The terms “prevention” and “mitigation” are often used to define safety functions in nuclear power plants and other complex engineered systems. For existing light water reactor (LWR) nuclear plants, these terms are typically used in the context of preventing core damage and mitigating the consequences of a severe accident. Balancing the reliance on prevention and mitigation is often stated as an important principle of defense-in-depth. To apply these terms to formulate design requirements for advanced reactors, it is necessary to define specifically what is to be prevented and mitigated because the concept of core damage is not generally applicable to advanced non-LWR concepts and designs. Advanced non-LWR reactor concepts use different fuels, moderators, coolants and different strategies for achieving the functional containment of radionuclides. The adoption of the small modular reactor concept also leads to plants with many small reactors. This paper discusses a risk-informed and performance-based definition of prevention and mitigation that can be applied to any reactor concept or design. It was developed as part of the Licensing Modernization Project (LMP) which has introduced a new approach to developing a safety case to support design and licensing. A new way of thinking about prevention and mitigation was needed to formulate advanced reactor design and special treatment requirements for structures, systems and components (SSCs) that could be applied to a wide diversity of designs. The LMP approach discussed in this paper includes criteria to identify safety significant SSC prevention and mitigation functions and uses SSC reliability and capability targets to inform the selection of design and special treatment requirements and to support the evaluation of defense-in-depth adequacy. These prevention and mitigation functions are defined in the context of event sequences that comprise the licensing basis events that anchor the safety case for the reactor operating license.
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