The principle aims of this article are to identify the mechanisms and strategies for U.S. foreign trade in telecommunications and its rationale with respect to the concept of “public interest” for U.S. citizens. Clearly, much more is at stake on a global level than the interests of U.S. citizens when it comes to U.S. foreign policy in telecommunications. However, it is misguided to assume that all U.S. citizens are the beneficiaries of U.S. foreign policies, particularly with respect to trade, and it is increasingly necessary to understand the relationships between foreign and domestic telecommunications policies. Whereas it has never been more important to critically assess U.S. foreign trade policies, particularly with respect to peripheral nations, it becomes all too easy to simplistically disregard how those trade policies relate to U.S. domestic social policy and issues of domestic peripheralization (Calabrese, 1991). In pursuing opportunity and wealth in other countries, what impacts are telecommunications monopolies having on U.S. citizens? This is not a jingoistic question, but rather one which draws attention to the concept of citizenship in an age of rapidly expanding global telecommunications. How do we define citizenship in an age of relative decline in sovereignty even among the most powerful states? What responsibilities do trade negotiators and domestic monopolies with expanding foreign investments have toward citizens in their own countries? These are questions of much broader significance than for U.S. citizens alone. Despite the relative economic decline of the United States in the global economy, United States-based capital and trade negotiators continue to have considerable global influence, both by example and through strategic efforts, on the relationships between capital, states, and citizens. This article raises these issues through an analysis of the role of the United States in telecommunications trade in Europe. U.S. firms have tried, somewhat unsuccessfully, to gain greater access to the telecommunications markets of some of the most affluent countries in the world, only to find that the national governments of many of these countries generally are resistant to the idea of allowing exogenous capital to enter and potentially come to dominate their markets. United States-Japan and United StatesEuropean Union trade in telecommunications both provide useful case studies, al-