Theoretical Philosophy Research Articles

Kant's Metaphysical Reflections in the Duisburg Nachlaß

The purpose of what follows is to show that, in the 1775 collection of notes called the “Duisburg Nachlaß” (henceforth, DN), Kant adapted central ideas from his early metaphysics in order to clarify the role of the thinking subject as a necessary condition of empirical knowledge. I shall try to show how these adaptations were made, how they were philosophically significant, and how they can help us understand what Kant was trying to do in the mid-1770s. The DN was written up when some of his most far-reaching ideas were starting to take shape. If we could make sense of it, it might ultimately shed light on the way Kant arrived at the mature statement of his theoretical philosophy in the Critique of Pure Reason. I cannot reconstruct the whole of this story or even offer a complete account of the DN in this paper. But I do hope to point out and clarify one interesting fact. By the mid-1770s, the thinking subject had taken the place Kant had reserved for God in his earlier metaphysics. That some such displacement was important for Kant is not an especially new or even exciting thesis. However, as I shall argue, the philosophical interest of the thesis lies in seeing exactly how Kant effected the displacement.

Sartre’s Response to Merleau-Ponty’s Charge of Subjectivism

Sartre's philosophy is widely held to represent the very epitome of subjectivism in the twentieth century and his detractors, by smearing him with the Cartesian label, have tried to present him as passe. One need only think of Claude Levi-Strauss's description of Sartre as "a prisoner of his cogito."1 To be sure, there is in Sartre's thought up to 1950 certain celebration of Descartes, never more clear than in "Cartesian Freedom," but I will argue that later, when he embraced dialectical reason, Sartre passed beyond subjectivism in the sense of a philosophy of the abstract isolated individual cut off from things and other individuals.2 Because Sartre's philosophical writings are so extensive and the differences between the various texts so significant, I shall confine myself here largely to the issues raised by MerleauPonty's sustained critique of Sartre of Sartre's alleged subjectivism. Merleau-Ponty was among the very first to offer such a critique and the negative assessment of Sartre that persists to this day can to a large extent be traced back to their debate. I shall focus here specifically on Merleau-Ponty's critique of Sartre in Adventures of the Dialectic, treating Merleau-Ponty's early criticisms of Being and Nothingness in Phenomenology of Perception simply as necessary background.3 Unquestionably one can already find in Phenomenology of Perception, the seeds of Merleau-Ponty's more vigorous critique in Adventures of the Dialectic, but it did not constitute a philosophical break, as is clear from the fact that, even after publishing Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty was content to serve on the radio as a spokesperson for Sartrean existentialism for the general public.4 It was only when Merleau-Ponty fell silent on politics at the time of the Korean War that the differences between the two thinkers gave rise to a full-blown debate. The philosophical division between Sartre and Merleau-Ponty must therefore be recognized as framed by their growing political disagreements, disagreements made all the more sensitive by the fact that Sartre readily acknowledged Merleau-Ponty's role in his political education. It should be understood that in the context of the 1950s the question of Sartre's alleged subjectivism was not only an issue of theoretical philosophy, but it also reached the core of his political philosophy. Although the debate between Sartre and Merleau-Ponty has been studied extensively, it is surrounded by myths. One of the most misleading can be traced back to Sartre himself, who described the course of the debate as follows: "He [Merleau-Ponty] wrote a book on Dialectic, where he strongly took me to task. Simone de Beauvoir replied to him in Les Temps modernes in terms no less strong. This was the first and last time that we fought in writing."5 As Sartre told the story, he himself never answered Merleau-Ponty directly, although we have to assume that he approved of what Simone de Beauvoir had to say on his behalf in her virulent essay "Merleau-Ponty and Pseudo-Sartreanism."6 Some commentators have taken their lead from Sartre and repeated the suggestion that he himself did not respond to Adventures of the Dialectic,1 but I shall argue here that in 1957, when Merleau-Ponty was still alive, Sartre in Search for a Method attempted to make good serious deficiencies in both the central doctrines and approach of Being and Nothingness in ways that clearly suggest that these revisions were formulated as a direct response to Merleau-Ponty. Nevertheless, we do not know if Merleau-Ponty recognized his impact on Search for a Method. Indeed, although Merleau-Ponty's lengthy treatment of Sartre in the second chapter of The Visible and the Invisible is as rich as the discussion in Adventures of the Dialectic is crude, he confined his attention there to a consideration of the ontology of Being and Nothingness, as if Sartre had not subsequently revised it, and furthermore Merleau-Ponty explicitly acknowledged that he was ignoring Sartre's indications that the famous phenomenological descriptions were introduced into Being and Nothingness explicitly to open the way to a revision of the ontology with which the book began. …

Philosophy And Education-A Symposium

This symposium begins with a critique by Paul Hirst of Wilfred Carr's ‘Philosophy and Education’(Journal of Philosophy of Education, 2004, 38.1), where Carr argues that philosophy of education should be concerned with ‘practical philosophy’ rather than ‘theoretical philosophy’. Hirst argues that the philosophy of education is best understood as a distinctive area of academic philosophy, in which the exercise of theoretical reason contributes critically to the development of rational educational practices and their discourse. While he acknowledges that these practices and their discourse must of their nature be directly developed in the exercise of practical reason, or phronesis, the notion of ‘practical philosophy’ is rejected as ultimately incoherent and illusory. In his reply to Hirst's critique, Carr identifies three central claims in Hirst's argument and takes issue with each of these. He reaffirms the need to draw upon the resources afforded by the Aristotelian tradition of practical philosophy in order to identify inadequacies in our present understanding of how philosophy is related to education. He suggests that it is only through bringing their own ‘prejudices’ into critical confrontation with this tradition that philosophers of education will be able to assess whether practical philosophy is incoherent and illusory, as Hirst claims, or whether it is indispensable to the future development of their discipline. In a rejoinder to Carr, Hirst, defends the claim that philosophy of education is a social practice concerned with developing justifiable propositional accounts of the conceptual relations, justificatory procedures and presuppositions of educational practices. He rejects the argument that this ‘theoretical philosophy’ approach must be replaced by that of a new ‘practical philosophy’.

Presenting the Unpresentable: The Metaphor in Merleau-Ponty's Last Writings

The Southern Journal of PhilosophyVolume 43, Issue 3 p. 463-474 Presenting the Unpresentable: The Metaphor in Merleau-Ponty's Last Writings Luca Vanzago, Luca Vanzago University of Pavia, Italy Luca Vanzago is professor of theoretical philosophy at Pavia University, Italy. His was trained in Pavia, Naples, and Leuven (Belgium), where he earned a Ph.D. in philosophy. His main interests are in the field of phenomenology, especially Husserl's and contemporary French phenomenology. He is working on a monograph on Husserl's conception of temporality, with special attention to the Bernauer Manuskripte and the C and D groups manuscripts.Search for more papers by this author Luca Vanzago, Luca Vanzago University of Pavia, Italy Luca Vanzago is professor of theoretical philosophy at Pavia University, Italy. His was trained in Pavia, Naples, and Leuven (Belgium), where he earned a Ph.D. in philosophy. His main interests are in the field of phenomenology, especially Husserl's and contemporary French phenomenology. He is working on a monograph on Husserl's conception of temporality, with special attention to the Bernauer Manuskripte and the C and D groups manuscripts.Search for more papers by this author First published: 26 March 2010 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.2041-6962.2005.tb01963.xCitations: 2 AboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Citing Literature Volume43, Issue3Fall 2005Pages 463-474 RelatedInformation

Mind, Meaning, and Mental Disorder: The Nature of Causal Explanation in Psychology and Psychiatry, 2nd ed.

Back to table of contents Previous article Next article Book Forum: Models of PsychiatryFull AccessMind, Meaning, and Mental Disorder: The Nature of Causal Explanation in Psychology and Psychiatry, 2nd ed.LAURA L. POST, M.D., Ph.D., LAURA L. POSTSearch for more papers by this author, M.D., Ph.D., Saipan, MP (USA)Published Online:1 Jul 2005https://doi.org/10.1176/appi.ajp.162.7.1398-aAboutSectionsPDF/EPUB ToolsAdd to favoritesDownload CitationsTrack Citations ShareShare onFacebookTwitterLinked InEmail In the epistemological spirit of trying to make (human) order out of (natural) disorder, this ambitious book attempts to trace the logic-oriented striving of psychology and psychiatry to apply observation, statistics, and logic to the chaotic phenomena of the mentally ill mind. For Americans, the use of British spellings (“behaviour”) and grammatical constructions (“the latter became subject to much philosophical stick”) may be distracting. For believers in biological underpinnings, descriptions such as, “The person appears to have nothing to be depressed about, or can think of no reason to be depressed,” may elicit head-shaking outrage. Clinicians seeking research or even anecdotal evidence of best practices will be entirely disappointed because these pages offer abstractions only and no immediately applicable hypotheses or data. However, if the reader is open-hearted and willing to adventure into the overlapping realms of theoretical philosophy and medical nosology, then there may be surprising rewards at the conclusion. Initial familiarity with the treatises of Plato, Michel Foucault, Karl Jaspers, Wittgenstein, Hume, and Thomas Szasz will be helpful, as will a schematic overview of neurobiology.The type of analysis in Mind, Meaning, and Mental Disorder may be demonstrated by a series of reasoning statements and paradigms. For example, if one’s former happy internal state is presumed to be linked to a happy external event, and one’s current unhappy state cannot be associated with any precedent unhappy stimulus, then could both the happiness and unhappiness be random rather than linked to or evoked by biochemistry or genetics or contagion? The conclusion of the authors is that only brain processes are genuinely causal. Alternatively stated, 1) intentionality is critical in the regulation and prediction of action, 2) intentional processes are causal, 3) intentional processes that regulate behavior are encoded in the brain, and 4) intentionality involves relativity. The process by which the authors arrive at their conclusion is through fording the dense and swirling waters of “meaning-as-culture”; the assumptions and methods of science; the conceptualization of the self, personality, and uniquely individual cognitive commitment; the distinctions between “understanding” and “explanation”; and the evolutionary connections between psychoanalytic interpretation and a prescription pad. (The seemingly benign linguistic caveats of the first paragraph are not so superficial as might have been suspected.)This volume has nine major divisions, with at least five subdivisions in each. Tracking the lines of thought requires consistent attention; this is not a book to be casually perused in bits and pieces over a protracted period of time. The development of the fundamental intellectual pursuit here starts with the intent of the authors to elucidate the bases of “action,” conceptualized as likely related to neural causation. In this model, empathy is merely the subjective re-creation of the electrochemical objective existence of the other person. Some of the logic is primarily semantic, and other aspects are firmly rooted in known physics and molecular biology. At the end, anxiety, schizophrenia, and personality disorders are deconstructed, and throughout, the examination is conducted with true passion and inspiration. Not for everyone.By Derek Bolton and Jonathan Hill. Oxford, U.K., Oxford University Press, 2004, 387 pp., $52.50 (paper). FiguresReferencesCited byDetailsCited byNone Volume 162Issue 7 July 2005Pages 1398-a-1399 Metrics PDF download History Published online 1 July 2005 Published in print 1 July 2005

Russell’s Influence on Ingemar Hedenius

_Russell_ journal (home office): E:CPBRRUSSJOURTYPE2501\REVIEWS.251 : 2005-09-14 19:58  Reviews RUSSELL’S INFLUENCE ON INGEMAR HEDENIUS S A Theology and Religious Studies / U. of Lund  , Lund, Sweden @. Svante Nordin. Ingemar Hedenius. En filosof och hans tid [Ingemar Hedenius. A philosopher and his time]. Stockholm: Natur och Kultur, . Pp. ;  photos.  kr. en years ago I wrote a review article about Gunnar Fredriksson’s book Tabout Bertrand Russell for Russell called “Russell’s Influence in Sweden”. In it I mentioned two Swedish philosophers who introduced and established analytic philosophy in Sweden. The oldest, Ingemar Hedenius (–), was professor in practical philosophy in Uppsala from  to ; the younger, Anders Wedberg (–), was professor in theoretical philosophy in Stockholm from  to . Together they had an enormous influence on the development of Swedish philosophy, since—among other things—they had the  See the review of Bertrand Russell: en intellektuelli i politiken, Russell, n.s.  (): –. _Russell_ journal (home office): E:CPBRRUSSJOURTYPE2501\REVIEWS.251 : 2005-09-14 19:58 Reviews  power to influence most of the new professors in philosophy. And they can both be called disciples of Bertrand Russell. The formal division between theoretical and practical philosophy goes back to Aristotle and Kant and consists in a distinction between the philosophy of thinking and the philosophy of acting. In practice it means that the former subject includes metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of language and philosophy of mathematics and logic, while the latter deals with ethics, aesthetics, social philosophy and philosophy of religion. It was Wedberg who introduced Russell as a logician and a philosopher of mathematics and for a long time theoretical philosophers primarily wrote about logic and tried to apply the symbols of mathematical logic to classical philosophical problems. Russell’s influence on Hedenius was of a more general character that showed itself in his writings on ethics and religion, but also in his general attitude to life. In  Hedenius published a collection of essays called Tro och Vetande [Faith and Knowledge] that started a public discussion about the truth of Christianity that went on for years. The book was an undisguised attack on Swedish theology and Swedish theologians that caused a lot of hard feelings and undermined the reputation of theology as a legitimate academic subject. It was such a knock out that still today many Swedish theologians suffer from a “Hedenius complex”. (One could call it a “Russell complex”.) There is only one reference to Russell in Hedenius’ book and that is to Sceptical Essays, where Russell writes: “I wish to propose for the reader’s favourable consideration a doctrine which may, I fear, appear wildly paradoxical and subversive. The doctrine in question is this: that it is undesirable to believe a proposition when there is no ground whatever for supposing it true” (SE, p. ). Of course, Russell was not the first philosopher to endorse such a doctrine, which can be traced back to the spirit of Socrates and the old Greek sceptical philosophers, but Hedenius seems to have been impressed by Russell’s humorous and elegant way of formulating it. He took it to his heart and called it “den intellektuella moralens maxim”, which translates into “the maxim of intellectual morality” and sounds like an echo of Kingdon Clifford, although Hedenius might not have heard of him. Anyway, Hedenius thought that it was morally wrong to believe any proposition without having good reasons. With this maxim in mind he examined the major tenets of Christianity and found that very few—if any—passed the test, although he never seems to have doubted that Jesus existed, which he might have done, if he had examined the reasons for believing so more critically. From now on Hedenius was the best known and feared philosopher in Sweden. Another professor in Uppsala with a big sense of humour said: “There is no God and Ingemar Hedenius is his prophet.” Hedenius took an active part _Russell_ journal (home office): E:CPBRRUSSJOURTYPE2501\REVIEWS.251 : 2005-09-14 19:58  Reviews in many public discussions and wrote hundreds of newspaper articles, essays and close to  books that could be read by anyone. The influence of Russell is obvious in many of them, although he is seldom...

Spectacles of truth in classical Greek philosophy: theoria in its cultural context

In fourth-century Greece (BCE), the debate over the nature of philosophy generated a novel claim: that the highest form of wisdom is theoria, the rational 'vision' of metaphysical truths (the 'spectator theory of knowledge'). This 2004 book offers an original analysis of the construction of 'theoretical' philosophy in fourth-century Greece. In the effort to conceptualise and legitimise theoretical philosophy, the philosophers turned to a venerable cultural practice: theoria (state pilgrimage). In this practice, an individual journeyed abroad as an official witness of sacralized spectacles. This book examines the philosophic appropriation and transformation of theoria, and analyses the competing conceptions of theoretical wisdom in fourth-century philosophy. By tracing the link between traditional and philosophic theoria, this book locates the creation of theoretical philosophy in its historical context, analysing theoria as a cultural and an intellectual practice. It develops a new, interdisciplinary approach, drawing on philosophy, history and literary studies.

Motivations, Philosophy, and Therapeutic Approaches of a Child‐Centered Play Therapist: An Interview With Garry L. Landreth

To encourage counselors to implement humanistic approaches with children, the author conducted an interview with Garry Landreth, a renowned child‐centered play therapist. Landreth's motivations, theoretical philosophy, therapeutic approaches, case examples, and words of wisdom for counselors are detailed in this article. Direction in light of managed care is provided.

The theories underpinning rational emotive behaviour therapy:: where's the supportive evidence?

This paper examines the underlying theoretical philosophy of one of the most widely used cognitive behaviour therapies, rational emotive behaviour therapy. It examines whether two central theoretical principles are supported by research evidence: firstly, that irrational beliefs lead to dysfunctional emotions and inferences and that rational beliefs lead to functional emotions and inferences and, secondly, that demand beliefs are the primary core irrational belief. The established criteria for evaluating the efficacy of the theories are detailed and used to evaluate the strength of evidence supporting these two assumptions. The findings indicate there is limited evidence to support these theories.

Is Quine a Verificationist?

The Southern Journal of PhilosophyVolume 41, Issue 3 p. 399-409 Is Quine a Verificationist? Panu Raatikainen, Panu Raatikainen University of Helsinki Panu Raatikainen is a fellow in the Helsinki Collegium for Advanced Studies and a docent of theoretical philosophy at the University of Helsinki. He is on the editorial board for Philosophical Studies from the University of Helsinki and Ajatus.Search for more papers by this author Panu Raatikainen, Panu Raatikainen University of Helsinki Panu Raatikainen is a fellow in the Helsinki Collegium for Advanced Studies and a docent of theoretical philosophy at the University of Helsinki. He is on the editorial board for Philosophical Studies from the University of Helsinki and Ajatus.Search for more papers by this author First published: 26 March 2010 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.2041-6962.2003.tb00959.xCitations: 1 AboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Citing Literature Volume41, Issue3Fall 2003Pages 399-409 RelatedInformation

Kant on Common Sense and Scepticism

Is the refutation of scepticism a central objective for Kant? Some commentators have denied that the refutation of either theoretical or moral scepticism was central to Kant's concerns. Thus, in his recent book Kant and the Fate of Autonomy, Karl Ameriks rejects 'taking Kant to be basically a respondent to the skeptic'. According to Ameriks, who here has Kant's theoretical philosophy in mind,What Kant goes on to propose is that, instead of focusing on trying to establish with certainty – against skepticism – that the objects of common sense exist, let alone that they have philosophical dominance, or, in contrast, on explaining that it is only the theoretical discoveries of science that determine what is objective, one can rather work primarily to determine a positive and balanced philosophical relation between the distinct frameworks of our manifest and scientific images.

Internal Reasons and Contractualist Impartiality

Williams's claim that practical reasons are internal reasons is analysed and interpreted as a neutral analysis, not distinctively Humean, of constraints on the concept of a practical reason. It is argued that within these constraints it remains possible to defend the impartiality of moral reasons. A reflective account of such reasons can be given in ‘pragmatic’ rather than ‘semantic’ terms. Paralleling a revisionary strategy towards Kant's theoretical philosophy, a higher order disposition to accept only reasons that can be put to others without the prospect of reasonable rejection is argued to be the internalization of a relativized a priori principle.

Political Philosophy in Bulgaria – a Fresh Start?

Bulgaria is a philosophical nation. It is one of the few countries in Europe in which the study of philosophy is mandatory in the high schools. Its philosophers often figure prominently in political life. The first philosopher of importance in this country, Dimitri Michaltschew, was an ambassador to Prague in the twenties and twice to Moscow, first in the thirties, later in the mid-forties. After September 1944 and until the Monarchy was abolished on 15 September, 1946, the Marxist philosopher, Todor Pavlov, was a member of the Regency Council. Finally, between 1990 and 1996, another philosopher, Zheliu Zhelev, was the President of Republic Bulgaria, thus joining the club of three philosopher-heads of state in twentieth-century Europe, the other members being A. J. Balfour of the United Kingdom and T. G. Masaryk of Czechoslovakia. There are several grounds for this. On the one hand, religious sentiment in the country is not pronounced; on the other, as some authors of the volume under review note, culture as a whole, education in particular, have a constitutive meaning for Bulgaria’s national identity. So theoretical philosophy came to have the function of something resembling a Weltanschauung. Historically, the introduction of philosophy in the country’s culture was a part of a program for radical modernization, passionately embraced after 1878, which was to wipe away the effects of the “dark age” of the “Turkish

Kant's early critics: the empiricist critique of the theoretical philosophy

Acknowledgements Frequently cited texts and abbreviations Introduction: major trends in the early empiricist reception of Kant's critical philosophy Part I. Feder/Garve and Garve: 1. The Gottingen review 2. The Garve review: Christian Garve, 'Critique of Pure Reason by Immanuel Kant' Part II. The Transcendental Aesthetic: 3. Dietrich Tiedemann, 'On the Nature of Metaphysics: An Examination of Professor Kant's Principles - Against the Aesthetic' 4. [Hermann Andreas Pistorius], 'Elucidations of Professor Kant's 'Critique of Pure Reason,' by Johann Schultze' 5. Johann Georg Heinrich Feder, On Space and Causality: An Examination of the Kantian Philosophy, 1-64, 84*-91* 6. [Anonymous], 'On Space and Causality: An Examination of the Kantian Philosophy by Johann Georg Heinrich Feder' 7. Friedrich Gottlob Born, Investigation into the First Grounds of the Doctrine of the Senses, 87-92 Part II. Idealism: 8. Johann Georg Heinrich Feder, On Space and Causality: An Examination of the Kantian Philosophy, 61-83*, 114-118 9. J. C. G. Schaumann, On the Transcendental Aesthetic: A Critical Attempt, 131-175 10. Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi, 'On Transcendental Idealism' 11. [Hermann Andreas Pistorius], 'Critique of Pure Reason by Immanuel Kant' 12. Friedrich Gottlob Born, Investigation into the First Grounds of the Doctrine of the Senses, 117-120, 141-153 Part IV. The Categories: 13. C. G. Selle, 'Attempt at a Proof that there are no Pure Concepts of Reason that are Independent of Experience' 14. Dietrich Tiedemann, 'Continuation of the Examination of Professor Kant's Thoughts about the Nature of Metaphysics - Against the Analytic' 15. [Johann Schultz], 'Institutiones Logicae et Metaphysica by Jo. Aug. Henr. Ulrich' 16. Gottlob August Tittle, On Kantian Forms of Thought or Categories, 3-41, 103-11 Part V. Empiricism vs. Purism: 17. Carl Christian Erhard Schmid, Some Remarks about Empiricism and Purism in Philosophy Occasioned by Selle's Principles of Pure Philosophy' 18. [Hermann Andreas Pistorius], 'On Carl Christian Erhard Schmid's essay about Kant's Purism and Selle's Empiricism' Appendix A: about the authors Appendix B: biographical sketches of figures in early Kant reception Notes Glossary Bibliography Index.

A League of Their Own: Gender Practices among Adolescents and Teachers in a Technology-Enhanced Learning Environment

The study—funded through a Dwight D. Eisenhower Professional Development Grant—examined gender differences and the process of Internet-assisted inquiry in a single-sex, technology-enhanced environment. Five group case studies consisted of various configurations selected from a cohort group of students and teachers representing two city school systems, five county systems, and one private school. A qualitative approach to research was implemented using the constant comparative method of data analysis. Data in the form of observational field notes, transcripts of video tapes, artifacts, and photos resulting from a two-week summer workshop revealed interesting findings regarding student behaviors while interacting with computers in a single-sex environment. Results from the study indicate that female students—when interacting within a single-sex environment—display similar behaviors as male students do when engaging in technology-enhanced activities. Additional findings show that the classroom teacher, operating within a theoretical framework and personal educational philosophy, can either hinder or enhance student processes.

Vladimir Solov'ëv's “Virtue Epistemology”

I attempt to clarify the connection between two late texts by V.S. Solov'ev: Justification of the Good and Theoretical Philosophy. Solov'ev drew attention to the intrinsic connection between moral and intellectual virtues. Theoretical Philosophy is the initial -- unfinished -- sketch of the dynamism of mind seeking truth as a good. I sketch several parallels and analogies between the doctrine of moral experience set out in Justification and the account of the intellect's dynamism based on immediate certitude set out in Theoretical Philosophy. Solov'ev can thus be considered as a ‘virtue epistemologist’ in the current meaning given to this description. I conclude by suggesting that Solov'ev's position on these questions does not easily cohere with the ‘impersonalism’ he appears to defend in Theoretical Philosophy.

Idealism and Freedom: Essays on Kant's Theoretical and Practical Philosophy

Idealism and Freedom: Essays on Kant's Theoretical and Practical Philosophy

Kant on Self-Consciousness

The highest principle of Kant's theoretical philosophy is that all cognition must be combined in one single (A 117a, B 136).1 Elsewhere I have tried to explain why he believed that all cognition must belong to a single self (Kitcher 1982); here I try to clarify the other half of the doctrine. What led him to the claim that all cognition involved self-consciousness? This question is pressing, because the thesis strikes many as obviously false (for example, Bennett 1966, 105). My interpretive hypothesis begins from three clues. First, Kant characterized the self-consciousness at issue as transcendental (for example, B 132), meaning both that it is a necessary condition for the possibility of cognitive experience and that it involves factors not derived from the senses.2 (I mark this special usage with

The Self-Other Relation in Beauvoiris Ethics and Autobiography

This article examines how some of Simone de Beauvoir's ethical notions about the Self-Other relation explored in her theoretical philosophy of the 1940s were developed in her subsequent autobiography. It argues that Beauvoir represents reciprocal alter-ity in these autobiographical texts through a testimonial engagement with autobiography conceptualized as an act of bearing witness for the Other, through the privileging of various interlocutors and privileged others with whom "the real" is experienced and through a negotiation with the reader. The article also explores the wider question of how Beauvoir's engagement with autobiography might constitute a mode of ethical engagement with the Other.

The Self-Other Relation in Beauvoir's Ethics and Autobiography

This article examines how some of Simone de Beauvoir's ethical notions about the Self-Other relation explored in her theoretical philosophy of the 1940s were developed in her subsequent autobiography. It argues that Beauvoir represents reciprocal alterity in these autobiographical texts through a testimonial engagement with autobiography conceptualized as an act of bearing witness for the Other, through the privileging of various interlocutors and privileged others with whom “the real” is experienced and through a negotiation with the reader. The article also explores the wider question of how Beauvoir's engagement with autobiography might constitute a mode of ethical engagement with the Other.