In China, economic growth targets significantly affect the economic behavior of local governments. This paper analyzes a dataset of the economic growth targets from 230 city government work reports from 2004 to 2019 to reveal how economic growth targets affect local environmental pollution. The empirical results show that the economic growth targets are “overweight” from the higher-level governments to the lower-level governments, which significantly aggravates regional environmental pollution because of environmental regulation relaxation, blocked industrial structure upgrades and technological innovation inhibition. Furthermore, to exceed the economic growth targets, local governments usually adopt the “riding a seesaw” strategy for the treatment of different pollutants. If the economic growth target statements are ambiguous or attainable, then environmental pollution is reduced. Interestingly, the “preemptive” city government, which sets economic growth goals before its province, is more inclined to maintain growth at the expense of the environment. This study provides important evidence for the literature on the impacts of government behavior on environmental pollution.
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