Terrorism Security Research Articles

Обзор личного архивного фонда Б. А. Смысловского в Национальном архиве княжества Лихтенштейн - Holmston-Smyslowsky, Arthur Graf von. 1831-1988 гг.

This is a traditional archival review of the personal provenance fond of Boris Alekseevich Smyslovsky, deposited in the National Archive of the Principality of Liechtenstein (Liechten stein Landesarchiv). The object of the study is formation of Boris Alekseevich Smyslovsky’s personal provenance fond and its information capacity. The article attempts to reconstruct the biography of B. A. Smyslovsky; to clarify the circumstances of acquisition of B. A. Smyslovsky’ documents by the archive of the Principality of Liechtenstein; to identify major document groups and their value to researchers. Boris Alekseevich Smyslovsky was born into a noble family of Lieutenant Colonel Alexei Smyslovsky on November 21, 1897 in the village of Terioki near St. Petersburg. He was a First World War and Civil War veteran. After the end of the Civil War, he lived in emigration in Poland. After German invasion in Poland, he worked at the headquarters of the German military intelligence in Warsaw “Abvernebenstelle-Warsaw.” In the days of the Great Patriotic War, he ran reconnaissance and sabotage units of the German army. In 1945, he was interned in the Principality of Liechtenstein with the remnants of his units. He was able to avoid repatriation and leave for Argentina. In September 1948, he created and headed the “Field-Marshal A.V. Suvorov Union of Russian Former War Veterans” in Argentina. He was a counter terrorism security advisor to the President of Argentina Juan Domingo Peron. Since 1966, he lived in Germany, collaborated with the foreign intelligence service of Germany, and held the position of adviser to the General Staff of the Bundeswehr. In 1973, B. A. Smyslovsky retired. In 1975, he moved to Liechtenstein with his wife. He died there on September 5, 1988. After his death, his documents were handed over to the National Archive of the Principality of Liechtenstein by his wife Irina Nikolaevna Holmston-Smyslovskaya (Kochanovich). In total, there are 90 files in the fond, including biographical documents; creative materials (books and articles by B. A. Smyslovsky); correspondence; documents collected by B. A. Smyslovsky; photographs; printed materials (books and periodicals). B. A. Smyslovsky’s personal provenance fond, deposited in the National Archive of the Principality of Liechtenstein, is of great interest to historians of the Second World War and history of post-war displaced persons. The author contends that these documents have not been sufficiently studied by the Russian researchers. This very article is an attempt to inform of the documents of the the B.A. Smyslovsky fond.

Theoretical and philosophical aspects of special powers of a political community with regard to counter terrorism security

The material scope of the analysis undertaken in the text covers the issues concerned with the relationship between two goods. Between the good constituted by community security on the one hand, and the good vested in the power to apply special measures falling within necessary defence and the state of higher necessity. The problem of the relationship between two goods, e.g. a conflict between two goods, can be observed in the competition between the common good and the good of the individual. A similar relation can be noted in the process of derogation from the obligations upon the contemporary political community as regards protection of life and other individual rights and freedoms. Special cases of the conflict between goods include the admissibility of the use of force, violence or restriction of individual freedom. Undoubtedly, situations in which individuals or groups are subjected to torture or have their life taken serve as the most extreme examples of violence use by the political community. All kinds of surveillance measures used by state institutions should be reckoned among the examples concerned with interference in individuals’ private lives.
 The main purpose of the analysis contained in the text is to present all manner of argumentation concerned with the possibility of applying special measures within or outside the bounds of necessary defence and the state of higher necessity by the political community. In order to elaborate the objective scope of the analysis, the following research questions have been formulated in the text: (1) To what extent is it possible, within the limits of the law and per analogiam to the individual’s adequate actions, for the political community to apply special measures (necessary defence or the state of higher necessity) with the aim of providing security (and in particular counter terrorism security) for itself?, (2) To what extent is it possible, outside the limits of the law and per analogiam to the individual’s adequate actions, for the political community to apply special measures (necessary defence or the state of higher necessity) with the aim of providing security (and in particular counter terrorism security) for itself?
 The presented analysis is chiefly an overview of a conceptual character with regard to the presentation of the issues concerned with the relationship between such goods as security and special powers of a political community. For the presentation of the legal aspects of this issue textual, functional and systemic interpretations have been applied. Next to the individual kinds of legal interpretation, in the course of argumentation a theoretical reflection on the law is used. The conceptual approach to the title problem makes use of argumentation per analogiam to appropriate actions by an individual when faced with a direct threat, and specified in the provisions of the Polish criminal law – necessary defence and the state of higher necessity.

‘Now that you mention it, museums probably are a target’: museums, terrorism and security in the United Kingdom

ABSTRACTThis article explores counter-terrorism security practices at museums in the United Kingdom (UK), locations that terrorists have targeted through both propaganda and operational activity. Drawing upon research that re-interprets the museum within the ‘single narrative’ of global jihadist terrorism, an outlook that justifies and legitimises the targeting of socio-cultural sites from instrumental and symbolic perspectives, this article highlights the important roles of the police Counter Terrorism Security Adviser (CTSA) and the museum security manager in counter-terrorism practice at museums in the UK. The practices of highlighting risk to the museum and managing risk in the museum environment are subsequently outlined. In doing so two key challenges facing counter-terrorism security practice in the museum are noted: the cost of implementing counter-terrorism measures and the cultural challenge of communicating and responsibly embedding such security thinking in everyday practice. The researchers also reflect upon the potential consequences of the implementation of counter-terrorism security measures at museums as a form of securitisation.

Mid-Infrared Sensing Using Heavily Doped Germanium Plasmonics on Silicon Substrates

The quest for novel plasmonic materials has been a lively area of research over the last few years. In the mid-infrared (mid-IR) spectral region, in particular, localized plasmon resonances in nanoparticles and nano-antennas hold promise for enhanced IR spectroscopies, with key applications in biology, medicine, and security. In this frame, the development of a CMOS-compatible plasmonic platform in the mid-IR could have disruptive effects for future technologies, allowing for cost-effective sensing devices integrated with electronics [1-2]. We report on the growth, fabrication and optical characterization of heavily-doped Ge antennas integrated on a Si substrate and we exploit them for the sensing of solid-phase and liquid-phase analytes [3-5]. Epitaxial Ge is grown on Si by plasma-enhanced chemical vapor deposition, exploiting phosphorous as the dopant and achieving plasma frequencies up to 1950 cm-1 (5.1 µm wavelength) corresponding to activated doping of 8.1 x 1019 cm–3. Through modelling and simulation of a series of key figures of merit we demonstrate that n-Ge has performance as a mid-infrared plasmonic material that is within an order of magnitude of noble metals such as gold and with properly designed antennas has the potential to provide enhancements of up to 3 orders of magnitude. We demonstrate two-wire gap antennas fabricated by electron-beam lithography and reactive ion etching techniques, displaying localized plasmon resonances in the important 8 to 13 µm molecular fingerprint region. We target the sensing of a thin polydimethylsiloxane (PDMS) layer (thickness of about 40 nm) and demonstrate experimentally an enhancement of two orders of magnitude in the collected signal for resonances around 800 cm–1 (12.5 µm wavelength), as derived from a comparison with the results of detailed numerical simulations. Further measurements of the ~700 cm–1 (14.3 µm wavelength) C–Cl bond duplet of 2-chloroethyl methyl sulfide, a mustard chemical warfare (CW) agent simulant, demonstrates potential security applications. This part of the mid-infrared spectrum has a host of molecular absorption lines important for the sensing of both CW agents and explosives, both of which are of interest for airport and counter terrorism security screening. Our results represent a first experimental benchmark for group-IV mid-IR plasmonics and confirm that future CMOS sensing platforms could benefit significantly from plasmonic enhancements provided by integrated heavily-doped Ge-based devices. The research leading to these results has received funding from the European Union’s Seventh Framework Programme under grant agreement n°613055. [1] R. Soref, Nature Phot. 4, 495-497 (2010). [2] R. Soref, J. Hendrickson, and J.W. Cleary, Opt. Exp. 20, 3814-3824 (2012). [3] L. Baldassarre, E. Sakat, J. Frigerio, A. Samarelli, K. Gallacher, E. Calandrini, G. Isella, D.J. Paul, M. Ortolani, and P. Biagioni, Nano Lett. 15, 7225-7231 (2015). [4] P. Biagioni, J. Frigerio, A. Samarelli, K. Gallacher, L. Baldassarre, E. Sakat, E. Calandrini, R.W. Millar, V. Giliberti, G. Isella, D.J. Paul, and M. Ortolani, J. Nanophot. 9, 093789 (2015). [5] A. Samarelli, J. Frigerio, E. Sakat, L. Baldassarre, K. Gallacher, M. Finazzi, G. Isella, M. Ortolani, P. Biagioni, and D.J. Paul, Thin Solid Films 602, 52 – 55 (2016). Figure 1

Resource allocation, emergency response capability, and infrastructure concentration around vulnerable sites

Public and private decision‐makers continue to seek risk‐based approaches to allocate funds to help communities respond to disasters, accidents, and terrorist attacks involving critical infrastructure facilities. The requirements for emergency response capability depend both upon risks within a region's jurisdiction and mutual aid agreements that have been made with other regions. In general, regions in close proximity to infrastructure would benefit more from resources to improve preparedness because there is a greater potential for an event requiring emergency response to occur if there are more facilities at which such events could occur. Thus, a potentially important input into decisions about allocating funds for security is the proximity of a community to high concentrations of infrastructure systems that potentially could be at risk to an industrial accident, natural disaster, or terrorist attack. In this paper, we describe a methodology for measuring a region's exposure to infrastructure‐related risks that captures both a community's concentration of facilities or sites considered to be vulnerable and of the proximity of these facilities to surrounding infrastructure systems. These measures are based on smoothing‐based nonparametric probability density estimators, which are then used to estimate the probability of the entire infrastructure occurring within any specified distance of facilities in a county. The set of facilities used in the paper to illustrate the use of this methodology consists of facilities identified as vulnerable through the California Buffer Zone Protection Program. For infrastructure in surrounding areas we use dams judged to be high hazards, and BART tracks. The results show that the methodology provides information about patterns of critical infrastructure in regions that is relevant for decisions about how to allocate terrorism security and emergency preparedness resources.

The Economics of Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism: A Survey (Part II)

This survey provides an in-depth analysis of existing research on the economic analysis of terrorism and counter-terrorist measures. First the existing evidence on the causes of terrorism is analyzed, then we consider the evidence of the consequences of terrorism and we demonstrate why it is important to regarding of the issue of counter-terrorism policy. Moreover the survey presents the existing knowledge on the interrelation between the economy and the issue of security and it incorporates analysis the level of knowledge about the causal chains between security and the economy. Also it focuses on perspective and methodologies from the discipline of economics but also refers to research from related disciplines (sociology, political science). It also assembles the knowledge on the impact of terrorism on the economy as reflected in macro-economic variables and its impact on specific sectors. Furthermore it assesses how potential an actual terrorist event determine consumer and producer behaviour, public policy, as well as terrorist responses to these policies. Finally a European perspective on the terrorism security annexes is discussed and here we analyze the causes of terrorism in Europe.

The Economics of Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism: A Survey (Part II)

This survey provides an in-depth analysis of existing research on the economic analysis of terrorism and counter-terrorist measures. First the existing evidence on the causes of terrorism is analyzed, then we consider the evidence of the consequences of terrorism and we demonstrate why it is important to regarding of the issue of counter-terrorism policy. Moreover the survey presents the existing knowledge on the interrelation between the economy and the issue of security and it incorporates analysis the level of knowledge about the causal chains between security and the economy. Also it focuses on perspective and methodologies from the discipline of economics but also refers to research from related disciplines (sociology, political science). It also assembles the knowledge on the impact of terrorism on the economy as reflected in macro-economic variables and its impact on specific sectors. Furthermore it assesses how potential an actual terrorist event determine consumer and producer behaviour, public policy, as well as terrorist responses to these policies. Finally a European perspective on the terrorism security annexes is discussed and here we analyze the causes of terrorism in Europe.

Terrorism security in the chemical industry: Results of a qualitative investigation

Industrial sectors are nowadays extensively confronted with anti-terrorism security. Chemical plants, in particular, face the necessity for increased terrorism prevention. This article discusses organizational security measures as they relate to chemical facilities in general, and to four chemical enterprises in particular. Furthermore, a general overview (used in the chemical industry as well as in other industrial sectors) of physical security components used to fight terrorism is provided. Four security hypotheses based on professional and academic literature and on internal documents with reference to the chemical industry are validated via in-depth interviews carried out in four chemical multinationals. Furthermore, recommendations are given to consider when striving for improvement in installing and continuously improving security measures in the chemicals sector.

Using Probabilistic Terrorism Risk Modeling for Regulatory Benefit‐Cost Analysis: Application to the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative in the Land Environment

This article presents a framework for using probabilistic terrorism risk modeling in regulatory analysis. We demonstrate the framework with an example application involving a regulation under consideration, the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative for the Land Environment, (WHTI-L). First, we estimate annualized loss from terrorist attacks with the Risk Management Solutions (RMS) Probabilistic Terrorism Model. We then estimate the critical risk reduction, which is the risk-reducing effectiveness of WHTI-L needed for its benefit, in terms of reduced terrorism loss in the United States, to exceed its cost. Our analysis indicates that the critical risk reduction depends strongly not only on uncertainties in the terrorism risk level, but also on uncertainty in the cost of regulation and how casualties are monetized. For a terrorism risk level based on the RMS standard risk estimate, the baseline regulatory cost estimate for WHTI-L, and a range of casualty cost estimates based on the willingness-to-pay approach, our estimate for the expected annualized loss from terrorism ranges from $2.7 billion to $5.2 billion. For this range in annualized loss, the critical risk reduction for WHTI-L ranges from 7% to 13%. Basing results on a lower risk level that results in halving the annualized terrorism loss would double the critical risk reduction (14-26%), and basing the results on a higher risk level that results in a doubling of the annualized terrorism loss would cut the critical risk reduction in half (3.5-6.6%). Ideally, decisions about terrorism security regulations and policies would be informed by true benefit-cost analyses in which the estimated benefits are compared to costs. Such analyses for terrorism security efforts face substantial impediments stemming from the great uncertainty in the terrorist threat and the very low recurrence interval for large attacks. Several approaches can be used to estimate how a terrorism security program or regulation reduces the distribution of risks it is intended to manage. But, continued research to develop additional tools and data is necessary to support application of these approaches. These include refinement of models and simulations, engagement of subject matter experts, implementation of program evaluation, and estimating the costs of casualties from terrorism events.

Terrorism and Industrial Chemical Production: A New Era of Risk Communication

The increased threat of and heightened concern for terrorist attacks since September 11, 2001 has reinvigorated the debate about industrial production security efforts, especially in the chemical manufacturing and refining industry. Through a telephone survey (n=400), researchers examined public perceptions of industry preparedness in the event of terrorism by featuring several risk communication variables. Results suggest that near-neighbor community residents who are more aware of recent industry terrorism security efforts demonstrate an increased sense of risk of living in an “at-risk” community. Residents who are aware of industry's efforts related to safety and terrorism express more trust for local industry and government officials, are more cognitively involved, and are more supportive of the local chemical industry.

Standardized Emergency Management System and Response to a Smallpox Emergency

AbstractThe smallpox virus is a high-priority, Category-A agent that poses a global, terrorism security risk because it: (1) easily can be disseminated and transmitted from person to person; (2) results in high mortality rates and has the potential for a major public health impact; (3) might cause public panic and social disruption; and (4) requires special action for public health preparedness. In recognition of this risk, the Los Angeles County Department of Health Services (LAC-DHS) developed the Smallpox Preparedness, Response, and Recovery Plan for LAC to prepare for the possibility of an outbreak of smallpox.A unique feature of the LAC-DHS plan is its explicit use of the Standardized Emergency Management System (SEMS) framework for detailing the functions needed to respond to a smallpox emergency. The SEMS includes the Incident Command System (ICS) structure (management, operations, planning/intelligence, logistics, and finance/administration), the mutual-aid system, and the multi/interagency coordination required during a smallpox emergency. Management for incident command includes setting objectives and priorities, information (risk communications), safety, and liaison. Operations includes control and containment of a smallpox outbreak including ring vaccination, mass vaccination, adverse events monitoring and assessment, management of confirmed and suspected smallpox cases, contact tracing, active surveillance teams and enhanced hospital-based surveillance, and decontamination. Planning/intelligence functions include developing the incident action plan, epidemiological investigation and analysis of smallpox cases, and epidemiological assessment of the vaccination coverage status of populations at risk. Logistics functions include receiving, handling, inventorying, and distributing smallpox vaccine and vaccination clinic supplies; personnel; transportation; communications; and health care of personnel. Finally, finance/administration functions include monitoring costs related to the smallpox emergency, procurement, and administrative aspects that are not handled by other functional divisions of incident command systems.The plan was developed and is under frequent review by the LAC-DHS Smallpox Planning Working Group, and is reviewed periodically by the LAC Bioterrorism Advisory Committee, and draws upon the Smallpox Response Plan and Guidelines of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and recommendations of the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP). The Smallpox Preparedness, Response, and Recovery Plan, with its SEMS framework and ICS structure, now is serving as a model for the development of LAC-DHS plans for responses to other terrorist or natural-outbreak responses.

Standardized emergency management system and response to a smallpox emergency.

The smallpox virus is a high-priority, Category-A agent that poses a global, terrorism security risk because it: (1) easily can be disseminated and transmitted from person to person; (2) results in high mortality rates and has the potential for a major public health impact; (3) might cause public panic and social disruption; and (4) requires special action for public health preparedness. In recognition of this risk, the Los Angeles County Department of Health Services (LAC-DHS) developed the Smallpox Preparedness, Response, and Recovery Plan for LAC to prepare for the possibility of an outbreak of smallpox. A unique feature of the LAC-DHS plan is its explicit use of the Standardized Emergency Management System (SEMS) framework for detailing the functions needed to respond to a smallpox emergency. The SEMS includes the Incident Command System (ICS) structure (management, operations, planning/intelligence, logistics, and finance/administration), the mutual-aid system, and the multi/interagency coordination required during a smallpox emergency. Management for incident command includes setting objectives and priorities, information (risk communications), safety, and liaison. Operations includes control and containment of a smallpox outbreak including ring vaccination, mass vaccination, adverse events monitoring and assessment, management of confirmed and suspected smallpox cases, contact tracing, active surveillance teams and enhanced hospital-based surveillance, and decontamination. Planning/intelligence functions include developing the incident action plan, epidemiological investigation and analysis of smallpox cases, and epidemiological assessment of the vaccination coverage status of populations at risk. Logistics functions include receiving, handling, inventorying, and distributing smallpox vaccine and vaccination clinic supplies; personnel; transportation; communications; and health care of personnel. Finally, finance/administration functions include monitoring costs related to the smallpox emergency, procurement, and administrative aspects that are not handled by other functional divisions of incident command systems. The plan was developed and is under frequent review by the LAC-DHS Smallpox Planning Working Group, and is reviewed periodically by the LAC Bioterrorism Advisory Committee, and draws upon the Smallpox Response Plan and Guidelines of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and recommendations of the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP). The Smallpox Preparedness, Response, and Recovery Plan, with its SEMS framework and ICS structure, now is serving as a model for the development of LAC-DHS plans for responses to other terrorist or natural-outbreak responses.

BALTIMORE PUSHES PLANT SECURITY

LAST WEEK, BALTIMORE BEcame the nation's first city to require that large chemical handlers establish terrorism security programs. A new city law calls for companies to reduce their terrorism vulnerability and offers them the option of a security program based on an American Chemistry Council (ACC) ACC strongly endorses the new law, as does the Maryland Chemistry & IndustrialTechnology Alliance (MCITA), a state industry group that helped negotiate it. law affects facilities that make, store, or use chemicals, but only in quantities high enough to trigger filing of a Clean Air Act risk management plan. Under the law's provisions, 17 Baltimore plants, mostly chemical companies, along with a handful of water treatment facilities, will have to comply, according to federal data. MCITA estimates eight of its members would have to comply. It's a first step, says Aaron J. Greenfield, a city official. The mayor, fire chief, and chemical industry agreed this was a fair threshold. We didn't want ...