Theoretical Entities Research Articles

APPLICATION OF THEMATIC ROLES IN URDU SENTENCE STRUCTURE

This research aims at exploring theta roles- theoretical entities in the Urdu language that are very crucial in enabling one to Account for relations between verbs and their associated arguments. This is explained by the elaborate framework of theta roles that are commonly used, and consist of the Agent, Theme, Goal, Source, Experiencer, Patient and Instrument. For instance, in the case of “He is reading the book,” while the Agent role refers to the performer of an action, the Experiencer role refers to the passive experience as it is illustrated in “I am hungry.” This paper provides a way of differentiating and studying the intricate relationship between various features of the Urdu language. However, in order to investigate this issue more vigorously, the research also applies Chomsky’s minimalist agenda. Analyzing the studied theories in the given program, this investigation provides a more detailed interpretation of the structural and semantic characteristics of Urdu, greatly increasing the awareness of the language’s sophistication.

On the relationship between scientific theory and ontology in everything flows.

In their anthology Everything Flows: Towards a Processual Philosophy of Biology, Daniel J. Nicholson and John Dupré argue that modern theories of biology imply that the fundamental structure of reality is processual at its core. In the present work, I first examine the implicit and explicit metaphysical presuppositions the editors make in order to allow for such an inference from scientific theory to ontology. After showing the difficulties of a naïve transfer of theoretical entities to fundamental ontology, I argue that the editors can nevertheless extend their claims beyond the mere articulation of different domain ontologies. This leads to the idea of a scientifically informed induction base for an ontology of processes.

The Chinese School of IR Theory: Ignored Process, Controversial Progress, and Uncertain Prospects

Abstract This article reviews issues relevant to the Chinese School of International Relations (IR) theory. After 20 or more years of relentless effort, the Chinese School has achieved concrete breakthroughs, evident in the emergence of Relational Theory, Moral Realism, and Symbiosis Theory. The Chinese School has thus entered a new stage, its primary task having been upgraded from theory innovation to theory development. But to proceed further, the Chinese School needs critical responses from its Western counterparts. Owing primarily to the language barrier, as well as to the non-confrontational academic tradition within Chinese IR, and the ethnocentrism that both sides practice, the few dialogues that have taken place between the Chinese School and Western theories have tended to be problematic, with important issues either ignored or misrepresented. In order to further study a comprehensive and intensive exchange of ideas between the Chinese School and Western theories, this article categorises issues relevant to the Chinese School into three areas. They are: process of evolution; progress in theoretical studies; and the Chinese School’s future relationship with other theoretical entities (in particular, Global IR). Predominantly reliant upon the discourse analysis of Chinese School publications, this contribution seeks to provide a foundation for further exchanges between Western theories and the Chinese School.

Synthesizing Methuselah: The Question of Artificial Agelessness.

As biological organisms, we age and, eventually, die. However, age's deteriorating effects may not be universal. Some theoretical entities, due to their synthetic composition, could exist independently from aging-artificial general intelligence (AGI). With adequate resource access, an AGI could theoretically be ageless and would be, in some sense, immortal. Yet, this need not be inevitable. Designers could imbue AGIs with artificial mortality via an internal shut-off point. The question, though, is, should they? Should researchers curtail an AGI's potentially endless lifespan by deliberately making it mortal? It is this question that this article explores. First, it considers what type of AGI is under discussion before outlining how such beings could be ageless. Then, after clarifying the type of immortality under discussion and arguing that imbuing an AGI with synthetic aging would be person-affecting, the article explores four core conundrums: (i) deliberately causing a morally significant being's death; (ii) immortality's associated harms; (iii) concerns about immortality's unequal assignment; and (iv) the danger of immortal AGI overlords. The article concludes that while prudence requires we create an aging AGI, in the face of the material harm such an action would constitute, this is an insufficient reason to justify doing so.

Structural realism and theory classification

AbstractOntic structural realism constitutes a promising take on scientific realism, one that avoids the well‐known issues that realist stances have with underdetermination and theory change. In its most radical versions, ontic structural realism proposes a type of eliminativism about theoretical entities, ascribing ontological commitment only to the structures, and not to the objects appearing in our theories. More moderate versions of ontic structural realism have also been proposed, allowing for ‘thin’ objects in the ontology. This work connects these takes on structural realism with the independent notion that there are two categorically different kinds of scientific theories, namely those that deal with interactions and those that deal with structural constraints – what are known as interaction and framework theories, respectively. By taking this classification seriously, one can arrive at a selective version of ontic structural realism which is better adapted to our scientific knowledge, in which eliminativist ontic structural realism constitutes a natural fit to framework theories, whereas the moderate version is connected to interaction theories.

An Alternative to Cognitivism: Computational Phenomenology for Deep Learning

We propose a non-representationalist framework for deep learning relying on a novel method computational phenomenology, a dialogue between the first-person perspective (relying on phenomenology) and the mechanisms of computational models. We thereby propose an alternative to the modern cognitivist interpretation of deep learning, according to which artificial neural networks encode representations of external entities. This interpretation mainly relies on neuro-representationalism, a position that combines a strong ontological commitment towards scientific theoretical entities and the idea that the brain operates on symbolic representations of these entities. We proceed as follows: after offering a review of cognitivism and neuro-representationalism in the field of deep learning, we first elaborate a phenomenological critique of these positions; we then sketch out computational phenomenology and distinguish it from existing alternatives; finally we apply this new method to deep learning models trained on specific tasks, in order to formulate a conceptual framework of deep-learning, that allows one to think of artificial neural networks’ mechanisms in terms of lived experience.

Contemporary Philosophical Perspectives on the Cosmological Constant

The (re)introduction of Λ into cosmology has spurred debates that touch on central questions in philosophy of science, as well as the foundations of general relativity and particle physics. We provide a systematic assessment of the often implicit philosophical assumptions guiding the methodology of precision cosmology in relation to dark energy. We start by briefly introducing a recent account of scientific progress in terms of risky and constrained lines of inquiry. This allows us to contrast aspects of Λ that make it relevantly different from other theoretical entities in science, such as its remoteness from direct observation or manipulability. We lay out a classification for possible ways to explain apparent accelerated expansion but conclude that these conceptually clear distinctions may blur heavily in practice. Finally, we consider the important role played in cosmology by critical tests of background assumptions, approximation techniques, and core principles, arguing that the weak anthropic principle fits into this category. We argue that some core typicality assumptions—such as the Copernican principle and the cosmological principle—are necessary though not provable, while others—such as the strong anthropic principle and appeals to naturalness or probability in the multiverse—are not similarly justifiable.

The Challenge of Scientific Realism to Intelligent Design

Intelligent Design (ID) argues for the existence of a designer, postulating it as a theoretical entity of a scientific theory aiming to explain specific characteristics in nature that seems to show design. It is commonly accepted within the Scientific Realism debate, however, that asserting that a scientific theory is successful is not enough for accepting the extramental existence of the entities it postulates. Instead, scientific theories must fulfill additional epistemic requirements, one of which is that they must show successful novel predictions. Evolutionists typically attack ID by offering cases of bad design, such as the inverted retina of vertebrates. ID defenders defend their position affirming that the inversion of the retina must be a detail of design for an as of yet unknown function. The recent discovery of such a function is celebrated by ID defenders as a triumph over evolutionists. The inverted retina case is a good candidate for a novel prediction in favor of ID. In this paper, I analyze whether this is the case.

J. Ladyman, D. Dennett and E.J. Lowe: How the electron exists

The paper aims to answer the question: «How does an electron exist at the beginning of the 21st century?» from the point of view of the general logic of the philosophy of science discourse, taking into account con­temporary philosophical concepts that explain what an «electron» is, and in what sense we could talk about the «existence» of such objects in the first quarter of the 21st century. A good concept of the existence of an object postulated by a successful scientific theory should at least take into account two contexts of proper philosophical reasoning – reasoning «from science», grasping the questions of the philosophical and meth­odological justification of knowledge at the level of certain «standards of rationality» that correspond to the chosen theory, and reasoning «from metaphysics», which, in the appropriate context, interpret «elec­tron» as an element of objective reality, as if the electron of scientists «actually» existed. Our thesis is that by choosing as the main elements of the concept the Dennettian ontology of patterns project and the E.J. Lowe’s neo-Aristotelian categorical ontology project, we will be able to block the problem of pessimis­tic meta-induction (H. Putnam, L. Laudan, etc.). The electron exists as a pattern that we extract from the whole set of empirical data associated with the theoretical entity «electron», whose «real definition» right now is given by the Standard Model and the accompanying concepts from quantum mechanics. In the course of the scientific revolution, the electron, as a pattern, does not disappear anywhere, since parts of the «real definitions» of the patterns of the old «paradigm», those that can be retrospectively interpreted and functionally meaningfully coupled with the new one, will be asserted within the «real definitions» of the new patterns, which indicates on the existence of a relationship of «essential dependence» between the «old» and the «new» patterns.

Quine’s Underdetermination Thesis

In On Empirically Equivalent Systems of the World from 1975, Quine formulated a thesis of underdetermination roughly to the effect that every scientific theory has an empirically equivalent but logically incompatible rival, one that cannot be discarded merely as a terminological variant of the former. For Quine, the truth of this thesis was an open question. If true, some would argue that it undermines any belief in scientific theories that is based purely on their empirical success. But despite its potential significance, surprisingly little has been done by way of establishing or refuting it. My aim is to establish the thesis for as large a class of theories as possible. Under various precisifications of the concepts involved, I show that it holds for all consistent and recursively axiomatizable theories that postulate infinitely many theoretical entities.

The Problem of the Relationship between Ontology and Theory of Knowledge in the Works of Samara Philosophers of the Late Soviet Period

The article discusses the issue of the relationship between ontology and theory of knowledge in the works of Samara philosophers of the late Soviet period. The purpose of the study is to identify the local specifics of Samara philosophical thought by revealing the system-forming significance of the problem of the conditional unity of being and thinking at the level of a distinctive separation between ontological premises and epistemological prospects of methodological reflection in scientific knowledge. The objectives of the article are (1) to establish the characteristic features of the views of Samara philosophers on the general methodological significance of the problem of the relationship between ontology and the theory of knowledge, (2) to demonstrate the methodological relevance of their theoretical principles in the context of the philosophy of science, (3) to substantiate the applicability of the latter for the activity approach to the social interpretation of theoretical results. In the course of the study, the author uses the method of distinctions, formed in onto-epistemology by M.A. Lifshitz, methods of functional analysis, diachronic reconstruction and rationing of the worldview legitimation of a particular subject theoretical entity. Thus, the article reveals the local specificity of the Samara philosophy of the era of developed socialism. The author analyzes the program for optimizing scientific knowledge based on the Borisov–Dukhanin methodology, tied to the materialistic solution of the “main question of philosophy” (i.e., the issue of the relationship of the being and consciousness). The article pays attention to the theory of the style of scientific thinking, proposed by V.T. Salosin, to the methodological foundations and reception of the socio-philosophical theory of M.S. Kvetnoy. The author examines the productivity of the Samara precedent of the interaction of worldview and methodological aspects in philosophy. The article concludes that the specificity of the Samara philosophers’ solution of the problem of the unity of being and thinking on the basis of the Marxist understanding of the the main question of philosophy lies in the fact that it is considered as a methodological problem of achieving logical consistency to express the balance between ontological premises and epistemological perspectives.

The hermeneutics of symptoms

The clinical encounter begins with presentation of an illness experience; but throughout that encounter, something else is constructed from it – a symptom. The symptom is a particular interpretation of that experience, useful for certain purposes in particular contexts. The hermeneutics of medicine – the study of the interpretation of human experience in medical terms – has largely taken the process of symptom-construction to be transparent, focussing instead on how constellations of symptoms are interpreted as representative of particular conditions. This paper examines the hermeneutical activity of symptom-construction more closely. I propose a fourfold account of the clinical function of symptoms: as theoretical entities; as tools for communication; as guides to palliative intervention; and as candidates for medical explanation or intervention. I also highlight roles they might play in illness experience. I use this framework to discuss four potential failures of symptom-interpretation: failure of symptom-type and symptom-token recognition; loss of the complete picture of illness experience through overwhelming emphasis on its symptomatic interpretation; and intersubjective feedback effects of symptom description altering the ill person’s own perceptions of their phenomenal experience. I conclude with some suggestions of potential remedies for failures in the process of symptom-construction.

Investigation of Pre-service Teachers' Conceptions of the Nature of Science Based on the LDA Model.

This study used the Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) topic model to analyze pre-service teachers’ views on the nature of science (NOS). This approach can be used to automate the classification of documents, and at the same time, the researcher does not need to deduce with a NOS framework prior to evaluation. Participants were 155 pre-service teachers studying at the Shandong Normal University in China. To gather our data, we used an open questionnaire, namely, the Views of Nature of Science Questionnaire—Form C (VNOS-C). LDA topic modeling was used to classify the document, which was divided into 12 topics. By comparing the LDA topic modeling results with the theoretical framework behind the VNOS-C questionnaire, we categorized these 12 topics into eight descriptive aspects of the NOS: The Empirical Nature of Scientific Knowledge, Observation, Inference, and Theoretical Entities in Science, Scientific Theories and Laws, The Theory-Laden Nature of Scientific Knowledge, The Social and Cultural Embeddedness of Scientific Knowledge, The Myth of The Scientific Method, The Tentative Nature of Scientific Knowledge, and The Nature of Scientific Theory. The results show that pre-service teachers usually hold naive or mixed views of the NOS. In addition, each aspect of NOS is not independent of each other but interrelated and influencing each other. In the future, more consideration can be given to the relationship between each aspect of NOS.

On the indispensability of theoretical terms and entities

Some realists claim that theoretical entities like numbers and electrons are indispensable for describing the empirical world. Motivated by the meta-ontology of Quine, I take this claim to imply that, for some first-order theory T and formula delta (x) such that T vdash exists x delta wedge exists x lnot delta , where delta (x) is intended to apply to all and only empirical entities, there is no first-order theory T' such that (a) T and T' describe the delta :s in the same way, (b) T' vdash forall x delta , and (c) T' is at least as attractive as T in terms of other theoretical virtues. In an attempt to refute the realist claim, I try to solve the general problem of nominalizingT (with respect to delta ), namely to find a theory T' satisfying conditions (a)–(c) under various precisifications thereof. In particular, I note that condition (a) can be understood either in terms of syntactic or semantic equivalence, where the latter is strictly stronger than the former. The results are somewhat mixed. On the positive side, even under the stronger precisification of (a), I establish that (1) if the vocabulary of T is finite, a nominalizing theory can always be found that is recursive if T is, and (2) if T postulates infinitely many delta :s, a nominalizing theory can always be found that is no more computationally complex than T. On the negative side, even under the weaker precisification of (a), I establish that (3) certain finite theories cannot be nominalized by a finite theory.

Parameterizing the AGN Radius–Luminosity Relation from the Eigenvector 1 Viewpoint

The study of the broad-line region (BLR) using reverberation mapping has allowed us to establish an empirical relation between the size of this line-emitting region and the continuum luminosity that drives the line emission (i.e., the RHβ − L5100 relation). To realize its full potential, the intrinsic scatter in the RHβ − L5100 relation needs to be understood better. The mass accretion rate (or equivalently the Eddington ratio) plays a key role in addressing this problem. On the other hand, the Eigenvector 1 schema has helped to reveal an almost clear connection between the Eddington ratio and the strength of the optical Fe II emission that originates from the BLR. This article aims to reveal the connection between theoretical entities, such as the ionization parameter (U) and cloud mean density (nH) of the BLR, with physical observables obtained directly from the spectra, such as optical Fe II strength (RFeII) that has shown immense potential to trace the accretion rate. We utilize the photoionization code CLOUDY and perform a suite of models to reveal the physical conditions in the low-ionization, dust-free, line-emitting BLR. The key here is the focus on the recovery of the equivalent widths (EWs) for the two low-ionization emission lines—Hβ and the optical Fe II—in addition to the ratio of their EWs, i.e., RFeII. We compare the spectral energy distributions, I Zw 1 and NGC 5548, of prototypical Population A and Population B sources, respectively, in this study. The results from the photoionization modeling are then combined with the existing reverberation-mapped sources with observed RFeII estimates taken from the literature, thus allowing us to assess our analytical formulation to tie together the aforementioned quantities. The recovery of the correct physical conditions in the BLR then suggests that—the BLR “sees” only a very small fraction (∼1–10%) of the original ionizing continuum.

The Ontological Status of Theoretical Entities

The Ontological Status of Theoretical Entities

The Ontological Status of Theoretical Entities

The Ontological Status of Theoretical Entities

Medical Empiricism and Causation

AbstractThe Empirical school of medicine, which arose in the third century BCE, defined itself in opposition to rationalist tendencies in medical thought. Causal explanation, which typically appeals to hidden, theoretical entities, is most at home in rationalist physiology and pathology, and much of what the Empiricists had to say about causes belongs to their anti-rationalist polemics. Over the course of the school’s history, however, some members appropriated the language and idea of cause, though always in ways that was consistent with its defining commitment to Empiricism.

Are bio-ontologies metaphysical theories?

Bio-ontologies are digital frameworks for handling biological and biomedical data. They consist of theoretical entities and relations with explicitly defined logical structures and precise definitions, whose purpose is to provide a shared language for representing information to be distributed and integrated across diverse scientific contexts. It is tempting to view bio-ontologies as clear and formal expressions of a scientific community’s ontological commitments about their domain of inquiry, and to view their integration as tantamount to the metaphysical unification of science that some philosophers have envisaged. However, I argue that the local, practical, social and technological factors that influence their design prevent us from straightforwardly reading metaphysical conclusions from them. I discuss these complications and suggest how they can be overcome, revealing more general lessons for the development of a well-founded scientific metaphysics.

The History, Landscapes, Metaphors and Ghosts Around the Concept of Specificity

The confusion between objects/processes and the language which describes them, leads to theories of doubtful verisimilitude about reality, inappropriate in time and even false, which distance us from the knowledge of perceived reality. In biology there are many examples of this kind of epistemological problem. Here we examine those related with specificity: a theoretical entity of enormous importance for biology and science in general. It sinks its roots beneath the evolutionary duality species-specificity, associated with the Linnean-Darwinist tradition that explains organized life in a discrete and hierarchical way. It conceptualizes the individual as an isolated agent fighting for survival as the foundation of a warrior vision of the immune system. Microorganisms are understood as inferior beings which should be eliminated in accordance with the self/not-self distinction. The use of these metaphors outside of historical context traces a map that guides the recognition of the Self and of the other according to the dialectic of Western biopolitics.