Bequest Tax Research Articles

Fair inheritance taxation

AbstractWe study the optimal taxation of bequests in a successive‐generation model in which individuals have heterogeneous preferences over their consumption and the net‐of‐tax bequest received by their heir. We show that it is possible to reconcile the views that children should not be penalized by the lack of altruism of their parents, and parents should be free to choose their bequests. The resulting optimal non‐linear inheritance tax scheme collects money and redistributes it through a non‐negative demogrant, and does not tax, and, in some cases, subsidizes bequests lower than that of the poorest altruistic individual.

The impact of bequest taxation on savings and transfers

Research background: The paper investigates the impact of bequest taxation on saving and transfers when parents and children make decisions consistently. It complements the predictions of Gale and Perozek's life-cycle modeling (2001) when decisions of parents and children are set independently and can be time-inconsistent. Purpose of the article: The paper strives to answer the question of whether taxation of bequest harms savings and inter vivos transfers. The previous results indicated that this is possible for some bequest motives. Our results show that this is not likely for the most typical values of parameters. Methods: The analysis involves economic modeling of four bequest motives: altruistic, paternalistic, accidental, and exchange. The method is based on the overlapping generation approach and life-cycle approach in the case of a paternalistic bequest. The results are supplemented with numerical simulations. Findings & value added: For the altruistic motive, savings are smaller if interest rates are low relative to the tax rate and the utility of one's consumption is more valuable than the utility of the next generations. For the accidental motive, savings decrease with small interest rates, high taxation and long-life expectancy. For the paternalistic motive, savings decrease when the interest rate and the value of future utility are low. For the exchange motive, savings are higher after a tax increase, but it depends on the value of attention and life expectancy. The general conclusion is that higher bequest taxation hamper saving behavior and may disturb the intergenerational exchange process. The bequest tax should, therefore, be set low, especially for aging populations, in order to induce higher savings and force the young to provide the elderly with higher attention.

Premature deaths, accidental bequests, and fairness*

AbstractWhile there is little agreement regarding the taxation of bequests in general, there is a widely held view that accidental bequests should be subjected to a confiscatory tax. We re‐examine the optimal taxation of accidental bequests by introducing a concern for compensating individuals for a premature death. Assuming that individuals care about what they leave to their children, we show that, whereas the 100 percent tax view holds under the utilitarian criterion, the ex post egalitarian criterion (giving priority to the worst‐off ex post) implies subsidizing accidental bequests so as to compensate the short‐lived. In a second‐best setting, compensating the short‐lived justifies taxing total bequests at a rate increasing with the age of the deceased. Finally, when the model is extended to an intergenerational setting, accidental bequests can no longer be used as a redistributive tool, so that ex post egalitarianism rejoins the 100 percent tax view.

Should Inheritance Be Taxed as Income?

Many have advocated the taxation of bequests and gifts as income in order to achieve substantial revenues from unearned wealth and address inequality. There are, though, many drawbacks to the idea of taxing inheritance as part of the beneficiary’s income. Even for those who claim the inclusion of inherited wealth in the beneficiary’s income tax base, the features of the current taxes on gratuitous transfers should be retained. High tax exemption thresholds, annual exemptions for small gifts, medical expenses and transfers to spouses, tax deferral for illiquid assets and so forth would continue to apply to inherited wealth, notwithstanding their inclusion in the income tax base. In the author’s opinion, the foregoing is a serious argument against including inheritances in the concept of taxable income. The special treatment to be accorded to inherited wealth, as compared to other taxable income, undermines the belief that legacies should be imposed as income, since it signals that they are inherently different. Inheritance is certainly suitable grounds for taxation, but it seems more appropriate to continue taxing it as part of an autonomous levy, without yielding to suggestions that it be included in the income tax base.

Age‐related taxation of bequests in the presence of a dependency risk

AbstractThis paper studies the properties of the optimal taxes on bequests when individuals differ in wage and in their risks of mortality and old‐age dependance. Survival is positively correlated to income but dependency is negatively correlated with it. The government cannot distinguish between bequests motives, that is whether bequests resulted from precautionary reasons or from pure joy of giving reasons. Instead, it observes the timing of bequests and the health status at death. Under the utilitarian social welfare criterion, we show that bequests taxation results from a combination of equity, insurance, and public revenue motives. If redistribution concerns dominate insurance concerns, it is desirable to tax the most bequests of those individuals living long in good health and to tax the least bequests of those dying early. This is a direct consequence of the socio‐demographic structure we assumed where richer agents live longer and in better health than poorer agents. To the opposite, if insurance concerns dominate redistributive concerns, early bequests should be the most taxed and, bequests under dependency the least taxed. Under the Rawlsian criterion, we find that early bequests should be the least taxed and bequests left by the healthy long‐lived individuals should be the most taxed.

Solidarity, Dominance, and the Taxation of Bequests

Solidarity, Dominance, and the Taxation of Bequests

Optimal Bequests Taxation in the Steady State

We consider an infinite-horizon economy populated by two types of individuals, some individuals being more productive than others. Individuals live one period and are altruistic toward their children. Assuming that the allocation received by a given individual depends only on his type and the one of his parent, we first determine the second-best steady state allocation and then study the optimal bequest and labor income tax functions, that are assumed to be separable. We first show that the second-best is not implementable with such tax schedules. We then demonstrate that it may be desirable to tax large bequests (and to subsidize low bequests), provided that individuals are sufficiently altruistic and the less productive individuals are sufficiently numerous. The taxation of large bequests is however not always part of the optimal solution. A numerical example suggests that no taxation of bequests is needed under moderate altruism, while large bequests should be subsidized when individuals are poorly altruistic.

Inheritance taxation and wealth effects on the labor supply of heirs

The taxation of bequests can have a positive impact on the labor supply of heirs through wealth effects. This leads to an increase in labor income tax revenue on top of direct bequest tax revenue. We first show in a theoretical model that a simple back-of-the-envelope calculation, based on existing estimates for the reduction in earnings after wealth transfers, fails: the marginal propensity to earn out of unearned income is not a sufficient statistic for the calculation of this effect because (i) heirs anticipate the reduction in net bequests and adjust their labor supply already prior to inheriting, and (ii) when bequest receipt is stochastic, even those who ex post end up not inheriting anything respond ex ante to the implied change in their distribution of net bequests. We quantitatively elaborate the size of the overall revenue effect due to labor supply changes of heirs by using a state-of-the-art life-cycle model that we calibrate to the German economy. Besides the joint distribution of income and inheritances, quasi-experimental evidence regarding the size of wealth effects on labor supply is a key target for this calibration. We find that for each Euro of bequest tax revenue the government mechanically generates, it obtains an additional 9 cents of labor income tax revenue (in net present value) through higher labor supply of (non-)heirs.

Age-Related Taxation of Bequests in the Presence of a Dependency Risk

This paper studies the design of the optimal linear taxation of bequests when individuals differ in wage as well as in their risks of both mortality and old-age dependance. We assume that the government cannot distinguish between bequests motives, that is whether bequests resulted from precautionary reasons or from pure joy of giving reasons. Instead, we assume that it only observes the timing of bequests, that is whether they are made early in life or late in life. We show that, if the government is utilitarian, whether the taxation of early bequests should be given priority over the taxation of late bequests depends on the magnitude of insurance and redistributive concerns. While the efficiency concern unambiguously recom- mends taxation of early bequests, redistributive concerns yield ambiguous results. This indeterminacy comes from the fact that, in case of late death, the government cannot ob- serve the health status of the deceased. Whether the taxation of early bequests should be given priority depends on the specific relationships between wages and both risks of early death and of old-age dependence, as well as on the concavity of the joy of giving utility function. If the government is Rawlsian, it is optimal to tax early bequests if the survival chances of the poorest agents are very low. If they survive, but their chances to remain autonomous are very low, it is then optimal to tax early bequests if the poorest agents con- tribute relatively less to the taxation of early bequests than to the taxation of late bequests or if the joy of giving utility is extremely concave.

Strategic Asset Allocation in Japan: An Empirical Evaluation

This research seeks to provide a comprehensive picture of lifetime asset allocation in Japan. We evaluate patterns in the level and composition of assets by household type, taking account of home ownership and household claims on social security as well as financial assets and pensions. The analysis relies on a micro-data taken from the RADAR survey fielded by Nikkei, for the year 2000. The RADAR data are the only publicly available dataset to record financial asset holdings in any detail, with which we calculate housing equity as well as other forms of wealth. We supplement this with external information on pension and social security entitlements. The resulting picture attests to the importance of housing and social security in the portfolios of households approaching retirement. As well, we compare asset allocation patterns between those who are worse vs. better off, better vs. worse educated, married couples vs others, and dualearner vs. single earner couples. Our econometric analysis of asset allocation choice reinforces priors regarding Japanese lifecycle asset allocation patterns: households do invest conservatively, other than their family home; they are risk-averse in their allocation of financial assets; and they appear to over-invest in housing and life insurance, two assets which enjoy preferential bequest tax treatment. We argue that institutional, historical, and policy influences explain much of observed Japanese preferences for safe financial assets, and we offer suggestions for mechanisms that could increase household diversification.

Determinants of Wealth Inequality and Mobility in General Equilibrium

What determines wealth inequality and mobility and how can the policy maker influence it? This paper quantifies in closed form the bottom and the top (Pareto) tail of the distribution in a continuous-time heterogeneous agent model. Financial market imperfections play a key role, for which factors that increase inequality also reduce mobility. While a bequest tax reduces inequality, its effects are dampened in general equilibrium. We formally show that the welfare trade-off for bequest taxes depends crucially on the bequest elasticity. However, in the calibrated model, even suboptimal bequest taxes have little adverse welfare effects.

Bequest Tax and Land Use in Japan

Bequest Tax and Land Use in Japan

Is capital back? The role of land ownership and savings behavior

Wealth inequality is a major political concern in most OECD countries. Under this premise, we analyze different policy instruments in terms of their impact on wealth inequality and output. In a general equilibrium model, we disaggregate wealth in its capital and land components, and savings in their life-cycle and bequest components. Households are heterogeneous in their taste for leaving bequests. We show that governments have considerable freedom in reducing wealth inequality without sacrificing output: Land rent taxes enhance output due to a portfolio effect and reduce wealth inequality slightly. Bequest taxes have the highest potential to reduce inequality, and their effect on output is moderate. By contrast, we confirm the standard result that capital taxes reduce output strongly and show that they only have moderate redistributive effects. Furthermore, we find that using the tax proceeds for transfers to the young generations enhances output the most and further reduces wealth inequality.

Premature Deaths, Accidental Bequests and Fairness

While little agreement exists regarding the taxation of bequests in general, there is a widely held view that accidental bequests should be subject to a confi…scatory tax. We propose to reexamine the optimal taxation of accidental bequests in an economy where individuals care about what they leave to their offspring in case of premature death. We show that, whereas the conventional 100 % tax view holds under the standard utilitarian social welfare criterion, it does not hold under the ex post egalitarian criterion, which assigns a strong weight to the welfare of unlucky short-lived individuals. From an egalitarian perspective, it is optimal not to tax, but to subsidize accidental bequests. We examine the robustness of those results in a dynamic OLG model of wealth accumulation, and show that, whereas the sign of the optimal tax on accidental bequests depends on the form of the joy of giving motive, it remains true that the 100 % tax view does not hold under the ex post egalitarian criterion.

Inheritance Taxation and Wealth Effects on the Labor Supply of Heirs

The taxation of bequests can have a positive impact on the labor supply of heirs through wealth effects. This leads to an increase in future labor income tax revenue on top of direct bequest tax revenue. We first show in a theoretical model that a simple back-of-the-envelope calculation, based on existing estimates for the reduction in earnings after wealth transfers, fails: the marginal propensity to earn out of unearned income is not a sufficient statistic for the calculation of this effect because (i) heirs anticipate the reduction in net bequests and adjust their labor supply already prior to inheriting, and (ii) when bequest receipt is stochastic, even those who ex post end up not inheriting anything respond ex ante to the implied change in their distribution of net bequests. We quantitatively elaborate the size of the overall revenue effect due to labor supply changes of heirs by using a state of the art life-cycle model that we calibrate to the German economy. Besides the joint distribution of income and inheritances, quasi-experimental evidence regarding the size of wealth effects on labor supply is a key target for this calibration. We find that for each Euro of bequest tax revenue the government mechanically generates, it obtains an additional 9 Cents of labor income tax revenue (in net present value) through higher labor supply of (non-)heirs.

Intergenerational disagreements in labor supply and optimal bequest taxation

This paper studies optimal taxation of bequests in a model where altruistic parents and their offspring disagree on the offspring's labor supply decision. I show that whenever offspring is too lazy from the parent's perspective and there are income effects on labor supply, optimal policy involves a subsidy on bequests.

Wealth Transfers and Tax Planning: Evidence for the German Bequest Tax

Wealth Transfers and Tax Planning: Evidence for the German Bequest Tax

Intergenerational altruism and house prices: Evidence from bequest tax reforms in Italy

The degree of intergenerational altruism is estimated in a benchmark Barro-type OLG framework with imperfect altruism, exploiting the exogenous variation generated by reforms of the tax treatment of bequests and inter vivos real estate donations enacted in Italy between 2000 and 2001. Using longitudinal information on the housing stock and house prices in 13 large Italian cities between 1993 and 2004, the structural parameter of interest is estimated via the effect of the reform on house prices. We estimate a degree of intergenerational altruism ranging between 0.2 and 0.3, a magnitude consistent with existing parameterizations for the US economy.

Intergenerational Disagreement and Optimal Taxation of Parental Transfers

We study optimal taxation of bequests and inter vivos transfers in a model where altruistic parents and their offspring disagree on intertemporal trade-offs. We show that the laissez-faire equilibrium is Pareto inefficient, and whenever offspring are impatient from their parents’ perspective, optimal policy involves a positive tax on parental transfers. Cautioned by the technical complications present in this class of models, our normative prescriptions do not rely on the assumption of differentiability of the agents’ policy functions.

Tax treatment of bequests when donor benefits are discounted

Recent literature on bequest taxation has made a case for subsidizing bequests on efficiency grounds, with the rate of subsidy declining with the size of the bequest to equalize opportunities among inheritors. These results rely heavily on the fact that bequests benefit both the donor and the recipient, creating an externality that is not taken into account by donors. The double counting of the benefits of bequests is questionable on normative grounds. We study the consequences for bequest taxation of giving less than full social weight to the benefit to donors. We analyse a simple model of parents and children with different skills where parents differ in their preferences for bequests. The government implements nonlinear income taxes on both parents and children as well as a linear inheritance tax and gives differential linear bequest tax credits to donor parents based on income. The nonlinear income taxes take standard forms. The inheritance tax and bequest tax credits are of indeterminate absolute level and together determine the effective price of net bequests. This effective price plays both externality-correcting and redistributive roles. The optimal effective price will depend on the social weight given to donor benefits and the share of donors of a given skill type.