Lucke Theory Research Articles

‘Marriage is like Gambling’: Interpreting and Narrating Stories of Hakka Chinese Indonesians’ Marriage Migration

ABSTRACT This article examines the stories of marriages between ethnic Hakka Chinese women from Singkawang, Indonesia and men in Taiwan. Initially, Indonesians described marriage as an opportunity to achieve a better life, whereas Taiwanese saw a ‘foreign spouse’ as the means to fulfil caring duties and carry on family lines. Marriage from Singkawang to Taiwan was a normative practice shaped by cultural, sociopolitical, and economic conditions, which peaked in number in the early 21st century. Yet these marriages rapidly declined in number after 2010, as Indonesia’s economy improved, and as attitudes changed when returning women told stories of failed marriages and abusive spouses and in-laws in Taiwan. Analysis of stories collected from more than 100 participants in Singkawang shows how participants interpreted ‘good’ and ‘bad’ marriages via an adaptive and malleable folk theory of fate and luck. Hence, parents can narrate themselves as passive, ill-fated participants not responsible when their daughters’ marriages turn bad. Or a woman can say that it is her fate to ‘try’ marriage and narrate herself as having agency when making decisions that test her luck. Therefore, this study deepens and enriches our understanding of the complexities and enduring impacts of marriage migration as experienced across time in Asia.

A normative theory of luck.

Psychologists have identified heuristics and biases that can cause people to make assumptions about factors that contribute to the success of individuals and firms, whose outcomes may have actually resulted primarily from randomness. Yet the interpretation of these biases becomes ambiguous when they represent reasonable cognitive shortcuts that offer certain advantages. This paper addresses this ambiguity by presenting four versions (weak, semi-weak, semi-strong, strong) of a normative theory of luck that integrates insights from psychology with the chance model approach to predict the circumstances under which performance non-monotonicity occurs: higher performance may not only indicate greater luck, but also lower expected merit or quality. The semi-strong version is illustrated by examining the decoupling of citations of academic publications and their impact, illuminating when higher citations indicate lower quality. We conclude by discussing the broader implications of a normative theory of luck, emphasizing strategies to address situations where people mistake luck for skill.

Reviewing the Interpretation of Confucian Destiny Thought from the Perspective of Moral Luck Theory

Rationalism has been occupying an important position in the interpretation of Confucian thoughts. However, it faces many limitations from the view of recent research. The theory of moral luck comes from the reflection on moral rationalism, emphasizing that the reflection on morality should return to the living world and pay attention to the context of human life and practice. This has brought new inspiration for the modern interpretation of Confucianism, especially the modern interpretation of the Confucian concept of destiny. The Confucian concept of fate advocates that people understand the “mandate of heaven” through self-cultivation and moral practice, and bravely undertake the mission they understand. The exploration of the Confucian concept of destiny is helpful for a deep understanding of important propositions such as the relationship between heaven and man in Confucianism.

Bringing to Light What’s Been Cast to the Shadows: Marginalized Relationships and Narratives at Work

The management literature is rich with theoretical and empirical insights into the processes and outcomes associated with interpersonal relationships at work. Whereas some workplace relationships and relational experiences have received a great deal of scholarly attention, others have been cast to the shadows. In this presenter symposium, we offer five papers uncovering the processes and consequences associated with taboo, counter-normative, and marginalized relational experiences in the workplace. Specifically, our symposium shines a spotlight on oft-overlooked relationships and relational experiences, including unrequited love in the workplace, workplace romances, relational experiences of Black women executives, and luck’s existence in employees’ relationships and careers. The theoretical and empirical papers included in this symposium offer novel contributions to the workplace relationships literature and its intersections with identity, careers, and gender and diversity, generating fruitful avenues for future research. A model of unrequited love in the workplace Presenter: Nikhil Awasty; Michigan State U. Presenter: Rebecca Mitchell; U. of Colorado Boulder Presenter: Lance Ferris; Michigan State U. Who I am through you: A self categorization model of dynamic romantic commitment at work Presenter: Keith Norman Leavitt; Oregon State U. Presenter: Trevor Watkins; U. of Oklahoma Risky or risqué?: The role of stigmatized identity in workplace romance formation Presenter: Emily Dunham Heaphy; U. of Massachusetts, Amherst Presenter: Emily Poulton; U. of Georgia Peer and CEO perceptions about their expectations for and challenges of senior black women Presenter: Marla Baskerville Watkins; Northeastern U. Presenter: Jamie Jocelyn Ladge; Northeastern U. Presenter: Alexis Nicole Smith; Oklahoma State U. Presenter: Pamela Carlton; Springboard – Partners in Cross Cultural Leadership Toward a theory of luck and inequality in careers Presenter: Erin Marie Reid; McMaster U. Presenter: Lakshmi Ramarajan; Harvard U.

Luck, Knowledge, and Epistemic Probability

Epistemic probability theories of luck come in two versions. They are easiest to distinguish by the epistemic property they claim eliminates luck. One view says that the property is knowledge. The other view says that the property is being guaranteed by a subject’s evidence. Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen defends the Knowledge Account (KA). He has recently argued that his view is preferable to my Epistemic Analysis of Luck (EAL), which defines luck in terms of evidential probability. In this paper, I defend EAL against Steglich-Petersen’s arguments, clarify the view, and argue for the explanatory significance of EAL with respect to some core epistemological issues. My overall goal is to show that an epistemic probability account of luck rooted in the concepts of evidence and evidential support remains a viable and fruitful overall account of luck.

Is the folk concept of luck normative?

Contemporary accounts of luck, though differing in pretty much everything, all agree that the concept of luck is descriptive as opposed to normative. This widespread agreement forms part of the framework in which debates in ethics and epistemology, where the concept of luck plays a central role, are carried out. The hypothesis put forward in the present paper is that luck attributions are sensitive to normative considerations. I report five experiments suggesting that luck attributions are influenced by the normative features of the case, and not merely by descriptive notions like agential control or modal fragility. I discuss the implications of this effect for theories of luck and debates in ethics and epistemology.

Dispositional optimism and luck attributions: Implications for philosophical theories of luck

ABSTRACTWe conducted two studies to determine whether there is a relationship between dispositional optimism and the attribution of good or bad luck to ambiguous luck scenarios. Study 1 presented five scenarios that contained both a lucky and an unlucky component, thereby making them ambiguous in regard to being an overall case of good or bad luck. Participants rated each scenario in toto on a four-point Likert scale and then completed an optimism questionnaire. The results showed a significant correlation between optimism and assignments of luck: more optimistic people rated the characters in the ambiguous scenarios as more lucky while more pessimistic people rated the same characters in the same scenarios as more unlucky. Study 2 separated the good and bad luck components of the study 1 scenarios and presented the components individually to a new group of participants. Participants rated the luckiness of each component on the same four-point scale and then completed the optimism questionnaire. We found that the luckiness of the bad luck component could be significantly predicted by their level of optimism. We discuss how these findings pose problems for philosophical accounts that treat luck as an objective property.

In defense of an epistemic probability account of luck

Many philosophers think that part of what makes an event lucky concerns how probable that event is. In this paper, I argue that an epistemic probability account of luck successfully resists recent arguments that all theories of luck, including probability theories, are subject to counterexample (Hales in Nous 50(3):490–508, 2016). I argue that an event is lucky if and only if it is significant and sufficiently improbable. An event is significant when, given some reflection, the subject would regard the event as significant, and the event’s epistemic probability, determined by the subject’s evidence, is the only kind of probability that directly bears on whether or not the event is lucky. I conclude with some lessons that are applicable to probability theorists of luck generally, including those defending non-epistemic probability theories.

Experimental evaluation onto the damping behavior of Al/SiC/RHA hybrid composites

In the present study, the damping behavior of hybrid composites has been investigated using dynamic mechanical analyzer (DMA). The composites were fabricated with 2, 4, 6, and 8% by weight of rice husk ash (RHA) and SiC in equal proportions using two stage stir casting process. Damping measurements of all the specimens were obtained by dynamic mechanical analyzer (DMA) at different frequencies in air atmosphere. Scanning electron microscope (model JSM-6610LV) was used to study the microstructural characterization of the hybrid composites. It was observed that the dislocation density, which results from the thermal mismatch between the reinforcement and the matrix and the porosity of composites, has a great influence on the damping capacity of hybrid composites. The dislocation damping mechanisms were discussed with regards to the Granato–Lucke theory.

Modified Granato–Lucke Theory with Pinning Length Distribution in Solid4He

We developed a detailed microscopic method that describes the shear modulus anomaly of solid helium at low temperature. The shear modulus was calculated using the pinning length of dislocations determined in detail for both crossing network nodes and 3He impurities. The strong suppression of the shear modulus is reproduced well as the temperature or stress increases. The shear modulus at low temperatures depends strongly on how the state was prepared. All the key features in the stress hysteresis can be quantitatively explained in terms of the thermomechanical path-dependent pinning length of dislocation networks.

A problem for moral luck

The present paper poses a new problem for moral luck. Defenders of moral luck uncritically rely on a broader theory of luck known as the control theory or the lack of controltheory. However, there are are two other analyses of luck in the literature that dominate discussion in epistemology, namely the probability and modal theories. However, moral luck is nonexistent under the probability and modal accounts, but the control theory cannot explain epistemic luck. While some have posited that “luck” is ambiguous, so that one theory of luck is operative with epistemic luck and a different theory works for moral luck, there are both semantic and philosophical reasons to reject luck ambiguity. Defenders of moral luck must engage with the broader literature on luck and either provide a comprehensive defense of the control theory or concede that moral luck is not a genuine thing in its own right.

Why flying dogs are rare: A general theory of luck in evolutionary transitions

There is a worry that the ‘major transitions in evolution’ represent an arbitrary group of events. This worry is warranted, and we show why. We argue that the transition to a new level of hierarchy necessarily involves a nonselectionist chance process. Thus any unified theory of evolutionary transitions must be more like a general theory of fortuitous luck, rather than a rigid formulation of expected events. We provide a systematic account of evolutionary transitions based on a second-order regularity of chance events, as stipulated by the ZFEL (Zero Force Evolutionary Law). And in doing so, we make evolutionary transitions explainable and predictable, and so not entirely contingent after all.

Effect of long period stacking ordered structure on the damping capacities of Mg–Ni–Y alloys

Abstract The microstructure and damping capacities of the Mg–Ni–Y alloys were researched and compared synthetically. This study showed that long period stacking ordered (LPSO) structures were conducive to the overall damping capacities. Mg–8.51%Ni–15.25%Y can be classified as high damping metals ( Q −1 ≥0.1) at strains exceeding 1×10 −3 . With increased LPSO phase, the critical strain amplitudes of alloys gradually decreased so that the alloys could more easily break away from pinning. In addition, the strain amplitude-independent damping and strain amplitude-dependent damping of the Mg–Ni–Y alloys both increased. The damping capacities of the alloys cannot be explained by the Granato–Lucke theory alone.

Why Every Theory of Luck is Wrong

There are three theories of luck in the literature, each of which tends to appeal to philosophers pursuing different concerns. These are the probability, modal, and control views. I will argue that all three theories are irreparably defective; not only are there counterexamples to each of the three theories of luck, but there are three previously undiscussed classes of counterexamples against them. These are the problems of lucky necessities, skillful luck, and diachronic luck. I conclude that a serious reevaluation of the role of luck in philosophy is called for.

Luck Attributions and Cognitive Bias

Philosophers have developed three theories of luck: the probability theory, the modal theory, and the control theory. To help assess these theories, we conducted an empirical investigation of luck attributions. We created eight putative luck scenarios and framed each in either a positive or a negative light. Furthermore, we placed the critical luck event at the beginning, middle, or end of the scenario to see if the location of the event influenced luck attributions. We found that attributions of luckiness were significantly influenced by the framing of the scenario and by the location of the critical event. Positively framing an event led to significantly higher lucky ratings than negatively framing the same exact event. And the closer a negative event was placed toward the end of a scenario, the more unlucky the event was rated. Overall, our results raise the possibility that there is no such thing as luck and thereby pose serious challenges to the three prominent theories of luck. We instead propose that luck may be a cognitive illusion, a mere narrative device used to frame stories of success or failure.

Luck, Knowledge, and “Mere” Coincidence

AbstractThere are good reasons for pursuing a theory of knowledge by way of understanding the connection between knowledge and luck. Not surprisingly, then, there has been a burgeoning of interest in “luck theories” of knowledge as well as in theories of luck in general. Unfortunately, “luck” proves to be as recalcitrant an analysandum as “knows.” While it is well worth pursuing a general theory of luck despite these difficulties, our theory of knowledge might be made more manageable if we could find a more restricted notion that captured the core phenomena of luck that are relevant to whether or not someone knows. This essay makes the attempt to delineate such a notion, called “mere coincidence.”

Strokes of Luck

AbstractThis essay aims to reorient current theorizing about luck as an aid to our discerning this concept's true philosophical significance. After introducing the literature's leading theories of luck, it presents and defends counterexamples to each of them. It then argues that recent luck theorists’ main target of analysis—the concept of an event's being lucky for a subject—is parasitic on the more fundamental notion of an event's being a stroke of luck for a subject, which thesis serves as at least a partial diagnosis of the leading theories’ failure. Next, it develops an analysis of strokes of luck that utilizes insights from the recent luck literature. Finally, having set out a comprehensive new analysis of luck—the Enriched Strokes Account of lucky events—the essay revisits the initial counterexamples to the literature's leading theories and argues that the Enriched Strokes Account properly handles all of them.

Investigating the Neural and Cognitive Basis of Moral Luck: It's Not What You Do but What You Know.

Moral judgments, we expect, ought not to depend on luck. A person should be blamed only for actions and outcomes that were under the person’s control. Yet often, moral judgments appear to be influenced by luck. A father who leaves his child by the bath, after telling his child to stay put and believing that he will stay put, is judged to be morally blameworthy if the child drowns (an unlucky outcome), but not if his child stays put and doesn’t drown. Previous theories of moral luck suggest that this asymmetry reflects primarily the influence of unlucky outcomes on moral judgments. In the current study, we use behavioral methods and fMRI to test an alternative: these moral judgments largely reflect participants’ judgments of the agent’s beliefs. In “moral luck” scenarios, the unlucky agent also holds a false belief. Here, we show that moral luck depends more on false beliefs than bad outcomes. We also show that participants with false beliefs are judged as having less justified beliefs and are therefore judged as more morally blameworthy. The current study lends support to a rationalist account of moral luck: moral luck asymmetries are driven not by outcome bias primarily, but by mental state assessments we endorse as morally relevant, i.e. whether agents are justified in thinking that they won’t cause harm.

Interaction of elastic waves with dislocations

This work concerns the effective propagation of elastic waves in a medium filled with randomly placed dislocations. Multiple scattering theory is applied to derive the effective velocity and attenuation of the waves (both transverse and longitudinal) because of the effect of the dislocations. Our work is a generalization of Granato & Lucke theory since it takes into account the polarization of the elastic waves. Two principal results have been obtained, in connexion with experiments: 1) we have explained the different attenuations experimentally measured between longitudinal and transverse waves. The difference between the two values is obtained in quantitative agreement with no adjustable parameter. 2) we have offered a scenario for the frequency law in the attenuation measured in polycrystals (a combination of quadratic and quartic law). This has been done by taking into account the dislocations at the grain boundaries that can contribute to the attenuation process.

Equilibrium kinetics of short-range order formation in the ternary Au 40Ag 40Pd 20 alloy

The kinetics of short range order (SRO) were investigated in the ternary Au 40Ag 40Pd 20 alloy under equilibrium conditions using residual electrical resistivity measurements. The changes in electrical resistivity were measured during isothermal annealing experiments after producing small deviations from the SRO-equilibrium. The analysis of these measurements gives evidence of three kinetic processes involved in the evolution of SRO. The results obtained from the determined kinetic parameters were found to be in good agreement with the Yu–Lucke theory of kinetics of SRO-formation in multi-component alloys.