Theory Of Historical Knowledge Research Articles

Index and Image

AbstractAlthough Walter Benjamin anticipated a confrontation with Martin Heidegger regarding the theory of historical knowledge, this confrontation was never fully elaborated. This essay contributes to filling out this lacuna by arguing that Benjamin’s concept of the dialectical image was conceived as a phenomenological corrective to Heidegger’s historicity. To clarify the phenomenological sources of Benjamin’s conception of the image, it reads the traces of Benjamin’s engagement with the early phenomenologist Jean Héring in the first sentences of entry “N3,1” in Das Passagen-Werk, where Benjamin presents his notion of the image in explicit opposition to Heidegger. The essay argues that Benjamin relied on Héring’s notion of phenomenological essences as indexically individuated to conceptualize the historical index of the image and to provide a better (i.e., more concrete) way of “saving history for phenomenology” than Heidegger’s historicity. By tracking Benjamin’s debts and departures from Héring, this essay prepares the ground for a reconstruction of Benjamin’s confrontation with Heidegger and argues for the relevance of Benjamin’s conception of history for contemporary critiques of historicism.

Machiavelli and Guicciardini: Intellectual History as Theory of Historical Knowledge

This article demonstrates the review of the international conference Machiavelli and Guicciardini: at the origin of Early Modern historical science, which was organized with the participation of the Institute of World History of the Russian Academy of Sciences, The Italian Institute of Culture in Moscow, Poletayev institute for theoretical and historical studies in the humanities (IGITI), The School of General and Applied Philology (SGAP), and The School of Philosophy. The conference took place in Moscow, September 23-25, 2019. The review considers the way intellectual history interconnects with contemporary theory and methodology of history while both of them refer to Machiavelli and Guicciardini. The review shows the role of Machiavelli and Guicciardini's political context, as well as the role of ideas of the historical science`s method in the 16th-18th centuries, for this interconnection.

К осмыслению истории вчера и сегодня

The article by the editor-in-chief of the Vlast’ journal raises topical issues of the deformation of historical narrative in contemporary political and scientific discourse, which resulted in real memory wars, especially around falsification of fundamental issues of the World War II. A serious answer is required based on unconditional, objective facts and documents. The author insists on using the rich heritage of domestic historians to preserve historical memory, considering this a task not only scientific, but also political one. In this regard, the monograph by Yu.A. Vasil’ev «Theory and Methods in the Russian Historical School: Theory of Historical Knowledge, Theory of the Historical Process, Psychological Direction», which presents the theoretical foundations of the Russian historical school is well-timed. Today it is necessary to use the ideas and concepts of Russian historians to overcome intellectual inertia and ensure a truly scientific reconstruction of the past.

Methodology or philosophy of history? Qualifying A.S. Lappo-Danilevsky's Theory of Historical Knowledge

Methodology or philosophy of history? Qualifying A.S. Lappo-Danilevsky's Theory of Historical Knowledge

Понимание проблемы ценности в теории исторического процесса

<p>Актуальность проблемы ценности сегодня связана с активизацией исторической памяти как функции исторического познания, c осмыслением феномена забвения и «опыта разрыва» в истории. В публикации представлен анализ проблемы ценности в теории исторического знания, основанный на концепции российского методолога и теоретика истории А. С. Лаппо-Данилевского.</p><p>Проанализированы концепты обоснованной ценности и общепризнанной ценности. Автор осмысляет критерий действенности исторических фактов (масштаб и силу их влияния и воздействия на развитие общества), ценность индивидуальности, положительное и отрицательное значение ценности. Всеобщее значение факта определяется на основе качественного критерия (общего признания), историческое же значение он приобретает в случае реального воздействия и влияния на развитие общества. Аксиологический анализ ценности основан на использовании не только познавательной, но и других инструментальных парадигм — этической, эстетической и пр. Признание ценности исторического факта сопровождается его изучением с причинно-следственной точки зрения.</p><p>Автор приводит классификацию типов забвения. Часть исторического материала из повседневной жизни прошлого не имеет значения для современности, поскольку не связана с настоящей идентичностью. Другой тип забвения обусловлен недостаточным знанием причинных факторов, имевших решающее значение в прошлом. Третий тип забвения объясняется чрезмерной степенью травматичности событий в исторической памяти для общественного сознания. Наконец, забвение может порождаться обретением новой идентичности в процессе отказа от старого мира. </p><p>Разрыв между историческим знанием и общественным сознанием необходимо преодолевать. Это связано также с проблемой ценности в истории. Об этом еще во второй половине XIX в. писал русский историк В. О. Ключевский. Для преодоления указанного разрыва требуется два условия: разработка исторического материала с целью возможности его усвоения общественным сознанием; готовность общества к изучению истории, обусловленная назревшей потребностью и необходимостью. В осмыслении так называемых трудных вопросов истории России необходимо понимание взаимосвязи проблемы ценности с российской идентичностью. </p>

Theoretical and Methodological Conceptualization of the Western Historiosophical Thinking

The object of research is the historical dimension of human existence in the context of the dynamics of Western thinking. The author analyzes the major trends in the development of Western historiosophical mind. The theory of historical knowledge – historical epistemology – was used to research the problem. It was used as a ground to show how fundamental issues of the human natural being were raised and solved: in particular, the issues of the ontological status of history (the “what” of the history), of the mechanisms of its functioning (the “how” of the history), of its direction (the “where” of the history), of its unity and multiplicity (the “how much” of the history), of its spatiotemporal certainty (the “where” and the “when” of the history). All the variety of these issues that sound in the context of philosophical reflection concerning the historical process comes together to a focus in the formulation of the problem of the meaning and purpose of history. The author concludes that the philosopher does not deliberately invent the theoretical matrix of understanding the history, but finds it in the conscious of the contemporary era and uses to construct meaningful structures of historical movement. In accordance with the dominant of the social consciousness of a certain era – in the framework of a theoretical understanding of history – its “dominant” historiosophema emerges. Their research is important in the theory of historical knowledge. DOI: 10.5901/mjss.2015.v6n4s1p406

Historismus Redivivus: A New Dilthey?

After a period of relative eclipse, study of Wilhelm (1833-1911) has recently been enriched by new sources and perspectives. This resurgence may prove to be a mixed blessing, as results have tended to complicate an already muddled picture. No doubt will continue to be generally known by various epithets father of intellectual the Kant of history and humanistic disciplines, or simply-to bring figure closer to home-the German William James. At specific level, beyond metaphors and generalities, however, need for careful investigation is more apparent than ever. The view of which has prevailed in last twenty years derives to a large extent from contemporary preoccupations and polemics. His notoriety is thereby assured, but only at cost of misrepresenting many aspects of his thought, including his key concepts of (Verstehen) and lived experience (Erlebnis). Since superb and scrupulous study of H. A. Hodges (The Philosophy of Wilhelin Dilthev [London, 1952]), scholarship has been forced increasingly onto a kind of procrustean double bed: in Germany, is featured prominently in so-called new Metliodenstreit (defined loosely as triangular conflict among neoMarxians, Weberians, and Heideggerians); in Anglo-American circles, his name is often invoked in ritualized dispute between proponents of hardheaded scientific explanation and defenders of a more empathic (and allegedly more humane) understanding or participant observation. Whatever their special theoretical merits for historians and social scientists, it must be said that has served these polemics better than they have served him. Admittedly, Proteus Dilthey offers grist to every academic mill, and his amorphous writings in history, psychology, epistemology, and hermeneutics (interpretation theory) seem to invite, even require, procrustean strategy. The more recent controversies have, however, entailed some serious and unwarranted distortions. In this situation it is necessary to return to basics-to look at his thought 'in its own terms, as he was fond of saying. These terms can no longer mean simply bits and snatches from a couple of volumes of Geswlnlnielte Schriften but, rather, thorough investigation of entire corpus, which now includes seventeen volumes and is projected to reach an eventual twenty. In keeping with his rule that follows practice,' Dilthey's actual historiography needs to be studied along with his theory of historical knowledge. The full scope of such an undertaking emerges from recent Bibliogriphlii Wi/lie/ll Dilthev (Weinheim, 1969) carefully compiled and organized by Ulrich Herrmann. The fact that Dilthey's writings were for most part assembled and organized after his death compounds problem by suggesting certain turns and reversals in his thought. The growing but semidigested state of materials militates against any easy conclusions. The interpreter appears left with a dilemma: either minute piceework or hazardous exposition in toto.

The Ideological Valences of Twentieth-Century Historicism

It was only after 1920, when productive season of contemporary historicism had drawn to a close, that problem of determining distinctive features of historicism and of explicitly stating what historicism is began to be considered. And in answers given to this problem by its most important representatives, historicism presented itself as a general philosophical conception, as a Weltanschauung which radically transforms consideration of history and penetrates all fields of life. Authors like Troeltsch and Meinecke, Mannheim and Croce agree that historicism is not only a theory of historical knowledge, a methodology of socio-historical sciences, but marks as well a decisive turning point in understanding of reality in fact, specifically modern conception of world, result of a centuries-old historical process. In a text dated 1910-1911, Dilthey already stated that the historical awareness of finitude of all historical phenomena, of every human or social situation, consciousness of relativity of every sort of belief is final step towards liberation of man;' it also shows in historical conscience condition of overcoming anarchy of philosophical systems. Some ten years later, following World War and trauma of German defeat, Ernst Troeltsch characterized crisis of historicism as being crisis of general philosophical presuppositions of historical thought, and therefore not as a crisis of historical knowledge but of its significance for conception of world. For Troeltsch, too, historicization of knowledge represented conclusion of development of modern thought; and so termination of historicism in a relativistic skepsis appears to be in Der Historismus und seine Probleme (1922) sign of a crisis involving fundamental presuppositions of modern culture. In similar terms, but in a decidedly positive

Pragmatism as a Theory of Historical Knowledge: John Dewey on the Nature of Historical Inquiry

Pragmatism as a Theory of Historical Knowledge: John Dewey on the Nature of Historical Inquiry Burleigh Taylor Wilkins Burleigh Taylor Wilkins Massachusetts Institute of Technology Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The American Historical Review, Volume 64, Issue 4, July 1959, Pages 878–890, https://doi.org/10.1086/ahr/64.4.878 Published: 01 July 1959

Pragmatism as a Theory of Historical Knowledge: John Dewey on the Nature of Historical Inquiry

WITHIN American academic circles pragmatism is passe. Lecture halls that once reverberated with words such as experimentalism and experience} are now filled with essence and existence. Perhaps we are all the wiser for it, because no one would want to hear the same words forever, not even essence and existence. Historians, however, have a duty to treat the past with an understanding that tries to be more profound than fashionable, and when American historians speak of pragmatism they should not overlook the fact that they are at once referring to the only major American contribution to Western thought and to a philosophy that has informed the spirit and presuppositions of modern American historiography. The late R. G. Collingwood melodramatically accused empiricists of participating in a conspiracy of silence where the problem of historical knowledge is concerned; no such accusation could be made against the pragmatists. Also, both George Herbert Mead and John Dewey were historians of a sort and even the highly abstract Charles S. Peirce was concerned with the historical or social fixation of belief and habit. It may be argued, as does the author of this essay in a forthcoming study of Carl Becker, that pragmatism is indeed the philosophy of some of the key American historians in the first half of the twentieth century. If this be so, the reflections on historical method of John Dewey, the cardinal pragmatist of our century, clearly assume a wider significance than their intrinsic quality might suggest. We sorely need, at this moment in the history of pragmatism, a study of how Dewey actually wrote about the history of philosophy, as

Collingwood's theory of historical knowledge

Collingwood's theory of historical knowledge