Target Of Explanation Research Articles

Conspiracy Theory and (or as) Folk Psychology

ABSTRACT One issue within conspiracy theory theory is whether, or to what extent, our central concept – <conspiracy theory> – should map on to the common, lay sense of the term. Some conspiracy theory theorists insist that we use the term as everyday people use it. So, for example, if the term has a pejorative connotation in everyday parlance, then academic work on the concept should reflect that. Other conspiracy theory theorists take a more revisionist approach, arguing instead that while their use of the theoretical concept should bear some relation to its use in natural language, it need not follow it subserviently. I argue that elements of this debate mirror related debates that were prominent in the philosophy of mind in the 1980s over folk psychology and eliminative materialism (debates that continue today, such as within the philosophy of perception and theories over how to individuate the senses). Then, there was a debate over whether the concepts of commonsense psychology, such as <belief> or <desire>, should be treated as theoretical posits, and hence open to significant revision or elimination, or whether they were instead the targets of explanation. I will argue that an eliminativist approach to <conspiracy theory> has significant merit.

Targets of explanation in correctional and forensic psychology: A black box model

A particularly pressing problem in the correctional psychology domain is the failure to ask questions about what the targets of explanatory theories should be, and in light of this failure, researchers have arguably spent too much time constructing misdirected explanations. In this paper this issue is addressed. First, we briefly describe the aims and different phases of scientific research. Second, the explanatory dilemma currently facing researchers within the correctional domain is outlined: concentrating on crime related categories (offending types and criminal behavior) versus psychological and social ones that are conceptually distant from criminal behavior. Third, we explore the offence solution to this problem in more detail, concluding that it is fruitless to continue basing explanations only on categories of offences or offending behavior. Fourth, we examine the possible solution of shifting the focus to psychological and social problems evident in people who have committed crime. Fifth, we present our solution to the problem of selecting explanatory targets based on the concept of black boxes. Finally, we conclude the paper with a brief discussion of the research and practice implications of our solution. • Identifies target selection dilemma in correctional psychology • Explains why phenomena modelling is a crucial part of scientific inquiry • Explores benefits and problems associated with focusing on offending behavior/offense categories versus psychological problems • Provides a solution to the target selection problem using a black box model

Motivated to learn: An account of explanatory satisfaction

Many explanations have a distinctive, positive phenomenology: receiving or generating these explanations feels satisfying. Accordingly, we might expect this feeling of explanatory satisfaction to reinforce and motivate inquiry. Across five studies, we investigate how explanatory satisfaction plays this role: by motivating and reinforcing inquiry quite generally (“brute motivation” account), or by selectively guiding inquiry to support useful learning about the target of explanation (“aligned motivation” account). In Studies 1–2, we find that satisfaction with an explanation is related to several measures of perceived useful learning, and that greater satisfaction in turn predicts stronger curiosity about questions related to the explanation. However, in Studies 2–4, we find only tenuous evidence that satisfaction is related to actual learning, measured objectively through multiple-choice or free recall tests. In Study 4, we additionally show that perceptions of learning fully explain one seemingly specious feature of explanatory preferences studied in prior research: the preference for uninformative “reductive” explanations. Finally, in Study 5, we find that perceived learning is (at least in part) causally responsible for feelings of satisfaction. Together, these results point to what we call the “imperfectly aligned motivation” account: explanatory satisfaction selectively motivates inquiry towards learning explanatory information, but primarily through fallible perceptions of learning. Thus, satisfaction is likely to guide individuals towards lines of inquiry that support perceptions of learning, whether or not individuals actually are learning.

Explanatory profiles of models of consciousness - towards a systematic classification.

Models of consciousness aim to inspire new experimental protocols and aid interpretation of empirical evidence to reveal the structure of conscious experience. Nevertheless, no current model is univocally accepted on either theoretical or empirical grounds. Moreover, a straightforward comparison is difficult for conceptual reasons. In particular, we argue that different models explicitly or implicitly subscribe to different notions of what constitutes a satisfactory explanation, use different tools in their explanatory endeavours and even aim to explain very different phenomena. We thus present a framework to compare existing models in the field with respect to what we call their ‘explanatory profiles’. We focus on the following minimal dimensions: mode of explanation, mechanisms of explanation and target of explanation. We also discuss the empirical consequences of the discussed discrepancies among models. This approach may eventually lead to identifying driving assumptions, theoretical commitments, experimental predictions and a better design of future testing experiments. Finally, our conclusion points to more integrative theoretical research, where axiomatic models may play a critical role in solving current theoretical and experimental contradictions.

Theory Construction Methodology: A Practical Framework for Building Theories in Psychology

This article aims to improve theory formation in psychology by developing a practical methodology for constructing explanatory theories: theory construction methodology (TCM). TCM is a sequence of five steps. First, the theorist identifies a domain of empirical phenomena that becomes the target of explanation. Second, the theorist constructs a prototheory, a set of theoretical principles that putatively explain these phenomena. Third, the prototheory is used to construct a formal model, a set of model equations that encode explanatory principles. Fourth, the theorist investigates the explanatory adequacy of the model by formalizing its empirical phenomena and assessing whether it indeed reproduces these phenomena. Fifth, the theorist studies the overall adequacy of the theory by evaluating whether the identified phenomena are indeed reproduced faithfully and whether the explanatory principles are sufficiently parsimonious and substantively plausible. We explain TCM with an example taken from research on intelligence (the mutualism model of intelligence), in which key elements of the method have been successfully implemented. We discuss the place of TCM in the larger scheme of scientific research and propose an outline for a university curriculum that can systematically educate psychologists in the process of theory formation.

Recharacterizing scientific phenomena

In this paper, I investigate how researchers evaluate their characterizations of scientific phenomena. Characterizing phenomena is an important – albeit often overlooked – aspect of scientific research, as phenomena are targets of explanation and theorization. As a result, there is a lacuna in the literature regarding how researchers determine whether their characterization of a target phenomenon is appropriate for their aims. This issue has become apparent for accounts of scientific explanation that take phenomena to be explananda. In particular, philosophers who endorse mechanistic explanation suggest that the discovery of the mechanisms that explain a phenomenon can lead to its recharacterization. However, they fail to make clear how these explanations provide warrant for recharacterizing their explananda phenomena. Drawing from cases of neurobiological research on potentiation phenomena, I argue that attempting to explain a phenomenon may provide reason to suspend judgment about its characterization, but this cannot provide warrant to recharacterize it if researchers cannot infer a phenomenon’s characteristics from this explanation. To explicate this, I go beyond explanation – mechanistic or otherwise – to analyze why and how researchers change their epistemic commitments in light of new evidence.

A functional approach to explanation-seeking curiosity

Why do some (and only some) observations prompt people to ask “why?” We propose a functional approach to “Explanation-Seeking Curiosity” (ESC): the state that motivates people to seek an explanation. If ESC tends to prompt explanation search when doing so is likely to be beneficial, we can use prior work on the functional consequences of explanation search to derive “forward-looking” candidate triggers of ESC—those that concern expectations about the downstream consequences of pursuing explanation search. Across three studies (N = 867), we test hypotheses derived from this functional approach. In Studies 1–3, we find that ESC is most strongly predicted by expectations about future learning and future utility. We also find that judgments of novelty, surprise, and information gap predict ESC, consistent with prior work on curiosity; however, the role for forward-looking considerations is not reducible to these factors. In Studies 2–3, we find that predictors of ESC form three clusters, expectations about learning (about the target of explanation), expectations about export (to other cases and future contexts), and backward-looking considerations (having to do with the relationship between the target of explanation and prior knowledge). Additionally, these clusters are consistent across stimulus sets that probe ESC, but not fact-seeking curiosity. These findings suggest that explanation-seeking curiosity is aroused in a systematic way, and that people are not only sensitive to the match or mismatch between a given stimulus and their current or former beliefs, but to how they expect an explanation for that stimulus to improve their epistemic state.

The conceptualization of gangs: Changing the focus

Abstract Discussions about the gang construct and appropriate definitions have been pervasive throughout gang research. This paper seeks to shed light on these discussions by adopting a theoretical perspective to examine the suitability of ‘gangs’ as a target of explanation and the appropriateness of current definitional approaches. First, we examine the validity and utility of the gang construct. It is concluded that the gang label has poor construct validity and limited explanatory utility, thereby making it unsuitable for theoretical purposes. Instead, we suggest that researchers need to focus on what gangs are at a foundational level, namely groups, and that the group should be the target of explanation. Second, we consider the limitations of gang definitions for theory construction and instead offer a method known as three-tier analysis to comprehensively conceptualize groups without discussions of necessary and sufficient definitional boundaries. Finally, we produce a framework based on these findings and demonstrate how it facilitates understanding of a specific gang exemplar. In doing so, we bypass several theoretical roadblocks obstructing gang research and advance a way to explain the group and (by extension) gangs, thus improving our understanding of groups and gangs with the purpose of ultimately informing practice and policy initiatives.

Datasets from a research project examining the role of politics in social psychological research

We present four datasets from a project examining the role of politics in social psychological research. These include thousands of independent raters who coded scientific abstracts for political relevance and for whether conservatives or liberals were treated as targets of explanation and characterized in a negative light. Further included are predictions about the empirical results by scientists participating in a forecasting survey, and coded publication outcomes for unpublished research projects varying in political overtones. Future researchers can leverage this corpus to test further hypotheses regarding political values and scientific research, perceptions of political bias, publication histories, and forecasting accuracy.

Associationism without associative links: Thomas Brown and the associationist project

There are two roles that association played in 18th–19th century associationism. The first dominates modern understanding of the history of the concept: association is a causal link posited to explain why ideas come in the sequence they do. The second has been ignored: association is merely regularity in the trains of thought, and the target of explanation. The view of association as regularity arose in several forms throughout the tradition, but Thomas Brown (1778–1820) makes the distinction explicit. He argues that there is no associative link, and association is mere sequence. I trace this view of association through the tradition, and consider its implications: Brown's views, in particular, motivate a rethinking of the associationist tradition in psychology. Associationism was a project united by a shared explanandum phenomenon, rather than a theory united by a shared theoretical posit.

The Structure of Explanations and Counter-Explanations of Homosexuality

The aim of this paper is to revisit an ongoing controversy within the so called “Science Wars”; more specifically, I will address a particular topic within the “human nature” debate: the ontological and epistemological status of homosexuality. I claim that, in this particular chapter of the “Science Wars”, we are continually left in an explanatory impasse even when more data are collected, more rigorous experimental techniques are developed, more subtle arguments are offered and more pluralistic narratives are told. My diagnosis of the source of this impasse leads me to the conclusion that here we are dealing with a structural problem that cannot be solved with an elaboration of new models and theories that maintain an on- tology and an epistemology that are no longer suited as an explanans of human nature in general, and homosexuality in particular. Nevertheless, my analysis of the structural features of the biological explanations and the constructivist counter-explanations also leads me to the belief that, although biologists do not fully understand the intricacies of subjects, neither constructivists understand the facticity of evolution and the challenge that it implies. If so, then the subject might be the right target of explanation. And, if so, constructivists might be right about the uniqueness of human homosexuality as a modern, western phenomenon explainable in terms of subjectivities and identities that mold and are molded by desires and institutions. But, if they are, evolution is not expendable because now we are facing a most intriguing question: How is that we humans became subjects?

Political ecology: a critical introduction

List of Figures.List of Tables.List of Boxes.Introduction.The Goals of the Text.The Rest of the Book.Many Acknowledgments.Part I: What is Political Ecology?.1. The Hatchet and the Seed:.What is Political Ecology?.Challenging Apolitical Ecologies.Ecoscarcity and the Limits to Growth.Other Apolitical Ecologies: Diffusion, Valuation, and Modernization.Common assumptions and modes of explanation.The Hatchet: Political Ecology as Critique.The Seed: Political Ecology as Equity and Sustainability Research.The Dominant Narratives of Political Ecology.Big Questions and Theses.The Degradation and Marginalization Thesis.The Environmental Conflict Thesis.The Conservation and Control Thesis.The Environmental Agency and Social Movement Thesis.The Target of Explanation.2. A Tree with Deep Roots:.The Determinist Context.A Political Ecological Alternative.The Building Blocks.Critical Approaches in Early Human/Environment Research.Continental Critique: Humboldt, Reclus, Wallace, and Sommerville.Critical Environmental Pragmatism.From Sewer Socialism to Mitigating Floods: Hazards Research.The Nature of Society: Cultural Ecology.Historicism, Landscape, and Culture: Carl Sauer.Julian Steward: A Positivist Alternative.System, Function, and Human Life: Mature Cultural Ecology.Beyond Land and Water: The Boundaries of Cultural Ecology.The Limits of Progressive Contextualization.Taking the Plunge.3. The Critical Tools:.Common Property Theory.Green Materialism.Materialist History.The Case of Oriental Despotism.Dependency, Accumulation, and Degradation.Lessons from Materialism: Broadly Defined Political Economy.The Producer is the Agent of History: Peasant Studies.Chayanov and the Rational Producer.Scott and the Moral Economy.Gramsci and Peasant Power.Breaking Open the Household: Feminist Development Studies.Critical Environmental History.Whose History & Science? Postcolonial Studies and Power/Knowledge.Power/Knowledge.Critical Science, Deconstruction, and Ethics.Political Ecology Emergent.4. A Field Crystallizes:.Chains of Explanation.Peanuts and Poverty in Niger.Marginalization.The Silent Violence of Famine in Nigeria.Broadly Defined Political Economy.Struggle in Cote D'Ivoire's Fields and Pastures.25 Years Later.Part II: Conceptual and Methodological Challenges:.5. Destruction of Nature - Human Impact and Environmental Degradation:.The Focus on Human Impact.Defining and Measuring Degradation.Loss of Natural Productivity.Loss of Biodiversity.Loss of Usefulness.Socio-Environmental Destruction: Creating or Shifting Risk Ecology.Limits of Land Degradation: Variability, Disturbance, and Recovery.What Baseline? Non-Human Disturbance and Variability of Ecological Systems.What Impact? Variable Response to Disturbance.Can We Go Back? Variable Recovery from Disturbance.Methodological Imperatives in Political Analysis of Environmental Destruction.6. Construction of Nature: Environmental Knowledges and Imaginaries:.Why Bother to Argue That Nature (or Forests or Land Degradation...) is Constructed?.Choosing Targets for Political Ecological Constructivism.Three Debates and Motivations.Hard and Soft Constructivism.Radical Constructivism.Soft Constructivism.Constructivist Claims in Political Ecology.Barstool Biologists and Hysterical Housewives: The Peculiar Case of Local Environmental Knowledge.Eliciting Environmental Construction.Talk and Text: Construction in Discourse.Categories and Taxonomies.Spatial Knowledge and Construction.Narratives of Ecological Process and Change.Genealogies of Representation: Environmental History.Methodological Issues in Political Analysis of Environmental Construction.Part III: Political Ecology Now:.7. Degradation and Marginalization:.The Argument.Degradation and Reversibility.Accumulation and Declining Margins.The Evidence.Amazonian Deforestation.Contract Agriculture in the Caribbean.Evaluating the Thesis.Research Example: Common Property Disorders in Rajasthan.Eliciting Rules of Use.Recording Environmental Practices and Response to Authority.Determining Ecological Outcomes.8. Conservation and Control:.The Argument.Coercion, Governmentality, and Internalization of State Rule.Disintegration of Moral Economy.The Constructed Character of Natural Wilderness.Territorialization of Conservation Space.The Evidence.New England Fisheries Conservation.Fire in Madagascar.Social Forestry Conservation in Southeast Asia.The Consistency of Colonial and Contemporary Forestry.The Limits of Social Reform in Forestry.Evaluating the Thesis.Riven Bureaucracies and Efficacious Species.Alternative Conservation?.Research Example: The Biogeography of Power in the Aravalli.A Classic Case of Conservation and Control?.Establishing historical patterns of access.Understanding contemporary land uses and enclosure impacts.Tracking unintended consequences.9. Environmental Conflict:.The Argument.Social structure as differential environmental access and responsibility.Property institutions as politically partial constructions.Environmental development and classed, gendered, raced imaginaries.The Evidence.Agricultural Development in Gambia.Gambia and the Gendered Land/Labor Nexus.Land Conflict in the US West.Evaluating the Thesis.Stock Characters and Standard Scripts.Research Example: Gendered Landscapes and Resource Bottlenecks in the Thar.Determining Differential Land Uses and Rights.Tracking Changes in Availability.Evaluating Divergent Impacts.10. Environmental Identity and Movement:.The Argument.Differential Risk and Ecological Injustice.Moral Economies and Peasant Resistance.Postcolonialism and Rewriting Ecology from the Margins.The Evidence.Andean Livelihood Movements.Modernization and Identity.Hijacking Chipko: Trees, Gender, Livelihood, and Essentialism in India.Women's Movement or Peasant Movement?.Evaluating the Thesis.Making Politics by Making a Living.The risk of primitive romances and essentialisms.The reality of dissent.In the Field: Pastoral Polities in Rajasthan.Agrarian Alliances and Traditional Technology as Resistance.Ambivalence, Research, and Ethics.Part IV: Where to Now?.11. Where to Now?.Against Political Ecology?.Too Much Theory or Too Little?.Denunciations versus Asymmetries.Three Calls for Symmetry.From Destruction to Production.From Peasants to Producers.From Chains to Networks.The Hybridity Thesis.Political Ecologies of Success.New Substantive Research Mandates.Population Is Too Important to be Left to the Malthusians.Genetic Modification Won't Go Away.Cities are Political Ecologies.Against Against Political Ecology: Retaining Both Theory and Surprise.In the Meantime...References.Index