Tax-interaction Effect Research Articles

Labor Market Distortions and Welfare-Decreasing International Emissions Trading

Using a multi-region, multi-sector computable general equilibrium model, this paper analyzes the effects of international emissions trading (IET) with a focus on labor market distortions. We construct four separate models with several different labor market specifications: (1) a model without labor market distortions; (2) a model with taxinteraction effects in the labor market; (3) a model with a minimum wage; and (4) a model in which a wage curve determines wages. We use these models to analyze how the effects of IET change according to model specification. The main results from the analysis are as follows. First, we found that IET generates gains for all participants in the model without labor market distortions. Second, even in the models with labor market distortions, importers of emissions permits are highly likely to benefit. Conversely, we show that the possibility of a welfare loss from IET is not as small for exporters of permits. In particular, in the minimum wage and wage curve models, we found that the exporters of emissions permits are likely to be disadvantaged. However, this also depends on the region in question. For example, China is likely to suffer under IET, whereas Russia is likely to benefit. Finally, if we implement policies to alleviate labor market distortion simultaneously with emissions regulation, all regions receive benefit from IET.

Labor Market Distortions and Welfare-Decreasing International Emissions Trading

International emissions trading (IET) has been widely recognized as a preferred approach for tackling the climate change because it would equalize marginal abatement costs and generates gains for all participants. However, this argument is heavily premised on the notion of partial equilibrium and ignores general equilibrium effects of IET. Using a multi-region, multi-sector CGE model, this paper analyzes effects of IET with focus on labor market distortions. We construct four separate models with several different labor market specifications: i) a model without labor market distortions; ii) a model with tax-interaction effects in the labor market; iii) a model with a minimum wage; and iv) the final model is one in which a wage curve determines wages. We use these models to analyze how the effects of IET change according to model specification.The main results from the analysis are as follows. First, if there are no labor market distortions, IET benefits all countries. Second, even in the context of models with labor market distortions, importers of emissions permits are highly likely to benefit. Conversely, we show that the possibility of a welfare loss from IET is not as small for exporters of permits. In the case of the minimum wage and wage curve models, we find in particular that the exporters of emissions permits are likely to be disadvantaged. However, this also depends on the region in question. For example, China is likely to suffer under IET, whereas Russia, also an exporter, is likely to benefit. We also make clear that if policies are employed to correct (i.e. reduce) labor market distortions when emissions regulation is introduced, all participants will benefit from IET in almost all cases. It is generally recognized that IET is a desirable policy that benefits all participating regions. However, we show that an analysis that does not take account of such labor market distortions will likely overestimate the benefits of IET for permit exporters.

The impacts of climate change policies on the transportation sector

This study examines the impact of carbon tax and its alternative, energy tax, on both the Malaysian economy and the transport sector, using a CGE (Computable General Equilibrium) framework. In order to achieve government revenue neutrality, two schemes for revenue recycling, namely lump-sum transfer and labour tax recycling, are employed. The simulation's results show that the carbon tax policy is more effective than the energy tax policy in reducing carbon emissions; because it is less expensive. The negative impact of the carbon tax, on real GDP (Gross Domestic Product) and investment, is less than the energy tax in both recycling schemes. Through lump-sum transfer, both taxes lead to an increase in the consumption and welfare of households, because the tax interaction effect is less than the tax recycling effect; however, through labour tax recycling, they decrease the consumption and welfare of all household groups. These tax policies are not beneficial for the transportation sector, because they lead to decreases in domestic output, domestic demand, exports and imports of all transport sectors. The climate change policies would lead to mitigation of rebound effect in whole of the economy and the transport sector.

Carbon abatement in the fuel market with biofuels: Implications for second best policies

A carbon tax on fuel would penalize carbon intensive fuels like gasoline and shift fuel consumption to less carbon intensive alternatives like biofuels. Since biofuel production competes for land with agricultural production, a carbon tax could increase land rents and raise food prices. This paper analyzes the welfare effect of a carbon tax on fuel consisting of gasoline and biofuel in the presence of a labor tax, with and without a biofuel subsidy. The market impacts of a carbon tax are also compared with that of a subsidy. Findings show that if a carbon tax increases biofuel demand, the tax interaction effect due to higher fuel prices is exacerbated by higher land rent and food prices and greater erosion of the carbon tax base. Thus, the second best optimal carbon tax for fuel is lower with biofuel in the fuel mix, especially if biofuel is subsidized.

The optimal subsidy on electric vehicles in German metropolitan areas: A spatial general equilibrium analysis

E-mobility and diffusion of electric vehicles have become a major policy issue in many countries. For example, the German federal government pursues the strategy of achieving one million electric vehicles by 2020. In this paper we examine whether it is optimal to subsidize the use of electric vehicles by granting electric power subsidies and how large the corresponding optimal rate is. We, first, analytically derive the optimal power tax in a spatial model of a city with two zones where commuting, carbon emissions, endogenous labor supply, fuel and power taxes are considered. It is shown that in a spatial urban environment, the optimal tax rate depends in particular on transport related externalities, tax interaction effects and redistribution effects working via the urban land market. Second, we extend the model to a full spatial general equilibrium model and employ simulations to calculate sign and size of the optimal tax/subsidy rate. This model is calibrated to a typical German metropolitan area. The results show that electric vehicles should not be subsidized but taxed. The results are robust with respect to changes in the willingness to adopt electric vehicles, the costs of driving electric vehicles, and even if emissions of electric vehicles are zero.

Is there a double-dividend from anti-sprawl policies?

This paper examines the welfare effects of anti-sprawl policies, such as development tax, in a simple spatial explicit urban model with two market failures – urban decline at the city core and underprovision of open space amenities at the urban fringe – and pre-existing distortionary property tax, used to fund public services and improvements to mitigate urban decline. Consistent with prior double-dividend literature, there is a tax interaction effect that occurs between the development tax and the pre-existing property tax. However, there are two fundamental differences between the tax interaction effect identified here and that of prior literature. Ours one has two components: First, there is a cost-side tax interaction effect that is ‘spatially’ concentrated at the urban fringe, as only agents at the urban fringe alter their behavior in response to the development tax. Second, there is also a benefit-side tax interaction effect, as increases in open space at the urban fringe are capitalized into housing prices throughout the city. In contrast to prior literature, we find that the empirical importance of the combined tax interaction effect is of substantially less importance and, as a consequence, the likelihood of a ‘double-dividend’ is higher than in prior studies. Further, we show that the development tax should be part of the local tax system, even in the absence of open space benefits.

Regulating CO 2 emissions of transportation in Europe: A CGE-analysis using market-based instruments

This paper analyzes the use of market-based emission regulation instruments to address the carbon dioxide emissions of transportation. Simulations with a static multi-region computable general equilibrium model show that including transportation into the European emission trading system is superior to a closed emission trading system for transportation or a tax-based approach. Furthermore, we show that exempting transportation from emission regulation is the most favorable approach in terms of welfare. This counterintuitive result is due to a large tax-interaction effect caused by high pre-existing fuel taxes in the transport sector.

Regulating CO2 Emissions of Transportation in Europe: A CGE-Analysis Using Market-Based Instruments

This paper analyzes the use of market-based emission regulation instruments to address the carbon dioxide emissions of transportation. Simulations with a static multi region computable general equilibrium model show that including transportation into the European emission trading system is superior to a closed emission trading system for transportation or a tax-based approach. Furthermore, we show that exempting transportation from emission regulation is the most favorable approach in terms of welfare. This result is due to a large tax interaction effect caused by high pre-existing fuel taxes in the transport sector.

Optimal environmental taxes under relative consumption effects

This paper explores the interactions between carbon dioxide emissions taxes and a pre-existing income tax in a numerically calibrated model of climate change and the world economy. Based on evidence from the recent empirical literature, the model allows for the presence of relative consumption effects in the specification of preferences. In the absence of relative consumption effects, optimal emissions taxes would rise from US$44 to US$229 per tonne of carbon (in year 2000 dollars) over the course of the next century. These tax rates, which arise when emissions tax revenues are used to reduce taxes on personal income, are slightly above the present value marginal benefits of emissions control. Given realistic assumptions concerning the empirical magnitude of relative consumption effects, the optimal emissions tax rises from US$63 per tonne in 2005 and US$384 per tonne in 2105. Accounting for relative consumption effects reduces the perceived social benefits of consumption, thus increasing social willingness to pay for environmental quality while reducing both the costs of tax interaction effects and the benefits of efficient revenue recycling. Taken together, these factors support the implementation of comparatively high environmental taxes in the face of relative consumption effects.

How do market reforms affect China's responsiveness to environmental policy?

A large percentage of total investment in China is allocated by the central government at below-market interest rates in pursuit of non-economic objectives. This has resulted in low rates of return and a high number of non-performing loans, threatening the future health of the Chinese economy. As a result, reform of capital markets is a high priority of the Chinese government. At the same time, the country is implementing various environmental policies to deal with serious pollution issues. In this paper we ask how reforms of the capital market will affect the functioning of a carbon tax. This allows us to assess how China's willingness to join global efforts to reduce carbon emissions is influenced by China's current efforts to reduce investment subsidies. We compare the costs of a carbon tax in a reformed economy with the costs of a carbon tax in the current subsidized economy. We find that in the subsidized economy the tax-interaction effect dampens the effect of a carbon tax resulting in smaller reductions in emissions than what would result in a reformed economy. Importantly, we also find that the effect on economic welfare from a carbon tax is lower in the subsidized economy; in fact, for lower levels of reductions, the carbon tax is actually welfare improving. These results have important implications for an economy undergoing economic transition. The carbon tax rate required to achieve a certain level of emission reductions will be higher in an economy with capital subsidies. However, the welfare implications of the tax indicate that the current system with capital subsidies is highly distorting implying that there is a high efficiency cost for the non-economic objectives the government is pursuing by maintaining this system of subsidies.

Tax Interaction Effects, Environmental Regulation, and ?Rule of Thumb? Adjustments to Social Cost

Preexisting distortions in factor markets complicate the estimation of the social welfare effects of regulatory interventions. The existence of these tax interaction effects (TIEs) suggests that general equilibrium (GE) approaches should be used to evaluate regulatory policies. However, formal GE analysis is not always feasible for the numerous environmental regulations proposed by federal, state, and local agencies. The question addressed in this paper is whether an empirically based ‘‘rule of thumb’’ upward adjustment factor is appropriate to properly scale social cost estimates in environmental policy. We argue that such rule of thumb adjustments are significantly less reliable than estimates based on a detailed general equilibrium analysis because of the uncertainty about both the magnitude and sign of the social cost distortion. In addition to addressing this question, the paper gives an overview of TIEs and their relevance to environmental policy.

Report of an Expert Panel to Review the Socio-Economic Models and Related Components Supporting the Development of Canada-Wide Standards (CWS) for Particulate Matter (PM) and Ozone To the Royal Society of Canada

Canada-Wide Standards (CWS) for particulate matter (PM) and ozone may be the most ambitious environmental standards ever proposed in Canada. They have attracted considerable attention and debate. This report addresses the validity of the socioeconomic modeling aspects of the Canada-Wide Standards development process. Socioeconomic considerations are addressed in one of eight principles underlying the development and attainment of CWS, according to a CWS subagreement signed by the Canadian Council of Ministers of the Environment (CCME). Principle 3.1.7 states that measures to attain agreed-upon Canada-Wide Environmental Standards will be determined in a sustainable development context, recognizing environmental and socio-economic considerations. This work has been previously published by the Royal Society of Canada, Ottawa (Ontario), in June 2001, appearing as “Review of Socio-Economic Models and Related Components Supporting the Development of Canadian Standards for Particulate Matter and Ozone,” ISBN 0-9...

Is International Emissions Trading Always Beneficial?

Economic efficiency is a major argument for international emissions trading under the Kyoto Protocol. We show that permit trading can be welfare decreasing for countries, even though private trading parties benefit. The result is a case of “immiserizing” growth in the sense of Bhagwati where the negative terms of trade and tax interaction effects wipe out the gains from trading. Simulation and welfare decomposition results based on a CGE model of the global economy show that under EU-wide trading countries that are net permit sellers generally lose, due primarily to the existence of distortionary energy taxes.

Environmental Tax Interactions when Pollution Affects Health or Productivity

Recent studies indicate that interactions with the tax-distorted labor market increase the cost of pollution regulation. However, these studies make restrictive assumptions regarding preferences and ignore key links between pollution, human health, and labor productivity. Together, these assumptions imply that pollution does not affect labor supply. This paper develops an analytical general-equilibrium model that considers several potential benefits from reduced pollution, including improved health or productivity. It shows that these benefits affect labor supply and thus create a benefit-side tax-interaction effect that can be of the same magnitude as the familiar cost-side interaction. When reduced pollution boosts labor productivity, the effect substantially magnifies such benefits. In contrast, when pollution affects consumer health, the effect tends to diminish the benefits of reduced pollution. The paper considers only environmental regulation, but these concepts apply equally to other policies affecting productivity or health, such as research subsidies or occupational safety regulations.

Labor supply and the double-dividend

A series of recent articles have argued that environmental taxes and cap-and-trade permit systems generate large distortions in the labor market. The claim is made that the higher prices for dirty goods induced by these incentive-based systems generate a ‘tax interaction effect’ leading to reductions in labor supply that are generally, on net, welfare reducing. For this reason, it is argued, a double-dividend seldom exists. However, price level increases, both by lowering family income and by reducing cross-spousal wage substitution effects, will tend to have offsetting positive impacts on labor supply. These effects are large enough to convert negative labor supply responses to rising prices into positive ones. The empirical literature also supports a positive relationship between price level increases and labor supply. These observations cast doubt on a central, critical assumption underlying the critique of the double-dividend in the ‘tax interaction effect’ literature.

Carbon Taxes and Carbon Emissions Trading

This paper surveys the literature on, and examples of current implementation of, carbon taxes and carbon emission permits. It sets out the theoretical basis for these instruments, with special reference to the revenue‐recycling and tax interaction effects. This theoretical work concludes that instruments which raise revenue which can be recycled so as to reduce pre‐existing distortionary taxes are significantly less costly than those which do not. The paper then reviews the sizable literature on the distributional effects of these instruments, especially with regard to industrial competitiveness and regressive effects on low‐income groups, evaluating attempts to mitigate these where they are perceived as unacceptable. The paper concludes that such efforts at mitigation, while possible, can substantially reduce the efficiency benefits of the instruments. The projected costs of carbon taxes depend on a wide range of assumptions. This is still a contested area, but the paper concludes that, on a range of plausible assumptions, these costs need not be high. Finally the paper notes that early evaluations of the environmental effectiveness of carbon taxes have been generally positive. This suggests that, if concern about anthropogenic climate change continues to increase, more countries will introduce carbon taxes and emission permits, with the latter increasingly auctioned.

Nonseparable Utility and the Double Dividend Debate: Reconsidering the Tax-Interaction Effect

The literature on the use of environmental taxes inthe presence of distortionary (labor) taxes warns thata partial-equilibrium Pigouvian tax analysis is notappropriate because increasing the price of dirtygoods can futher aggravate the prexisting distortions. This argument is most frequently made assuming thatlabor is taxed to meet a fixed revenue requirement.When a dirty good is also taxed, others argue thatthis lowers workers' real wages, causing people toreduce their labor supply below its already suboptimallevel, aggravating labor market distortions. However,most papers ignore the effect that a cleanerenvironment can have on labor supply. That is, mostpast work has assumed that the quality of theenvironment is weakly separable in the utilityfunction. We argue that a cleaner environment canincrease labor supply, at least partially offsettingany incentive for workers to decrease their laborsupply. Further, we show explicitly how relaxing theseparability assumption affects the standardresults.

Environmental Policy Making in a Second-Best Setting

This paper uses analytically tractable and numerically solved general equilibrium models to examine the significance of pre-existing distortions in factor markets for revenue- neutral environmental tax reforms and for various policies involving pollution quotas and permits. Results indicate that pre-existing factor taxes generally raise the costs of these environmental policies. This reflects a tax-interaction effect: the lowering of real factor returns resulting from the higher output prices occasioned by environmental taxes and other regulations. The revenue-recycling effect — stemming from the use of environmental tax revenues to finance cuts in pre-existing factor taxes — helps reduce policy costs, but under plausible assumptions does not eliminate the costs of such policies: the double dividend does not materialize. Even if it does not produce a double dividend, the revenue-recycling effect is important for reducing policy costs. Policies that fail to exploit the revenue-recycling effect suffer significant disadvantages in terms of efficiency. Like environmental taxes, freely allocated (or grandfathered) pollution quotas or permits, for example, produce a costly tax-interaction effect, yet such quotas or permits do not enjoy the offsetting revenue-recycling effect. Auctioning the permits or quotas makes possible the revenue-recycling effect and allows given pollution-abatement targets to be achieved at lower cost. The failure to exploit the revenue-recycling effect can alter the sign of overall efficiency impact. Indeed, if marginal environmental benefits from pollution reductions are below a certain threshold value, then any level of pollution abatement through freely allocated quotas or permits is efficiency-reducing. The tax-interaction effect is relevant to government regulation outside the environmental area. To the extent that regulations on international trade or agricultural production raise output prices and thereby reduce real factor returns, these regulations exacerbate the factor-market distortions from pre-existing taxes and thus involve higher social costs than would be indicated by partial equilibrium analyses.

Reflections on the Double Dividend Debate

We survey the history of carbon taxation, the range of market-based instruments (MBIs) of environmental control, and the state of the double dividend debate, in order to suggest directions for future research into MBIs. Returning MBI revenues as lower distortionary taxes rather than as lump sums raises aggregate welfare, but we favour MBIs which raise little or no revenue, for reasons of political acceptability to interest groups. At the same time, the overall case for any environmental improvement is weaker because of general equilibrium interactions with prior distortionary taxes. Research seems most necessary on quantifying the efficiency benefits of market control of heterogeneous polluters, the benefits of environmental improvement, the tax interaction effect, and the various information costs of an MBI, all on a case-by-case basis for different pollutants and places.

Revenue-Raising versus Other Approaches to Environmental Protection: The Critical Significance of Preexisting Tax Distortions

Using analytical and numerical general equilibrium models, we show that preexisting factor taxes produce a "tax-interaction effect" that increases the costs of pollution taxes and quotas. Under policies that raise revenue and recycle it through cuts in marginal factor tax rates, this effect is partially offset by a "revenue-recycling effect." Grandfathered pollution quotas, such as those used under the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments to regulate electric utilities' SO2 emissions, do not benefit from this offset. Preexisting taxes raise this regulation's cost by over 70%. More than half of this additional cost could be avoided by auctioning quotas and exploiting the revenue-recycling effect.