Tactical Domain Research Articles

ASSESSMENT OF STUDENT-ATHLETE ATHLETIC PERFORMANCE BASED ON MOTIVATIONAL CLIMATE

The study on the assessment of the student athlete’s motivational climate and their athletic performance was conducted utilizing descriptive research design. The student athletes from all the campus of the Nueva Ecija University of Science and Technology were chosen using purposive sampling technique. It used the survey method to gather data. Survey-questionnaire was administered online via Google Forms to collect the relevant data. Likert Scale of 1- 5 was utilized to quantify the assessment of the student athlete’s motivational climate in two portion which is Coach- created and peer-created motivational climate of the respondents. Frequency count, percentage, and weighted mean were the statistical tools applied. Results revealed that 143 student athletes of NEUST had experienced motivational climate in terms of coach created and peer created and evaluated their athletic performance in terms of tactical and technical domain. Highest weighted mean of their coach created motivational climate is 4.78 which is the coaches and trainers always motivate the athletes in all of their games. 4.58 was the highest weighted mean in terms of their peer created motivational climate said that the athletes motivate their co-athletes to have a strong desire to win the competitions. On their tactical domain, 4.75 was the highest weighted mean which the Coaches and trainers have plans on winning the games. Highest weighted mean of their technical domain was 4.50 which the coaches and trainers are active during training. KEYWORDS: Coach created motivational climate, Peer Created motivational climate, Tactical domain, technical domain, Student Athletes and Assessment

Adaptation and Validation of a Test for the Evaluation of Tactical Knowledge in Soccer: Test de Conocimiento Táctico Ofensivo en Fútbol for the Brazilian Context (TCTOF-BRA)

BackgroundStudies and tests to assess the tactical domain of young soccer players are recent, and few instruments meet the majority of quality criteria.ObjectiveTo adapt and validate the Test de Conocimiento Táctico Ofensivo en Fútbol (TCTOF) for the Brazilian context (TCTOF-BRA).MethodsThe article consists of two studies. Study 1 (n = 111) included the translation, theoretical/semantic analysis, back translation, cross-cultural equivalence, and content and face validity (pre-test). In study 2 (n = 768), a theoretical and empirical item analysis was carried out, followed by construct validity [exploratory factor analysis (EFA), confirmatory factor analysis (CFA), and the known-groups method] and reliability (internal consistency and repeatability).ResultsIn the cross-cultural evaluation, the Coefficient of content validity total (CCVt) of the instrument was 0.96 and in the content validity, the CCVt of the instrument was 0.87. The face validity was confirmed (>95%). After theoretical and empirical analysis, 15 questions were included in the Teste de Conhecimento Tático Ofensivo no Futebol (TCTOF-BRA). The EFA showed a model with adequate fit (KMO = 0.69; Bartlett p < 0.001), with a factor structure considered very good, composed of four factors (decision making, operational tactical principles, collective tactical-technical elements, and rules). The CFA by the Asymptotically Distribution-Free estimation method demonstrated good and very good goodness of fit indices (X2/df = 1.54, GFI = 0.99, CFI = 0.94, TLI = 0.92, PGFI = 0.71, PCFI = 0.76, RMSEA = 0.03, and ECVI = 0.26). The known-groups method showed significant differences (p < 0.01) and effect sizes varying from small-to-medium to large. With respect to reliability, coefficients of 0.89 (CR) and 0.74 (KR20) for internal consistency and 0.85 for repeatability were found.ConclusionThe TCTOF-BRA presented satisfactory evidence, demonstrating it to be an instrument with valid and reliable measures for the evaluation of tactical knowledge (declarative and theoretical procedural), based on specific knowledge and decision making (cognitive domain), of Brazilian young soccer players from 12 to 17.9 years old.

TACTICS: Validation of the security framework developed for tactical SOA

Contemporary military networks and the requirements arising from future strategic planning, call for the increasing integration of information mobility and network enabled capabilities on the field. Therefore, adopting Service Oriented Architecture (SOA) concepts for the development of command and control infrastructures have become essential, since they provide modularity, flexibility and interoperability of services. Nevertheless, constraints related to infrastructure and operational aspects, render current enterprise SOA ineffective for the tactical domain. Accordingly, the goal of TACTICS was the definition and experimental demonstration of a Tactical Services Infrastructure (TSI) that enables contemporary tactical radio equipment to participate in SOA, providing the required functionalities under the imposed constraints. This article presents a comprehensive view of the developed architecture, focusing on the elements that constitute the security framework according to our closing experimental results and field demonstrations.

Toward federated mission networking in the tactical domain

NATO is currently working on the Federated Mission Networking (FMN) concept, which will become the foundation for establishing mission networks in the future. The realization of the FMN concept is described in the NATO FMN Implementation Plan (NFIP). The information infrastructure outlined in NFIP today builds on the concept of service-oriented architecture in order to achieve interoperability, and bases itself on many of the same standards and specifications as the ones identified through NATO Network Enabled Capabilities (NNEC). The NNEC SOA Baseline [1] identifies a number of core enterprise services that represent the common functionality needed to build an interoperable service-oriented infrastructure in a federation. It further identifies which standards should be used to realize these core services while ensuring interoperability between the federation members. A subset of these capabilities includes messaging services, collaboration services, service discovery, and security services. This article looks into each of these foundational core services, presents the challenges related to extending support for these services into the tactical domain, and identifies potential solutions.

Design considerations for next-generation airborne tactical networks

Airborne tactical networks (ATNs) have provided protected air-to-air communications for military aircraft for several decades. To support emerging and future warfighter needs, the next generation of systems will require significant improvements to provide higher capacity, longer range, greater flexibility, and increased interoperability. Governed by domain characteristics such as long transmission ranges, low-to-medium data rates, latency constraints, and link protection needs, the air tactical domain poses several unique requirements on link and network design. Developing next-generation ATNs requires an understanding of the airborne tactical domain, including the design constraints and challenges at various layers of the network stack. In this article, we provide an overview of the unique domain characteristics of ATNs and highlight the key design challenges and research areas associated with the physical, link, and network layers.

Information-centric networking in the tactical domain

Information-centric networking is a communication paradigm where there is no focus on endpoint addressing; rather, it is an attempt to achieve efficient information dissemination by focusing on the content that is distributed. In this article we describe how information-centric networking can be leveraged in order to extend NATO core enterprise services (CES) into the tactical domain. The paradigm can be implemented using decentralized publish/subscribe along with content caching. We present our information-centric middleware, Mist, and perform a comparative evaluation with an existing framework called Haggle. Mist is tailored to mitigate challenges encountered in mobile ad hoc networks. As a proof of concept, we implement a gateway between Mist and WS-Notification, which is the standard used in the Publish/Subscribe CES. This shows that with little effort it is possible to create gateways from networks using Mist to Web services-enabled infrastructure networks, ensuring compatibility and interoperability with higher levels in the chain of command, and also with other nations.

Reconsidering Afghanistan: Time for an “Azimuth Check”

For some time now, our trajectory and strategy in Afghanistan have been flat. We are not losing, and we are not winning. We find ourselves in an operational stalemate where progress on governance, reconstruction, and economic development--the core of our state-building strategy--is slowing while requirements for security and additional military force are accelerating. This condition is dangerous, given the American cultural urge to move on to new challenges. The Pakistanis and Afghans are not only aware of this tendency, they remember it, rendering our protestations of constancy moot. Even Mullah Omar, the Taliban leader, ousted by the United States in 2001, understands the virtue of patience. Americans have all the watches, he once observed, we have all the What Mullah Omar is suggesting is that if we are not winning, we are losing. He seems to grasp, possibly better than we do, that the United States and the international community cannot maintain their current level of commitment to Afghanistan indefinitely, probably not even for another five years. His prognosis, if correct, carries profound implications for US strategy. Two Strategic Mistakes Why we are not winning is complex but can be traced to two strategic errors, both of which are remediable. The first error centers on state-building: We have adopted a standard western state-building template that does not fit Afghan conditions particularly well. Expectations, both ours and the Afghans', are not aligned with reality, not just in terms of outcomes but also in terms of the time it will take to achieve them. The second mistake is more dangerous to our overall objectives in Afghanistan. It centers on the Taliban insurgency, which we perceive in one dimension (as a military--our military--problem). This perception drives American strategy and the instruments of US power we choose, with decreasing returns, to apply to it. But there are other parties to the conflict. Pakistan, the Afghan people, and the insurgents themselves view the insurgency in ways that differ significantly from our perspective. A successful strategy for defeating the insurgency needs to be based on a clearer, deeper understanding of what these parties want. Barring a major revision in strategy, our trajectory in Afghanistan is likely to continue to be flat, or worse. Most Afghans still think things are a little better now than they were before we came. But they also wonder why things are not a lot better, and a lot safer. The longer they wonder, the harder our task becomes, because while we may have a reputation for impatience, we do not own it outright. Thus the Mullah's strategy: If he is not losing, he is winning. A Matter of Time The current approach is an acceptable strategy, but it is not without flaws. The Taliban cannot defeat NATO militarily, but they do not have to; their best weapon is time. They can retard governance, reconstruction, and development, diminish security for the population, and erode national will. In essence, they can shorten the time available for state-building. A waiting game, however, is passive. It cedes the tactical domain to the United States, NATO, and the international community, betting that under the conditions that support the insurgency those actors will make operational mistakes that will result in their losing the contest in the long run. This strategy also assumes that America lacks the vision and agility either to recover from our operational mistakes or to craft an overall strategy that could make time switch sides. That line of reasoning makes Afghanistan still ours to win or lose. If we are to win, it is commonly understood, we have to identify the mistakes being made in our operations, militarily as well as in project assistance. But beyond the simple identification of mistakes, we are actually expected to fix these errors and omissions, a much more difficult proposition that is often overcome by doctrine, politics, and budgets. …

The Development of Sport Expertise: Mapping the Tactical Domain

This article explores issues and research relevant to sport tactical knowledge development and expertise. A discussion of the controversies concerning methodological tools is accompanied by a presentation of the possible levels of analysis (continua) in sport research. Theories of knowledge development and a protocol structure model for sport tactical knowledge are included. Knowledge development trends based on expert-novice cross-sectional research are presented, followed by longitudinal research exploring issues of instruction and player development. A concluding discussion concerns the role of tactical knowledge in contemporary motor skill theory and limitations of learning and instruction theory.