Theory Of International Justice Research Articles

The Dilemma of Realistic Utopia: On the Conception of “Peoples” in Rawls’s Theory of International Justice

The Dilemma of Realistic Utopia: On the Conception of “Peoples” in Rawls’s Theory of International Justice

Rawls’ Theory of International Justice: A Brief Reconstruction and Critical Commentary

The aim of this paper is to offer a concise and faithful account of Rawls’ theory of international justice, in an effort, first, to elucidate the structure of the argument that is advanced in that theory and, second, to present a critical assessment of it. The critical assessment section attempts, on the one side, to cope with crucial methodological issues, which have a more general bearing upon Rawls’ overall political philosophical position, including the constructivist perspective of theory making and the division between a political conception and a comprehensive doctrine; on the other side, to weigh up a set of substantive claims made in the Rawlsian theory of international justice, including the recognition of peoples as the fundamental subjects of international law, the toleration of the so-called decent peoples and the considerably thin construal of human rights encompassed in The Law of Peoples. The paper attempts to provide a series of reasons that could be well-suited to explicate its author’s doubts about the soundness of the Rawlsian theoretical perspective with regard to both its formal methodological features and its more content-oriented convictions.

Rawls' Theory of International Justice: A Brief Reconstruction and Critical Commentary

The aim of this paper is to offer a concise and faithful account of Rawls’ theory of international justice, in an effort, first, to elucidate the structure of the argument that is advanced in that theory and, second, to present a critical assessment of it. The critical assessment section attempts, on the one side, to cope with crucial methodological issues, which have a more general bearing upon Rawls’ overall political philosophical position, including the constructivist perspective of theory making and the division between a political conception and a comprehensive doctrine; on the other side, to weigh up a set of substantive claims made in the Rawlsian theory of international justice, including the recognition of peoples as the fundamental subjects of international law, the toleration of the so-called decent peoples and the considerably thin construal of human rights encompassed in The Law of Peoples. The paper attempts to provide a series of reasons that could be well-suited to explicate its author’s doubts about the soundness of the Rawlsian theoretical perspective with regard to both its formal methodological features and its more content-oriented convictions.

The concept of evidence in the international judicial process

This article discusses evidence in the judicial process as the information serving as grounds for court’s decision. In the international judicial process, which mostly of challenge character, significant role belongs to the sides, and the sides present the courts with information that substantiates each of their positions. The court, being an independent body, evaluates and selects information that it considers necessary to hear the case. It is advanced that the theory of international justice still lacks established and generally accepted procedure for selection of information. Such rules are formed in the judicial process and admissibility of these rules by the states or other subjects of international law. This work highlights the importance of determining comparable approaches towards the process of evidence in various international judicial bodies. Special attention is given to the issues of distribution of the burden of proof, methods, forms and standards of evidence applicable in the international judicial process.

The European Union as a Tolerant Actor

Although we associate toleration with the norms and institutions needed to navigate moral conflict within individual states, John Rawls has proposed an international norm of toleration as part of his theory of international justice. While Rawls’s approach is ultimately untenable, I argue that the European Union can benefit from thinking about its external action for global justice in terms of toleration. In part, this is because the standard approaches to toleration—classical, neutral and toleration as recognition—have strong, if uneven, affinities with the three approaches to global justice identified by GLOBUS. After considering the implications of all three theories of toleration and global justice for the EU’s external action, I argue that the EU is unable to engage in the strong recognition of cultures and practices that conflict with its values that is urged by both toleration and justice as recognition. The EU’s strong commitment to its values and the exigencies of its external action require that it not abandon these values in its foreign policy or the international systems that promote them. Nevertheless, the EU can engage in some practices of recognition that avoid the deficiencies of approaches—like ‘justice as non-domination’ and ‘justice as impartiality’—that do not include recognition as an essential part. This form of recognition focuses on including individuals, groups and states on the basis of their membership of a group entitled to recognition and inclusion, not as adherents or representatives of conflicting cultural and religious values and practices.

A Stability Interpretation of Rawls’s The Law of Peoples

In this essay, I propose an interpretation of John Rawls’s The Law of Peoples that puts the stability of liberal societies as the central organizing idea of its principles. I start by critically examining other interpretations currently found in the literature. I observe two characteristics of Rawls’s conception of stability from his political turn: stability for the right reasons and in the right way. In the main body of the essay, I argue that the absence of a global egalitarian principle is compatible with the stability of liberal peoples, that the toleration of decent peoples is conducive to the stability of liberal peoples, and that the universal enforcement of human rights and assistance to burdened societies are rationally required for the stability of liberal peoples. I clarify the meaning of the centrality of peace and stability, and explain why it is not conspicuous but still unsurprising given Rawls’s personal history and the development of his theory of international justice. I conclude by suggesting how the stability interpretation paves the way for further extensions of Rawls’s theory of justice and assessing the practical value of The Law of Peoples.

In defense of the duty to assist: a response to critics on the viability of a Rawlsian approach to climate change

One test of the practical relevance of any theory of international justice will be to apply it to the case of global climate change. Several thinkers have already dismissed John Rawls’s Law of Peoples as a possible candidate for helping to manage this problem, arguing, among other things, that it demands too little, too late. This paper revisits and defends the Rawlsian framework as a viable approach to managing climate change. In particular, it argues that the duty to assist (the eighth principle of the Law of Peoples) may actually be an invaluable resource for dealing with the now inevitable consequences of global climate change.

The Law of Peoples and Global Justice: Beyond the Liberal Nationalism of John Rawls

The Law of Peoples and Global Justice: Beyond the Liberal Nationalism of John Rawls The paper deals with the relation of a theory of international justice, specifically John Rawls's philosophy of the law of peoples, and a theory of global justice. In the first part, the paper outlines Rawls's main theses on the international conception of the law of peoples. The second part concerns a problem found in segments of Rawls's theory, specifically his concept of a social contract—contractualism. This problem inadequately approaches the relationship between the individual and the community. The third part deals with the inconsistent points in Rawls's theory contained in part two, i.e. his principles of justice selected with the aid of social contract. In the fourth part, the paper concentrates on the consequences of these limitations for a socially distributive dimension of justice or as an approach for dealing with disproportionate global inequalities. The last part formulates the causes of the limitations of Rawls's theory of international justice and points out the need for a global justice which is socially and inter-culturally considerate.

Health and justice in our non-ideal world

In this article, I explore some advantages of viewing well-being in terms of an individual's health status. Principally, I argue that this perspective makes it easier to establish that rich countries at least have an obligation to transfer 1 percent of their GDP to poor countries. If properly targeted at the fundamental determinants of health in developing countries, this transfer would very plausibly yield a disproportionate `bang for the buck' in terms of individual well-being. This helps to explain how the obligation can be both light enough in its burden on the rich to avoid being `too demanding' and yet also bountiful enough in its effects to be worthy of the status of a `minimum obligation'. The advantages I enunciate are particularly relevant to establishing an obligation in the context of a non-ideal theory of international justice, which aims to set interim targets for practical action before an ideal theory has been settled.

A Comment on J. Rawls' Theory of International Justice

A Comment on J. Rawls' Theory of International Justice

International Justice, Human Rights and Neutrality

A number of theorists have tried to resolve the tension between a western-oriented liberal scheme of human rights and an account that accommodates different political systems and constitutional ideals than the liberal one. One important way the tension has been addressed is through a “neutral” or tolerant, notion of human rights, as present in the work of Rawls, Scanlon and Buchanan. In this paper I argue that neutrality cannot by itself explain the difference between rights considered appropriate for liberal states and rights considered to be human rights proper. The central arguments used by neutralist theorists presuppose, rather than justify, this differential treatment. Instead, that difference can be understood only by reference to the purpose of human rights as distinct from the constitutional rights of a liberal state. This requires us to reassess the point and purpose of a theory of international justice, in contrast to justice for a domestic and politically separate society. In the case of a theorist like Rawls, human rights represent guides to the foreign policy of a liberal state, rather than to principles by which all states are expected to abide. That is because of Rawls’ acceptance that no common, authoritative, third-party, institutions capable of imposing duties on all agents uniformly exist or can exist. This also makes his theory inherently conservative about human rights, given that they are simply to act as a guide to which states can be treated as legitimate when it comes to liberal foreign policy: those that possess institutions that can be said to represent a peoples, rather than being imposed through violence. This standard is lower than the ideal set of rights extended to all in a liberal society.

Theories of International Justice

A late-twentieth century political theorist presented with an essay on ‘Theories of Justice’ would be able to predict with some confidence what he or she was about to read. Justice is widely acknowledged to be a legitimate topic for political theory, and there are a number of recent studies which are exemplary as to content and style – most obviously the work of Rawls, but also of, amongst others, Nozick, Walzer, Sandel, Scanlon and Barry. These exemplary studies have generated an extensive secondary literature: the major figures in the ‘ Justice’ industry comment upon and develop each others work, and are, in turn, the subject of commentary by the next generation. Obviously there is, as yet, no consensus as to the actual nature of justice, but there is quite general agreement as to how to go about investigating the subject. In short, this is, to apply a Rawlsian term, a ‘well-ordered’, professional, branch of political theory – and Rawls is an appropriate reference point here, since the professionalism of this discourse is largely attributable to the central role played by his work and the literature it has generated.An excellent example of such an essay would be David Miller, ‘Review Article: Recent Theories of Social Justice’, British Journal of Political Science, 21(1991), 371–91.John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971), and Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993); Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1974); Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1983); Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982); Thomas Scanlon, ‘Contractualism and Utilitarianism’ in Amartya Sen and Bernard Williams, eds, Utilitarianism and Beyond (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), pp. 103–28; Brian Barry, Theories of Justice (Hemel Hempstead, Herts: Harvester-Wheatsheaf, 1989); and Justice as Impartiality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995).See Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 453. The dominance of Rawls can, of course, be exaggerated, and there are important contemporary writers who do not simply disagree with his account of justice, but regard his project as misconceived; see, for example, Alasdair MacIntyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (London: Duckworth, 1988).

Towards a theory of international justice

Towards a theory of international justice