Theory Of Political Competition Research Articles

Towards a Renovation of the Laclauian Paradigm

This article provides a renovation of Ernesto Laclau’s theories of political competition and collective identity-building for their better application at an empirical level. It does so not as a critique but as a way to make the Laclauian approach more operational and rigorous from a methodological perspective. The key goal is to make available a form of discourse analysis that centers on the political sphere and has two key characteristics. The first is an emphasis on the role of what Antonio Gramsci called “organic ideologies” in political identity-building. The second is the differentiation between a descriptive and a subjective level of analysis. The article intends to initiate a debate on the prospects of the Laclauian approach both with its advocates and its detractors.

The Politics of Public Housing Reform: Local Government Stock Transfer in England

ABSTRACTDrawing on theories of political competition, we explore the extent to which local public housing reform reflects the ideology of local ruling parties and local political preferences. Based on the citizen candidate and median voter perspectives, we hypothesize that left-wing party rule and pro-state preferences are associated with higher levels of government-owned housing. We test these hypotheses by analyzing the levels of housing stock held by English local governments during the period 2001–14. Our findings suggest that pro-state preferences matter more than left-wing party rule for the overall extent of public housing provision. By contrast, right-wing party rule is associated with the likelihood that a local government’s housing stock will be transferred out of the public sector, but pro-market preferences do not influence this decision. The implications of the findings are discussed in the conclusion.

Political Competition in Sweden 1976-2014

The main purpose of this study is to examine political competition on the local level in Sweden and to empirically test two theories of political competition, namely whether the size of the unit affects the variation in political competition and whether socioeconomic standards affect the variation in political competition. The findings support the suggested causal mechanism between socioeconomic standards and competition. Accordingly, units with higher socioeconomic standards have a higher level of political competition. Some empirical findings also support the suggested causal mechanism between the size of the units and the political competition. The findings show that population size is a robust determinant of competition and that a larger population size affects competition positively. The findings show also that area size is a relatively robust determinant of competition and that area size has a negative effect on competition. However the negative effect is contrary to the expectations.

The dimensionality of political space: Epistemological and methodological considerations

Spatial characterizations of agents’ preferences lie at the heart of many theories of political competition. These give rise to explicitly dimensional interpretations. Parties define and differentiate themselves in terms of substantive policy issues, and the configuration of such issues that is required for a good description of political competition affects how we think substantively about the underlying political space in which parties compete. For this reason a great deal of activity in political science consists of estimating such configurations in particular real settings. We focus on three main issues in this article. First, we discuss the nature of political differences and from this construct an interpretation of the dimensionality of the political space needed to describe a given real setting, underscoring the essentially metaphorical and instrumental use of this concept. Second, we contrast ex ante and ex post interpretations of this dimensionality. Third, we illustrate potential hazards arising from the purely inductive estimation of political spaces using a spatial example from the physical world and political competition in the European Parliament as a political example.

Strangers in Politics - The Market for Good Politicians in Medieval Italy and its Lessons for Modern Democracy

Limited political competition ultimately leads to inefficient policy setting. Still contemporary democratic institutions cannot be nefit from the healing forces of market competition because candidates have to be residents and wages are politically determined. In late medieval Italy, however, the prospering city-states mostly employed foreign executive politicians, the podestas. Their history illustrates the forces of an open market in politics. Applying the method of analytic narrative, these insights are captured by economic theory of political competition, reputation building and career concerns. The paper concludes that the combination of both, electoral and market competition, substantially improves policy setting.

Multiparty democracy: elections and legislative politics

1. Multiparty democracy 2. Elections and democracy 3. A theory of political competition 4. Elections in Israel 1988-1996 5. Elections in Italy: 1992-1996 6. Elections in the Netherlands: 1979-1981 7. Elections in Britain: 1979-2005 8. Political realignments in the U.S. 9. Concluding remarks 10. References 11. Tables and figures.

The Theory of Political Competition

The Theory of Political Competition

The Economics of Violence in Latin America: A Theory of Political Competition.

Introduction A Question of Theory Latin America's Revolutions Political Entrepreneurs Political Competition The Dilemma of Political Competition Political Development and the Institutionalization of Political Entrepreneurship The Calculus of Participation Comparisons and Implications Selected Bibliography Index

The Economics of Violence in Latin America: A Theory of Political Competition

The Economics of Violence in Latin America: A Theory of Political Competition

The economics of violence in Latin America: a theory of political competition

The economics of violence in Latin America: a theory of political competition

On the theory of political competition: Comparative statics from a general allocative perspective

It is a widely held belief that interest groups respond competitively to political challenges from other groups. This view is found not only in the traditional theory of interest groups, but also in the literature on policy typologies. Though it is not necessarily supposed that groups form in response to opposition, it is believed that when groups exist, they compete.