Theory Of Mind Paradigm Research Articles

Is the Theory of Mind deficit observed in visual paradigms in schizophrenia explained by an impaired attention toward gaze orientation?

Schizophrenia is associated with poor Theory of Mind (ToM), particularly in goal and belief attribution to others. It is also associated with abnormal gaze behaviors toward others: individuals with schizophrenia usually look less to others' face and gaze, which are crucial epistemic cues that contribute to correct mental states inferences. This study tests the hypothesis that impaired ToM in schizophrenia might be related to a deficit in visual attention toward gaze orientation.We adapted a previous non-verbal ToM paradigm consisting of animated cartoons allowing the assessment of goal and belief attribution. In the true and false belief conditions, an object was displaced while an agent was either looking at it or away, respectively. Eye movements were recorded to quantify visual attention to gaze orientation (proportion of time participants spent looking at the head of the agent while the target object changed locations).29 patients with schizophrenia and 29 matched controls were tested. Compared to controls, patients looked significantly less at the agent's head and had lower performance in belief and goal attribution. Performance in belief and goal attribution significantly increased with the head looking percentage. When the head looking percentage was entered as a covariate, the group effect on belief and goal attribution performance was not significant anymore.Patients' deficit on this visual ToM paradigm is thus entirely explained by a decreased visual attention toward gaze.

A Phenomenological Reading of Zhuzi

This essay situates Tetsurō Watsuji within contemporary approaches to social cognition. It argues for Watsuji's current relevance, suggesting that his analysis of embodiment and social space puts him in step with some of the concerns driving ongoing treatments of social cognition in philosophy of mind and cognitive science. It is further shown how Watsuji offers a fruitful contribution to this discussion by lending a phenomenologically informed critical perspective. First, some interpretative work is done to explore Watsuji's conception of embodied intersubjectivity. The focus in particular is on Watsuji's conception of what is termed here the "hybrid" body as well as his distinctive treatment of interpersonal space—what Watsuji terms "betweenness" (aidagara). Next, these notions are connected to current treatments of social cognition within philosophy of mind and cognitive science. Made explicit are several of the ways that Watsuji challenges the core cognitivist and internalist presuppositions behind the Theory of Mind paradigm, and experimental work is drawn from, among other sources, developmental psychology and gesture studies to support Watsuji's alternative characterization of embodied social interaction.

Watsuji's Phenomenology of Embodiment and Social Space

This essay situates Tetsuro Watsuji within contemporary approaches to social cognition. It argues for Watsuji's current relevance, suggesting that his analysis of embodiment and social space puts him in step with some of the concerns driving ongoing treatments of social cognition in philosophy of mind and cognitive science. It is further shown how Watsuji offers a fruitful contribution to this discussion by lending a phenomenologically informed critical perspective. First, some interpretative work is done to explore Watsuji's conception of embodied intersubjectivity. The focus in particular is on Watsuji's conception of what is termed here the "hybrid" body as well as his distinctive treatment of interpersonal space—what Watsuji terms "betweenness" (aidagara). Next, these notions are connected to current treatments of social cognition within philosophy of mind and cognitive science. Made explicit are several of the ways that Watsuji challenges the core cognitivist and internalist presuppositions behind the Theory of Mind paradigm, and experimental work is drawn from, among other sources, developmental psychology and gesture studies to support Watsuji's alternative characterization of embodied social interaction.

Theory of mind in patients with schizophrenia: Is mentalizing delayed?

ObjectiveFunctional imaging studies have used numerous neurocognitive designs to investigate brain activation during theory of mind (ToM) tasks in patients with schizophrenia. The majority of studies asks participants to retrospectively attribute mental states to others. We used a novel animated task to investigate implicit mentalizing online. Because behavioral studies have revealed slower ToM performance reaction times in patients with schizophrenia, we hypothesized that time would influence functional MRI (fMRI) activation patterns also. MethodsWe applied the “Moving Shapes” paradigm, which involves two interacting triangles, to a functional MRI block design and investigated the neural activation patterns of 15 patients with schizophrenia and 14 healthy controls. We additionally analyzed the first and second halves of each video separately to assess time-related differences. ResultsOverall, patients with schizophrenia showed increased activation in the inferior and middle frontal gyri, the superior temporal gyrus, the precuneus and the cerebellum compared with controls during ToM versus non-ToM videos. Most importantly, patients with schizophrenia had predominantly increased activation in ToM-related brain areas during the second half of the ToM paradigm, whereas the activation in areas of the ToM-network in healthy controls occurred during the first half of the presentation. ConclusionsOur results confirm recent findings of significantly stronger neural activations that encompass the fronto-temporo-parietal cerebral areas in patients with schizophrenia compared with controls during ToM tasks. The observation of slower cognitive processing in patients with schizophrenia during mentalizing might explain some of the contradictory imaging findings in these patients and have implications for cognitive remediation.

A visual joke fMRI investigation into Theory of Mind and enhanced risk of schizophrenia

Theory of Mind (ToM) or mentalizing is the ability of individuals to determine the intentions and behavior of others. This ability is known to be compromised in schizophrenia and has been shown to fluctuate with symptom severity. Neuropsychological investigations into relatives of individuals with schizophrenia have shown that some relatives also show a deficit in this area of social cognition. In order to address this state and trait issue, we investigated the performance of high-risk relatives of individuals with schizophrenia to those of a matched control group ( n = 13) on a blocked design visual joke fMRI paradigm. The task involved looking at two sets of cartoon jokes, one set which required mentalizing abilities to understand the jokes and another set that did not require such abilities. Relatives were divided into two groups based on the presence (HR+, n = 12) or absence (HR−, n = 12) of positive symptoms. The task provided robust activations across the groups in areas previously associated with mentalizing abilities, such as the PFC, precuneus, and temporal lobes. Significant between-group activations were observed in the PFC (primarily BA6, 8, and 9) with the HR− activating significantly greater than the HR+ in these regions. Both a secondary state-specific analysis and a third post hoc analysis further investigating state effects showed significant PFC between-group differences. This study is the first time relatives of individuals with schizophrenia have been imaged using a ToM paradigm, and the results provide evidence of both a state and state-mediated trait effect.

A Theory of Mind investigation into the appreciation of visual jokes in schizophrenia

BackgroundThere is evidence that groups of people with schizophrenia have deficits in Theory of Mind (ToM) capabilities. Previous studies have found these to be linked to psychotic symptoms (or psychotic symptom severity) particularly the presence of delusions and hallucinations.MethodsA visual joke ToM paradigm was employed where subjects were asked to describe two types of cartoon images, those of a purely Physical nature and those requiring inferences of mental states for interpretation, and to grade them for humour and difficulty. Twenty individuals with a DSM-lV diagnosis of schizophrenia and 20 healthy matched controls were studied. Severity of current psychopathology was measured using the Krawiecka standardized scale of psychotic symptoms. IQ was estimated using the Ammons and Ammons quick test.ResultsIndividuals with schizophrenia performed significantly worse than controls in both conditions, this difference being most marked in the ToM condition. No relationship was found for poor ToM performance and psychotic positive symptomatology, specifically delusions and hallucinations.ConclusionThere was evidence for a compromised ToM capability in the schizophrenia group on this visual joke task. In this instance this could not be linked to particular symptomatology.

Mind Reading: Neural Mechanisms of Theory of Mind and Self-Perspective

Human self-consciousness as the metarepresentation of ones own mental states and the so-called theory of mind (TOM) capacity, which requires the ability to model the mental states of others, are closely related higher cognitive functions. We address here the issue of whether taking the self-perspective (SELF) or modeling the mind of someone else (TOM) employ the same or differential neural mechanisms. A TOM paradigm was used and extended to include stimulus material that involved TOM and SELF capacities in a two-way factorial design. A behavioral study in 42 healthy volunteers showed that TOM and SELF induced differential states of mind: subjects assigned correctly first or third person pronouns when providing responses to the stimuli. Following the behavioral study, we used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) in eight healthy, right-handed males to study the common and differential neural mechanisms underlying TOM and SELF. The main factor TOM led to increased neural activity in the anterior cingulate cortex and left temporopolar cortex. The main factor SELF led to increased neural activity in the right temporoparietal junction and in the anterior cingulate cortex. A significant interaction of both factors TOM and SELF was observed in the right prefrontal cortex. These divergent neural activations in response to TOM and SELF suggest that these important differential mental capacities of human self-consciousness are implemented at least in part in distinct brain regions.

Response inhibition and practice effects on a stroop paradigm in schizophrenia and obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD)

Schizophrenia is associated with poor Theory of Mind (ToM), particularly in goal and belief attribution to others. It is also associated with abnormal gaze behaviors toward others: individuals with schizophrenia usually look less to others' face and gaze, which are crucial epistemic cues that contribute to correct mental states inferences. This study tests the hypothesis that impaired ToM in schizophrenia might be related to a deficit in visual attention toward gaze orientation.We adapted a previous non-verbal ToM paradigm consisting of animated cartoons allowing the assessment of goal and belief attribution. In the true and false belief conditions, an object was displaced while an agent was either looking at it or away, respectively. Eye movements were recorded to quantify visual attention to gaze orientation (proportion of time participants spent looking at the head of the agent while the target object changed locations).29 patients with schizophrenia and 29 matched controls were tested. Compared to controls, patients looked significantly less at the agent's head and had lower performance in belief and goal attribution. Performance in belief and goal attribution significantly increased with the head looking percentage. When the head looking percentage was entered as a covariate, the group effect on belief and goal attribution performance was not significant anymore.Patients' deficit on this visual ToM paradigm is thus entirely explained by a decreased visual attention toward gaze.