Theory Of Mind Battery Research Articles

Neural correlates of preschoolers' passive-viewing false belief: Insights into continuity and change and the function of right temporoparietal activity in theory of mind development.

Behavioral research demonstrates a critical transition in preschooler's mental-state understanding (i.e., theory of mind; ToM), revealed most starkly in performance on tasks about a character's false belief (e.g., about an object's location). Questions remain regarding the neural and cognitive processes differentiating children who pass versus fail behavioral false-belief tasks and the extent to which there is continuity versus change in the ToM neural network. To address these questions, we analyzed event-related spectral power in the electroencephalogram (EEG) to investigate how preschoolers' neural activity during passive viewing of false-belief scenarios related to their explicit behavioral ToM performance. We found that neural activity during passive viewing of false-belief events (6-9Hz EEG 'alpha' suppression in right temporoparietal [RTP] electrodes) strongly related to children's explicit ToM. However, children's RTP alpha suppression differed depending on their explicit behavioral ToM performance: Children who did better on a broad battery of standard ToM tasks and who passed explicit behavioral false-belief tasks showed greater RTP alpha suppression when the character's belief first became false (during the 'location-change' event); whereas children who did worse on the ToM battery and who failed explicit behavioral false-belief tasks showed greater RTP alpha suppression only later when they could evaluate the character's behavior in the context of prior events (during the 'active-search' event). Findings shed light on what differentiates preschoolers who pass versus fail explicit false-belief tasks and raise questions about how to interpret existing neuroscience data from ToM tasks across infancy to adulthood. RESEARCH HIGHLIGHTS: Preschool children's neural activity (EEG 6-9Hz suppression in right temporoparietal [RTP] electrodes) during passive-viewing of false-belief events was related to their explicit behavioral theory-of-mind performance. Children who did better on a theory-of-mind (ToM) battery and passed explicit false-belief tasks showed greater RTP alpha suppression when the character's belief first became false. Children who performed worse on the ToM battery and failed explicit false-belief tasks showed greater RTP alpha suppression later when observing the character's search behavior. Findings reveal change in preschoolers' ToM neural correlates and suggest that the presence of RTP activity does not necessarily indicate 'mature' theory of mind.

Early bilingualism enhances theory of mind in children from low-income households via executive function skills

The study focuses on children in poverty and investigates whether early bilingualism enhances economically disadvantaged children’s Theory of Mind (ToM), and what role Executive Function plays in the relation between bilingualism and ToM. Sixty-eight preschool-aged children (35 English monolinguals, 51.4% boys, and 33 English-Spanish bilingual children, 57.5% boys) from low-income backgrounds completed standardized language assessments, three executive function tasks, and a five-task ToM battery. Results showed that after controlling for children’s age, income-to-needs ratio, and English proficiency, bilingual children demonstrated greater ToM competence compared to monolingual children. A higher degree of bilingualism was associated with better ToM performance in bilingual children. Mediation analyses showed that children’s working memory and attention shifting accounted for the links between bilingualism and ToM. The findings suggest that an early bilingual learning experience may facilitate preschool children’s ToM development in economically disadvantaged environments, and this relation was differentially impacted by executive function components.

Culturally constituted universals: Evidential basis of belief matters.

Differences in the sequence with which children pass the tasks in Wellman and Liu's (2004) theory of mind (ToM) battery is increasingly bringing into question the universal and cultural specifics of children's developing understanding of others' minds. Children from China, Iran, and Turkey pass the knowledge access (KA) task of the battery earlier than they pass the diverse beliefs (DB) task (e.g., Selcuk etal., 2018). This pattern is the reverse of what has been documented with children from Australia and the US (e.g., Peterson etal., 2005). This paper presents three studies with Turkish samples that explore the possible reasons for developmental sequence and performance differences in the ToM battery. Study 1 investigated Turkish-speaking adults' judgments of appropriateness for different epistemic verbs as used in the DB and false belief (FB) tasks. Study 2 investigated whether adults' performance (i.e., accuracy, reaction time) on FB tasks were affected by culturally preferred uses of these verbs. Collectively these studies showed that adults found different epistemic language ("guess," "think," and the Turkish-specific "falsely think") to be appropriate for different belief-based tasks. However, there was no difference in adults' performance based on epistemic language. In Study 3, Turkish-speaking preschoolers' performance in belief-related tasks based on variations in epistemic language and epistemic features (i.e., presence of evidence) was investigated. Among five modifications, Turkish children benefited only from a modification that involved the manipulation of the epistemological basis for ambiguous beliefs (i.e., visual evidence for belief). RESEARCH HIGHLIGHTS: Turkish adults find different epistemic language ("guess," "think," and the Turkish-specific "falsely-think") to be appropriate for different belief-based tasks (diverse and false belief tasks). Turkish adults' performance on false belief (FB) tasks is not affected by epistemic language. Turkish children perform better in diverse beliefs (DB) task if an epistemological basis for ambiguous beliefs (i.e., visual evidence for either belief) is provided.

Executive Function and Theory of Mind in Children Living in Poverty: A Short-term Longitudinal Study

ABSTRACT The early childhood years are critical for developing executive function (EF) and theory of mind (ToM). Prior literature suggests a robust relationship between EF and ToM; however, this relationship has seldom been investigated in children living in poverty. In addition, few studies have employed comprehensive ToM measures to explore how EF relates to different components of ToM. This study examined longitudinal relations between EF and ToM among 86 preschool children (3- to 5-year-old) attending Head Start programs in the United States. Children completed two EF tasks and a 5-task ToM battery twice, four months apart. Results showed that, for children living in poverty, early EF did not significantly predict later ToM as a composite after controlling for significant covariates. However, the emotionally salient component of ToM predicted children’s later Stroop performance, above and beyond several controls. Findings suggest that for impoverished children living in the U.S., the development of emotional perspective-taking may be particularly important for EF development compared to other components of ToM.

Theory of mind: A clue for the interpretation of functional movement disorders.

ObjectivesFunctional movement disorders (FMD) refer to a heterogeneous group of manifestations incongruent with known neurological diseases. Functional neuroimaging studies in FMD indicate the overlap between cerebral regions in which abnormal activation occurs and those considered crucial for theory of mind (ToM), the ability to attribute mental states. The aim of this study was to explore whether FMD might be related to ToM disorders to the extent that they reduce the ability to make inferences about the mental states underlying motor behaviour during social interaction.Materials & MethodsEighteen subjects with FMD and 28 matched healthy controls (HC) were given a ToM battery. The severity of FMD was rated by the Simplified‐FMD Rating Scale (S‐FMDRS). Dissociative symptoms were evaluated by the Dissociative Experiences Scale (DES‐II).ResultsFMD scored worse than the HC in most ToM tasks: second‐order False Beliefs (p = .005), Faux‐Pas Recognition Test (p < .001) and Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test (p = .020); control questions elicited normal scores. The DES‐II indicated dissociative‐borderline psychopathology and negatively correlated with accuracy on the second‐order False Belief (Spearman's rho = −.444; p = .032); the positive correlation between DES‐II and severity of motor symptoms (S‐FMDRS) approached significance (Spearman's rho test = .392; p = .054). ToM disorders were not correlated with S‐FMDRS, due to the typical variability in FMD over time with regard to the severity of symptoms and the district of body involved.ConclusionsOur results are consistent with the hypothesis that FMD are related to ToM deficits, and future studies are needed to define the specific nature of this relationship.

Cortical activity measured by functional near infrared spectroscopy during a theory of mind task in subjects with schizophrenia, bipolar disorder and healthy controls

Theory of Mind (ToM) deficits interfere in social cognitive functioning in schizophrenia (SCZ) and are increasingly recognized to do so in bipolar disorder (BD), however their clinical and neurobiological correlates remain unclear. This study represents the first direct comparison of subjects with SCZ (N = 26), BD (N = 26) and healthy controls (N = 33) in cortical activity during the Reading the Mind in the Eyes Task (RMET) using functional Near Infrared Spectroscopy (fNIRS) with the control condition (CC) involving gender identification via the same stimuli. The three groups were compared with a comprehensive ToM battery and assessed in terms of the relationship of ToM performance with clinical symptoms, insight and functioning. The controls scored higher than the SCZ and BD groups in ToM assessments, with SCZ group showing the worse performance in terms of meta-representation and empathy. The SCZ group ToM scores inversely correlated with negative symptom severity and positively correlated with insight; BD group ToM scores negatively correlated with subclinical mania symptoms and projected functioning. Cortical activity was higher during the ToM condition compared to the CC in the pre-motor and supplementary-motor cortices, middle and superior temporal gyri, and the primary somatosensory cortex. Group x Condition interaction was detected whereby activity was higher during the ToM condition among controls with no detected difference between SCZ and BD groups. The results suggest that ToM is represented similarly in cortical activity in SCZ and BD compared to healthy controls pointing to possible neurobiological convergence of SCZ and BD in underlying impairments of social cognition.

Adaptación al español de cuatro instrumentos para evaluar la teoría de la mente en niños y adolescentes

Introducción: La teoría de la mente (ToM) es una de las dimensiones de la Cognición Social más relevantes y de gran interés para la investigación en psicología del desarrollo, psicología cognitiva, neuropsicología y neurociencias sociales, así como en la labor clínica. Esto ha conllevado a la generación de instrumentos validados para la evaluación de esta función; sin embargo, en español son pocos los que hay y aún menos los adaptados para población infantil y adolescente.&#x0D; Objetivo: En el presente trabajo se presenta la adaptación de la Batería de la ToM, el inventario de la ToM, el Test de Paso en Falso y el Test de la Mirada, cuatro instrumentos con tareas clásicas para evaluar la ToM.&#x0D; Método: El proceso de adaptación se hizo en dos fases, una de traducción al español y otra de adaptación cultural. Para verificar los resultados se hizo un pilotaje para todos los instrumentos con 20 participantes en edades entre 4 y 13 años y 20 participantes entre 6 y 17 años.&#x0D; Resultados: Se presentan los cuatro instrumentos adaptados en español con los principales ajustes en cada uno de ellos.&#x0D; Discusión: Se discute sobre la importancia de generar un protocolo de valoración de la ToM haciendo una validación estadística de estos instrumentos.

Social Mind and Long-Lasting Disease: Focus on Affective and Cognitive Theory of Mind in Multiple Sclerosis.

The role of social cognition, including theory of mind (ToM), in affecting quality of life (QoL) along the course of diseases has been reported. This is a considerable aspect in chronic pathologies, such as multiple sclerosis (MS), in which supporting and maintaining QoL is of crucial importance. We aimed to investigate the relation between ToM, clinical variables and neuropsychological profile in a cohort of adults with long lasting disease, such as different clinical MS phenotypes (Relapsing Remitting -RR- versus Progressive -Pr). In particular, our study focuses on (1) how (affective and cognitive) ToM impairment occurs in different phenotypes, (2) whether MS ToM impairment is secondary to or independent from cognitive deficit and (3) whether ToM deficit impacts QoL. 42 adults with MS (18 M: 24 F, 52.38 ± 10.31 mean age, 21.24 ± 10.94 mean disease duration, 26 RR and 16 Pr) and 26 matched healthy controls (HC) (7 M: 19 F, 51.35 ± 12.42 mean age) were screened with a neuropsychological and ToM battery, assessing both affective and cognitive components. We found statistically significant groups differences in cognitive but not affective ToM, with a lower performance in PrMS than those with a RRMS disease course. Also, significant predictive effects of neuropsychological tests on ToM were identified in MS group. Finally, MS people with different level of affective ToM differed significantly in QoL. ToM deficit in moderately disabled people with MS involves cognitive but not affective ToM components with implications on QoL. It also appears to be related to cognitive performance. As neurological and neurocognitive profiles influence mentalizing in MS, ToM evaluation should be considered for inclusion in clinical screening.

Not just a sum of its parts: How tasks of the theory of mind scale relate to executive function across time

There is a well-established relationship between theory of mind (ToM) and executive function (EF) during the preschool years. However, less is known about the concurrent and longitudinal relations between EF and specific tasks tapping different aspects of ToM. The current study investigated the ToM-EF relationship across 1 year in 3- to 5-year-old Turkish children using the ToM battery of Wellman and Liu (2004), which measures understanding of diverse desires (DD), diverse beliefs (DB), knowledge access (KA), contents false belief (CFB), explicit false belief (EFB), and hidden emotion (HE). This battery has not yet been used in its entirety to test the predictive relations between ToM and EF. We used peg-tapping and day–night tasks to measure EF. Our sample comprised 150 Turkish preschool children (69 girls) aged 36–60 months at Time 1 (T1) and 49–73 months at Time 2 (T2). Using the ToM composite with all six tasks, when child’s age, receptive language, and T1 ability level (EF or ToM) were controlled, T1 EF significantly predicted T2 ToM, whereas T1 ToM did not predict T2 EF. Among DD, DB, KA, false belief understanding (FBU: the composite score of CFB and EFB), and HE, only KA and FBU were significantly associated with EF at T1 and T2. Further regression analyses showed that KA did not have a predictive relationship with EF. Instead, FBU drove the predictive EF–ToM relationship across time. Thus, in Turkish children, earlier EF predicts later ToM, but especially the FBU component, in this well-validated battery.

Theory of Mind in Children with Fetal Alcohol SpectrumDisorders.

Theory of mind (ToM) refers to the ability to understand and make inferences about other people's intentions, feelings, and beliefs. Although children with fetal alcohol spectrum disorders (FASD) are known to have deficits in social-cognitive function, little is known about ToM in FASD. ToM ability was assessed using a developmentally sensitive ToM battery, including the reading the mind in the eyes (RME) test, a measure of mental inferential ability that has been found to be impaired in other clinical populations. IQ and executive function (EF) were assessed as potential mediating variables. The battery was administered to 63 children (aged 9 to 11years) from Cape Town, South Africa, whose mothers had been prospectively recruited during pregnancy. Children with fetal alcohol syndrome (FAS; n=8) and partial FAS (PFAS; n=19), as well as nonsyndromal heavily exposed children (n=17), were compared to children born to abstaining or light drinkers (n=19) from the same community. No FASD group differences were found on the less challenging ToM tasks. By contrast, children with FAS and PFAS performed more poorly than controls on a more challenging ToM task, the RME test. A continuous measure of prenatal alcohol exposure (PAE) was more sensitive than FASD diagnosis in that it was related to 4 higher-order ToM measures, particularly the ability to attribute mental states assessed on RME. IQ only partially mediated the effect of exposure on RME performance, and these effects were not mediated by EF. Hence, the data suggest that these ToM measures tap into a specific alcohol-related social-cognitive deficit that does not merely reflect poorer EF. FASD diagnosis and PAE were each also related to RME after control for attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder. These findings suggest that deficits in higher-order ToM function may play a significant role in the social-cognitive behavioral impairment in FASD.

Evidence from paranoid schizophrenia for more than one component of theory of mind.

We previously reported finding that performance was impaired on four out of five theory of mind (ToM) tests in a group of 21 individuals diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia (pScz), relative to a non-clinical group of 29 individuals (Scherzer et al., 2012). Only the Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test did not distinguish between groups. A principal components analysis revealed that the results on the ToM battery could be explained by one general ToM factor with the possibility of a latent second factor. As well, the tests were not equally sensitive to the pathology. There was also overmentalization in some ToM tests and under-mentalisation in others. These results led us to postulate that there is more than one component to ToM. We hypothesized that correlations between the different EF measures and ToM tests would differ sufficiently within and between groups to support this hypothesis. We considered the relationship between the performance on eight EF tests and five ToM tests in the same diagnosed and non-clinical individuals as in the first study. The ToM tests shared few EF correlates and each had its own best EF predictor. These findings support the hypothesis of multiple ToM components.

Assessing cognitive abilities in children with autism: practitioner evaluation of treatment validity

This study investigated practitioners’ perception of the treatment validity in autism of two assessments of general cognitive abilities: intellectual quotient (IQ) and dynamic assessment, and two assessments related to causal cognitive theories in autism: theory of mind and executive function. The views of 14 educational and clinical psychologists were sought through focus group methodology in relation to three aspects of treatment validity: treatment utility, cost-benefit analysis, and incremental validity. Practitioners evaluated the treatment validity of the assessment measures related to causal theories of autism more favourably than the measures of general cognitive abilities. The theory of mind battery was most positively evaluated in terms of its incremental validity, i.e. it was seen to provide ‘unique’ information about children with autism not readily offered by other methods.

Friendlessness and theory of mind: A prospective longitudinal study

Chronic friendlessness in childhood predicts adverse mental health outcomes throughout life, yet its earliest roots are poorly understood. In theory, developing a theory of mind (ToM) should help children gain mutual friends and one preschool study (Peterson & Siegal, 2002. Br J Dev Psychol, 20, 205) suggested a cross-sectional connection. We therefore used a 2-year prospective longitudinal design to explore ToM as a predictor of mutual friendship in 114 children from age 5 to 7years after controlling potential confounds including language ability and group popularity. Confirming friendship's distinctiveness from group sociometric status, numerous group-rejected children (53%) had a mutual friend whereas 23% of those highest in group status did not. Five-year-olds with a mutual friend significantly outperformed their friendless peers on a comprehensive ToM battery (basic and advanced false belief). Longitudinally, chronically friendless 7-year-olds (no friends at either testing time) stood out for their exceptionally poor Time 1 ToM understanding even after controlling for group popularity, age, and language skill. Extending previous evidence of ToM's predictive links with later social and cognitive outcomes, these results for mutual friendship suggest possible interventions to help reduce the lifelong mental health costs of chronic friendlessness.

Autistic adolescents show atypical activation of the brain′s mentalizing system even without a prior history of mentalizing problems

Some autistic children pass classic Theory of Mind (ToM) tasks that others fail, but the significance of this finding is at present unclear. We identified two such groups of primary school age (labelled ToM+ and ToM−) and a matched comparison group of typically developing children (TD). Five years later we tested these participants again on a ToM test battery appropriate for adolescents and conducted an fMRI study with a story based ToM task. We also assessed autistic core symptoms at these two time points. At both times the ToM− group showed more severe social communication impairments than the ToM+ group, and while showing an improvement in mentalizing performance, they continued to show a significant impairment compared to the NT group. Two independent ROI analyses of the BOLD signal showed activation of the mentalizing network including medial prefrontal cortex, posterior cingulate and lateral temporal cortices. Strikingly, both ToM+ and ToM− groups showed very similar patterns of heightened activation in comparison with the NT group. No differences in other brain regions were apparent. Thus, autistic adolescents who do not have a history of mentalizing problems according to our ToM battery showed the same atypical neurophysiological response during mentalizing as children who did have such a history. This finding indicates that heterogeneity at the behavioural level may nevertheless map onto a similar phenotype at the neuro-cognitive level.

Theory of Mind and Social Cognition in Huntington's Disease, Clinical Correlations - A Preliminary Report (P07.185)

Objective: To evaluate social cognition (SC) and theory of mind (TOM) in Huntington9s disease (HD). Background SC embraces several sub-domains related with the ability to predict what others will think, feel or do in novel situations. TOM is the core component of social functioning and relies on the ability to represent the mental states of others and to predict their possible behaviors. HD is characterized by involuntary movements and psychiatric, behavioral and cognitive dysfunctions. HD patients are often socially aloof, show lack of empathy, cognitive rigidity and mood disturbances. Design/Methods: After giving informed consent, 5 patients were diagnosed with HD by clinical findings and genetic testing and composed the sample of this study. The mean age was 47±22.2 years, the average duration of the illness was 7.4±10.5 years, and the mean CAG repeats in the expanded allele was 47, 8±10, 4. The mean level of education was 14, 4±2.6 years. An SC / TOM battery that included Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (WCST), Reading the Eyes in the Mind Test (REMT), Iowa Gambling Task (IGT), Faux Pas test (FPT) and reversion test was administered. All data were compared with control individuals.Statistical analysis was carried out using one-way ANOVA and correlation coefficients. Results: HD patients performed poorly as compared with control subjects in IGT and FPT, respectively (p Conclusions: The SC and TOM impairment in our HD patients agree with previously reported series and contribute to support a fronto-striatal involvement.Interestingly, in these patients an inverse correlation was observed among SC, TOM and nCAG repeats and disease duration, which may predict a more severe evolution of the disease. Disclosure: Dr. Etcheverry has nothing to disclose. Dr. Demey has nothing to disclose. Dr. Ruotolo has nothing to disclose. Dr. Leis has nothing to disclose. Dr. Orellano has nothing to disclose. Dr. Vanotti has nothing to disclose. Dr. Vilas has nothing to disclose. Dr. Villar has nothing to disclose. Dr. Rojas has nothing to disclose. Dr. Parisi has nothing to disclose. Dr. Persi has nothing to disclose. Dr. Allegri has nothing to disclose. Dr. Gatto has nothing to disclose.

Mapping levels of theory of mind in Alzheimer's disease: A preliminary study

Background: Research on Theory of Mind (ToM), the ability to understand behaviour based on mental state representation, has shifted towards a life span perspective in typical and atypical conditions (dementia). Objectives: The aim of this study is to investigate the presence and the features of ToM decay in early Alzheimer's disease (AD) patients compared to healthy controls adopting a neurodevelopmental stance. Method: Sixteen AD patients and 16 healthy controls were submitted to an increasing complexity ToM battery, tapping ToM precursors, standard first- and second-order false beliefs and advanced ToM tasks (Eyes Test and strange stories). Results: The results underline a similar pattern of increasing difficulty of the tasks that explore ToM abilities in both the groups. They also confirm the presence of a strong gap in performance between the CTR and the AD groups, especially in the more complex ToM tasks, whereas there is no significant difference between the two groups in the first level of reasoning about beliefs (first-order false belief). The impairment in specific cognitive functions (i.e. memory and executive functions) seems to correlate with the decline in the most complex mentalistic abilities. Conclusion: This study identifies a specific pattern of deterioration in ToM abilities in AD patients, following backwards developmental steps typical of the acquisition of mentalizing abilities, where the most complex ToM levels are impaired, whereas the intermediate and the simplest ones are preserved.

Theory of Mind in Schizophrenia and Asperger's Syndrome: Relationship with Negative Symptoms.

Although previous studies have shown that the theory of mind (ToM) ability is impaired in Asperger's Syndrome (AS) and in schizophrenia, few controlled studies compared the ToM performance between the two disorders. Besides, the relationship between the degree of ToM impairment and symptom dimensions is unclear, and presence of ToM impairment in remitted patients with schizophrenia is controversial. Here, we tested the hypothesis that schizophrenia patients with prominent negative symptoms were closer to AS patients and different than schizophrenia patients without prominent negative symptoms and healthy controls in terms of ToM functioning. Fourteen patients with AS, 20 with schizophrenia and 20 healthy controls, matched by age, educational level and IQ scores were enrolled. AS was diagnosed according to the DSM-IV criteria and independently confirmed by two psychiatrists. Schizophrenia patients were diagnosed by the Turkish version of Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV Diagnosis (SCID-I) and symptom severity was evaluated with the Scale for the Assessment of Negative and Positive Symptoms. Schizophrenia group consisted of clinically stable patients. The ToM battery included stories to assess first and second order false belief tasks (ToM1 and ToM2). The full-scale IQ, Verbal Comprehension, Freedom from Distractibility and Perceptual Organization scores were assessed by Weschler Adult Intelligence Scale-Revised (WAIS-R). Non-parametric tests were used to compare the neuropsychological performances of the three groups. In order to investigate whether schizophrenia patients with prominent negative symptoms were similar to AS patients, schizophrenia patients were divided into high (Sch-HN) and low (Sch-LN) negative-symptom subgroups by median split. For these four groups (AS, Sch-HN, Sch-LN, and controls) between group comparisons were performed. Correlations between the clinical measures and ToM performance were assessed by Spearman correlation test. AS and schizophrenia patients performed significantly worse than controls in the ToM2 task, while the AS group had worse ToM1 performance than both schizophrenia patients and healthy controls. The Sch-HN subgroup had significantly lower ToM2 scores than the Sch-LN patients, and worse ToM1 functioning than the controls. These results suggest that clinically stable schizophrenia patients have ToM impairments. Sch-HN group performed comparably poorly as the AS group, while the Sch-LN group was relatively spared. The most profoundly impaired patients with schizophrenia in terms of ToM functioning were represented by those with high negative symptoms (Sch-HN). Similar to AS, as a neurodevelopmental impairment, these patients may not have developed ToM ability, or they may have lost their ToM capacity as a result of a neurodegenerative process during the illness. Supplementary studies using other methods (e.g., neuroimaging, neurophysiology) may highlight the brain regions that are affected differentially in AS and schizophrenia, the relationship of ToM impairments and negative symptoms, and the role of ToM impairments in the neurodevelopmental or neurodegenerative hypothesis of schizophrenia.

Imitation and action understanding in autistic spectrum disorders: How valid is the hypothesis of a deficit in the mirror neuron system?

The motor mirror neuron system supports imitation and goal understanding in typical adults. Recently, it has been proposed that a deficit in this mirror neuron system might contribute to poor imitation performance in children with autistic spectrum disorders (ASD) and might be a cause of poor social abilities in these children. We aimed to test this hypothesis by examining the performance of 25 children with ASD and 31 typical children of the same verbal mental age on four action representation tasks and a theory of mind battery. Both typical and autistic children had the same tendency to imitate an adult's goals, to imitate in a mirror fashion and to imitate grasps in a motor planning task. Children with ASD showed superior performance on a gesture recognition task. These imitation and gesture recognition tasks all rely on the mirror neuron system in typical adults, but performance was not impaired in children with ASD. In contrast, the ASD group were impaired on the theory of mind tasks. These results provide clear evidence against a general imitation impairment and a global mirror neuron system deficit in children with autism. We suggest this data can best be understood in terms of multiple brain systems for different types of imitation and action understanding, and that the ability to understand and imitate the goals of hand actions is intact in children with ASD.

Mental playmates: Siblings, executive functioning and theory of mind

This study assessed the theory of mind (ToM) and executive functioning (EF) abilities of 124 typically developing preschool children aged 3 to 5 years in relation to whether or not they had a child‐aged sibling (i.e. a child aged 1 to 12 years) at home with whom to play and converse. On a ToM battery that included tests of false belief, appearance‐reality (AR) and pretend representation, children who had at least 1 child‐aged sibling scored significantly higher than both only children and those whose only siblings were infants or adults. The numbers of child‐aged siblings in preschoolers' families positively predicted their scores on both a ToM battery (4 tasks) and an EF battery (2 tasks), and these associations remained significant with language ability partialled out. Results of a hierarchical multiple regression analysis revealed that independent contributions to individual differences in ToM were made by language ability, EF skill and having a child‐aged sibling. However, even though some conditions for mediation were met, there was no statistically reliable evidence that EF skills mediated the advantage of presence of child‐aged siblings for ToM performance. While consistent with the theory that distinctively childish interaction among siblings accelerates the growth of both ToM and EF capacities, alternative evidence and alternative theoretical interpretations for the findings were also considered.