Tariff Shocks Research Articles

How U.S. tariffs impact China’s domestic sourcing: Evidence from firm-to-firm transactions

This paper investigates how tariff shocks influence the domestic performance of Chinese firms, leveraging quarterly data on both international and domestic transactions from 2017 to 2018. Our analysis uncovers several key findings: (i) a one percent increase in export tariffs leads to a 0.235 percent increase in sales to domestic buyers, suggesting that higher export costs drive suppliers to prioritize domestic markets, primarily affecting the extensive margin; (ii) a similar increase in countervailing import tariffs results in a 0.995 percent decrease in domestic purchases, underscoring a complementary relationship between China’s imported intermediates and domestic products; (iii) larger firms exhibit smaller magnitudes of domestic sales and are more likely to reduce their domestic intermediate inputs in response to a negative external risk. These findings highlight that understanding the complementary relationship between imports and domestic inputs is crucial for developing strategies to mitigate the adverse effects of tariff policies on domestic production.

Besides tit for tat: The effect of US 301 tariffs on Chinese local government spending

Many studies have shown that the US-China trade war has harmed China's exports and economy. This paper analyzes whether local governments respond to US 301 tariffs through public spending. Using the variation of tariff exposure across cities, this paper finds that the tariff shock led local governments to increase public spending, mainly on social security and employment. Heterogeneity analysis indicates this effect was more pronounced in cities with higher openness, lower fiscal pressure, and lower saving levels. Robustness tests are provided.

Carbon tariffs and energy subsidies: Synergy or antagonism?

Carbon tariffs represent an alternative mechanism devised by developed nations to combat climate change, yet their ramifications on the economies of developing nations necessitate deeper investigation. This study introduces a new open economy macroeconomic framework incorporating bilateral trade dynamics to analyze the effects of forthcoming carbon tariff policies on developing economies. Our research reveals that carbon tariffs, on the one hand, reduce the exports of intermediate goods from developing countries, thereby worsening their domestic economic development. On the other hand, they will curb fossil energy consumption in developing countries, improving air quality. Additionally, we propose two common policies that may mitigate the adverse effects of carbon tariff shocks on developing countries, namely, subsidies by developing country governments for the domestic use of renewable energy (Renewable Energy Subsidy Policy, RESP) and tax incentive discounts for the domestic use of fossil energy (Tax Discount on Fossil Fuels, TDFF). Our analysis shows that the RESP outperforms the TDFF in facilitating the transition to renewable energy, incentivizing structural reforms in corporate energy consumption, and improving environmental quality. Furthermore, variations in conditional consumption compensation within RESP are about 10 times that of TDFF under identical circumstances, leading to higher household welfare levels. We argue that despite the antagonistic impacts of RESP and TDFF on carbon tariffs, there are synergistic effects between RESP and carbon tariffs, particularly concerning environmental improvement. This offers a theoretical foundation for the policy responses of developing countries to carbon tariffs.

The US–China Trade War: Quantify the Negative Shocks to Local Housing Markets and Land-Based Finance in Chinese Cities

The US–China trade war’s impacts on Chinese cities’ housing markets and local public finance are examined. In China, institutional reforms and ever-growing housing prices in the past resulted in land-based finance that city governments heavily rely on land sales (state-land use-right transfers) for fiscal revenues. However, the trade war has severely struck the cities’ housing markets and land sales since 2018. This article applies 2016–2019 data to a shift-share analysis and finds the following. Imposed by the US on imports from China, the retaliatory tariffs hurt Chinese cities’ production and caused employment and wage declines and firm exit. Importantly, the tariff shocks also affected housing and land markets. A one percentage point (p.p.) increases in the (weighted average) tariffs applicable to cities’ exports reduced cities’ new home sale volume by 3.1% and prices by 1.2%. Besides, city governments’ land sale revenues dropped 7.6%. Since the applicable tariffs to cities increased by 1.62 p.p. on average and 10.4 p.p. at the extreme by 2019, many cities’ housing markets and public finance have hit trouble. The resilient cities to the tariff shocks were those with less overbuilding, more population, more diversified industries or export destinations, or a stronger tertiary sector.

The US–China trade war and corporate innovation: Evidence from China

AbstractThis study investigates the effect of the US–China trade war on corporate innovation in the context of China. We find that the first‐order effect of the trade war on corporate innovation is significantly negative. That is, Chinese firms exposed to the US–China trade war have lower numbers of patent applications and invention patent applications. Underlying mechanisms include reductions in market expansion and innovation input. Our findings are more pronounced for firms connected to the United States and those suffering financial distress and for non‐state‐owned enterprises. We further contribute to the literature by showing that firms with developed managerial ability, more confident managers, and better corporate social responsibility performance tend to increase innovation for competitiveness in response to the trade war. Finally, we explore the effect of Chinese retaliatory tariff shocks on corporate innovation and find that US tariffs and Chinese retaliatory tariffs hinder corporate innovation in China.

Tariff Hedging with a New Supplier? An Analysis of Sourcing Strategies Under Competition

Due to the U.S.-China trade war, multinational firms may develop new contract manufacturers outside China to hedge against high tariffs on Chinese exports to the U.S. market. However, tariffs exhibit high uncertainty in recent years and developing a contract manufacturer incurs costs; hence, it is challenging to decide whether to develop a new contract manufacturer. We study two competing firms’ contract manufacturer development decisions in a sequential game. First, we find that multinational firms prefer to develop new contract manufacturers when tariffs are expected to rise moderately rather than sharply. This is because the value of developing a new contract manufacturer for a multinational firm is the largest when the new contract manufacturer and the existing one compete most intensely, which happens for similar tariff-inclusive costs. This implies, when taking into account competition, an overly high tariff on Chinese exports to the United States does not necessarily serve the purpose of switching suppliers from China to other regions. Furthermore, higher tariff uncertainty can decrease development value and hence the incentive to develop a contract manufacturer. When there is an upward tariff shock that induces the equilibrium where both multinational firms develop a contract manufacturer, both firms must be worse off; only when it induces the asymmetric development equilibrium is it possible for the multinational firm developing a contract manufacturer to be better off, even with tariff increase and development cost. Second, the impact of development cost on multinational firms’ incentives to develop new contract manufacturers is nonmonotone. As the development cost increases, the equilibrium can switch from both not developing new contract manufacturers to one developing a new contract manufacturer. Third, when the future tariff is expected to be high, multinational firms should diversify their development strategies in environments with fierce competition. Furthermore, increasing competition is not necessarily harmful for multinational firms. We also extend the analysis to consider asymmetric development costs and unobservable wholesale prices, and find the major insights are robust.

Impact of carbon border adjustment mechanism on China's manufacturing sector: A dynamic recursive CGE model based on an evolutionary game

As the global carbon emission problem is getting more and more serious, the European Union has proposed the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) to prevent carbon leakage, which will have an impact on China's foreign trade. Based on this background and the problems of current research that ignores factors such as commodity prices, long-term impacts, intertemporal substitution analysis, and changes in national strategies for foreign exports, this paper propose a Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model based on an evolutionary game as a dynamic recursive basis to study the impact of the CBAM on the Chinese manufacturing industry. For the industries mentioned in the CBAM, 18 affected sectors are collated, and a CGE model containing multiple blocks such as production, trade, and carbon emissions is built. Meanwhile, we establish an evolutionary game model with EU suppliers, manufacturers, and the government, allowing Chinese suppliers to compete with EU suppliers. Based on the above model, the impact of carbon tariff policies from 2020 to 2050 is studied. The results indicate that under the intra-EU competition condition, carbon tariffs will reduce the price of Chinese exports and slightly decrease China's real GDP, as well as the carbon emission intensity of 18 sectors and fossil energy. However, the impact of carbon tariffs on overall carbon emissions is small and is essentially a protective policy. In addition, the evolutionary game-based CGE model takes into account the dynamic strategies of both sides and is therefore less affected by carbon tariff shocks and recovers more quickly and more realistically. Finally, the article argues that the advantage of carbon tariffs for local suppliers is unsustainable and Chinese suppliers will still dominate, and local suppliers need more subsidies from the EU government. On the other hand, the Chinese government needs to implement a stricter carbon tax regime and export subsidies to improve the competitiveness of Chinese products in terms of green levels and price advantages. The purpose of this paper is to examine the quantitative impacts of CBAM on China's related manufacturing industries and strategies to maximize the benefits to both governments.

(Asymmetric) tariff‐driven foreign direct investment: Evidence from Korean firm‐level data

This study examines the effects of identified industry tariff shocks on firms' outward foreign direct investment (FDI) into their destinations. Using rich Korean firm‐level data for 2010–18, the study decomposes FDI outflows from multinational enterprises (MNEs) into the number of subsidiaries (extensive margin) and average FDI for individual subsidiaries (intensive margin) in the destination. New evidence of tariff‐driven FDI reveals that the tariff decrease shocks (TDS) (significant tariff decreases) lower the number of existing subsidiaries rather than the average FDI volume for the existing subsidiaries. In addition, more productive firms investing in developing countries lower the number of existing subsidiaries to a greater extent in response to TDS, implying that productive MNEs reallocate resources into selective core subsidiaries when a significant tariff decrease occurs.

How Exporters Grow

Abstract We use customs data for Irish firms to show that in successful episodes of export market entry, there are statistically and economically significant post-entry dynamics of quantities, but not of mark-ups. To match these moments, we structurally estimate a model where firms can invest in future customer base through two channels: by selling more today, and by spending on marketing and advertising. Our estimates suggest that customer base is insensitive to lagged sales, so firms have no incentive to engage in dynamic pricing to accumulate customers. Instead, investment in customer base through marketing and advertising explains the dynamics of quantities. The ratio of advertising and marketing expenditures to sales implied by the model is consistent with data from other sources. Our estimated model generates long-run export responses to permanent tariff changes that are bigger than short run responses, as well as responses that are increasing in the expected persistence of tariff shocks, contributing to our understanding of the International Elasticity Puzzle.

The macroeconomic stabilization of tariff shocks: What is the optimal monetary response?

In the wake of Brexit and Trump trade war, central banks face the need to reconsider the role of monetary policy in managing the inflationary-recessionary effects of hikes in tariffs. Using a New Keynesian model enriched with global value chains and firm dynamics, we show that the optimal monetary response is expansionary. It supports activity and producer prices at the expense of aggravating short-run headline inflation---contrary to the prescription of the standard Taylor rule. This holds all the more when the home currency is dominant in pricing of international trade.

Macroeconomic impact of the Sino–U.S. trade frictions: Based on a two-country, two-sector DSGE model

To examine the impact of the recent Sino–U.S. trade frictions on the macroeconomics of China and the United States, we constructed a two-country, two-sector dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model. This model was used to explore the tariff transmission mechanism in such trade frictions and provide a basic analytical framework for future research on bilateral trade frictions. Based on our benchmark analysis, the tariff shocks affect non-tradable sectors through the tradable sectors, which, in turn, have impacted consumption, investments, prices, and production. Specifically, the tariffs on intermediate and final goods affect the economy from the supply and demand sides, respectively, and as the trade dependence decreases, the economic volatility caused by the tariff shocks also decreases. Moreover, our simulation showed that the impact of the trade frictions on the macroeconomics of the two countries has been asymmetrical, which is consistent with the objective economic realities.

Trade war and corporate social responsibility: Evidence from China

Based on the shock of the US–China trade war, this study investigates the effect of trade tariff shock on corporate social responsibility (CSR). We find that Firms increase CSR activities in response to the trade war and results are robust when using alternative control groups and excluding firms that experienced changes in their main business. We further examine the economic consequences of CSR and find that CSR during the trade war leads to an increase in sales and a decrease in stock price crash risk. Overall, this paper offers timely policy implications on the role of CSR in global trade events.

The impact of the US–China trade war on domestic and multinational companies in China

AbstractThis short paper investigates whether the US–China trade war has a different impact on domestic and multinational companies in China. Using the Orbis database with the coverage of ownership structure, we can identify Chinese multinational companies that own foreign subsidiaries with at least 51% stake. Then, using a panel dataset of Chinese companies from 2011 to 2019, we compare revenues of multinational and domestic companies before and after the trade war. We have found that multinational companies have about 8% higher in revenue after the trade war than domestic ones. These findings are consistent with the recent literature on the real hedging channel that operation flexibility reduces the impacts of tariff shocks.

The Moderating Role of Corporate Governance under Tariff Shocks: Evidence from the U.S.-China Trade War

The Moderating Role of Corporate Governance under Tariff Shocks: Evidence from the U.S.-China Trade War

The Macroeconomic Stabilization of Tariff Shocks: What is the Optimal Monetary Response?

In the wake of Brexit and the Trump tariff war, central banks have had to reconsider the role of monetary policy in managing the economic effects of tariff shocks, which may induce a slowdown while raising inflation. This paper studies the optimal monetary policy responses using a New Keynesian model that includes elements from the trade literature, including global value chains in production, firm dynamics, and comparative advantage between two traded sectors. We find that, in response to a symmetric tariff war, the optimal policy response is generally expansionary: central banks stabilize the output gap at the expense of further aggravating short-run inflation---contrary to the prescription of the standard Taylor rule. In response to a tariff imposed unilaterally by a trading partner, it is optimal to engineer currency depreciation up to offsetting the effects of tariffs on relative prices, without completely redressing the effects of the tariff on the broader set of macroeconomic aggregates. Institutional subscribers to the NBER working paper series, and residents of developing countries may download this paper without additional charge at www.nber.org.

The effects of US import tariffs on steel and aluminum imports from Mexico

To this end, mathematical and statistical methods are used to model the effect of tariffs, ex-ante and ex-post, after implementing this trade policy, on exports of aluminum and steel from Mexico to the United States, versus US imports of these metals from the ROW. The results show that the protectionist tariff policy had a structural effect on US imports; likewise, the tariff shock implemented by the United States in June 2018 adversely affected its imports of these goods, both in terms of volume and value. This suggests that bilateral trade may be affected, but the effect is differentiated. The United States may be achieving its objective of protecting its domestic industry or it may impact upwards on the domestic prices of these metals, which could influence the prices paid by the final consumer. For Mexico, trade may be diverted or its export capacity reduced, adversely affecting its trade balance of these metals.

Trade shocks, industrial growth, and electrification in early 20th-century China

How does demand from the industrial sector promote the diffusion of electricity? Using newly digitized data on Chinese power plants from 1912 to 1935, we examine the impact of a trade shock, which protected the domestic manufacturing sector from import competition, on the adoption of electricity. To establish a causal relationship, we exploit time variations in imported manufactured goods caused by China's unexpected recovery of tariff autonomy in 1929 and cross-sectional variations in local access to treaty ports. We find that the reduction in manufactured imports resulted from the tariff shock led to the expansion of the local electricity sector. Further analysis suggests that the booming domestic industrial sector rather than population agglomeration was the key channel for the effect.

Invoicing Currency and Symmetric Pass-Through of Exchange Rates and Tariffs: Evidence from Malawian Imports from the EU

The response of import prices to exchange rates can be used to predict the effect of changes in trade policy, as the symmetric hypothesis asserts that the effect of tariffs and exchange rates on prices are identical. This paper examines whether the hypothesis holds in the context of various invoicing currencies, using transaction-level data of Malawian imports from the European Union (EU). The findings show that the U.S. dollar has the highest invoicing share, and the pass-through of exchange rate and tariff shocks on importers is high, but not necessarily equal, when the currency of invoicing is considered. Crucially, the tariff pass-through to prices is higher than the exchange rate pass-through, with important differences across countries, currencies and sectors. Thus, in order to predict the effects of trade policy, bilateral exchange rates may not be suitable for capturing exchange rate pass-through for small developing countries, especially import-dependent ones such as Malawi.

The Macroeconomic Stabilization of Tariff Shocks: What is the Optimal Monetary Response?

In the wake of Brexit and the Trump tariff war, and a general weakening of the political support for free trade, central banks have been faced with the need to reconsider the role of monetary policy in managing the economic effects of unexpected hikes in tariffs and trade costs. Although tariffs induce a slowdown with rising inflation like supply shocks, their distortionary effects on production and relative prices distinguish them from standard supply disturbances, and thus motivate a different monetary response. This paper studies the optimal monetary stabilization of tariff shocks using a New Keynesian model enriched with elements from the trade literature, including global value chains in production, firm dynamics, and comparative advantage between traded sectors. We find that, in response to tariff shocks, the optimal monetary stance is generally expansionary: central banks support activity at the expense of further aggravating short-run inflation—contrary to the prescription of the standard Taylor rule. If the tariff is imposed unilaterally by a trading partner, currency depreciation partly offsets the effects of tariffs on relative prices, without completely redressing the effects of the tariff on the broader set of macroeconomic aggregates. Remarkably, the country issuing a dominant currency can shelter its economy from the adverse effects of a selective tariff war on comparative advantage.

The impact of US tariffs against China on US imports: Evidence for trade diversion?

AbstractWe provide evidence on the existence of short‐run trade diversion effects towards third countries as a consequence of tariff shocks. We exploit sudden policy changes in the context of the trade dispute between the United States and China in 2018. Based on a data set covering monthly product‐level information on US imports from 30 countries for the period 2016 until May 2019, we employ a difference‐in‐differences estimation framework. Doing so, we can show a strong negative direct effect of US tariffs on US imports from China, but do not find evidence for significant short‐run trade diversion effects towards third countries.