Taiwan Mainland Research Articles

Radon levels and dose assessment at the basement workplaces of hospitals in different regions of Taiwan

The basements of large hospitals in Taiwan are usually working areas for image radiometry, radiation therapy, and nuclear medicine, where the radon concentration can be accumulated. This study investigated radon concentrations in the basement working environments of 30 hospitals in different regions with various geology of Taiwan, aiming to explore the relationship between geological conditions and radon concentrations and estimate the radiation dose received by the working staff. Portable MR107+ semiconductor radon detectors calibrated with a radon chamber were used for radon measurement at the hospital basement working areas according to the protocol of MAH-2019 instrument placement recommendations from the US EPA. The excess lung cancer risk (ELCR) as well as the lung cancer cases per million persons (LCC) were further derived from the radiation dose.The basement working areas investigated are located on the first to sixth underground floors of hospitals in Taiwan mainland and islands, Penghu and Kinmen. The 222Rn concentration higher than 100 Bq/m3 was observed at CH-1 (122.1 Bq/m3) in Changhua City and CY-1 (114.7 Bq/m3) in Chiayi City. This is attributed to that the central air conditioning systems of these hospitals were turned off during off-duty hours. The radon concentrations of all hospitals were lower than the action level, 150 Bq/m3, regulated by the US EPA. No significant relationship was found between radon concentration and the geological characteristics of the measured sites. That is, the ventilation of the basement working areas in hospitals is more important than local geological characteristics on indoor radon concentration, and therefore proper ventilation is crucial for reducing radon gas concentration in the hospital basements. Estimated annual effective dose from 222Rn for the hospital staff was higher than 1 mSv/y at YL (1.24 mSv/y), CH-1 (1.64 mSv/y), CY-1 (1.54 mSv/y), CY-2 (1.34 mSv/y), and PH-2 (1.14 mSv/y), and that for the rest sites was <1 mSv/y. The maximum mean ELCR was found to be 0.63% at CH-1, and the related LCC was estimated to be 29.5 per million persons.

Redescription and new record of the spongobiotic shrimp Periclimenaeus rastrifer Bruce, 1980 (Crustacea: Decapoda: Palaemonidae) from Taiwan.

The palaemonid shrimp Periclimenaeus rastrifer is here reported from Taiwan based on three specimens. It bears a feeble but distinct anterodorsal lobe on the first pleonite (not reported before). The mouthparts, not previously described, are also remarkable by a multidentate apex of the mandibular incisor, asymmetric distal endite of the second maxilla, and expanded dorsal lobe on the second maxilliped merus. The species is thus redescribed here. One of the examined specimens possesses an unusual rostrum, and malformed telson and uropodal spinulation; the latter specimen is described and illustrated in detail, including the mouthparts. Previously, the only species in the genus published in faunistic repors from Taiwan were P. wolffi Bruce 1993 and P. gorgonidarum (Balss, 1913) recorded from the Taiwan Strait, and the Green Island, respectively; P. rastrifer is reported here as the first of the genus from Taiwan mainland.

East and South Asia: Managing Difficult Bilateral Relations and Regional Integration Globally

This paper analyzes the economic integration of the East and South Asian economies in the global economy. East Asian economies are shown to be achieving much more of their potential trade than South Asian economies, both in terms of intra‐regional trade and in trade with the rest of the world. Examination of the China–Japan, India–Pakistan and Taiwan–mainland China bilateral relationships shows that integration of these economies into the global economy has allowed economic relations to dominate and constrain difficult bilateral political relations in East Asia while in South Asia adverse political relations have hampered development of bilateral economic relationships.

The China that was not to be: nostalgia and the exilic imagination of Taiwan's mainland diaspora

Studies of diaspora typically inquire after culturally homogenous populations driven from their homelands and living as subalterns in their new environs. In this paper, we look at such an exiled population living not at the periphery, but in the upper rungs of its host society, and as such is able to impose its ancestral language, literature of nostalgia, and exilic world view upon its host population. We show how mainland refugees of the Chinese Civil War entering Taiwan between 1945 and 1949 have managed, for some 40 years, to import an exoglossic linguistic standard, set literary trends born of nostalgic longing, define a culture of pan-Chinese nationalism, and impose an imaginary geography of historical China upon the local population. We further illustrate how this nostalgia-tinged interpretation of Chinese history and culture has shaped a generation of Western views of China and imparted a literary and cultural legacy far beyond expectations generated by the diaspora's small numbers. Finally, as travel bans are lifted and counter-diasporic movement made possible since the 1980s, we show how contact with reality spells the death knell for diasporic identity and vitality, which, among Taiwan's third-generation mainland diaspora, are now little more than a historical curiosity and cultural commodity with which to look back in wonder.

National security vs. economic interests: reassessing Taiwan's mainland policy under Chen Shui‐bian

Having finished its first term, the Chen Shui‐bian Administration has found itself in deep water in the troubled cross‐Strait relations. Not only has Chen himself been making contradictory remarks, the Cabinet has been indecisive over issues related to China. The most difficult and irritating case for the DPP government has been the handling of the call made by high‐tech industries to allow them to invest in the mainland. The controversy seems to highlight a dilemma for Taiwan: while it needs the mainland market to save it from the current economic doldrums and create yet another potential ‘miracle’ of becoming a global economic powerhouse, it is worried that further economic engagement with its former rival may pose new kinds of threats to its national security. The debate over whether to allow an eight‐inch wafer foundry, the crown jewel of Taiwan's economy, to invest in the mainland market is but one case, albeit a highly significant one, of the difficult relations between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait.

National identity and Taiwan's Mainland China policy

Taiwan is a mildly divided society—divided essentially along the lines of national identity. Indeed, there is no doubt that national identity is the dominant factor affecting Taiwan's mainland China policy. Other factors such as business interests and security concerns may enter the picture from time to time, but they often get bogged down in the national identity controversies. As a matter of fact, there is high correlation between people's attitudes toward business and security concerns and their positions on the national identity issue. The key to understanding Taiwan's mainland China policy is thus the distribution of voters on the national identity issue and how it is translated into the political fortunes of various political parties in the electoral game.

The dynamics of political and economic interactions between Mainland China and Taiwan

Abstract. The purpose of this article is to examine the trade and economic linkages across the Taiwan straits from the dynamic economic and political perspectives. In particular, we study the pattern and structure of the cross‐straits trade and business linkages using game theory arguments. We assess the increasing economic interdependence between Taiwan and Mainland China, particularly the enduring political deadlock, by examining issues related to “Taiwanification”, the dynamic instability, Taiwan's Mainland policy, and Taiwan in Beijing's Grand Strategy.

The political economy of Taiwan's mainland policy

The emerging patterns of the cross‐strait interaction present a perplexing duality, revealing both the trends toward closer economic convergence and greater political divergence. Taiwan's mainland policy is both the manifestation and the catalyst of the two contradictory processes. It is the locus of confrontation of the various economic, social, and political forces that propels the two concurrent processes. It has been propelled by the epic changes in the global political economy, the market‐oriented reform in China, and Taiwan's economic restructuring process. It has also been prompted by the perceived challenges and opportunities brought about by the transition to the post‐Cold War era, the unraveling of structural conflicts between a status‐quo power (i.e., the US) and a rising power (i.e., the PRC) and by the politics of political succession within the CCP. In more immediate terms, it has been driven by the power struggle over political succession within the KMT, the bureaucratic process, the interest group politics, the partisan politics in both the electoral and legislative arenas, and the unfolding of the national identity crisis during Taiwan's recent transition to democracy.

The cross‐strait talks of 1993—The rest of the story: Domestic politics and Taiwan's mainland policy

In April 1993 ‘unofficial’ representatives of the mainland and Taiwan met in Singapore. This was the most important cross‐strait meeting since the end of the civil war in 1949 and was held against a background of growing contact that had begun in the late 1980s. However, these meetings also came at a time when the political system in Taiwan was undergoing a process of dramatic change. The development of an opposition party, divisions within the ruling KMT party, a more assertive Legislative Yuan and the sprouts of interest group politics all provided a domestic context for the meetings in Singapore. This paper looks at the manner in which these domestic factors shaped the tone and substance of Taiwan's bargaining position at these talks.

Taiwan's Mainland Policy: Normalization, Yes; Reunification, Later

Since 1949, the spectre of the People's Republic of China (PRC) has constantly dominated Taiwan's political stage. The PRC was considered until the mid-1960s by Chiang Kai-shek, then President of the Republic of China on Taiwan (ROCOT), as a part of the country to be reconquered from the Communist bandits (gongfei). And since the United States′ de-recognition in 1979 the reunification with mainland China has remained one of the key official objectives of the Nationalist regime.

The Taiwan-Mainland economic nexus: Sociopolitical origins, state-society impacts, and future prospects

Most researchers on Taiwan's Mainland investment are economists who tend to focus on the economic dimension of the Taiwan-Mainland nexus. Consequently they are unable to explain both the timing (wh...

The State and Taiwan's Mainland Economic Policy

T his article adopts the state-centered approach to analyze Taiwan's crossstraits economic policy in the 1990s. I use the strong-state paradigm to explain Taiwan's development in the past forty years. While the neo-liberal school of political economy stresses the advantage of laissez-faire policies, and dependency theorists emphasize international constraints upon development, the statist approach focuses on the state's capacity and autonomy in manipulating the statesociety relationship and in governing the market. The East Asian developmental states in general and Taiwan in particular work with and often promote the market, which is employed as an instrument that exposes particular industries to international competitive pressures. A selective industrial policy for economic development involves (1) state initiatives that decide which products or technologies should be encouraged; (2) public resources or influences over private resources to carry through these initiatives, and (3) a big before-the-fact strategy.' The state's regulative policies compete with the market mechanism in the international arena. The state must meet the major challenges presented by profit-seeking businessmen and economic interdependence among trading states. It needs to accommodate domestic social forces on the issue of trade and investment and to protect national interests through deliberate designs to enhance its competitive edge and increase international cooperation. The strong state initiates policies according to autonomous actions of the state elite, leads the market force, and adjusts the economic structure to accommodate the changing international environment. This article will highlight one crucial perspective of the state-centered