Teacher Performance Pay Research Articles

Designing Effective Teacher Performance Pay Programs: Experimental Evidence from Tanzania*

Abstract We use a nationally representative field experiment in Tanzania to compare two teacher performance pay systems in public primary schools: a ‘pay-for-percentile’ system (a rank-order tournament) and a ‘levels’ system that features multiple proficiency thresholds. Pay for percentile can potentially induce socially optimal effort among teachers, while levels systems can encourage teachers to focus on students near passing thresholds. Despite the theoretical advantage of the tournament system, we find that both systems improved student test scores across the distribution of initial learning levels after two years. However, the levels system is easier to implement and is more cost effective.

The Long Run Effects of a Comprehensive Teacher Performance Pay Program on Student Outcomes

The Long Run Effects of a Comprehensive Teacher Performance Pay Program on Student Outcomes

Teacher Performance Pay and Student Learning: Evidence from a Nationwide Program in Peru

We study the impact of a nationwide teacher pay-for-performance program in Peru. Public secondary schools compete in a tournament based on eighth graders’ performance in a standardized test. The principal and teachers of winning schools receive a substantial bonus. We perform a difference-in-differences estimation comparing the internal grades of eighth and ninth graders of the same school, before and after the program. We find a precisely estimated zero effect on student achievement, which could be a consequence of teachers’ uncertainty about how to improve their students’ performance in the standardized test tied to the bonus.

(Un)Intended Consequences of a Teacher Performance Pay Program

(Un)Intended Consequences of a Teacher Performance Pay Program

Pay by Design: Teacher Performance Pay Design and the Distribution of Student Achievement

We present results of a randomized trial testing alternative approaches of mapping student achievement into rewards for teachers. Teachers in 216 schools in western China were assigned to performan...

Teacher Performance Pay and Student Learning: Evidence from a Nationwide Program in Peru

We study the impact on student achievement of a nationwide teacher pay-for-performance program implemented in Peruvian public secondary schools in 2015. Schools compete in a tournament primarily based on 8th graders' performance in a standardized test, where the principal and teachers of the top 20 percent of schools receive a substantial bonus. We perform a difference-in-differences estimation comparing the internal grades of 8th and 9th graders of the same school, before and after the program. We find a precisely estimated zero effect on student achievement, and we reject impacts greater than 0.017 standard deviations, well below those previously found in the literature. We provide evidence against a series of potential explanations, and argue that this zero effect could be a consequence of teachers' uncertainty about how to improve their students' performance in the standardized test tied to the bonus.

Teacher Performance Pay in the United States: Incidence and Adult Outcomes

Teacher Performance Pay in the United States: Incidence and Adult Outcomes

Chinese teachers’ attitudes toward performance pay: the cases of three schools

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to investigate Chinese teachers’ attitudes toward performance pay. Specifically, this study examined the extent to which Chinese teachers supported performance-pay programs. The study also examined the effects of these programs on teachers, particularly on their levels of collaboration, work motivation, and job stress. Design/methodology/approach – This research was conducted in a northeastern city of China. Criteria sampling and maximum variation sampling techniques were used to select three schools, representing different characteristics of teacher performance pay (TPP) programs. In all, 150 questionnaires were administered to each of the three schools. The questionnaire contained three parts. Part 1 asked about respondents’ overall attitude toward pay-for-performance in general. Part 2 was composed of 20 closed-ended items asking respondents to rate their levels of agreement with various aspects of implementation of performance pay. Part 3 of the questionnaire comprised open-ended items. Findings – Approximately 48.5 percent of the teachers supported the teacher-performance-pay programs. This indicated a low support of Chinese teachers in comparison to that in some countries. Regarding how teachers’ attitudes toward performance pay are related to teacher characteristics (e.g. teaching experience, professional ranking), the ANOVAs results showed no significant differences in any of the factors. This quantitative result was different from the qualitative result of this study (e.g. veteran teachers complained about the implementation of performance pay). In spite of the differences between quantitative and qualitative findings, some findings from the current study are consistent with those found in western countries. Research limitations/implications – One limitation of this study was the small sample size for quantitative analyses. Future research should consider a larger sample size to conduct more advanced statistical analyses such as structural equation modeling to examine further the relations among, for example, how much the incentive pay should be, and what proportion of teachers should receive it, the level of teacher stress, their work enthusiasm, and peer relationships. Another limitation of this study was that the qualitative data were collected through open-ended questions of the questionnaire. Future research should interview teachers and principals to obtain richer voices from the teachers. Originality/value – Very few articles published in Chinese journals surveyed the implementation of TPP. In addition, these few articles were not well-designed from an empirical sense. So far research of teacher opinions about performance pay was a missing area in China’s educational discourse. The present study provides information to non-Chinese readers who are interested in Chinese teachers’ attitudes toward TPP. It is hoped the present study adds knowledge to the literature of TPP from the perspective of Chinese teachers.

Pay by Design: Teacher Performance Pay Design and the Distribution of Student Achievement

We present results of a randomized trial testing alternative approaches of mapping student achievement into rewards for teachers. Teachers in 216 schools in western China were assigned to performance pay schemes where teacher performance was assessed by one of three different methods. We find that teachers offered “pay-for-percentile” incentives (Barlevy and Neal 2012) outperform teachers offered simpler schemes based on class average achievement or average gains over a school year. Moreover, pay-for-percentile incentives produced broad-based gains across students within classes. That teachers respond to relatively intricate features of incentive schemes highlights the importance of close attention to performance pay design.

Teacher Performance Pay Programs and Necessary Communication Actions

Teacher performance pay programs have proliferated across the country over the past 20 years. To aid in understanding their many variations, the seven major components of these programs are described. Three examples of teacher performance pay programs are provided for illustration: Denver ProComp, TAP, and Houston ASPIRE. Evidence is mixed on the impact of performance pay programs in general. We suggest that flawed communication strategy and action accompanying the programs have likely contributed to weak, if any, impact. We suggest the use of a three-pronged concerted communication approach: communication strategy, communication action plan, and communication supports. We provide specific examples for each prong.

The Self-Interest & Public-Interest of Teacher's Performance Pay : From the Viewpoint of Public Choice Theory

The Self-Interest & Public-Interest of Teacher's Performance Pay : From the Viewpoint of Public Choice Theory

Credentials Versus Performance: Review of the Teacher Performance Pay Research

In this article we examine the economic case for merit or performance-based pay for K–12 teachers. We review several areas of germane research. The direct evaluation literature on these incentive plans is slender; highly diverse in terms of methodology, targeted populations, and programs evaluated; and primarily focused on short-run motivational effects. It is nonetheless fairly consistent in finding positive program effects. The general personnel literature highlights potentially significant selection effects of employee compensation systems. This is particularly relevant for teaching, because a growing body of production function research points to large, persistent, but idiosyncratic differences in teacher productivity. Thus, along with motivation effects, there is potential for substantial positive long run selection effects from teacher performance pay systems. The evaluation literature is not sufficiently robust to prescribe how systems should be designed (e.g., optimal size of bonuses, mix of individual vs. group incentives). However, it is sufficiently positive to support much more extensive field trials, pilot programs, and policy experiments, combined with careful follow-up evaluation.