Theory Of Moves Research Articles

Hareketler Teorisi Klasik Oyun Teorisinin Sağlayamadığı Neyi Sağlıyor? Hareketler Teorisinin Metodolojik Araçları Üzerine Bir Çalışma

Game Theory (GT) and game-theoretic models have been used for many years to examine particularly international politics and strategic interactions between rational actors, in general, the dynamics of the social world. Different models and approaches have been developed to enhance the explanatory capacities of GT. In this regard, Theory of Moves (TOM) was developed by Stephen Brams in order to analyze and explain strategic interaction more realistically. The purpose of this article is to examine the main assumptions, rules and concepts of TOM with the structure and drawbacks of Classical GT to evaluate methodological tools of TOM. The purpose of this article is to examine two game-theoretic models, Classical GT and TOM, and to scrutinize what sorts of methodological utilities could be achieved by them. Thus it is aimed to illustrate methodological constraints and drawbacks of Classical GT and how the rules and features of TOM intend to overcome these issues. In the study, although it is claimed that TOM made remarkable contribution to GT, the methodological constraints of TOM are pointed out.

Reforms of the Common Agricultural Policy of the EU: Expected results and their social acceptance

The Common Agricultural Policy of the European Union (CAP) is one of the oldest and most controversial of the UE policies. Different possible scenarios of the future reforms of the CAP are currently being discussed. They vary in terms of the extent and the type of the intervention and consequently the welfare effects for different social groups. The objective of this paper is to demonstrate that the partial equilibrium model (CAPRI) and the Theory of Moves (TOM) can be jointly used to test socio-political acceptance of the CAP’s reforms, informing subsequent changes to the policy. Our exemplary results demonstrate that liquidation of the first pillar of the CAP would negatively influence the socio-political acceptance of the CAP.

Negotiation analysis using the theory of moves—Theoretical background and a case study

A branch of game theory—the Theory of Moves (TOM) proposed by Brams (1994a, Theory of moves. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge), is used to model the negotiations on agriculture during the Uruguay Negotiation Round of World Trade Organization (WTO). The paper presents general principles underlying the TOM and demonstrates that it is well suited to describe the negotiation process. Moreover, the results of the TOM game prove that the Common Agricultural Policy of the European Union (CAP) was shaped by the international negotiations on agriculture during the Uruguay Round of WTO.

Strategic Behaviour in Imperialist Interstate Conflict: A Game-Theoretic Analysis

This paper aims at presenting a game-theoretic analysis of interstate conflict in modern East Asia involving two countries, by focusing on historical junctures whereby imperial expansion reached and conflicted with China, Japan, and Korea. Two questions are addressed regarding the outcome and the rule of the game: why did some crises end up peacefully while others escalated to armed conflict, and how can we explain the process of strategic interaction? I conducted two works: First, I built up a generic game, the structure of which is determined by the attitude of the target country and the type of foreign power. Second, I analyzed the process of conflict resolution using standard game theory and the Theory of Moves, which assume different rules of play. I argue that the latter provides more coherent accounts for dynamic aspects of imperialist interstate conflict in modern East Asia.

Discovery, utilisation and analysis of credible threats for 2×2 incomplete information games in the Theory of Moves framework

Steven Brams's [(1994). Theory of moves. Cambridge University Press] Theory of Moves (TOM) is an alternative to traditional game theoretic treatment of real-life interactions, in which players choose strategies based on analysis of future moves and counter-moves that arise if game play commences at a specified start state and either player can choose to move first. In repeated play, players using TOM rationality arrive at nonmyopic equilibria. One advantage of TOM is its ability to model scenarios in which power asymmetries exist between players. In particular, threat power, i.e. the ability of one player to threaten and sustain immediate, globally disadvantageous outcomes to force a desirable result long term, can be utilised to induce Pareto optimal states in games such as Prisoner's Dilemma which result in Pareto-dominated outcomes using traditional methods. Unfortunately, prior work on TOM is limited by an assumption of complete information. This paper presents a mechanism that can be used by a player to utilise threat power when playing a strict, ordinal 2×2 game under incomplete information. We also analyse the benefits of threat power and support in this analysis with empirical evidence.

On the rationality of cycling in the Theory of Moves framework

Theory of Moves (TOM) is a novel approach to game theory for determining rational strategies during the play of dynamic games [Brams, S J. (1994). Theory of moves. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press]. While alternate models such as normal form games exist, players of these games are limited to single shot interactions with each other, but within TOM, sequences of moves and counter moves are allowed. As a consequence of this framework potential cyclic behaviour may arise. Unfortunately, standard TOM framework suggests that players do not move from the initial state if the possibility of cyclic behaviour is detected. However, in a plethora of real life scenarios, cycling can benefit a player over time. We first extend the TOM framework by allowing players to choose how much time to stay in each state while specifying time limits for moves. This generalisation allows for cycling behaviour in addition to normal, acyclic TOM play. We present additional rationality rules to handle the choice of move time and cyclic play and identify conditions for the existence of solutions that involve cycles. Moreover, if solutions do exist, equilibrium are determined so a player can predict the rational outcome upon engaging a cycle. A variety of time constraints on move times are investigated and the effects of these contrasts on the solution space and equilibrium are analysed.

The political sustainability of space exploration

Abstract The swiftly changing policy environment introduces significant uncertainty into the design of technical systems that rely on public resources. Politics necessarily impacts technical design as requirements change to suit different needs. Simple game-theoretic models may be used to provide insights into resource allocation dynamics between the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and the US Congress. This paper utilizes game theory, supplemented by Brams’ Theory of Moves, to model the process by which stakeholders within NASA and the US Congress may arrive at an affordable and politically sustainable funding level on a yearly basis. In doing so, this paper advances a game-theoretic definition of political sustainability.

Analyzing Information System Investments: A Game-Theoretic Approach

Businesses invest billions of dollars in information technology every year. Sometimes the incentive for a given investment may not be apparent when considered using traditional financial analysis methods. in this article, Game Theory and an extension, the Theory of Moves, are presented as alternative methods of modeling IT investment decisions. This technique specifically considers investments motivated by operating or competitive necessity. the modeling process is discussed and several examples from the current trade press are examined.

MIXED STRATEGIES IN THE MUGGING GAME

This note is a contribution to the debate on Steven Brams's Theory of Moves. In particular, it aims to show that standard game-theoretic concepts can both account for and explain the statistics concerning mugging incidents that Brams presents to support the better predictive power of his own theory.

Response to Randall Stone

Randall Stone's critique of theory of moves (TOM) is motivated by a desire to purge game theory of TOM's alleged “backsliding” and restore its superior orthodoxy. But Stone's indictment is marred by serious misunderstandings of TOM and unfortunate misconceptions about what constitutes a scientific theory and how it should be applied and tested. The author rebuts Stone's charges and briefly discusses a new area for which TOM seems especially well suited—the study of path dependence—suggesting how TOM can contribute to the understanding of when actors make seemingly irrational choices that lead to immediately worse outcomes.

Fuzzy approaches to the game of Chicken

Game theory deals with decision-making processes involving two or more parties, also known as players, with partly or completely conflicting interests. Decision-makers in a conflict must often make their decisions under risk and under unclear or fuzzy information. In this paper, two distinct fuzzy approaches are employed to investigate an extensively studied 2/spl times/2 game model-the game of Chicken. The first approach uses a fuzzy multicriteria decision analysis method to obtain optimal strategies for the players. It incorporates subjective factors into the decision-makers' objectives and aggregates objectives using a weight vector. The second approach applies the theory of fuzzy moves (TFM) to the game of Chicken. The theory of moves (TOM) is designed to bring a dynamic dimension to the classical theory of games by allowing decision-makers to look ahead for one or several steps so that they can make a better decision. TOM is the crisp counterpart of TFM, the approach we implement here to deal with games that include fuzzy and uncertain information. The application of fuzzy approaches to the game of Chicken demonstrates their effectiveness in manipulating subjective, uncertain, and fuzzy information and provides valuable insights into the strategic aspects of Chicken.

Game Theory: Pitfalls and Opportunities in Applying It to International Relations

Four problems plague game-theoretic models in international relations (IR): (1) misspecifying the rules, (2) confusing goals and rational choice, (3) arbitrarily reducing the multiplicity of equilibria, and (4) forsaking backward induction. An alternative approach, theory of moves (TOM), is discussed and applied to Prisoners' Dilemma and then, more prescriptively, to the Iran hostage crisis of 1979–80. TOM incorporates into the framework of game theory an initial state in a payoff matrix, the moves and countermoves required to reach a “nonmyopic equilibrium,” and threat, moving, and order power that reflect asymmetries in the capabilities of the players. It also allows for incomplete information, which in the Iran hostage crisis led to misperceptions and flawed play. Two general lessons come out of the U.S. foreign-policy failure in the Iran hostage crisis: (1) know the game you are playing, and (2) make threats only if they are likely to be credible. In specific games, TOM provides detailed prescriptions for optimal play, depending on where play starts and the powers of the players, that could aid foreign-policy makers, especially in crises.

RATIONALITY AND STABILITY IN THE THEORY OF MOVES

According to Brams' Theory of Moves (TOM), mutual cooperation will emerge in the Prisoner's Dilemma Game (PDG) from all initial states (except initial state (2,2)). Contrary to this result, only applying the rules of TOM to the PDG (including the precedence norm) yields mutual defection from all initial states (except initial state (3,3)). It appears that TOM achieves the cooperative outcomes by introducing a concept of voluntary cooperation (magnanimity) and an interpretation of self-interest (the Two-Sidedness Convention), which are both based on collective rationality. Specifically, these elements of TOM ignore the conflict between individual and collective rationality, which characterizes the dilemma of the PDG. In addition, the PDG in TOM is not internally stable in the case of uncertainty with regard to the starting point of the game.

To Mobilize or Not to Mobilize: Catch-22s in International Crises

In his classic novel Catch-22 (1961), Joseph Heller describes a thoroughly frustrating situation faced by a combat pilot in World War II. This is generalized to a “generic” 2 × 2 strict ordinal game, in which whatever strategy the column player chooses, the best response of the row player is to inflict on the column player a worst or next-worst outcome, and possibly vice versa. In the 12 specific games subsumed by the generic game, which are called catch-22 games , “moving power” is “effective,” based on the theory of moves (TOM). A generic “Mobilization Game” applicable to international crises, in which the rules of TOM are somewhat modified, is used to divide the catch-22 games into two mutually exclusive classes. Predictions for each class are compared with the behavior of decision-makers in two Egyptian-Israeli crises. In the 1960 Rotem crisis, Egypt retracted its mobilization after a discreet countermobilization by Israel, which is consistent with being in a class I game in which a status-quo state has moving power. In the 1967 crisis, escalation moved up in stages from a class I to a class II game, which precipitated war and is consistent with cycling wherein both a status-quo and a revisionist state think they have moving power. It is argued that catch-22 games better model the dynamics of conflict spirals than does the usual static representation of the security dilemma as a Prisoners' Dilemma. How such conflict spirals might be ameliorated is discussed with respect to recent conflicts in South Africa, Northern Ireland, and the former Yugoslavia.

Fuzzy moves using normal fuzzy reasoning with fuzzy knowledge discovery

By merging the theory of moves (TOM) and the fuzzy sets theory, we have developed the theory of fuzzy moves (TFM) to make better fuzzy moves for fuzzy games. Since the data granularity of conventionally used fuzzy sets is too low to contain more heuristic information and mined knowledge, we take primary fuzzy sets with higher data granularity as fundamental elements for fuzzy reasoning so as to make more reasonable moves. The simulation results indicate that (1) TFM with normal fuzzy reasoning can make better and more reasonable moves than TOM with precise reasoning since different global strategies are taken into account by TFM and (2) the novel fuzzy reasoning methodology is more reasonable and more useful to make fuzzy moves than the conventional one.

Fuzzy moves

In this paper, the basic principles of the Theory of Fuzzy Moves (TFM) are developed based on the Theory of Moves (TOM) and game theory. The new approach to achieving the globally optimal goal of fuzzy moves is rationally proposed based on not only order payoffs used by TOM but also fuzzy payoffs including more decision-making information. Generally, the classical game theory and TOM can locally make a player reach an absolute optimal outcome which is as advantageous to his own side as possible only based on the given payoffs. For completeness, TFM is able to globally make a player reach a relative optimal outcome which is not only as advantageous to his own side as possible but also as disadvantageous to his opponent as possible based on both the given payoffs (i.e. order payoffs and fuzzy payoffs) and the globally strategic goals the players choose. The hybrid decision-making system for fuzzy moves is typically designed so as to make more reliable decisions for fuzzy moves. Finally, some typical examples of global fuzzy moves have indicated that TFM is a relatively rational and effective methodology for dealing with complex fuzzy moves games in the real world.

FUZZY PRISONER’S DILEMMA

In this paper, the global prisoner's dilemmas are introduced and extensively analyzed. This variation from the traditional game consists in allowing the players to combine, with variable emphasis, both selfish and philanthropic goals. Through analyzing the various kinds of precise and fuzzy global prisoner's dilemmas, we have found that some of them can effectively be solved by using either classical Game Theory or Theory of Moves (TOM), but the others that included fuzzy data and uncertain information cannot effectively be handled by them. Therefore, the basic principles of Theory of Fuzzy Moves (TFM) are developed based on TOM and the Game Theory. By transforming a local game to a more meaningful global game, TFM is able to globally make a player reach a better outcome which is not only as advantageous to its own side as possible, but also as disadvantageous to its opponent as possible in the selfish sense. Finally, some typical examples of fuzzy moves for global prisoner's dilemmas indicate that TFM is a useful methodology for dealing with dynamic and uncertain situations in fuzzy games

Long-term behavior in the theory of moves

This paper proposes a revised Theory of Moves (TOM) to analyze matrix games between two players when payoffs are given as ordinals. The games are analyzed when a given player i must make the first move, when there is a finite limit n on the total number of moves, and when the game starts at a given initial state S. Games end when either both players pass in succession or else a total of n moves have been made. Studies are made of the influence of i, n, and S on the outcomes. It is proved that these outcomes ultimately become periodic in n and therefore exhibit long-term predictable behavior. Efficient algorithms are given to calculate these ultimate outcomes by computer. Frequently the ultimate outcomes are independent of i, S, and n when n is sufficiently large; in this situation this common ultimate outcome is proved to be Pareto-optimal. The use of ultimate outcomes gives rise to a concept of stable points, which are analogous to Nash equilibria but consider long-term effects. If the initial state is a stable point, then no player has an incentive to move from that state, under the assumption that any initial move could be followed by a long series of moves and countermoves. The concept may be broadened to that of a stable set. It is proved that every game has a minimal stable set, and any two distinct minimal stable sets are disjoint. Comparisons are made with the results of standard TOM.

An efficient hybrid direct-vague fuzzy moves system using fuzzy-rules-based precise rules

In this paper, a game transformation is proposed to enable a player to get a globally reasonable goal which is not only as advantageous to his own side as possible but also as disadvantageous to his opponent as possible. The Theory of Fuzzy Moves (TFM), based on the Theory of Moves (TOM) and game theory, is suitable for making a player reach a relatively good fuzzy outcome. Through analysis, we have found that only some of the fuzzy moves' rules are vague (i.e. fuzzy), and the others are direct (i.e. precise). We have found that (1) for the direct rules, the hybrid system is fault-tolerant and stable; (2) for the vague rules, the hybrid system is sensitive for the relevant players' fuzzy payoffs and globally strategic goals since there exist sensitive points or curves. Through the mathematical simplification of the vague rules' inference, we can finally construct the hybrid direct-vague fuzzy moves system by directly using the simple mathematical mapping functions without using the conventional fuzzification, fuzzy inference, and defuzzification. Importantly, the hybrid direct-vague fuzzy moves system with the simple mapping functions can run much more quickly than the fuzzy moves system with the complex fuzzy mapping functions. Finally, some typical examples of globally optimal fuzzy moves have shown that the hybrid direct-vague fuzzy moves system is stable and fault-tolerant enough to deal with the fuzzy moves in dynamic and uncertain situations.

Theory of Moves.

Journal Article Theory of Moves. Get access Theory of Moves. By Steven J. Brams . (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994. Pp. xii + 248. £35.00 hardback, US $54.95 hardback. ISBN o 521 45226 o.) Sanjeev Goyal Sanjeev Goyal Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Economic Journal, Volume 107, Issue 440, 1 January 1997, Pages 216–218, https://doi.org/10.1093/ej/107.440.216 Published: 01 January 1997