Theory Of Intrinsic Value Research Articles

Nature's Intrinsic Value

Environmental ethicists often make claims about the intrinsic value of nature or parts thereof. Advances in intrinsic value theory, most notably Ben Bradley’s ‘Two Concepts of Intrinsic Value,’ successfully cleave the concept of intrinsic value into two: a Moorean and Kantian variety. This paper seeks to classify and organize different environmental theorists within a Bradley-inspired framework, helping to bring clarity and charity to the claims of older and newer environmental ethicists. These two types of intrinsic value help explain why different thinkers have differing intuitions on e.g., culling cases. As well as valuing nature suis generis, the paper considers the value that might accrue from other relational properties in nature, such as beauty, biodiversity, and rarity.

The Meaning of the Earth: Reading Nietzsche in the Anthropocene

Abstract In this article, the author argues against a dominant trend in the literature on Nietzsche and the environment that is mostly concerned with assessing Nietzsche’s relevance to environmental ethics. The author departs from this trend by showing that Nietzsche can hardly provide the kind of intrinsic value theory typically needed to ground an environmental ethic. The author then suggests that an environmentalist reading of Nietzsche has much to gain from closer attention to his concept of “earth” and briefly outlines the evolution of this concept throughout the Nietzschean corpus. The author concludes by coming back to Zarathustra’s mysterious claim that “the overhuman shall be the meaning of the earth” and clarifying how, though it should not be thought of as a new foundation for an environmental ethic, it might still be significant in the context of the Anthropocene.

The Value of Unity

The Value of Unity

Three Errors in the Substance View's Defense

Abstract According to the theory of intrinsic value and moral standing known as the \substance view," all human beings have intrinsic value, full moral standing and, with these, a right to life. The substance view has been defended by numerous contemporary philosophers who use the theory to argue that the standard human fetus has a right to life and, ultimately, that abortion is prima facie seriously wrong. In this paper, I identify three important errors committed by some of these philosophers in their defense of the theory|what I refer to as the \extratheoretical-proposition error," \quantitative-differences error," and \non-normative-answer error"|and conclude that these errors render their defense inadequate.

Is there a need for intrinsic values in conservation biology?

Conservation biology has amongst its aims the conservation of the biologically valuable. As a consequence, some underlying theory of value is invoked. Clear challenges to orthodox value theory have been on the table for some time now, with some arguing for recognition of intrinsic values in nature, and some conservation biologists subsequently drawing on such a view. However, this development of value theory has recently been criticised for lacking sufficient clarity and failing to serve the needs of decision-making in conservation biology. These criticisms serve to highlight confusion and difficulties in the development of a coherent and efficacious theory of intrinsic value for application in decision-making. They do not, however, count as sufficient grounds for the rejection of such a theory. Sylvan appears to offer a theory that avoids the criticisms made. The debate here is instructive in clearing away some of the misguided claims frequently encountered in this area and in seeing the value in Sylvan’s “deep green theory”.

The Substance View: A Critique (Part 3).

In my articles 'The Substance View: A Critique' and 'The Substance View: A Critique (Part 2),' I raise objections to the substance view (naturally), a theory of intrinsic value and moral standing defended by a number of contemporary moral philosophers, including Robert P. George, Patrick Lee, Christopher Tollefsen, and Francis Beckwith. In part one of my critique of the substance view, I raise reductio-style objections to the substance view's conclusion that the standard human fetus has the same intrinsic value and moral standing as the standard adult human being, among other human beings. In part two, I raise objections to some of the premises invoked in support of that conclusion. Here, in part three, I raise objections to Henrik Friberg-Fernros's attempt to rebut some of the aforementioned objections.

A Study on the Theory of Intrinsic Value and Rights of Nonanthropocentric Environmental Ethics

A Study on the Theory of Intrinsic Value and Rights of Nonanthropocentric Environmental Ethics

Nobel Price for Father of the Efficient Market Hypothesis

Nobel Price for Father of the Efficient Market Hypothesis

The Turn of the Skew: Pragmatism, Environmental Philosophy and the Ghost of William James

This paper addresses two issues: the controversy over pragmatism in environmental philosophy, and the habitual exclusion of William James's work from serious examination. Addressing critiques of pragmatic naturalism from Max Horkheimer, Eugene Hargrove and Holmes Rolston, I argue that their criticisms misfire, primarily due to skewed perception derived from mis-interpretative projections of views to which pragmatism is not committed. I conclude that the critics' major concerns are largely groundless, but that greater emphasis on pragmatism's experiential aspect would clarify this.1. IntroductionThe possibility that pragmatism might offer a new, better direction for environmental ethics was first raised by Anthony Weston in a path-breaking paper in 1985,1 since which time a significant debate between pragmatists and anti-pragmatists has affected the whole field. Arguments on the pragmatist side have tended to criticize the high level of abstraction found within environmental ethics, often arguing against the practical helpfulness of the habitual stress on theoretical axiology, especially intrinsic value theory.In place of these axiological emphases, pragmatists have urged a greater and more pluralist attendance to specifics of particular environmental problems, and aimed at a greater emphasis on practical policy convergence in political terms. Thus Weston urges a pragmatic multicentrism and a plurality of revisioning options for our everyday relationships to the natural world; Andrew Light has suggested a metaphilosophical pragmatism that may help separate wheat from chaff in otherwise interminable theoretical debates, and Bryan Norton has advocated a convergence hypothesis on policy that tries to defuse the tensions between anthropocentric and nonanthropocentric varieties of environmental concern as well as attempting to justify strong conceptions of sustainability in broadly pragmatic terms. On the anti-pragmatist side, J. Baird Callicott has stoutly defended the emphasis on axiology and intrinsic value theory for its radical potential, repudiating pragmatic pluralism in the process, whilst figures such as Eric Katz, Holmes Rolston and Eugene Hargrove have criticized what they perceive as excessive anthropocentrism, subjectivism and instrumentalism within pragmatism. The pragmatist perspective has also attracted hostility outside North America, with similar but more overtly political suspicions of American pragmatism to those of Callicott, Rolston and Hargrove coming from the European left, where the pragmatic connection of truth with success and utility has drawn fire.Accordingly, a range of anti-pragmatist critics exist, and part of what is striking about their criticisms from a pragmatist perspective is the extent to which the complaints have continuously repeated the same broad themes in response to answers. Thus it remains common for critics to assume a radical incompatibility between pragmatism and intrinsic value theory, despite Hugh McDonald's demonstration that Deweyan ethics actually includes intrinsic value concepts.4 Similarly, the view of pragmatism as subjectivist and thus antinaturalistic is frequently taken for granted, as is the claim that pragmatism is anti-theoretical. This last view, which (as we shall see) is in fact a reheating of quite an old charge, has been maintained by Callicott in his attacks on pragmatism,5 and in fairness, it must be conceded that many environmental pragmatists' fixation on policy and management may have contributed to the view that pragmatism offers little room for intellectual novelty or theory. A similar case obtains, as we shall see, in relation to the lack of attention to the Jamesian tradition,6 where pragmatists themselves may have internalized the view of William James as an anti-naturalistic subjectivist. Thus, even Paul Thompson and Thomas Hilde' s compilation of essays on American pragmatism and the agrarian tradition, which finds room for such figures as Benjamin Franklin and John Steinbeck as well as the more familiar names of Jefferson, Emerson, Thoreau, Royce, Peirce and Dewey, gives only passing mention to James. …

THE SUBSTANCE VIEW: A CRITIQUE

According to the theory of intrinsic value and moral standing called the 'substance view,' what makes it prima facie seriously wrong to kill adult human beings, human infants, and even human fetuses is the possession of the essential property of the basic capacity for rational moral agency - a capacity for rational moral agency in root form and thereby not remotely exercisable. In this critique, I cover three distinct reductio charges directed at the substance view's conclusion that human fetuses have the same intrinsic value and moral standing as adult human beings. After giving consideration to defenders of the substance view's replies to these charges, I then critique each of them, ultimately concluding that none is successful. Of course, in order to understand all of these things - the reductio charges, defenders of the substance view's replies to them, and my criticisms of their replies - one must have a better understanding of the substance view (in particular, its understanding of rational moral agency) as well as its defense. Accordingly, I address the substance view's understanding of rational moral agency as well as present its defense.

World and Earth: Hannah Arendt and the Human Relationship to Nature

In place of traditional approaches in environmental ethics, I suggest an improved approach, with respect to the goal of improving the condition of the natural environment, called ‘world mediation’ through the use of Hannah Arendt's theory of the vita activa. This approach focuses on the relationship between human made worlds and nature, from which a theory of value is suggested. Intrinsic value theory and nature–culture monism are both criticized for an insufficient attention paid toward the human–nature relationship.

Beyond Positivist Ecology: Toward an Integrated Ecological Ethics

A post-positivist understanding of ecological science and the call for an "ecological ethic" indicate the need for a radically new approach to evaluating environmental change. The positivist view of science cannot capture the essence of environmental sciences because the recent work of "reflexive" ecological modelers shows that this requires a reconceptualization of the way in which values and ecological models interact in scientific process. Reflexive modelers are ecological modelers who believe it is appropriate for ecologists to examine the motives for their choices in developing models; this self-reflexive approach opens the door to a new way of integrating values into public discourse and to a more comprehensive approach to evaluating ecological change. This reflexive building of ecological models is introduced through the transformative simile of Aldo Leopold, which shows that learning to "think like a mountain" involves a shift in both ecological modeling and in values and responsibility. An adequate, interdisciplinary approach to ecological valuation, requires a re-framing of the evaluation questions in entirely new ways, i.e., a review of the current status of interdisciplinary value theory with respect to ecological values reveals that neither of the widely accepted theories of environmental value-neither economic utilitarianism nor intrinsic value theory (environmental ethics)-provides a foundation for an ecologically sensitive evaluation process. Thus, a new, ecologically sensitive, and more comprehensive approach to evaluating ecological change would include an examination of the metaphors that motivate the models used to describe environmental change.

Is the esse of intrinsic value percipi?: pleasure, pain and value

In this paper I shall speak sympathetically of a hedonistic theory of intrinsic value which, ignoring any other such theories, I shall simply call the hedonistic theory of value. How far I am finally committed to it will partly appear at the end.

Biodiversity and environmental values: in search of a universal earth ethic

While biodiversity protection has become a widely accepted goal of environmental protectionists, no such agreement exists regarding why it is important. Two, competing theories of natural value – here called ‘Economism’ and ‘Intrinsic Value Theory’ – are often cited to support the goal. Environmentalists, who have recently proposed the articulation of a universal ‘Earth Charter’ to express the shared values humans derive from nature, have cited both of these theories as support for biodivesity protection. Unfortunately these theories, which are expressed as polar opposites, do not work well together and the question arises: is there a shared value that humans place on nature? It is argued that these two value theories share four questionable assumptions: (1) a sharp distinction between ‘intrinsic’ and ‘instrumental’ value; (2) an entity orientation; (3) moral monism; and (4) placeless evaluation. If these four assumptions are denied, an alternative value system emerges which recognizes a continuum of ways humans value nature, values processes rather than only entities, is pluralistic, and values biodiversity in place. An alternative theory of value, which emphasizes protecting processes rather than protecting objects, and which values nature for the creativity of its processes, is proposed as a more attractive theory for expressing the universal values of nature that should motivate an Earth Charter and the goal of biodiversity protection.

Moral Knowledge and Ethical Character.

This book presents an ethical theory that uniquely integrates naturalistic and rationalistic elements. Robert Audi develops his theory in four areas: moral epistemology, the metaphysics of ethics, moral psychology, and the foundations of ethics. Comprising both new and published work, the book sets forth a moderate intuitionism, clarifies the relation between reason and motivation, constructs a theory of intrinsic value and its place in moral obligation, and presents a sophisticated account of moral justification. The concluding chapter articulates a new normative framework built from both Kantian and intuitionist elements. Connecting ethics in novel ways to both the theory of value and the philosophy of action, the essays explore topics such as ethical intuition, reason and judgement, and virtue. Audi also considers major views in the history of ethics, including those of Aristotle, Hume, Kant, Mill, Moore, and W. D. Ross, and engages contemporary work on autonomy, responsibility, objectivity, reasons, and other issues. Clear and conceptually rich, this book makes vital reading for students and scholars of ethics.

Intrinsic Value as a Reason for the Preservation of Minority Cultures

In the Netherlands, the policy of supporting the efforts of ethnic-cultural minorities to express and preserve their cultural distinctiveness, is nowadays considered as problematic because it might interfere with their integration into the wider society. The primary aim is now to reduce these groups' unemployment rate and to stimulate their participation in the wider society. In this article I consider how the notion of the intrinsic value of cultures, if sensible, might affect the policy regarding ethnic-cultural minorities. I develop a theory of intrinsic value of culture, as an analogy of the theory of intrinsic value of non-human natural entities. My conclusion is that the dominant cultural group in the Netherlands should preserve clearly deviant minority cultures which have considerable intrinsic value.

An approach to a theory of intrinsic value

In Section I a theory of intrinsic value is constructed. Since this theory shares, in part, the general approach of the theory developed by Warren S. Quinn', this section begins with a critical discussion of Quinn's theory. In Section II the results of Section I are compared with Chisholm's theory of intrinsic value.2 Certain criticisms of Chisholm's theory are advanced. It is also seen how a difficulty which has been discussed by Aqvist3 is avoided by the theory constructed here. In Section III Moore's Principle of Organic Unities is discussed. It is seen how this principle, if true, would force a generalization of the theory developed in this paper.