Tax-based Consolidations Research Articles

Fiscal Consolidation and Income Inequality in Latin America and the Caribbean

This paper estimates the effects of past fiscal consolidations in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) on income inequality. For the 13 LAC countries with fiscal consolidation episodes identified by the narrative approach, one percent of GDP fiscal consolidation increases the disposable Gini coefficient by 0.12 percentage point on average in five years. The size of the effect tends to be larger for tax-based consolidations and for non-commodity exporters but broadly similar during booms and slumps.

Why do governments cut their deficits?

Using discrete choice models, this paper examines the macroeconomic and political factors motivating more than 450 fiscal consolidation episodes in 185 countries during the period 1979–2019. In emerging and developing countries, consolidations are more likely during “good times”: when growth is high, and countries experience positive terms of trade shocks with low inflation. In these countries, governments with a high margin of majority, regardless of how long they have been in power, are also more likely to consolidate fiscal accounts. The opposite seems to be the case in advanced economies, where more “mature” governments are more likely to implement fiscal consolidations and the consolidations themselves are more likely during periods of subdued growth. Evidence also suggests that tax-based consolidations may be relatively more politically challenging to implement. Finally, consolidations in advanced economies are relatively more likely to take place in the presence of fiscal rules.

Tax evasion, fiscal policy and public debt: Evidence from Spain

We reconsider the macroeconomic effects of fiscal policy in an estimated dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with limited tax enforcement. The results of the Bayesian estimation provide evidence in favor of a sizeable underground sector in Spain, with the associated tax evasion having contributed, on average, to 23% of public debt accumulation over the period 1985–2015. From the standpoint of fiscal policy, the estimated results show that the presence of tax evasion triggers a resource-reallocation mechanism that dampens the effects on economic activity caused by an increase in government spending, while it amplifies those due to changes in tax rates. Because of this mechanism, we show that tax-based consolidation plans may become completely ineffective in reducing the debt-to-GDP ratio if tax enforcement is imperfect. Moreover, by characterizing the long-run Laffer curve, we show that the actual taxation in Spain is inefficiently too high, in the sense that the government might increase tax revenues by cutting the actual tax rates on both corporate and personal income.

Lagging behind: the hysteresis of austerity

This paper investigates the role of hysteresis in the long-term transmission of consolidations in a panel of 17 OECD countries. The evidence supports that the hysteresis of the labour market is the main driver of consolidations’ long-term effects: an increase in the rigidity of the labour market exacerbates and prolongs the contraction following tax-based consolidations, while it mutes the expansion following expenditure-based consolidations. In contrast, the response of productivity is irrelevant to the presence of the long-term scars.

Labour market rigidity and expansionary austerity

This study provides new evidence on how labour market rigidities affect the transmission of fiscal consolidations using a sample of 17 OECD countries. Owing to a novel empirical approach, the outcomes of consolidations are modelled as a function of employment and wage rigidities. The evidence confirms that tax-based consolidations are distortionary, while expenditure-based consolidations have wealth effects. These effects are then magnified by flexible employment and rigid wages, while they are moderated by rigid employment and flexible wages. This indicates that labour market conditions influence how fiscal consolidation is propagated in the economy by affecting both the magnitude and the transmission channels of consolidation plans. This result has crucial policy implications and suggests that the design of consolidation plans should account for the labour market structure.

The pace of fiscal consolidations, fiscal sustainability, and welfare: An overlapping generations approach

This study investigates expenditure- and tax-based consolidations under the rule of reductions in debt-to-GDP ratios to the target level and the effects of these consolidations on fiscal sustainability and welfare, using an overlapping generations model with exogenous growth settings. We derive (i) a threshold (ceiling) of public debt to ensure fiscal sustainability, (ii) sustainable paces of these consolidations, and (iii) the optimal pace of consolidations under both expenditure- and tax-based consolidations, examining whether these consolidations are effective in the sense that they are sustainable, increase welfare, and induce fairness of welfare distribution across generations (lower intergenerational conflicts over welfare). We find that the pace of tax-based consolidation required to ensure fiscal sustainability is higher than that required for expenditure-based consolidation. As for welfare, countries may differ in their choice of the type of consolidation, which depends on the size of outstanding debts relative to capital, the economy’s productivity, tax rate levels, and the extent of utility derived by individuals from public goods and services. More importantly, it may also depend on whether policymakers emphasize social welfare or fairness of welfare distribution between generations. By contrast, a common result from the viewpoints of both social welfare and fair distribution of welfare across generations is that fiscal consolidation cannot persist much longer than 30 years (one period in the model). This result will support the pace of consolidation in the EU: the Stability and Growth Pact.

Fiscal policy and fiscal fragility: Empirical evidence from the OECD

In this paper, we use local projections to investigate the impact of consolidation shocks on GDP growth, conditional on the fragility of government finances. Based on a database of fiscal plans in OECD countries, we show that spending shocks are less detrimental than tax-based consolidation. In times of fiscal fragility, our results indicate strongly that governments should consolidate through surprise policy changes rather than announcements of consolidation at a later horizon.

Fiscal Consolidations and Informality in Latin America and the Caribbean

The transmission mechanisms of fiscal policy are significantly affected by informality in the labour market. Extending a narrative database of fiscal consolidations in 14 countries from Latin America and the Caribbean between 1989 and 2016 in order to account for heterogeneity in terms of commitment to the reforms, I show that tax-based and spending-based multipliers are both recessionary and do not significantly differ one from another in this region. Furthermore, these multipliers decline in absolute value as the level of labour informality increases in the economy, although evidences are less robust for spending-based consolidations. An analysis of the effects of tax-based consolidations on private demand suggests that labour market informality constitutes a short-term social buffer that attenuates the contractionary effects of this type of policy by increasing investment opportunities through tax evasion and entrepreneurial alternatives to unemployment for dismissed workers.

Political Costs of Tax-Based Consolidations

This paper studies the impact of tax-based consolidations on reelection outcomes. Using a granular database of tax-based consolidations for a panel of 10 OECD countries over the last 40 years, we find that tax reforms are politically costly but some reforms are costlier than others. Measures aimed primarily at reducing existing deficits and debt are costlier than tax consolidation policies for improving long-term growth prospects. Electoral costs are particularly high for broad-based indirect tax and corporate tax reforms. Voters tend to penalize governments less if tax consolidations are announced early in the government’s term or if the government has a strong political mandate. Favorable economic conditions increase public support for tax-based consolidations. Personal income tax reforms are electorally salient if the reforms are frontloaded, announced during recessions, and in less progressive tax systems.

Innovation-led growth in a time of debt

We study the effects of large reductions in government budget deficits (labeled “fiscal consolidations”) on firms’ entry, innovative investments, productivity and per capita output growth in a model of endogenous technological change. Due to the absence of lump-sum taxes, temporary budget deficits set government debt-output ratios on unsustainable paths. An equilibrium then requires the specification of a date at which the debt-output ratio is stabilized at a constant finite value. We discipline parameters using post-war observations for the U.S. economy. We find that fiscal consolidations produce persistent growth slowdowns, permanently lowering the path of per capita output relative to a benchmark economy in which the fiscal consolidation is achieved with lump-sum taxes. These output losses are sizable. In this sense, government debt is a burden on the economy. Tax-based consolidations produce output losses that are twice as large as those from spending-based consolidations.

Political Costs of Tax-Based Consolidations

This paper studies the impact of tax-based consolidations on reelection outcomes. Using a granular database of tax-based consolidations for a panel of 10 OECD countries over the last 40 years, we find that tax reforms are politically costly but some reforms are costlier than others. Measures aimed primarily at reducing existing deficits and debt are costlier than tax consolidation policies for improving long-term growth prospects. Electoral costs are particularly high for broad-based indirect tax and corporate tax reforms. Voters tend to penalize governments less if tax consolidations are announced early in the government's term or if the government has a strong political mandate. Favorable economic conditions increase public support for tax-based consolidations. Personal income tax reforms are electorally salient if the reforms are frontloaded, announced during recessions, and in less progressive tax systems.

The composition effects of tax-based consolidation on income inequality

Many advanced economies have recently embarked on fiscal austerity. As this has come at a time of high and rising income disparities, policy-makers have fretted about the inequality effects of fiscal consolidations. We shed new light on this issue by empirically investigating the (composition) effects of tax-based consolidations on income inequality, output and labour market conditions for a sample of 16 OECD countries over the period 1978–2012. We find that tax-based consolidations reduce income inequality, but at the cost of weaker economic activity. However, tax composition does matter. Indirect taxes reduce income inequality by more than direct taxes, possibly due to the operation of a positive labour supply channel. Higher indirect taxes increase the price of the consumption basket and create incentives for agents to increase their labour supply. We find this effect to be stronger for middle-aged women. Looking at specific instruments, general consumption taxes and personal taxes are the most suited to reduce inequality while at the same time minimizing the equity-efficiency trade-off.

Should I Stay or Should I Go? Austerity, Unemployment and Migration

High unemployment and fiscal austerity during the Great Recession have led to significant migration outfl ows in those European countries that suffered a deep deterioration of their economy, Greece being the most obvious case. This paper introduces endogenous migration in a small open economy DSGE model to analyze the business cycle effects from the interaction of fiscal consolidation instruments with migration. A tax-based consolidation induces the strongest increase in emigration, leading to the highest costs in terms of aggregate GDP and unemployment in the medium run. As a result, the unemployment gains from migration are only temporary. However, in terms of per capita GDP, cuts in the components of public spending that are either productive or utility-enhancing can lead to a deeper contraction than tax hikes or wasteful spending cuts. The introduction of potential migration by the employed implies even higher unemployment costs, a deeper demand contraction, and an increase in both the tax hike and the time required to achieve the same size of fiscal consolidation.

The (Intertemporal) Equity-Efficiency Trade-Off of Fiscal Consolidation

We build a dynamic general equilibrium model with heterogeneous households and capital-skill complementarity in the production function to study aggregate and distributional effects of fiscal consolidation policies when government uses a rich set of productivity-enhancing spending instruments along with utility-enhancing spending and tax fiscal instruments. Fiscal policy is conducted through simple fiscal rules. We study both ad-hoc and optimized fiscal rules. Our main results indicate that ad-hoc fiscal consolidation policies, either through spending cuts or tax increases, are recessionary and entail an equity-efficiency trade-off in the short- and medium-run. That is spending-based consolidation policies are less recessionary but come at a higher distributional cost; whereas tax-based consolidation policies result in sharper output losses but have smoother distributional effects. In addition, fiscal consolidation policies through optimized fiscal rules can be expansionary and social welfare enhancing while at the same time balance the equity-efficiency trade-off.

Fiscal consolidations and heterogeneous expectations

We analyze fiscal consolidations using a New Keynesian model where agents have heterogeneous expectations and are uncertain about the composition of consolidations. We look at spending-based and tax-based consolidations and analyze their effects separately. We find that the effects of consolidations and the output multipliers are sensitive to heterogeneity in expectations before and after implementation of a specific fiscal plan. Depending on the beliefs about the type of consolidation prior to implementation, we show that heterogeneity in expectations may lead to optimism in the economy, improving thus the performance of a specific fiscal plan, or can work towards the opposite direction leading to pessimism, amplifying the contractionary effects of the consolidation. In general, we find that spending-based consolidations last longer and lead to deeper recessions when agents are boundedly rational compared to the rational expectations benchmark, while the opposite holds for tax-based consolidations.

On the Predictability of Narrative Fiscal Adjustments

This paper shows that spending-based adjustments identified by DeVries et al. (2011) can be predicted on the basis of past output growth and other macroeconomic variables. Moreover, their contractionary effects vanish once we account for this source of endogeneity while tax-based consolidations remain contractionary.

On the predictability of narrative fiscal adjustments

This paper shows that spending-based adjustments identified by DeVries et al. (2011) can be predicted on the basis of past output growth and other macroeconomic variables. Moreover, their contractionary effects vanish once we account for this source of endogeneity while tax-based consolidations remain contractionary.

Distributional Consequences of Fiscal Consolidation and the Role of Fiscal Policy: What Do the Data Say?

The 2007-09 Great Recession has led to an unprecedented increase in public debt in many countries, triggering substantial fiscal adjustments. What are the distributional consequences of fiscal austerity measures? This is an important policy question. This paper analyzes the effects of fiscal policies on income inequality in a panel of advanced and emerging market economies over the last three decades, complemented by a case study of selected consolidation episodes. The paper shows that fiscal consolidations are likely to raise inequality through various channels including their effects on unemployment. Spending-based consolidations tend to worsen inequality more significantly, relative to tax-based consolidations. The composition of austerity measures also matters: progressive taxation and targeted social benefits and subsidies introduced in the context of a broader decline in spending can help offset some of the adverse distributional impact of consolidation. In addition, fiscal policy can favorably influence long-term trends in both inequality and growth by promoting education and training among low- and middle-income workers.

Fiscal Consolidation in a Currency Union: Spending Cuts vs. Tax Hikes

Abstract This paper uses a two country DSGE model to examine the effects of tax-based vs. expenditure-based fiscal consolidation in a currency union. We find three key results. First, given limited scope for monetary accommodation, tax-based consolidation tends to have smaller adverse effects on output than expenditure-based consolidation in the near-term, though is more costly in the longer-run. Second, a large expenditure-based consolidation may be counterproductive in the near-term if the zero lower bound is binding, reflecting that output losses rise at the margin. Third, a “mixed strategy” that combines a sharp but temporary rise in taxes with gradual spending cuts may be desirable in minimizing the output costs of fiscal consolidation.

Fiscal consolidation in a currency union: Spending cuts vs. tax hikes

This paper uses a two country DSGE model to examine the effects of tax-based vs. expenditure-based fiscal consolidation in a currency union. We find three key results. First, given limited scope for monetary accommodation, tax-based consolidation tends to have smaller adverse effects on output than expenditure-based consolidation in the near-term, though is more costly in the longer-run. Second, a large expenditure-based consolidation may be counterproductive in the near-term if the zero lower bound is binding, reflecting that output losses rise at the margin. Third, a “mixed strategy” that combines a sharp but temporary rise in taxes with gradual spending cuts may be desirable in minimizing the output costs of fiscal consolidation.