Terrorist Attempts Research Articles

The Barcelona Attack as an Example of a New Way of Carrying Out a Terrorist Attempt in an Urban Space Using a Vehicle Ramming a Crowd of Pedestrians

Abstract In this article the author presents problems related to the use of a new way of carrying out attacks by terrorists and terrorist groups, which is the use of vehicles to ram people in crowded areas of urban space. This method is presented based on the 2017 attacks in Barcelona and Cambrils, Spain. The text presents the course of the attack, the actions of the services, as well as a detailed analysis of these attacks. The material on which the article was based was taken from Spanish press and from communications made available by the services responsible for state security. In the conclusion the author draws particular attention to the increasing use of the method of ramming people with vehicles by terrorists and the ways in which this should be counteracted.

Negative spaces: Terrorist attempts to erase cultural history and the critical media coverage

The recent annihilation of the ancient Assyrian city of Nimrud by ISIS represents a disturbing trend in how some terrorist groups are trying to erase historical sites for the cultures they communicate. This study explores how one of these devastated spaces is still expressed in the media years after its destruction by examining another act of iconoclasm that occurred in 2001 when the Taliban annihilated the 1,500-year-old Buddhas of Bamiyan statues. The research explores the conception of negative spaces in communication and the means by which they are created through warfare and terrorism. A frame and critical analysis of popular magazines then assesses how the Bamiyan Buddhas’ identity has been transformed over time, and some of the journalistic practices that have enabled these renderings. The results reveal how the Buddhas have gradually become journalism’s touchstone for modern cultural terrorism, while in 70 percent of the coverage the site’s actual history has been replaced by the narrative of its destruction.

Creating Space for the Non-Buddhist in Sri Lanka: A Buddhist Perspective on the Other

Creating Space for the Non-Buddhist in Sri Lanka: A Buddhist Perspective on the Other Mahinda Deegalle (bio) love for the stranger, xenophobia, philoxenia, hospitality, Durch Reformed Church, Buddhist tolerance of Muslims and Roman Catholics At one of our interfaith Thinking Together workshops on “From Xenophobia to Philoxenia,” held in Florida, we gathered to discuss the religious attitudes and practical concerns of the world’s religious traditions on the notion of the “stranger.” This topic is as timely as ever. Within the last few years, several catastrophic events that have implications for interreligious relations have occurred in the Western hemisphere—for example, the Al-Qaeda attack on the Twin Towers in New York on September 11, 2001; 1 the July 7, 2005, bombings in public transport in metropolitan London; and the foiled terrorist attempt to destroy ten jets bound to the United States from the United Kingdom on August 10, 2006. 2 All these events have significant impact on the “other,” since a religious other is suspected in connection with these atrocities. This topic of the stranger needs creative reflection informed by religious teachings and supported by positive, genuine social practices cultivated in the contemporary competitive and tense interreligious environment. More than at any other time in the history of human civilization, the issue of the other and of difference has become a practical issue and a concern of our [End Page 158] daily lives. Without any religious difference, we all are affected today by the stereotypes of the stranger and misconceptions of the other. After the turmoil of the September 11 attacks in New York, in the Western hemisphere the place, location, attitude, and notion of the other have been continuously debated, argued, and evaluated in relation to the natives of the country and their ways of life. While immigration officers are busy identifying aliens and restricting their entrance to Western society at all levels, democratic values of human liberty and freedom are at stake due to surveillance and persecution based on difference. Awareness and concern are how we deal today with difference; in particular, manifest differences in relation to religious doctrines and practices are misconceived, manipulated, and misrepresented. How can we appreciate difference as a positive dimension of human life? To what extent can we accept and accommodate differences that appear in religious doctrines and cultural practices? How should we incorporate difference and plurality as a powerful resource for a healthy society in this global village? More than at any other time in history, religious communities are challenged to seek and to develop religious resources that enhance communal life in a pluralistic society and the healthy incorporation of plurality for spiritual growth in a diverse social and religious context. Here, I want to explore and understand Buddhist views toward the stranger, the other, and the non-Buddhist. I want to search for teachings and practices that locate the stranger in a culturally and socially positive environment in contemporary society. For a contextual and detailed analysis of Buddhist attitudes toward the stranger and the other, I focus on Theravada Buddhist society in Sri Lanka. While identifying doctrines and concepts that shape Buddhist attitudes toward the other and the stranger, I explore here in depth how Buddhist teachings construct a practical worldview for the contemporary world and guide human actions that are genuinely informed by and rooted in religious virtues in a healthy fashion. In our modern, tense political context, there is a strong need to examine the use and effectiveness of Buddhist principles in developing a practical ethic toward the stranger. As religious communities, we are challenged again and again within our communities as well as outside them to test religious teachings and views that we hold dear and their practical use in communal life. We are encouraged to search for relevant resources and place the [End Page 159] resources that are useful to create a practical religious view toward the stranger in a complex web of human interactions in our modern society. In our communities, we realize that, unless the community is homogenous, we do not share the same religion or worldview; there are multiple resources for resolving conflicts and creating harmony and peace, and each community proposes...

Fast reactors and nuclear nonproliferation problem

The growing number of countries wishing to use nuclear energy, and the expansion in the geography of NPPs entails the risk of nuclear weapons proliferation, given that political leaders in some countries may want to purchase or develop sensitive nuclear technologies. A certain risk of proliferation through nuclear power technologies and materials cannot be excluded altogether. In the nuclear fuel cycle there are large inventories of nuclear materials, including fissile materials, (many hundreds and thousands of tons). The problem of spent nuclear fuel with plutonium in it, especially for novice countries and countries with small nuclear power program, also increases the risk of proliferation, including the growing risk of actions on the part of subnational or terrorist organizations because of the proliferation of nuclear technologies and materials as respective protection measures are insufficient in these countries.In the event of thermal reactors, uranium enrichment is indispensable to production of fuel. Long-term storage of SNF from thermal reactors in an open fuel cycle, which is a common practice nowadays, entails an increased risk of proliferation due to the weakening of the radiation barrier over time and the potentiality of unauthorized removal of fuel by the proliferator state and its theft by criminals and terrorists.Fast-neutron reactors started up and operating on plutonium fuel do not require uranium enrichment. There is no long-term storage of SNF in the closed fuel cycles of fast reactors. Gradual replacement of thermal reactors by fast reactors, due to natural uranium being in short supply, creates prerequisites for phasing out uranium enrichment. However, countries having small nuclear power programs and, therefore, a limited number of nuclear units will use thermal reactors still for a long time, which will require uranium enrichment.Creation of nuclear weapons based on energy-grade plutonium using a simpler “gun-type” design is practically impossible because of a high neutron background inherent in this kind of plutonium. However, this does not exclude the potentiality of terrorist attempts to fabricate a primitive nuclear explosive device.Both sensitive technologies (uranium enrichment and SNF processing with separation of plutonium) will be used to start up fast reactors on uranium fuel with the subsequent transition to plutonium fuel. In this case, plutonium with a small content of higher isotopes will be bred not only in the blanket, but also in the reactor core in much greater quantities.The paper considers various technological and institutional approaches to solving the problem of fast reactor blankets in terms of ensuring a strong proliferation resistance.

Evolving Risk Perceptions About Near-Miss Terrorist Events

After disasters such as the attacks of September 11, 2001, the public experiences a heightened response that naturally returns to some lower level of concern. We demonstrate that this pattern of heightened response followed by a decline as time passes also occurs for terrorist events that are near misses. Data from a field study and two experimental lab studies show that people's perceptions of the risk of similar category events and their perception that the near-miss attempt was close to being a successful terrorist attack decline over time. Moreover, the decline in the perception of how close the near miss was to being a successful terrorist attack partially explains the decline in the perception of the risk of future similar category events. We also show that the perceived risk for terrorism in general decays more slowly than for a specific category event, and is reactivated by additional terrorist attempts. Finally, we show that people rely on reference points to provide the context for near-miss terrorism events, and without reference points assessing perceptions of risk and perceptions of how close an event was to having a truly bad outcome are difficult. The reliance on reference points for context can result in different people evaluating the same event differently depending on that person's information about prior terrorist attempts. Our contributions provide guidance to organizations such as the U.S. Department of Homeland Security for encouraging stakeholders to make rational decisions on the basis of the nature, scale, and scope of the attack that balance recovery with continued vigilance. We also provide information to other intelligence agencies who need to consider their own individuals' personal biases that may arise when repeatedly examining terrorist near misses.

AN ATTEMPT TO EVALUATE THE RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH RADIOLOGICAL TERROR

The evaluation of the risk of a terrorist attack has been made frequently by multiplying the probability of occurrence of a terrorist attempt by the probability of its success and a quantity which represents the consequences of a successful attack. In the case of a radiological attack the consequences will vary in case the action will be active or passive. Thirteen radionuclides were examined for their potential uses in credible threats or terrorist attacks based on their availability from laboratories and hospitals. Taking into account the dose conversion coefficients published by the International Atomic Energy Agency, those radionuclides with higher dose effectiveness for ingestion are the following: 210Po; 226Ra and 241Am. Other radionuclides which can be used in threats and terror attacks, like 137Cs for example have also been examined. The risks associated with the selected radionuclides have been tentatively ranked as high, medium, or low. The probability used to evaluate risks depends on the motivation of the terrorist and the capacity, which implies availability or the actual possibility of obtaining a particular radionuclide. On the other hand, whenever a list of radionuclides to be used in a malevolent action is available to a terrorist, the choice of the most adequate will depend also on the action to be undertaken. This work ranks risks associated with radiological terror based on physical, chemical, radio-toxicological and other relevant data on radionuclides, which were either already used in terror attacks, or were pointed out as adequate to be used in such malevolent actions.

Security as controversy: Reassembling security at Amsterdam Airport

Critical approaches to security have come to define themselves against mainstream security studies by not a priori assuming what security is, but rather taking it as an ‘essentially contested concept’. Yet, as evidenced by the way in which recent ‘turns’ in the field have played out in the debate around airport security, ontological assumptions about security tend to restrict the scope of empirical analysis, with airport security being studied as, for instance, either discourse or practice. This article aims to propose an alternative methodological approach to security by studying security as controversy. Studying security as controversy means refraining from making a priori assumptions about the ontology of (in)security, instead considering it as itself at stake in – and hence the outcome of – security governance efforts. The article elaborates on this approach by drawing on core insights from actor-network theory, a conceptual and methodological toolkit that allows, as I show, a focus on how security actors perform security by enrolling, assembling and translating heterogeneous elements into stable assemblages that can be presented as definitive security solutions or threats. The article illustrates this approach through a look at the case of airport security at Amsterdam Airport in the aftermath of the 2009 Christmas terrorist attempt.

Smart Grid, Safe Grid

The existing power delivery system is vulnerable to both natural disasters and intentional attack. A successful terrorist attempt to disrupt the power delivery system could have adverse effects on national security, the economy, and the lives of every citizen. Secure and reliable operation of the electric system is fundamental to national and international economic systems, security, and quality of life.

The “New Terrorism” and its Critics

This article attempts to fulfill a lacuna in the literature on terrorism by providing a systematic response to the widespread criticism of the concept of “new terrorism.” According to this conceptualization, the “new terrorism” is characterized by religious motivation, networked organizational structures, tendency to launch mass casualty attacks and possible use of weapons of mass destruction. This conceptualization is criticized by scholars who argue that religiously motivated terrorism has always existed; that increased frequency of mass casualty attacks is due to other factors; that traditional terrorists were also indiscriminate in their targeting; and that there is nothing new about terrorist attempts to use WMDs or horizontal terrorist networks. These critics are not convincing on three counts: they adopt a rudimentary notion of “new” which is hardly appropriate for detecting or understanding social change; they employ inappropriate categories and labels, which make it impossible to distinguish the characteristic features of new terrorism from those of the old; and several critics create a straw man version of the “new terrorism” argument by resorting to reductionist interpretations. The article points out that the contemporary terrorism is not only religious, but is also characterized by the absence of several ideological and political imperatives for centralized and hierarchical organizational structures and for using discriminate violence that characterized left wing and ethno-nationalist terrorism of the past. The critics also ignore the fact that there is a declared intention on the part of new terrorists to organize horizontally through networks and to kill indiscriminately among civilians.

Respuesta de los servicios de radiodiagnóstico ante ataques terroristas con múltiples víctimas

Objectives To analyze whether the radiological management of seriously injured victims from the March 11 terrorist attempt was affected by the large number of victims treated at two hospitals in Madrid. To evaluate the organization for providing imaging services, detect failings, and propose a protocol for diagnostic imaging departments. Material and methods Two hundred and fifty one patients arrived at hospital A and 36 at hospital B. Both centers have emergency imaging areas and protocols for the treatment of patients with multiple trauma. We compared organizational aspects (classification, identification), material resources, human resources, healthcare resources (number and type of examinations), as well as the initial radiological management with the usual protocol and with the recommendations for incidents with multiple victims. Results In hospital A, patients’ injuries were classified as severe (175) or minor (76); in hospital B, injuries were classified as extremely severe (13), severe (4), or minor (19). Additional staff were assigned to the emergency imaging areas in both hospitals. In hospital A, 62 portable plain-film radiographs, 39 ultrasonographic examinations, 25 cranial CT examinations, 6 cervical CT examinations, 2 chest CT examinations, and 2 abdominopelvic CT examinations were performed. In hospital B, 19 portable plain-film radiographs (74 in total), 9 ultrasonographic examinations, 17 cranial-chest-abdominopelvic CT examinations, 2 cervical CT examinations, 2 orbital CT examinations, and 2 CT examinations of the sinuses were performed. Conclusion In both hospitals, each victim was managed as if he or she were the only patient. The discrepancies between the two hospitals were due to differences in the usual protocol for multiple trauma patients. In light of the organizational errors discovered, we propose a plan of action based on the identification and progressive activation of material and human resources until sufficient levels are achieved.

Should We Protect Commercial Airplanes Against Surface-to-Air Missile Attacks by Terrorists?

This paper describes a decision tree analysis to assess the cost-effectiveness of MANPADS (Man-Portable Air Defense Systems) countermeasures. These countermeasures are electronic devices that can be installed on commercial airplanes to detect and deflect surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) fired by terrorists. The model considers a terrorist attempt to shoot down a commercial airplane with a heat-seeking SAM, and it evaluates the decision to install countermeasures, taking into account alternative modes of attack, probabilities of success, and consequences to the economy. All model variables were fully parameterized, using reasonable ranges based on open-source literature. Not surprisingly, the probability of an attack, the consequences of an attack to the economy, and the cost of countermeasures are the most important parameters. Surprisingly, some of the hotly disputed parameters, such as the probability of an airplane surviving a successful hit or the probability of a false alarm, have very little impact on the results. The analysis suggests that MANPADS countermeasures installed on planes can be cost-effective if the probability of such an attack is large (greater than about 0.40 in ten years), the economic losses are large (greater than about $75 billion), and the countermeasures are relatively inexpensive (smaller than about $15 billion). An economic analysis conducted as part of this analysis showed that the economic impacts can be as large as $250 billion, thus making countermeasures a possibly cost-effective option. More research is needed to determine the real costs of MANPADS countermeasures and how terrorists may shift their tactics, once countermeasures are installed.

An Anatomy of Urban Terror: Lessons from Jerusalem and Elsewhere

This paper examines the increased prevalence of urban terror and its spatial implications. Urban terror concerns territory, space and logistics, and is characterised by low-intensity, ambiguously bounded warfare. It is defined as attacks intentionally directed against non-combatants and key installations located in high-density, continuously developed, diversified environments. The research traces the collective experience of London, Moscow and Istanbul with extended attention paid to Jerusalem. Four patterns of urban terror are identified and used to conduct the analysis. These consist of terrorist attempts to: decontrol urban territory, cause instability and demonstrate vulnerability; launch repetitive attacks on specific spaces in order to create conditions of chaos; achieve proximity and access to targets; and, finally, a response to terror by authorities based on surveillance, partition, closure and shrinkage of urban space. A final section consists of analysing terror's impact on the economy and future of cities.

Security challenges for the electricity infrastructure

Because critical infrastructures touch us all, the growing potential for infrastructure problems stems from multiple sources, including system complexity, economic growth, deregulation, terrorism, and even the weather. Electric power systems constitute the fundamental infrastructure of modern society. A successful terrorist attempt to disrupt electricity supplies could have devastating effects on national security, the economy, and every citizen's life. Yet power systems have widely dispersed assets that can never be absolutely defended against a determined attack. Indeed, because of the intimate connections between power systems and society's other infrastructures, we need to consider three different kinds of threats: attacks upon the power system; attacks by the power system; and attacks through the power system.

Autocracy under Siege: Security Police and Opposition in Russia, 1866-1905

Autocracy under Siege examines the role of the security service in the titanic struggle between the regime and those dedicated to the defeat of monarchical absolutism. From the first terrorist attempt on the life of a Russian emperor in 1866 through the seismic upheaval of 1905, Daly traces the reaction, expansion, and evolution of the security police in the face of the increased antigovernment activity that threatened the continued survival of the regime.

Risk Analysis of Terrorist Attacks

A quantitative probabilistic/systems analysis model is described which is useful for allocating resources to safeguard valuable documents or materials in either a fixed‐site facility or a moving convoy against an overt terrorist attack. The model is also useful for ranking the sensitive areas at a site according to their survivability of a given hypothesized terrorist attempt. To compare various defense strategies and security configurations, the probability of a successful terrorist activity is computed based on event tree models of the site/security configuration. This calculation incorporates a realistic engagement model (in the event a guard force engages the terrorists prior to completion of their objective) and information on barrier penetration times (for example, distribution of the time to defeat a chain link fence or vault door, traverse an open area, and so forth). Two security analyses are described to illustrate the methodology. One example considers a terrorist attack on a convoy transporting a missile from a storage to a launch facility. The second example involves an attack on a munitions storage facility.