals. Professor MacIntyre supports this claim by arguing that there is no tradition-neutral conception of practical rationality that can be used to settle disputes about justice. Through an examination of four philosophical traditions, he argues that the conception of justice of each is linked to its own theory of practical rationality. Although MacIntyre's historical brand of holism may turn out to be correct, I do not think that his arguments are sufficient to support it. As MacIntyre's own practice reveals, an Aristotelian conception of practical reason can support more than an Aristotelian conception of justice. In pursuing this criticism I shall take Aristotelian justice and practical reason to be as MacIntyre describes them. Aristotelian justice focuses on treating people as they deserve to be treated, desert being determined by the extent to which people achieve excellence across a range of activities, many of which are tied to social roles. These activities and their virtues are hierarchically ordered by a shared conception of the best life, one that if expressed in a constitution would define the best polis. There are three aspects to Aristotelian practical reason-a dialectical apprehension of the ends that constitute the best life, a determination of more specific goods based on an understanding of the best life supplemented by experience in the complexities of human life, and an ability to perceive situations in which these goods can be achieved. Correct exercise of practical reason arises through the kind of social education that allows one to acquire virtue.

Criteria for Theories of Practical Rationality: Reflections on Brandt's Theory

There are various normative theories of practical rationality, i.e., theories about what it is rational for individuals to want and to do. According to Gewirth's theory,' for example, it is irrational for any agent, regardless of her psychological make-up and history, to deny any other agent freedom and well-being. According to Brandt's theory,' on the other hand, the psychological make-up and history of an individual determine what it is rational for that individual to want and to do. There have been various criticisms of individual theories of practical rationality, but there is no agreement about how to go about criticizing such a theory. For example, Daniels criticizes Brandt's theory on the grounds that it classifies as rational some desires that we intuitively consider to be irrational, and classifies as irrational some desires that we intuitively consider to be rational.' Brandt rejects all forms of intuitionism and so rejects Daniels' criterion. Parfit seems also to reject Daniels' criterion. He points out that our intuitions about what desires are rational have been formed by the self-interest theory of practical rationality. Thus, he claims, our intuitions about what desires are rational should not be allowed to prove the self-interest theory correct, nor should they be allowed to disprove rival theories of practical rationality.4 Since Brandt's theory is a rival to the self-interest theory, it seems to follow from Parfit's view that intuitions should not be allowed to refute Brandt's theory.

Rationality, Value, and Preference

Gauthier's magnificent book erects a conception of morality, “morals by agreement,” on the foundation of his own theory of practical rationality. This is as it should be if, as he claims, following Hobbes and others, there is an initial “presumption against morality” (MA, p. 13) and no theory of morals “can ever serve any useful purpose, unless it can show that all the duties it recommends are also truly endorsed in each individual's reason” (MA, p.1), indeed, that it is a requirement of rationality that one always satisfy the requirements of morality (MA, p.5). This means, however, that the initial assumption against morality is inherited by his theory of practical rationality. His theory of morals therefore can serve a useful purpose only if his theory of rationality is sound. In this paper, I want to explore some of the more dubious aspects of that theory to see whether it can bear the heavy load of justification that “morals by agreement” places on it.

A critique of Habermas' theory of practical rationality

Habermas' theory of practical rationality is a significant theoretical attempt to preserve both rationality and democracy at the level of political decision making that transcends both technocratic and decisionistic theories of rationality. Habermas' theory of rationality accords with his epistemological, sociological, psychological, and linguistic premises. His theory, however, overlooks the interactions between instrumental action and symbolic interaction, the relevance of professional knowledge of facts for the choice of ends, the conflict between the norms of efficiency and democracy, and the duality of subject and object in historical formation. The rational interest in reproduction of free communication, however, can be used to reformulate Habermas' theory of rationality.