Theory Of Mind Regions Research Articles

How Unexpected Events are Processed in Theory of Mind Regions: A Conceptual Replication

ABSTRACT Recent research in social neuroscience has postulated that Theory of Mind (ToM) regions play a role in processing social prediction error (PE: the difference between what was expected and what was observed). Here, we tested whether PE signal depends on the type of prior information people use to make predictions—an agent’s prior mental states (e.g. beliefs, desires, preferences) or an agent’s prior behavior—as well as the type of information that confirms or violates such predictions. That is, does prior information about mental states (versus behavior) afford stronger predictions about an agent’s subsequent mental states or behaviors? Additionally, when information about an agent’s prior mental states or behavior is available, is PE signal strongest when information about an agent’s subsequent mental state (vs behavior) is revealed? In line with prior research, results suggest that DMPFC, LTPJ, and RTPJ are recruited more for unexpected than expected outcomes. However, PE signal does not seem to discriminate on the basis of prior or outcome information type. These findings suggest that ToM regions may flexibly incorporate any available information to make predictions about, monitor, and perhaps explain, inconsistencies in social agents.

The Neural Basis of Social Cognition in Typically Developing Children and Its Relationship to Social Functioning.

Theory of mind (ToM), the ability to think about the perspectives, beliefs, and feelings of another, develops throughout childhood and adolescence and is an important skill for social interactions. This study examines neural activity in typically developing children during a novel ToM task – the Movie Mentalizing Task– and tests its relations to ToM behavioral performance and social functioning. In this fMRI task, children ages 8–13years (N=25) watched a brief movie clip and were asked to predict a character’s mental state after a social interaction. Engaging in the Movie Mentalizing Task activated the ToM neural network. Moreover, greater neural activity in the ToM network, including the superior temporal gyrus and inferior frontal gyrus, was associated with better behavioral performance on independent ToM tasks and was related to better social functioning, though these results do not survive correction for multiple comparisons. Results offer a new affective theory of mind task for children in the scanner that robustly recruits activity in theory of mind regions.

A fundamental distinction in early neural processing of implicit social interpretation in schizophrenia and bipolar disorder

BackgroundSocial cognition impairment is a key phenomenon in serious mental disorders such as schizophrenia (SCZ) and bipolar disorder (BPD). Although genetic and neurobiological studies have suggested common neural correlates, here we hypothesized that a fundamental dissociation of social processing occurs at an early level in these conditions. MethodsBased on the hypothesis that key structures in the social brain, namely the temporoparietal junction, should present distinctive features in SCZ and BPD during low-level social judgment, we conducted a case-control study in SCZ (n = 20) and BPD (n = 20) patients and controls (n = 20), using task-based fMRI during a Theory of Mind (ToM) visual paradigm leading to interpretation of social meaning based on simple geometric figures. ResultsWe found opposite neural responses in two core ToM regions: SCZ patients showed social content-related deactivation (relative to controls and BPD) of the right supramarginal gyrus, while the opposite pattern was found in BPD; reverse patterns, relative to controls and SCZ, were found in the left posterior superior temporal gyrus, a region involved in inferring other’s intentions. Receiver-operating-characteristic curve analysis showed 88% accuracy in discriminating the two clinical groups based on these neural responses. ConclusionsThese contrasting activation patterns of the temporoparietal junction in SCZ and BPD represent mechanistic differences of social cognitive dysfunction that may be explored as biomarkers or therapeutic targets.

Theory of Mind Following the Violation of Strong and Weak Prior Beliefs.

Recent work in psychology and neuroscience has revealed differences in impression updating across social distance and group membership. Observers tend to maintain prior impressions of close (vs. distant) and ingroup (vs. outgroup) others in light of new information, and this belief maintenance is at times accompanied by increased activity in Theory of Mind regions. It remains an open question whether differences in the strength of prior beliefs, in a context absent social motivation, contribute to neural differences during belief updating. We devised a functional magnetic resonance imaging study to isolate the impact of experimentally induced prior beliefs on mentalizing activity. Participants learned about targets who performed 2 or 4 same-valenced behaviors (leading to the formation of weak or strong priors), before performing 2 counter-valenced behaviors. We found a greater change in activity in dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (DMPFC) and right temporo-parietal junction following the violation of strong versus weak priors, and a greater change in activity in DMPFC and left temporo-parietal junction following the violation of positive versus negative priors. These results indicate that differences in neural responses to unexpected behaviors from close versus distant others, and ingroup versus outgroup members, may be driven in part by differences in the strength of prior beliefs.

Women with early maltreatment experience show increased resting-state functional connectivity in the theory of mind (ToM) network

ABSTRACT Background: Experience of childhood maltreatment significantly increases the risk for the development of psychopathology and is associated with impairments in socio-cognitive skills including theory-of-mind (ToM). In turn, neural alterations in ToM processing might then influence future interpersonal interaction and social-emotional understanding. Objective: To assess resting-state activity in the theory-of-mind network in traumatized and non-traumatized persons. Methods: Thirty-five women with a history of childhood maltreatment and 31 unaffected women completed a resting-state scan and a ToM localizer task. The peak coordinates from the localizer were used as the seed regions for the resting-state functional connectivity (RSFC) analyses (temporo-parietal junction, dorsomedial prefrontal cortex, middle temporal gyrus and precuneus). Results: Child abuse was associated with increased RSFC between various ToM regions including the precuneus and the brainstem suggesting altered hierarchical processing in ToM regions. Number of types of abuse was driving the effect for the temporo-parietal junction and the brainstem, while the severity of abuse was linked to increased RSFC between the middle temporal gyrus and the frontal cortex. Post-hoc analyses of brainstem regions indicated the involvement of the serotonergic system (dorsal raphe). Conclusions: The data indicate a lasting impact of childhood maltreatment on the neural networks involved in social information processing that are integral to understanding others’ emotional states. Indeed, such altered neural networks may account for some of the interpersonal difficulties victims of childhood maltreatment experience.

Discourse-level comprehension engages medial frontal Theory of Mind brain regions even for expository texts

ABSTRACT In addition to understanding individual word meanings and processing the syntactic and semantic dependencies among those words within a sentence, language comprehension often requires constructing a higher-order discourse structure based on the relationships among clauses and sentences in the extended context. Prior fMRI studies of discourse-level comprehension have reported greater activation for texts than unconnected sentences in what-appear-to-be regions of the Theory of Mind (ToM) network. However, those studies have generally used narratives rich in mental state content, thus confounding coherence and content. We report an fMRI experiment where ToM regions were defined functionally in each participant, and their responses were examined to texts vs. sentence lists. Critically, we used expository texts to minimise mental state content. Medial frontal but not posterior ToM regions exhibited small but reliable increases in their responses to texts relative to unconnected sentences, suggesting a role for these regions in discourse comprehension independent of content.

Brain Mechanisms Underlying Reading the Mind from Eyes, Voice, and Actions

Evidence from cognitive and social neuroscience research suggests that Theory of Mind (ToM), the ability to attribute mental states to others, is mediated by a group of brain regions collectively known as the ToM network. Nevertheless, there is significant variability in the functional activation of regions within this network across tasks. The goal of the present functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study was to examine the common and differential neural mechanisms of two aspects of ToM processing (emotion/mental-state recognition and intentional attribution) using three distinct, but complementary ToM tasks (Reading the Mind in the Eyes (RMIE), Reading the Mind in the Voice (RMIV), and Intentional Causal Attribution) in healthy adults. Participant accuracy was significantly worse in the ToM compared to the control condition across all tasks. Brain activation analyses replicated previously reported activation in inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) and middle temporal gyrus extending to posterior superior temporal sulcus (pSTS) in RMIE. Activation in the fusiform gyrus and bilateral middle temporal gyrus extending to temporo-parietal junction (TPJ) was unique to causality task. A region-of-interest analysis revealed shared activation in left IFG for RMIE and RMIV as well as TPJ recruitment specific to the causality task. The role of right TPJ in the causality task was further supported by a percent signal change analysis. A conjunction analysis revealed overlap in left IFG, left precentral gyrus, and left superior frontal gyrus activity across all tasks. These findings highlight common and differential recruitment of ToM regions according to task demand.

The behavioral and neural signatures of distinct conceptions of fairness

ABSTRACTAdhering to standard procedures (impartiality), returning favors (reciprocity) or giving based on individuals’ needs (charity) may all be considered moral and/or fair ways to allocate resources. However, these allocation behaviors may be perceived as differently motivated, and their moral evaluation may make different demands on theory of mind (ToM) – the capacity to process information about mental states, including motives. In Studies 1 and 2, we examined participants’ moral judgments of allocations based on (1) impartiality, (2) reciprocity, (3) charity and (4) unspecified criteria as depicted in vignettes, as well as participants’ perceptions of allocators’ motivations. In Study 3, we used functional magnetic resonance imaging to investigate how brain regions for ToM were recruited during moral evaluation of the same vignettes. Reciprocity and charity were processed similarly, in that they recruited ToM regions to the same extent, i.e., precuneus, dorsal and ventral medial prefrontal cortex and left temporoparietal junction (LTPJ). In turn, impartiality and the unspecified condition were processed similarly, recruiting the same ToM regions to a lesser extent. Nevertheless, reciprocity elicited greater activity relative to impartiality and unspecified in the ToM regions of interest. Overall, evaluations of different allocation behaviors depend differently on ToM, with charity and reciprocity eliciting greater attention to individuals’ unique states and motivations.

Abnormal Brain Activation During Theory of Mind Tasks in Schizophrenia: A Meta-Analysis.

Social cognition abilities are severely impaired in schizophrenia (SZ). The current meta-analysis used foci of 21 individual studies on functional abnormalities in the schizophrenic brain in order to identify regions that reveal convergent under- or over-activation during theory of mind (TOM) tasks. Studies were included in the analyses when contrasting tasks that require the processing of mental states with tasks which did not. Only studies that investigated patients with an ICD or DSM diagnosis were included. Quantitative voxel-based meta-analyses were done using Seed-based d Mapping software. Common TOM regions like medial-prefrontal cortex and temporo-parietal junction revealed abnormal activation in schizophrenic patients: Under-activation was identified in the medial prefrontal cortex, left orbito-frontal cortex, and in a small section of the left posterior temporo-parietal junction. Remarkably, robust over-activation was identified in a more dorsal, bilateral section of the temporo-parietal junction. Further abnormal activation was identified in medial occipito-parietal cortex, right premotor areas, left cingulate gyrus, and lingual gyrus. The findings of this study suggest that SZ patients simultaneously show over- and under-activation in TOM-related regions. Especially interesting, temporo-parietal junction reveals diverging activation patterns with an under-activating left posterior and an over-activating bilateral dorsal section. In conclusion, SZ patients show less specialized brain activation in regions linked to TOM and increased activation in attention-related networks suggesting compensatory effects.

Distinct neural patterns of social cognition for cooperation versus competition

How do people consider other minds during cooperation versus competition? Some accounts predict that theory of mind (ToM) is recruited more for cooperation versus competition or competition versus cooperation, whereas other accounts predict similar recruitment across these two contexts. The present fMRI study examined activity in brain regions for ToM (bilateral temporoparietal junction, precuneus, dorsomedial prefrontal cortex) across cooperative and competitive interactions with the same individual within the same paradigm. Although univariate analyses revealed that ToM regions overall were recruited similarly across interaction contexts, multivariate pattern analyses revealed that these regions nevertheless encoded information separating cooperation from competition. Specifically, ToM regions encoded differences between cooperation and competition when people believed the outcome was determined by their and their partner's choices but not when the computer determined the outcome. We propose that, when people are motivated to consider others' mental states, ToM regions encode different aspects of mental states during cooperation versus competition. Given the role of these regions for ToM, these findings reveal distinct patterns of social cognition for distinct motivational contexts.

The role of the right temporoparietal junction in attention and social interaction as revealed by ALE meta-analysis.

The right temporoparietal junction (rTPJ) is frequently associated with different capacities that to shift attention to unexpected stimuli (reorienting of attention) and to understand others' (false) mental state [theory of mind (ToM), typically represented by false belief tasks]. Competing hypotheses either suggest the rTPJ representing a unitary region involved in separate cognitive functions or consisting of subregions subserving distinct processes. We conducted activation likelihood estimation (ALE) meta-analyses to test these hypotheses. A conjunction analysis across ALE meta-analyses delineating regions consistently recruited by reorienting of attention and false belief studies revealed the anterior rTPJ, suggesting an overarching role of this specific region. Moreover, the anatomical difference analysis unravelled the posterior rTPJ as higher converging in false belief compared with reorienting of attention tasks. This supports the concept of an exclusive role of the posterior rTPJ in the social domain. These results were complemented by meta-analytic connectivity mapping (MACM) and resting-state functional connectivity (RSFC) analysis to investigate whole-brain connectivity patterns in task-constrained and task-free brain states. This allowed for detailing the functional separation of the anterior and posterior rTPJ. The combination of MACM and RSFC mapping showed that the posterior rTPJ has connectivity patterns with typical ToM regions, whereas the anterior part of rTPJ co-activates with the attentional network. Taken together, our data suggest that rTPJ contains two functionally fractionated subregions: while posterior rTPJ seems exclusively involved in the social domain, anterior rTPJ is involved in both, attention and ToM, conceivably indicating an attentional shifting role of this region.

Cortical mechanisms of pretense observation

Pretend play emerges in children the world over around 18 months and continues into adolescence and even adulthood. Observing and engaging in pretense are thought to rely on similar neural mechanisms, but little is known about them. Here we examined neural activation patterns associated with observing pretense acts, including high-likelihood, low-likelihood, and imaginary substitute objects, as compared with activation patterns when observing parallel real acts. The association between fantasy predisposition and cortical representations of pretense was also explored. Supporting prior research that used more limited types of pretense, observed pretense acts, when contrasted with real acts, elicited activity in regions associated with mentalizing. A novel contribution here is that substitute object pretense (high- and low-likelihood) elicited significantly more activity than imaginary (pantomime) acts not only in theory of mind regions but also in the superior parietal lobule, a region thought to aid in the prediction and error-monitoring of motor actions. Finally, when high-likelihood pretense acts were contrasted with real acts, participants with elevated fantasy predispositions evidenced significantly different activation patterns than their more reality-prone peers. Future research will explore the intersection of fantasy predisposition and experience with the neural representation of pretense.

Comparing the neural correlates of affective and cognitive theory of mind using fMRI: Involvement of the basal ganglia in affective theory of mind.

Theory of Mind (ToM) is the ability to infer other people’s mental states like intentions or desires. ToM can be differentiated into affective (i.e., recognizing the feelings of another person) and cognitive (i.e., inferring the mental state of the counterpart) subcomponents. Recently, subcortical structures such as the basal ganglia (BG) have also been ascribed to the multifaceted concept ToM and most BG disorders have been reported to elicit ToM deficits. In order to assess both the correlates of affective and cognitive ToM as well as involvement of the basal ganglia, 30 healthy participants underwent event-related fMRI scanning, neuropsychological testing, and filled in questionnaires concerning different aspects of ToM and empathy. Directly contrasting affective (aff) as well as cognitive (cog) ToM to the control (phy) condition, activation was found in classical ToM regions, namely parts of the temporal lobe including the superior temporal sulcus, the supplementary motor area, and parietal structures in the right hemisphere. The contrast aff > phy yielded additional activation in the orbitofrontal cortex on the right and the cingulate cortex, the precentral and inferior frontal gyrus and the cerebellum on the left. The right BG were recruited in this contrast as well. The direct contrast aff > cog showed activation in the temporoparietal junction and the cingulate cortex on the right as well as in the left supplementary motor area. The reverse contrast cog > aff however did not yield any significant clusters. In summary, affective and cognitive ToM partly share neural correlates but can also be differentiated anatomically. Furthermore, the BG are involved in affective ToM and thus their contribution is discussed as possibly providing a motor component of simulation processes, particularly in affective ToM.

Neural correlate of human reciprocity in social interactions

Reciprocity plays a key role maintaining cooperation in society. However, little is known about the neural process that underpins human reciprocity during social interactions. Our neuroimaging study manipulated partner identity (computer, human) and strategy (random, tit-for-tat) in repeated prisoner's dilemma games and investigated the neural correlate of reciprocal interaction with humans. Reciprocal cooperation with humans but exploitation of computers by defection was associated with activation in the left amygdala. Amygdala activation was also positively and negatively correlated with a preference change for human partners following tit-for-tat and random strategies, respectively. The correlated activation represented the intensity of positive feeling toward reciprocal and negative feeling toward non-reciprocal partners, and so reflected reciprocity in social interaction. Reciprocity in social interaction, however, might plausibly be misinterpreted and so we also examined the neural coding of insight into the reciprocity of partners. Those with and without insight revealed differential brain activation across the reward-related circuitry (i.e., the right middle dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and dorsal caudate) and theory of mind (ToM) regions [i.e., ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC) and precuneus]. Among differential activations, activation in the precuneus, which accompanied deactivation of the VMPFC, was specific to those without insight into human partners who were engaged in a tit-for-tat strategy. This asymmetric (de)activation might involve specific contributions of ToM regions to the human search for reciprocity. Consequently, the intensity of emotion attached to human reciprocity was represented in the amygdala, whereas insight into the reciprocity of others was reflected in activation across the reward-related and ToM regions. This suggests the critical role of mentalizing, which was not equated with reward expectation during social interactions.

Are there theory of mind regions in the brain? A review of the neuroimaging literature.

There have been many functional imaging studies of the brain basis of theory of mind (ToM) skills, but the findings are heterogeneous and implicate anatomical regions as far apart as orbitofrontal cortex and the inferior parietal lobe. The functional imaging studies are reviewed to determine whether the diverse findings are due to methodological factors. The studies are considered according to the paradigm employed (e.g., stories vs. cartoons and explicit vs. implicit ToM instructions), the mental state(s) investigated, and the language demands of the tasks. Methodological variability does not seem to account for the variation in findings, although this conclusion may partly reflect the relatively small number of studies. Alternatively, several distinct brain regions may be activated during ToM reasoning, forming an integrated functional "network." The imaging findings suggest that there are several "core" regions in the network-including parts of the prefrontal cortex and superior temporal sulcus-while several more "peripheral" regions may contribute to ToM reasoning in a manner contingent on relatively minor aspects of the ToM task.

Atypical frontal-posterior synchronization of Theory of Mind regions in autism during mental state attribution

This study used fMRI to investigate the functioning of the Theory of Mind (ToM) cortical network in autism during the viewing of animations that in some conditions entailed the attribution of a mental state to animated geometric figures. At the cortical level, mentalizing (attribution of metal states) is underpinned by the coordination and integration of the components of the ToM network, which include the medial frontal gyrus, the anterior paracingulate, and the right temporoparietal junction. The pivotal new finding was a functional underconnectivity (a lower degree of synchronization) in autism, especially in the connections between frontal and posterior areas during the attribution of mental states. In addition, the frontal ToM regions activated less in participants with autism relative to control participants. In the autism group, an independent psychometric assessment of ToM ability and the activation in the right temporoparietal junction were reliably correlated. The results together provide new evidence for the biological basis of atypical processing of ToM in autism, implicating the underconnectivity between frontal regions and more posterior areas.

Co-operation with another player in a financially rewarded guessing game activates regions implicated in theory of mind

Functional imaging studies have identified a network of brain regions associated with theory of mind (ToM); the attribution of mental states to other people. Similar regions have also been observed in studies where people play games that involve either competing or co-operating with another person. Such games are thought to place implicit demands on ToM processes. Co-operation with others has also been shown to elicit brain responses in areas associated with the processing of reward, suggesting that co-operation is an intrinsically rewarding process. In this study, we used a factorial design to assess the interaction between co-operation and the availability of financial rewards in a guessing game. Twelve subjects were scanned with functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) while they performed a guessing game with and without co-operation, and under both these conditions with and without financial reward. The main effect of co-operation was associated with neural responses in theory of mind regions, while the main effect of financial reward was associated with neural responses in reward regions. Critically the response to reward in medial orbitofrontal cortex was significantly enhanced when subjects were co-operating. This suggests that rewards achieved through co-operation are more valuable than rewards achieved alone.