The chief characteristic of presuppositio ns is that they tend to take wide scope, yet most theories of presupposition, the author's not excepted, fail to provide an explanation of this fact. Recently, however, it has been suggested that a principled explanation can be given in terms of informativeness: the idea is that presuppositions simply prefer stronger readings to weaker ones. This proposal is studied in some depth, and is shown to lack solid empirical evidence. Furthermore, it is argued that assuming a preference for strong readings is either ad hoc, when restricted to presuppositio ns, or just false, when held to apply more widely. The paper leaves the main problem very much where it is, though some suggestions are made as to how the situation might be improved. Anaphoric pronouns may be used to refer back to an object introduced in the preceding discourse, but also to refer forward to an object yet to be introduced (the latter usage is sometimes called 'kataphora' or even 'cataphora'). This may be so, but a theory of anaphora that predicts only this much is seriously incomplete, because it does not account for the fact that forward reference is the exception and backward reference the rule. A theory that does not explain this preference is not much of a theory at all. Most of the phenomena a theory of interpretation has to deal with are like this. It would be very nice if we had theory that predicted all and only possible interpretations for any expression in any context; but it would hardly count as a full-fledged theory of interpretatio n. Small wonder, therefore, that the framework of optimality theory naturally suggests itself for dealing with a wide range of problems in semantics and pragmatics. One of the problems that immediately comes to mind is that of presuppositio n projection, not only because projection phenomena seem to spring from the interaction between several forces of varying strength, but also because that is precisely how many theories of presupposition treat their subject matter. Optimality-theoretic treatments of presuppositio n have been proposed by Zeevat (1999) and Blutner (this volume), and in the following I will assume that some account along these lines is the right one. What I will be worrying about is one of the constraints postulated by Blutner and Zeevat. Thus I will follow the lead of Haspelmath (2000), who argues that optimality-theoretic analyses are often incomplete, because they fail to motivate their constraints. Haspelmath restricts his discussion to phonology and syntax, where it is still possible just to postulate a set of constraints, and get away with it, but people working in semantics and pragmatics