Commonsense Terms Research Articles

Extended Event Calculus using Neutrosophic Logic: Method, Implementation, Analysis, Recent Progress and Future Directions


 Brains do not reason as digital computers do. Computers reason in clear steps with statements that are either true or false, while humans reason with vague terms of common sense. Neutrosophy is a new branch of philosophy and machine intelligence that deals with neutralities, specifically the idea of indeterminacy that is evident and experienced in our everyday lives. Indeterminacy is interpreted as everything that falls between a concept, idea, statement, declaration, etc. and its opposite. The fundamental thesis of neutrosophy is to employ neutrosophic logic, an extension of fuzzy logic, to incorporate fuzzy truth into complex schemes of formal reasoning. Event calculus is a logical formalism used to describe and reason about events and their consequences over time. It is considered a valuable mathematical tool in the field of artificial intelligence (AI) for depicting dynamic systems where events occur and have temporal relationships with each other. However, previous studies in AI have neglected to adequately address the complexity of time. In this context, our work aims to introduce a neutrosophic event-based calculus as a logic formalism to handle situations where there is insufficient knowledge or ambiguity regarding the occurrence or consequences of certain events in a system. In particular, neutrosophic event calculus examines causality between ideas and the connection between tasks and actions in the presence of time. Due to the lack of related studies in the existing literature, we believe that our work will contribute to the field of knowledge representation by proposing an alternative to current forms of logic. We aim to demonstrate the capacity of neutrosophic event calculus in the context of knowledge representation and reasoning.

Classical Pentecostal Bible reading practices and Baconian common sense

Although early Pentecostals read the Bible in terms of common sense, it differed from fundamentalists’ use in their theological endeavours. However, by the 1940s, the vast majority of Pentecostals adopted a fundamentalist view of Scriptures. Since the 1990s, Pentecostal scholarship has revisited early Pentecostals’ use of Baconian common sense. In postmodern times, it is important to define a balanced Pentecostal hermeneutic to reconsider the use of Baconian common sense realism in Bible reading practices. A scientifically informed and Spirit-inspired inductive hermeneutic is proposed that emphasises the context of a text, leaving room for the viewpoints of other interpreters and reading in terms of contemporary encounters with God. This will enhance the exegetical process, by enabling the reader to read the Bible for its impact, value and significance.

“AMONG DEAD AND WOUNDED”: MAPPING, CHARACTERIZATION AND ANALYSIS OF FIRES WITH VICTIMS IN RECIFE’S METROPOLITAN ZONE

This article presents the mapping and analysis of fires with dead and wounded people in the Metropolitan Region of Recife (MRR) served by the Firefighters Department from 2013 to 2016. There was an average rate of 1 death per million inhabitants, similar to countries such as Singapore and Vietnam. The weighted number of fires per wounded or dead person results in rates of 0.5 and 1.7 per 100 recorded fires, respectively. These numbers are concerning, especially when compared to rates from other regions in the world. The victims of fires in MRR were shown to generally not be a perceivable problem in terms of common sense, yet they are real and require accurate analysis and effective measures.

Untoward laughter and the micropolitical: social action, politics and the will after the sovereign subject

From a commonsense perspective, an outburst of laughter appears to demonstrate little more than a lack of subjective will; it certainly does not register as having political significance. Yet, this is also to render the political in commonsense terms. As the emerging body of literature on the question of the micropolitical suggests, there is, beneath the essentially representational sphere of macropolitics, a micropolitics of affective force. In exploring the political potential of eruptions of laughter, I argue that grasping the novelty of the micropolitical requires that we shift debate away from the scalar questions of large and small, towards the distinction between the ordinary and the singular. Untoward laughter, by protracting the process through which affective force crosses a threshold of perception and becomes remarkable, draws attention to the micropolitics of everyday life. In pursuing this argument, first, I draw on the work of Helmuth Plessner to make a case for the fundamentally ‘undecidable’ nature of laughter: laughter expresses an ‘answer’ to an unanswerable situation. Yet, I argue that Plessner’s phenomenological explanation of laughter is insufficiently sensitive to the micropolitics of bodies, their affective and intensive transformations. Second, then, I draw on Nietzsche’s critique of the sovereignty of subjective will, arguing that the ‘I’ who laughs is merely the dominant drive among a series of conflicting drives. Finally, I draw on Gilles Deleuze’s The Fold, to show that such drives are never ‘mine’. As untoward laughter demonstrates so clearly, the events of the world are always constituted through much more dynamic foldings of material and incorporeal forces.

Falsifcation of Financial Statements: Concept and Tools of Identifcation

To succeed in a market economy an economic entity should attract investments. The quality of accounting and analytical information about a company’s activities is an important factor in the decisions potential investors make. Accounting (fnancial) reporting is a signifcant part of the informational support of the company’s activity. The problem of reliability of the accounting (fnancial) statements has always been relevant. According to the modern concept of business audit, audit is primarily understood as an activity aimed at reducing business risks. Nowadays the main task of an auditor is to provide assurance that the accounting (fnancial) reporting does not contain signifcant misstatements because of its falsifcation, or mistakes made by employees of the auditee. Assessing the risk of fnancial statements falsifcation is an urgent and diffcult task. Though the term “falsifcation of fnancial statements” is widely used and seems clear in terms of common sense, the scientifc understanding and normative defnition of this concept is not so defnite. This article analyzes the concept of “falsifcation of fnancial statements” and approaches to its defnition in foreign and domestic practice; reviews modern tools to identify risks of fnancial statements falsifcation; discusses issues related to the use of mathematical models to identify the risk of fnancial statements falsifcation. To do this the authors analyze the index model of the American scientist M. Benish, carry out econometric tests within the assumptions of the Gauss-Markov theorem and propose a variant of developing an index model to detect accounting (fnancial) statements falsifcation. An attempt was made to create a model to identify the risk of reporting information falsifcation with a certain degree of probability that could be applied in Russia. To create such a model, called NARM, there were selected 75 reports of Russian organizations, of which 1/3 were falsifed. This model makes it possible to identify the probability of fnancial statements falsifcation to within 76%.

Compromise: What Makes it Bad?

This article considers what makes a compromise bad. First, it defines a compromise as a decision involving a loss of good (i.e., an evil), which should therefore be accompanied by ‘agent-regret’. Regret, however, is not moral guilt. Pace proponents of ‘dirty hands’, a morally right compromise cannot retain elements of moral wrongness (as distinct from non-moral evil). Second, the article proceeds to elaborate the features of bad compromise further in terms of common moral sense: the preference of less rather than more of a single good; the preference of an inferior to a superior good; and the violation of an absolute moral rule. Third, it extends its elaboration in terms of three historical cases: the abandonment of strategic promotion of a good; tactical suspension for insufficient reasons; complicity in indubitable and certain injustice to avoid tolerable costs; and the violation of a basic principle of justice as distinct from normal judicial process. Finally, it adds a methodological epilogue, in which it reflects on whether its treatment of the topic has been sufficiently theological.

La filosofía de los cuidados centrados en el desarrollo del recién nacido prematuro (NIDCAP): una revisión de la literatura

<p>Objetivo. Conocer las intervenciones de la filosofía de los cuidados centrados en el desarrollo del recién nacido prematuro (NIDCAP) dirigidas a optimizar el macroambiente y el microambiente, junto a las actuaciones orientadas a la familia a fin de favorecer la estabilidad y la organización del desarrollo y la conducta del recién nacido prematuro; y a partir de aquí, evaluar la eficacia de su aplicación.<br />Metodología. Se lleva a cabo una búsqueda bibliográfica (a partir de una serie de criterios de inclusión y exclusión específicos) en castellano y en inglés, durante el periodo 2010 a 2015, en las siguientes bases de datos: PUBMED, THE COCHRANE LIBRARY, SCOPUS, CUIDEN, DIALNET, LILACS, TDR y GOOGLE ACADÉMICO (se recurrió también a determinadas páginas web oficiales).<br />Resultados. Se han centrado en la revisión del Macroambiente (luces, ruidos), el Microambiente (postura, manipulaciones, dolor), la Familia (padres principales cuidadores, método canguro, lactancia materna), y de la Evaluación de la eficacia de la aplicación del NIDCAP.<br />Discusión. Se orienta, fundamentalmente, en la consideración del NIDCAP desde la perspectiva de la realidad (la prematuridad como primera causa de morbimortalidad neonatal e infantil), de la evidencia de la literatura, de la calidad/calidez de los cuidados, del coste económico, y del papel de los profesionales.<br />Conclusiones. No hay evidencia de que el programa NIDCAP mejore el desarrollo neurológico a largo plazo o los resultados médicos a corto plazo, por lo que no se puede recomendar la aplicación del NIDCAP en su forma actual como atención estándar en recién nacidos prematuros. Si bien, al analizar las intervenciones que forman parte de los CCD o del NIDCAP de forma aislada, la mayoría de ellas se justifican desde el sentido común, la sensibilidad en los cuidados y el respeto a la familia y al niño.</p>

Semantic Web for the Legal Domain: The next step

Ontology-driven systems with reasoning capabilities in the legal field are now better understood. Legal concepts are not discrete, but make up a dynamic continuum between common sense terms, specific technical use, and professional knowledge, in an evolving institutional reality. Thus, the tension between a plural understanding of regulations and a more general understanding of law is bringing into view a new landscape in which general legal frameworks – grounded in well-known legal theories stemming from 20th-century c. legal positivism or sociological jurisprudence – are made compatible with specific forms of rights management on the Web. In this sense, Semantic Web tools are not only being designed for information retrieval, classification, clustering, and knowledge management. They can also be understood as regulatory tools, i.e. as components of the contemporary legal architecture, to be used by multiple stakeholders – front-line practitioners, policymakers, legal drafters, companies, market agents, and citizens. That is the issue broadly addressed in this Special Issue on the Semantic Web for the Legal Domain, overviewing the work carried out over the last fifteen years, and seeking to foster new research in this field, beyond the state of the art.

Bewilderingly, Forcefully

There is something unsettling about the of Gilles Deleuze, not in a social, historical, or religiously moral sense, judging the act itself, but rather in a philosophical and a singular sense, his in particular, Deleuze's act. It is perhaps troubling specifically to those who think with his philosophy, a philosophy as much of as for life. trouble arises immediately from the difficulty in readily assimilating appears to be an obvious paradox in general--a and a philosophy of life. Nor is one immediately able to resist seem to be natural impulses of synthesis and identification (not to go as far as interpretation): Deleuze the man and Deleuze the philosopher, Deleuze as an act of and Deleuze as thought of life. And yet, these are unsynthesizable poles particularly because of the ways in which Deleuze conceptualizes suicide, because of the function or the figure of in his philosophical movements. Unlike Michel whose words have been, in one way or another, used to explain acts in which he allegedly engaged and have been made to equal a death drive, (1) Deleuze appears to treat unambiguously and consistently as a failed line of flight, as a botched experiment. Nevertheless, when he invokes Foucault's thought in A Portrait of Foucault, (2) Deleuze conceptualizes the figure with intensity closely akin to an embrace, though cautious and resistant to its draw. His thinking through the line Outside, through drawing the line, is particularly compelling and illuminating to an inquiry into one of the significant theoretical divergences between the two thinkers, namely their conceptions of desire and pleasure. My essay extends this inquiry not in order to settle but rather to mobilize the figure of as a line of flight, souci de soi, in terms of desire and pleasure. (3) It is rather a movement towards engaging Foucault's and Deleuze's conceptions of through the significance of the notion to their philosophies of living. While it is the drawing of an interlocution, it is also an effort to desubjectify and speak of it, in a way, between Deleuze and as a movement, an acceleration, and a techne. To ask what is presents an ontological query that perhaps is not the appropriate approach to the question vis-a-vis Foucault's program. But, literally and conventionally, in terms of common sense, how does one think the concept suicide? More often than not, it finds itself integrated in the medical discourse (though its itinerary meanders through religious and legal discourses), linked with morbidity, clinical depression, despair, renunciation, an obsession or fascination with or a death-drive, a loss of interest in or value of life, even with a lack of morality. (4) In a variety of ways, James Miller's Passion of Michel considered to be one of the four major biographies of the thinker, (5) seems to both draw and build on these connections, interpreting and deducing the subject of his portrait, from shards of thought and fragmented utterances. This approach reinforces the commonplace opposition of to life, a dichotomy that Foucault collapses. Deleuze approaches the portrait of Foucault through affects and percepts, experimenting and thinking with, which allows for an opening and a drawing of new plateaus. In the same sense, I seek to let Foucault break suicide open, especially by considering his question How had the subject been compelled to decipher himself in regard to was forbidden? (6) It is a question that permits an unfolding of the way in which the line of flight is implicated in suicide, in the art of life and both in politics. In a curious text titled The Simplest of Pleasures, Foucault envisions a gun store clerk who helps a person select the most apposite style of for them. He commences the text by denying that he would be yet another to debate the making of either legal or moral, but the text seems to both subvert and perhaps on a certain level do just that. …

Academic Mobility and Hospitality: The Good Host and the Good Guest

In a globalized economy, knowledge production and exchange, and innovative and creative orientations and aptitudes, are regarded as crucial to economic growth and competitiveness. Hence, people with ‘brains’ and ‘talent’ are in demand by nation states and regional blocs. As a consequence, they are also highly mobile internationally. Certainly, university academics are increasingly mobile. The European Commission is at the forefront of designing and sponsoring mobility programs for academics. Through them, it seeks to promote a sense of ‘European-ness’ and, more importantly, to harness universities and research in Europe’s bid to become a globally dominant magnet economy and culture.[1] In such contexts, questions of hospitality arise. This article engages with the ethics of institutional and intellectual hospitality in an increasingly regionalized and globalized university sector. It is part of our research on the political, epistemological, ontological and ethical dimensions of both national and regional policies on researcher mobility and of mobile researchers themselves.[2] In focusing on hospitality, we move away from macro-considerations of brain–drain–gain and academic diaspora (see Fahey & Kenway, 2009a), and thus from the ethics of national loss and gain (Lowell & Findlay, 2002). Instead, we focus on the everyday ethics of host and guest. We draw loosely on Jacques Derrida’s (1995, 1999, 2000, 2001) ideas about conditional and unconditional hospitality. In his recent work, he discusses hospitality of laws and nations, and focuses on France and on uninvited, unwelcome and powerless foreigners – particularly refugees. In contrast, we are concerned with those who are welcome because of their ‘brains’ or ‘talent’: privileged foreigners and valued guests. Clearly, the ethical issues involved differ dramatically. In common-sense terms, hospitality refers to the relationship between a host and a guest. It also refers to the act or practice of being hospitable, of welcoming guests, visitors or strangers, with liberality and goodwill. However, in focusing on the tangled relationship between ethics and hospitality, Derrida (1999) complexifies this view. When conceptualizing ‘hospitality’, Derrida (2000) acknowledges a fundamental paradox that turns on ‘conditional’ and ‘unconditional’ hospitality (see also Borradori, 2003). When the host of the house, institution or nation extends an invitation to a guest, it is through this invitation that they also demonstrate to the guest that they are in control of the property or territory. In other words, in order to be hospitable, one must have the power to host. However, the host must also have some control over the people who are being hosted. Hospitality fails when the guests take control of the house. If the host is no longer in control, they are not being hospitable to their guests (Derrida, 2000). According to Derrida (2000), this kind of hospitality is ‘conditional’, as it is dependent on imposing certain limits on guests. And he argues that, as hospitality always involves placing limitations on guests, hospitality is inherently inhospitable.

The Need for Metaphysics

This article explains the importance of the categories of explanation in Process and Reality and sets it in context, in particular in relation to Whitehead's account of misplaced concreteness and his description of the role of metaphysics in terms of common sense. The article then responds to a series of broad criticisms of Whitehead's position, notably in the claim that it is self-contradictory, inconsistent about common sense and mistaken about the nature of explanation in contemporary science. This response comes from a close interpretation of the categories as described in Process and Reality. The article concludes with a critical discussion of an application of the categories of explanation, taken from Process and Reality.

Spinal Cord Injury Treatment With Intrathecal Autologous Bone Marrow Stromal Cell Transplantation: The First Clinical Trial Case Report

Saito, Fukuki MD; Nakatani, Toshio MD; Iwase, Masaaki MD; Maeda, Yuji MD; Hirakawa, Akihiko MD; Murao, Yoshinori MD; Suzuki, Yoshihisa MD; Onodera, Rie MS; Fukushima, Masanori MD; Ide, Chizuka MD Author Information

Commonsense Causal Explanation in a Legal Domain

In this paper, we present an approach to commonsense causal explanation of stories that can be used for automatically determining the liable party in legal case descriptions. The approach is based on \({\mathsf {LRICore}}\), a core ontology for law that takes a commonsense perspective. Aside from our thesis that in the legal domain many terms still have a strong commonsense flavour, the descriptions of events in legal cases, as e.g. presented at judicial trials, are cast in commonsense terms as well. We present design principles for representing commonsense causation, and describe a process-based approach to automatic identification of causal relations in stories, which are described in terms of the core ontology. The resulting causal explanation forms a necessary condition for determining the liability and responsibility of agents that play a role in the case. We describe the basic architecture and working of \({\mathsf {DIRECT}}\), the demonstrator we are constructing to test the validity of our process oriented view on commonsense causation. This view holds that causal relations are in fact abstractions constructed on the basis of our commonsense understanding of physical and mental processes.

On the preference for minimization in referring to persons: Evidence from Hebrew conversation

Hebrew is among the languages in which person, number and gender are inflected on the verb in past and future tenses. Although free-standing pronouns are therefore “redundant” in common-sense terms when articulated in such contexts, they do occur, and constitute departures from what conversation analysts propose to be a preference for minimization in person reference. Several exemplars are examined to show one interactional environment in which this usage occurs, and which it can be seen to mark, namely, environments of disalignment. Three upshots of this analysis are explicated.

Marine Reserves: A Guide to Science, Design and Use

Review: Marine Reserves: A Guide to Science, Design and Use By Jack Sobel and Craig Dahlgren Reviewed by Ryder W. Miller San Francisco, USA Jack Sobel and Craig Dahlgren. Marine Reserves: A Guide to Science, Design and Use. Island Press (2004). 383 pages. Trade Paper ISBN: 1-55963-841-9 US $35.00 Trade Cloth ISBN: 1-55963-840-0 US $70.00 Printed on recycled, acid-free paper. This thorough explanation of and rationale for marine protected areas details in common sense terms why they are necessary. Marine reserves can protect the seeding grounds for fish and therefore also the fishery stocks that fishing communities have depended upon. They can also protect the denizens of marine ecosystems that have been adversely affected by fishing. As the authors note: “Considerable evidence that marine reserves are capable of increasing the abundance or density of exploited species is…provided by studies that have examined the change in the abundance or density of exploited species in an area over time before and after a reserve has been created. These studies typically show an increase in the abundance of exploited species within the reserve area for several years following its designation” (p. 97). The political and legal history of marine protection is somewhat complicated due to numerous marine protection area designations and laws, but it is presented clearly and in a concerned way by the authors. Jack Sobel is a director at the Ocean Conservancy, and Craig Dahlgren is a science director at the Caribbean Research Center at the Perry Institute for Marine Science. Also included are chapters by others in the marine conservation field. This internationally oriented book details the damage to marine systems and the signs of hope from the West Coast of America all the way around the world to Chile. Discussed in detail are research issues and methods, social considerations and implications, and lessons learned from establishing marine reserves so far. But there is still more to learn. “[The creation of] larger reserves and reserve networks provide[s] opportunities to greatly expand and document reserve benefits related to both ecosystem protection and fisheries conservation” (p. 358). The authors argue for an “ocean ethic” akin to Aldo Leopold’s “land ethic” as a means to advance ocean conservation and marine no-take reserves. This

Child and family assessment: clinical guidelines for practitioners

Child and Family Assessment provides a practical, thoughtful and systematic guide to the theory and practice of family assessment. It combines a clear summary of current knowledge with practical, detailed and adaptable procedures for practitioners to use, such as a script for a family interview. Not only does it contain clear and specific guidance for practice, but the materials are discussed within a broad theoretical context. Written from an eclectic point of view in a clear and precise style using common sense terms, it is an essential summary of key concepts and methods for assessment. The book is written in three sections: on theory, practice and issues. Section one traces the development of important theoretical ideas which are relevant to assessment with children and families. Section two shows what results when these principles are applied in practice, and how information gained from the assessment can be used to determine a therapeutic strategy. Section three considers the relationship between science, assessment and clinical practice, and the book concludes with a set of brief clinical guidelines for child and family assessment which summarize the approach described. Child and Family Assessment will be an essential guide for practitioners who work with children and their families, and will be an invaluable aid for practitioners and students in all disciplines in the helping professions.

What's the use of International Relations?

This article discusses some controversies over the relations of the academic discipline of International Relations to policy. The article argues that, while our ultimate goal may be to have some impact on the world, the immediate goals can be more abstract. International Relations consists, and should consist, of a set of Lakatosian Research Programmes, some conflicting, some complementary, which range from the abstract to the directly policy-relevant. Effective intervention in social systems depends on analyses in more than commonsense terms. The article looks sceptically on recent disciplinary history, doubting both the supposed positivist hegemony and the supposed novelty of normative debate.

Bodies, rights and abortion.

The issue of abortion is discussed with reference to the claim that people have a right of control over their own bodies. Do people "own" their own bodies? If so,...

Making Common Sense of Japan

Common misconceptions about Japan begin with the notion that it is a small country (it's actually lager than Great Britain, Germany or Italy) and end with pronouncements that the Japanese think differently and have different values-they do things differently because that's the way they are. Steven Reed takes on the task of demystifying Japanese culture and behavior. Through examples that are familiar to an American audience and his own personal encounters with the Japanese, he argues that the apparent oddity of Japanese behavior flows quite naturally from certain objective conditions that are different from those in the United States. Mystical allegations about national character are less useful for understanding a foreign culture than a close look at specific situations and conditions. Two aspects of the Japanese economy have particularly baffled Americans: that Japanese workers have permanent employment and that the Japanese government cooperates with big business. Reed explains these phenomena in common sense terms. He shows how they developed historically, why they continue, and why they helped produce economic growth. He concludes that these practices are not as different from what happens in the United States as they may appear.

How we acquire a sense of morality

Wilson fights a brave battle against political correctness (and factual incorrectness), the absurdities of moral relativity, and Marxist social enviromnentalism. It is difficult to see how anyone with an ounce of common sense could ever believe that our standards of behavior reflect the needs of the social order, or are determined by the economic dictates of our means of production, distribution and exchange. The arguments in favor of such an unlikely thesis are so obviously incorrect that it should not take much research to disprove them. Let me look at the problem first in common sense terms; I will then take up the more difficult task of trying to show how conscience (the bearer of our moral sense) originates. Those who favor moral relativism often point to the fact that certain activities are freely permitted in some societies, but severely punished in others. Even in the same society there may be sudden changes from forbidden to permitted; homosexuality was against the law in England until 1967 when it suddenly became legally permissible. In fact, homosexuality is a good example for relativity of moral sense, being actively encouraged in ancient Sparta, and punished by torture and death in some medieval societies! Sodomy is now permitted in England between consenting males over eighteen years of age but forbidden between man and wife! Altogether, sex provides us with a multitude of insane laws--I recall attending an annual general conference of the American Psychological Association where the printed material sent to all participants included a separate notice warning us that in the particular Southern state where the conference was held oral sex was legally prohibited, even among married couples! (It would be interesting to know how this law was enforced. There are many political and religious areas where there are sharp differences from country to country, and from time to time. In the Hitler Germany where I grew up (and which I left in protest) one could be severely punished for not giving the Hitler salute. In Catholic Italy Galileo was severely punished for asserting the truth about our heliocentric solar system. In Turkey once could have your nose slit for smoking-modern America seems to be approaching the same point, but as yet has not quite reached it. Prostitution is not legal in the USA, but permitted in Germany and England. The list is endless, but what does it prove? It simply shows that powerful people may impose their social, religious or moral ideas by law, usually by inventing victimless crimes. But these are a tiny minority of crimes; the vast majority of crimes do have victims (burglary, assault, mugging, rape, murder, thieving, looting, robbing, grievous bodily harm, industrial espionage, and many more). And these crimes are universally condemned; there is no relativity there. From time immemorial men (and occasionally women) have committed these crimes, and from time immemorial the state has punished the wrongdoer. There is 95 percent of universality and 5 percent of relativism about our moral sense; to believe in 100 percent relativity is not meaningful. No state could exist for any length of time that permitted its citizens to carry out these activities without let or hindrance, and this solid core of don't do to others what would not like them to do to you establishes a robust air of universality for our moral sense. Is this moral sense learned, in the sense that we learn Latin, or algebra, or history? Clearly not. Criminals have often been quizzed, as have normal citizens, about the morality of certain actions, and their lawfulness; criminals know as well (or even better!) what is lawful, what is not. After all, it is their business to know! But this knowledge is quite irrelevant to their actions; every criminal who steals, or rapes, or murders, knows perfectly well that what he is doing is unlawful, and subject to punishment; this does not prevent him from carrying on stealing, raping and murdering. …