Terrorism In Northern Ireland Research Articles

Transitioning to Peace in Northern Ireland: Before and After the Belfast-Good Friday Agreement 1998

ABSTRACT The 1998 Belfast-Good Friday Agreement (GFA), credited with bringing peace to Northern Ireland, has celebrated its 25-year anniversary. The key research question in this paper is how have the changes made under the GFA impacted on the nature of terrorism in Northern Ireland? To address this question, we examine terrorist attacks before and after the Agreement using statistics from the Global Terrorism Database. The research finds: a significant reduction in both Republican and Loyalist terrorism but a residual of groups, particularly republican splinter organisations, intent on continuing their campaign of violence. Post GFA, in relative terms, there is an increase in attacks against private persons and property and a decrease in attacks against the military. Terrorists are now more likely to use explosives than firearms but with a reduced predicted likelihood of success. The Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) has responded with attempts to normalise policing. Consolidating peace goes well beyond the realms of policing and involves tackling the wider issues of power sharing politics, socio-economic inequalities, and societal divisiveness.

Prominent need to increase the level of education and awareness in the field of terrorist activities

The relevance of the problem under study stems from the fact that the practice of terrorism is one of the main challenges of contemporary world politics, affecting various regions of our planet. In this regard, the study of this phenomenon within a particular region deserves special attention, Northern Ireland in this case. The practice of terrorism there has been a destabilising challenge almost throughout the twentieth century and is associated with unresolved interethnic and interreligious problems. The aim of the paper is to identify factors in the emergence, spread and de-escalation of political violence in Northern Ireland in a historical retrospective. The main approaches to the study of the problem in question are historical and analytical methods. The study shows the main reasons for the emergence and escalation of political violence and terrorism in Northern Ireland and indicates the main measures to find compromise in a multi-confessional and multi-ethnic society, which may be a model for the resolution of similar conflicts in other regions of the modern world. The materials of the paper can help to study the specifics of regional terrorism, to identify the main factors that allow reducing the level of social conflict, and to understand similar phenomena in other regions (the Balkan Peninsula, the Middle East, etc.). Moreover, it reveals the needs to make the awareness of the educated class of the society.

Legacies of the Troubles: The Links between Organized Crime and Terrorism in Northern Ireland

One of the most important legacies of the “Troubles” in Northern Ireland and the ensuing 20 years post-peace-process era, heralded by the 1998 Good Friday Agreement, is the rise of complex and diverse Republican and Loyalist paramilitary groups engaging in acts of terrorism and a wide range of organized criminal and cross-border activities. Yet, little scholarship has been dedicated for examining the nexus between terrorism and organized crime in Northern Ireland or for accurately understanding the role that paramilitaries play in organized crime and their dynamic interactions with organized criminal groups. Informed by empirical evidence and qualitative interviews with government agencies in Northern Ireland, it is this important gap in scholarship that this article aims to fill. It does so by developing a new terrorism-organized crime model which reveals a range of different types of crime-terror interactions in Northern Ireland. The article concludes that national terrorism-organized crime models, and the Northern Ireland model in particular, albeit with variations to its constituent components to accommodate local situations, are most appropriate for capturing intricate and dynamic interactions between these two phenomena across diverse environments rather than existing models designed for universal application.

Neil Southern (2018). Policing and Combating Terrorism in Northern Ireland: The Royal Ulster Constabulary

Neil Southern (2018). Policing and Combating Terrorism in Northern Ireland: The Royal Ulster Constabulary

Neil Southern, Policing and the Combating of Terrorism in Northern Ireland: The Royal Ulster Constabulary GC

Neil Southern, <i>Policing and the Combating of Terrorism in Northern Ireland: The Royal Ulster Constabulary GC</i>

The Role of Former Combatants in Preventing Youth Involvement in Terrorism in Northern Ireland: A Framework for Assessing Former Islamic State Combatants

ABSTRACTThe article engages with emerging debates on the potential role returning Islamic State fighters may have in preventing violence and whether nonviolent radical ideology acts as a conveyor-belt or firewall to violence. Rather than focusing on former combatant ideologies, it demonstrates how framing processes—not ideology per se—are more salient indicators of whether former combatants will act as conveyor-belts or firewalls to violence. The analytical framework developed for analyzing framing processes is then applied to the case of Northern Ireland. It argues that ideology shapes and constrains the type of antiviolence framing that may emerge, which provides a middle ground between the two perspectives in the literature. Furthermore, the article highlights the importance of network structures, incentives, and opportunities insofar as these can shape antiviolence framing and improve resonance among audiences. While recognizing the differences between cases, the framework is then used to argue that former Islamic State combatants can play a preventative role depending on whether their antiviolence framing is based on durable structural conditions, de-glamorizes violence, and is supported by networks that incentivize its diffusion—not on whether they have denounced their ideology.

Spatio-temporal patterns of IED usage by the Provisional Irish Republican Army

In this paper, a unique dataset of improvised explosive device attacks during “The Troubles” in Northern Ireland (NI) is analysed via a Hawkes process model. It is found that this past dependent model is a good fit to improvised explosive device attacks yielding key insights about the nature of terrorism in NI. We also present a novel approach to quantitatively investigate some of the sociological theory surrounding the Provisional Irish Republican Army which challenges previously held assumptions concerning changes seen in the organisation. Finally, we extend our use of the Hawkes process model by considering a multidimensional version which permits both self and mutual-excitations. This allows us to test how the Provisional Irish Republican Army responded to past improvised explosive device attacks on different geographical scales from which we find evidence for the autonomy of the organisation over the six counties of NI and Belfast. By incorporating a second dataset concerning British Security Force (BSF) interventions, the multidimensional model allows us to test counter-terrorism (CT) operations in NI where we find subsequent increases in violence.

The similarities and differences between separatist terrorism in Northern Ireland and Spain

The similarities and differences between separatist terrorism in Northern Ireland and Spain

Security Force Collusion in Northern Ireland 1969–1999: Substance or Symbolism?

In order to thwart and prevent terrorism the State is compelled to use all of the covert capabilities at its disposal in order to protect the society it serves. One of its most effective weapons is the use of human intelligence. Often acquired through secret relationships with terrorists or those with the ability to access preemptive intelligence. This important work is contentious for any democratic society as such practices and relationships, should they become known, inevitably beg the question—How far is it permissible for the State to go? A case study of State efforts to combat terrorism in Northern Ireland presents the moral, ethical, and legal dilemmas encountered and the propaganda opportunity such activity presents its detractors and critics. This article will identify key aspects related to the intelligence war and the development and creation of the concept of “collusion,” a subjective issue, and one that has no legal definition.

Keith Ewing, Bonfire of the Liberties: New Labour, Human Rights, and the Rule of Law

The principal aim of the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA) was to incorporate the rights set out by the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 1950 (‘the Convention’). The HRA was conceived of at a time of relative peace and stability within the United Kingdom (UK). The issue of violence and terrorism in Northern Ireland, that dogged the previous Conservative Governments throughout their tenure, shifted from a military situation towards a more peaceful political resolution, culminating in devolution and the Good Friday Agreement, also signed in 1998. However, the HRA came into force 11 months prior to the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001. This brought into being the so-called ‘War on Terror’, involving extensive domestic anti-terrorism powers being claimed by Governments across the world, as well as military interventions into Afghanistan, Pakistan, Somalia and Iraq. It is within this context of heightened military tensions both domestically and abroad that Professor Ewing has written this book, examining the discordance between the rhetoric of a ‘culture of liberty’ employed by the previous Labour Government, of which the HRA is the pinnacle, and the reality of the large-scale erosion of civil liberties that has continued to occur over the last 13 years.

Terrorism, Tourism and FDI: Estimating a Lower Bound on the Peace Dividend in Northern Ireland

In this article we estimate the economic cost of terrorism with regard to foreign direct investment and tourism in Northern Ireland during periods extending from 1970 through to 2007. Previous studies which have estimated the economic cost of terrorism internationally have neglected Northern Ireland. As a result, we focus exclusively on the economic cost of terrorism in Northern Ireland, which has been significant. In particular, our analyses indicate that for those initiatives reliant on foreign direct investment as well as for the tourism sector, a fatality as a result of terrorism imputes a minimum economic cost of £3.69 million pounds sterling. Taken together, our findings indicate an economic lower bound on the cost of terrorism in Northern Ireland.

Countering terrorism in Northern Ireland: the role of intelligence

This article aims to review some of the key lessons learnt by the Royal Ulster Constabulary's (RUC) Special Branch in the 37 years of the troubles in Northern Ireland. Above all counter-terrorism is an intelligence led operation and Special Branch are the key agency for this in all UK police forces, who have now benefited enormously from the expertise that the RUC's Special Branch built up over the years and have passed on to their colleagues throughout the UK. Intelligence is more often than not a human role and relies on human agencies, which was the case in Northern Ireland. The bulk of intelligence gathering was carried out at quite low levels although the sifting and analysing of it became a more specialist skill. Electronic intelligence and computerised systems were often quite low down in the order of priorities and uses, which tends to confound popular impressions. Agents, informers and good old fashioned ‘coppers’ who knew their patch were much more important both in terms of gathering information and in terms of undermining the terrorists morale from within and it was these factors that fundamentally defeated the IRA in Northern Ireland.

Abandoning Armed Resistance? The Ulster Volunteer Force as a Case Study of Strategic Terrorism in Northern Ireland

This article explores the Ulster Volunteer Force's (UVF) decision in May 2007 to abandon its campaign of “armed resistance” and pursue “a non-military, civilianized, role” in Northern Ireland. It does so by analyzing the UVF's actions in light of the academic literature on strategic terrorism. The central argument advanced in the article is that the UVF's decision to put its weapons “beyond reach” and re-structure its organization along civilian lines is (a) internally consistent with its stated policy of countering “violent nationalism,” (b) symptomatic of the transformation in the sociopolitical context since the 1994 paramilitary cease-fires, and (c) the logical outworking of the group's lack of popular legitimacy among its core Protestant working-class support-base. The article concludes with an assessment of the risks and possible dividends that the end of UVF terrorism holds for the Northern Ireland peace process.

Toward a Theory of Terrorism: Human Security as a Determinant of Terrorism

In this article, we investigate the relationship between human rights conditions and terrorist activity. We begin by outlining a theory for the genesis and growth of terrorism and argue that states which deny subsistence rights along with civil and political rights create an environment that is conducive to the development of terrorism. However, we conclude that it is the denial of security rights that is a necessary condition for the creation and growth of terrorism. We then examine the causes of terrorism in Northern Ireland in light of this theory. Specifically, we explore the extent to which human rights abuses contributed to the formation and growth of terrorists within Northern Ireland. We find that limits on the civil and political rights of the Catholic minority in Northern Ireland played a significant role in the genesis of terrorism. More importantly, British abuses of security rights increased the number of Irish citizens who supported and participated in terrorist activity.

Toward a Theory of Terrorism: Human Security as a Determinant of Terrorism

In this article, we investigate the relationship between human rights conditions and terrorist activity. We begin by outlining a theory for the genesis and growth of terrorism and argue that states which deny subsistence rights along with civil and political rights create an environment that is conducive to the development of terrorism. However, we conclude that it is the denial of security rights that is a necessary condition for the creation and growth of terrorism. We then examine the causes of terrorism in Northern Ireland in light of this theory. Specifically, we explore the extent to which human rights abuses contributed to the formation and growth of terrorists within Northern Ireland. We find that limits on the civil and political rights of the Catholic minority in Northern Ireland played a significant role in the genesis of terrorism. More importantly, British abuses of security rights increased the number of Irish citizens who supported and participated in terrorist activity.

Pathways Out of Terrorism in Northern Ireland and the Basque Country: The Misrepresentation of the Irish Model

This article focuses on the reasons why the attempt to achieve the end of ETA's violence in the Basque Country during the mid- to late-1990s was unsuccessful when compared to the IRA's case in Northern Ireland. It argues that the different roles played by Basque and Irish nationalism in that decade and the distortion of the Irish model by Basque nationalist parties and the terrorist organization ETA were decisive in this outcome. The radicalisation of constitutional nationalism in the Basque region, as opposed to the constitutionalisation of radical nationalism that was a key factor in the achievement of the consensus enshrined in the 1998 Belfast Agreement, contributed to the continuation of terrorism. Contrary to the spirit of this Agreement, Basque nationalists moved away from an existing consensus with non nationalist parties around the principle of full development of the Basque autonomy strengthening ETA's will to carry on with their campaign.

In the Wake of Terrorist Attack, Hatred May Mask Fear

Reactions of anger, rage, and hatred in the wake of September 11 terrorist attack are considered in light of the psychology of emotion and stress. Acknowledging underlying grief and fear through self‐reflection, writing, and social communication is likely to reduce unchecked anger, rage, and hatred. Hate crimes may also have some psychological bases in responses to stress called “flight‐or‐fight.” When flight is not an option, identifying and hating an enemy may have had evolutionary value for survival. This response creates harm in the current situation. An alternative cooperative response to stress, called “tend‐and‐befriend” by researchers, will be more helpful.

The Impact of the “Troubles” on Therapy Groups in Northern Ireland

Since September 11, 2001, terrorism has become familiar to us. The word itself rolls readily off our lips and we wonder about, and struggle with, the lasting consequences of that late summer day. In this paper we speak about thirty-four years of civil strife and terrorism in Northern Ireland. We examine the traumatic impact of that chronic strife on the therapy groups in Northern Ireland. Specifically we examine its impact on therapy groups-as-a-whole, on therapy group members and their interactions with each other, and on the group therapists who lead those groups. A brief review of the history of the strife and its impact on the citizenry precedes these central discussions. We conclude with suggestions about how we may use specially designed groups to enable therapists to address those effects in their groups. Some of these suggestions are already underway.

Drink, Drugs, and Rock'n'Roll: Financing Loyalist Terrorism in Northern Ireland — Part Two

Though the main loyalist groups have now been observing cease-fires for nearly five years, the fund-raising activities of these organizations has continued unabated. Following from the previous article on this subject, this paper gives an account of the various fund-raising methods which are currently being used by the loyalists. Particular attention is focused on the controversial topic of drug dealing. Related to this topic, the article considers in detail the emergence in 1996 of the splinter group, the Loyalist Volunteer Force (LVF). The rise and subsequent fall of this faction provides a telling case study in the importance of understanding the fund-raising methods and policies of terrorist groups. The article concludes that the financial dimension to terrorism in Northern Ireland presents an as yet unrecognized and extremely serious obstale to lasting peace.

In defense of the realm: Financing loyalist terrorism in Northern Ireland—part one: Extortion and blackmail

The revival of loyalist terrorism has been one of the most important developments in Northern Ireland in the 1990s. This article examines the recent fund‐raising activities of the two main loyalist paramilitary groups, the Ulster Defence Association (UDA) and the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF). The article focuses particularly on the financial importance of extortion and blackmail to the groups in the 1990s. It also explores how the loyalist paramilitaries have responded, as organizations, to the constant need for funds, a need that has continued unabated since both groups implemented cease‐fires in 1994. The paper concludes that because of internal arrangements, the loyalist groups are consistently risking the spread of corruption among their most senior members.