Kahle and White (2004) (hereafter Kahle and White) examine the joint effects of two characteristics of evidence—its relation to initial beliefs (i.e., confirming or disconfirming) and its potential consequences for a client (i.e, positive or negative)—on tax professionals’ interpretations of that evidence and subsequent judgments. Prior research suggests that decision makers, including professional accountants, tend to seek out and weight more heavily evidence that confirms existing or preferred beliefs/hypotheses. Prior research examining tax professional judgment also suggests that tax professionals may weight more heavily evidence with positive tax consequences for their clients. These are interesting and important findings as they suggest that tax professionals may be unable to objectively evaluate the risks to both themselves and their clients associated with a given tax reporting position. Kahle and White seek to examine whether these effects may have been confounded in prior research, or whether the results of prior studies purporting to examine one source of bias may alternatively be attributable to the other. Kahle and White label the tendency to confirm one’s initial beliefs as confirmation bias and the tendency to weight more heavily evidence that has positive consequences for the client as positive evidence proneness, implying that the two are conceptually distinct. In fact, it may be more accurate to think of both existing beliefs and client preferences as different potential targets of confirmation. The identification of two potential confirmation targets is interesting and potentially leads to several research questions regarding whether decision makers can/do attend to multiple confirmation targets and, if not, why one target might dominate others. Properly identifying the salient target and the factors that lead to its salience are also important for designing procedures to mitigate the bias. Kahle and White report the results of an experiment designed to jointly test for simple effects of initial beliefs and client preferences, as well as their interaction, on tax professional judgment incorporating a model employed in related auditing research (Bamber et al. 1997) to help isolate and measure the effects of interest. They interpret the results to suggest that both initial beliefs and client preferences impacted subjects’ interpretations of evidence. Subjects weighted evidence with potentially positive tax consequences more heavily than evidence with potentially negative consequences but, inconsistent with findings related to most other decision makers, subjects discounted evidence consistent with their own prior beliefs. In fact, on closer examination, the results may suggest that neither the