Counterinsurgency Theory Research Articles

Relationship between Coup-proofing and Counterinsurgency

Theories of coup-proofng and counterinsurgency have received increased attention in recent years.1 However, minimal research has been conducted to determine if a causal relationship exists between the two theories. Therefore, this dissertation endeavors to broaden both theories by drawing insights into how coup-proofng measures impact strategic approaches and operational efcacy in counterinsurgency campaigns. To accomplish this task, this dissertation analyzes the case of the Islamic Republic of Iran and its counterinsurgency campaign in the province of Sistan va Baluchestan. This case tests the hypothesis that coup proofing has caused Iran to adopt a coercive-repressive approach to counterinsurgency, and diminished its operational performance. Following a case study analysis and conclusions regarding the hypothesis, I further outline these fndings and discuss their applicability to other cases. I also place my research within the context of broader coup-proofng and counterinsurgency theory, linking it to ongoing debates in each feld. Though the conclusions drawn are in the context of Iran, the case provides a jumping-of point for further research.

Bangsamoro Separatism and Classical Counterinsurgency: Reconsidering Revolutionary War in the Southern Philippines

The dominant history of Muslim armed separatism in the Philippines obscures the insurgency’s character. Insurgents espouse revolutionary war, even though this mischaracterizes the interests constituted in the insurgent cause. Patricio Abinales’ critiques of the orthodoxy are applied to disambiguate the Bangsamoro cause, highlighting the insurgency’s concurrent supralocal and local logics. Supralocal-local dissonance is reconciled by recasting the Bangsamoro cause as a supralocal-local bargain through Stathis Kalyvas’ concept of alliance, retaining classical counterinsurgency theory’s macropolitical locus but imbued with cognizance of the insurgency’s micropolitics. This approach challenges the perceived finality of the insurgency after the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao.

The asymmetry of Laos conflict in the views of the RAND Corporation experts (1960–1973)

The paper deals with analytical reports prepared by the experts of the RAND Corporation on the Secret War in Laos (19601973) between the Royal Laotian Army, tacit living in the United States, and the communist movement Patet Lao, which received assistance from the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. Initially, it was Laos, not Vietnam that was the strategic and important region of Southeast Asia in the concept of domino theory of the US policy. A vivid example is the study of Laos in the RAND Corporation, which began earlier than the study of Vietnam. Analyst reports were created on the basis of geography, demography, geology, economics, etc. The paper addresses reports on the development of the military-political situation in Laos by the experts of the corporation such as Joel Martin Halpern, Paul Langer and Joseph Zastoff. It is shown that a part of the research was carried out with the aim of developing the theory of counterinsurgency at the request of the Agency for Perspective Research under the Ministry of Defense of the USA for the development of a foreign policy strategy in the countries of the Third world. Special attention is paid to the connection of research on the situation in Laos with the analysis of the prospects of the American policy in Vietnam in the 1960s and early 1970s.

Theory and Practice of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency: The Case Study of Balochistan

Insurgency is a violent political struggle borne out of grievances in a local community. The phenomenon of insurgency is old and the ways of tackling insurgencies have always been studied with interest. Pakistan has faced sporadic insurgencies in its Balochistan province. This study applies conceptual framework propounded by Scott Moore to Balochistan insurgency and analyzes the complex combination of Actions triggered by varied Beliefs and Structures of the Baloch society. In order to employ effective countermeasures to insurgency, an integrated approach needs to be worked out that seeks to create positive changes in the intertwined dimensions of Actions, Beliefs and Structures. The study finds that such an approach to handle insurgency in Balochistan has generally been successful. And the Baloch society has largely been mainstreamed in the national society and the state of Pakistan.

SÚKROMNÉ VOJENSKÉ SPOLOČNOSTI V PROTIPOVSTALECKOM BOJI:Diskusia nad konceptmi Erika Princeho

This text deals with the analysis of private military companies as an counterinsurgency actor in Afghanistan from the point of view of Erik Prince's proposal and application to the theory of David Kilcullen. The first part of the thesis deals with the theoretical and terminological definition of the basic concepts of this issue. A key part of the thesis is the subsequent analysis of the Prince's proposal and application to the theory of counterinsurgency. The conclusion of the work brings a general summary and recommendations based on the analysis.

Creating the Deserved Protection: Reflections on Civilian Joint Task Force Counter-insurgency Operations in the North-Eastern Region of Nigeria

This article considers the role of the Civilian Joint Task Force (popularly called CJTF), a group of armed local population participating in the joint battle against Boko Haram, has become a platform for recruitment into the Nigerian security institutions in north-eastern Nigeria. CJTF members have played many roles, from mostly discrete surveillance networks in the north-eastern region of Nigeria to military combat auxiliaries or semi-autonomous fighting forces in the country. For the region’s overstretched and under pressure militaries, they have somewhat filled the security gap and provided local knowledge. CJTF can be a powerful counter-insurgency tool, but there is a compelling need to confront the immediate concerns it raises, notably in terms of impunity, and to begin planning for its long-term post-conflict transformation. The article adopts Galula’s theory of counter-insurgency. It reveals several lessons in how a community-based security structure can be applied to a conventional security engagement.

All Counterinsurgency is Local: Counterinsurgency and Rebel Legitimacy

Although the concept of legitimacy is central to Western counterinsurgency theory, most discourse in this area black-boxes the concept. It hence remains under-specified in many discussions of counterinsurgency. Fortunately, recent research on rebel governance and legitimacy contributes to our understanding of the problems faced by counterinsurgents who want to boost state legitimacy while undermining that of the rebels. Taken together, this research illustrates that a rational choice approach to legitimacy is simplistic; that micro-level factors ultimately drive legitimacy dynamics; and that both cooption of existing legitimate local elites and their replacement from the top–down is unlikely to succeed. Western counterinsurgency doctrine has failed to grasp the difficulties this poses for it.

Blurred lines and false dichotomies: Integrating counterinsurgency into the UK’s domestic ‘war on terror’

The UK’s counter-terrorism strategy (CONTEST) seeks to pursue individuals involved in suspected terrorism (‘Pursue’) and seeks to minimise the risk of people becoming ‘future’ terrorists by employing policies and practices structured to pre-emptively incapacitate and socially exclude them (‘Prevent’). This article demonstrates that this two-pronged approach is based on a framework of counterinsurgency; a military doctrine used against non-state actors that encourages, amongst other things, the blanket surveillance of populations and the targeting of propaganda at them. The use of counterinsurgency theory and practice in the UK’s ‘war on terror’ blurs the distinction between Pursue and Prevent, coercion and consent, and, ultimately, civilian and combatant. This challenges the liberal claim that counter-terrorism policies, especially Prevent, are about social inclusivity or ‘safeguarding’ and that the UK government is accountable to the people.

Conceptualising the Events of 1956: The Elusive Quest for a Conveniently Simple Definition

The objective of the following article is to give the reader a perspective on the events of 1956 in Hungary – known commonly as the 1956 Hungarian Uprising or Revolution (or as it is sometimes called in Hungary: the 1956 Revolution and Freedom Fight) – from the point of view of counterinsurgency theory. The author intends to show that the current theory has many problems and shortcomings when it comes to the analysis of the events of 1956 because of the unique set of circumstances which prevailed at that time.

State violence and the colonial roots of collusion in Northern Ireland

This article considers the nature of collusion between the British state and loyalist paramilitary organisations during the conflict in Northern Ireland in the context of British counterinsurgency theory and practices in prior colonial campaigns. It briefly outlines the nature, pattern and logic of collusion in Northern Ireland before examining some of the key works of British counterinsurgency theorists – Charles Callwell, Charles Gwynn and Frank Kitson – reflecting on earlier imperial experiences. Collusion is understood as an expedient coercive state practice, premised on a ‘doctrine of necessity’, designed to remove ‘enemies’ and induce fear in a target population via a strategy of assassination in which the appearance of adherence to the rule of law is a political end shaping the specific forms of state violence involved. Such a practice, the author argues, is not an aberration in the tradition of British state counterinsurgency violence, it is exemplary.

Institutionalization of risk management framework in Islamic NGOs for suppressing terrorism financing

Purpose – The aim of this paper is to propose solutions for improving internal controls and transparency to alleviate concerns of international community over alleged linked with terrorist groups. Design/methodology/approach – The authors explore the counter-insurgency theory and political process model to explain the current state of counter-terrorism activities aimed at Islamic NGOs after 9/11. Findings – The authors believe the idea of money flow disruption to be of greater importance than freezing the accounts to suppress terrorism financing. Practical implications – Islamic NGOs established for philanthropic and humanitarian aid in third world Muslim countries have been accused of being involved in terrorism financing. This revelation is to the disadvantage of the donors who do not channel their donations for such activities. The authors propose risk management framework useful at operational level to detect and prevent welfare activities financing warfare activities. Originality/value – The proposed risk management framework is to complement various regional and international initiatives championed by Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering and Financial Action Task Force to combat money laundering and terrorist financing.

Regional Support for Afghan Insurgents: Challenges for Counterinsurgency Theory and Doctrine

ABSTRACTAfter the fall of the Taliban regime in 2001, several thousand Afghan Taliban forces fled across the border to Pakistan, and the area became a safe haven for Afghan insurgents. In 2014, the transnational dimension of the insurgency is still highly prominent. Although regional support for insurgents is not uncommon, how to counter this aspect is mostly ignored in counterinsurgency (COIN) theory and doctrines. In this article, a regional counterinsurgency framework is developed, using the regional counterinsurgency efforts in Afghanistan as an example. The framework will facilitate the systematic inclusion of regional COIN measures in theory and doctrine.

The Genesis of the “Dutch Approach” to Asymmetric Conflicts

From a theory on occupying regimes and from traditional concepts of counterinsurgency theory, the author traces back the development of the Dutch discourse regarding present day missions. The genesis of the so-called Dutch approach is studied, and the case of Uruzgan is reviewed by scrutinizing political, security, economic, and governance aspects of the use of the military in the aforementioned province of Afghanistan. The case is studied to determine whether there really is something Dutch about this approach. We learn that the “Dutch approach” is predominantly a narrative whose main objective is the appeasement of Dutch public opinion and the legitimation of Dutch policy making. At the same time and even though more comparative case studies are necessary, it seems plausible that the Dutch approach is different. But the difference is not typical Dutch; it lies in the manner of collaborating with and co-opting indigenous elites. Studying the genesis of the “Dutch approach” is therefore an analysis of a discourse and a study in operational effectiveness at the same time.

Modest, Secure, and Informed: Successful Development in Conflict Zones

Most interpretations of prevalent counterinsurgency theory imply that increasing government services reduces rebel violence. Empirically, however, development programs and economic activity sometimes increase violence. Using new panel data on development spending in Iraq, we show that violence-reducing effects of development assistance are greater when: (i) projects are small; (ii) troop strength is high; and (iii) professional development expertise is available. These findings are consistent with an information-centric (“hearts and minds”) model, which implies that violence-reduction is greatest when projects are secure, valued by community members, and services derived are conditional on government control of the territory.

Field Manual 3-24 and the Heritage of Counterinsurgency Theory

The Counterinsurgency Field Manual 3-24 has been accused of being over-dependent on the counterinsurgency ‘classics’ Galula and Thompson. But comparison reveals that it is different in spirit. Galula and Thompson seek practical control; the Manual seeks to build ‘legitimacy’. Its concept of legitimacy is superficially Weberian, but owes more to the writings of the American Max Manwaring. The Manual presupposes that a rights-based legal order can (other things being equal) be made to be cross-culturally attractive; ‘effective governance’ by itself can build legitimacy. The fusion of its methods with an ideology creates unrealistic criteria for success. Its weaknesses suggest a level of incapacity to think politically that will, in time, result in further failures.

WESTERN MILITARY CULTURE AND COUNTERINSURGENCY: AN AMBIGUOUS REALITY

Contemporary campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan once again have demonstrated that conventional armies experience many problems in adapting to counterinsurgency operations. This article seeks an explanation for those problems by exploring the conceptual background of both Western-style conventional armies and counterinsurgency. In essence, Western military culture is about fighting large-scale decisive battles with armies of other states. This contrasts strongly with counterinsurgency, which is about outbidding the insurgents for the favour of the people with a minimised use of force. The article analyses the further consequences of this conceptual clash between Western military culture and counterinsurgency in the reality of counterinsurgency warfare. It is explained that the contrast between both concepts leads to an ambiguous reality in which soldiers are aware of the specifics of counterinsurgency theory, but refer back to Western military culture for fighting counterinsurgency campaigns.

Population-centric counterinsurgency and the movement of peoples

The theory of population-centric counterinsurgency rests upon the untenable premise that the population within a theater of operations is fixed in place. By showing that people tend to move away from contested rural areas towards the relative safety and prosperity of counterinsurgent-controlled areas, this article demonstrates that this crucial premise is empirically false. Furthermore, a theory of counterinsurgent resource deployment, population movement, and incumbent strategic ineffectiveness is presented. Ultimately, the application of counterinsurgency resources actually dislocates the population from their place of residence and causes them to move into cities. When the urban areas' ability to absorb newcomers is overwhelmed, localized negative externalities emerge and can give rise to crime and insecurity. Such increased insecurity then creates an incentive for the counterinsurgency to retrench its resource use into the cities. As more physical territory is conceded to the insurgency, the relative strategic effectiveness of the counterinsurgency declines.

Atrocities in Theory and Practice: An Introduction

Classical counterinsurgency theory – written before the 19th century – has generally strongly opposed atrocities, as have theoreticians writing on how to conduct insurgencies. For a variety of reasons – ranging from pragmatic to religious or humanitarian – theoreticians of both groups have urged the lenient treatment of civilians associated with the enemy camp, although there is a marked pattern of exceptions, for example, where heretics or populations of cities refusing to surrender to besieging armies are concerned. And yet atrocities – defined here as acts of violence against the unarmed (non-combatants, or wounded or imprisoned enemy soldiers), or needlessly painful and/or humiliating treatment of enemy combatants, beyond any action needed to incapacitate or disarm them – occur frequently in small wars. Examples abound where these exhortations have been ignored, both by forces engaged in an insurgency and by forces trying to put down a rebellion. Why have so many atrocities been committed in war if so many arguments have been put forward against them? This is the basic puzzle for which the individual contributions to this special issue are seeking to find tentative answers, drawing on case studies.

From Bismarck to Petraeus: The question of the social and the Social Question in counterinsurgency

This article situates ‘population-centric’ counterinsurgency in the context of the modern rise of the social realm as a distinct form of space and mode of governance. The first part establishes the historical novelty of the concept of the social in the history of political thought and describes the ontology of the modern social realm. The second section discusses one powerful response to the ‘Social Question’ within international theory: the convergence between realpolitik and socialpolitik identified by two founders of modern realism. Max Weber developed his understanding of the requirements of political order in the context of the emerging German administrative/welfare state, or Sozialstaat, which Otto von Bismarck had founded. We focus on this case not to endorse realist political strategy but to illuminate the continuing relevance of this paradigm of social regulation, which is at work in recent US-led counterinsurgency theory and practice.

The Heroes of COIN

The conventional wisdom holds that security in Iraq only improved after Gen. David Petraeus implemented a new counterinsurgency doctrine that stressed population security instead of aggressive operations against insurgent forces. This interpretation is strikingly similar to the historiography of the Huk Rebellion, the Malayan Emergency, and the Vietnam War. In each case observers criticized initial efforts as brutal and counterproductive, only to be rescued when enlightened new leaders arrived on the scene. This article challenges the familiar hero narrative, arguing that critics routinely exaggerate the importance of leadership changes because they view conflicts as experiments in counterinsurgency rather than exercises in state-building. Whereas counterinsurgency (COIN) theory emphasizes issues like public security and government legitimacy, theorists of state-building describe a bloody and protracted competition for power under conditions approaching anarchy. The upshot is that the “heroes” of late-stage COIN might actually depend on the earlier “villains” who did the dirty work of establishing political order and coercing the population into obedience.