System Of Transcendental Idealism Research Articles

The value method in literary studies (on the interpretation of N.A. Nekrasov's work in the axiological aspect)

Nekrasov's work presents a certain problem for studying from the point of view of the value system expressed in it. Despite the fact that quite a large number of works were devoted to this problem in Soviet times, it does not seem to be solved. The most productive approach to solving the question of the ethical foundations of Nekrasov's poetry seems to be the reconstruction of the understanding of the connection between aesthetics and ethics, characteristic of the socio-philosophical thought of his time. Throughout the 1830s and 1850s, the Russian liberal intelligentsia turned to German classical philosophy in search of answers to the question of the place of art in the world. From the philosophy of Kant, who sharply divided ethics and aesthetics and denied the possibility of art's direct impact on the world and society, she moved on to Schelling's "system of transcendental idealism". Not satisfied with the potential "immoralism" of this system, Russian liberal thought accepted Hegel's philosophy, on the one hand, recognizing the need for the philosopher to "accept" reality, on the other – reserving the artist the right to criticize this reality as not corresponding to his "concept". In the 1850s, the thinkers of the circle of Chernyshevsky and Dobrolyubov made additions based on Feuerbach's philosophy, but in fact it remains unchanged. These concepts allow us to truly understand Nekrasov's axiology, to truly approach his specific "poetry of reality", combining the pursuit of aesthetic perfection, philosophical acceptance of the world in its entirety and sharp criticism of modern society.

Le premier moment de l’art dans À la recherche du temps perdu de Marcel Proust – une « leçon d’idéalisme » ?

Although very famous, some key moments of the novel In Search of Lost Time, such as those of the madeleine or the uneven pavement, often remain enigmatic for the reader. Our article attempts to formulate a possible philosophical interpretation of the narrator's experiences during these scenes, through a confrontation of the Proustian text with the ideas found in the System of Transcendental Idealism (1800) of the German philosopher F. W. J. Schelling. We thus try to highlight the essential role of the self in Marcel Proust's aesthetic thinking, by showing that the mysterious happiness felt by the narrator, and from which the project of creating a work of art is ultimately born, is similar to the experiences of pure self-consciousness evoked and analyzed by Schellingian philosophy of art.

Wallace Stevens: Poetry, Philosophy, and Figurative Language ed. by Kacper Bartczak and Jakub Mácha

Reviewed by: Wallace Stevens: Poetry, Philosophy, and Figurative Language ed. by Kacper Bartczak and Jakub Mácha Krzysztof Ziarek Wallace Stevens: Poetry, Philosophy, and Figurative Language. Edited by Kacper Bartczak and Jakub Mácha. Berlin, Bern, Bruxelles, New York, Oxford, Warszawa, Wien: Peter Lang, 2018. As the title aptly conveys, this collection contains essays devoted to exploring the relation between poetry, philosophy, and language—in particular, the figure of metaphor—in Wallace Stevens’s poetry and essays. Most of the contributions were first presented as papers at the PhiLang conference at the University of Łódź, which took place on May 12–14, 2017. The introduction underscores the “amazingly contemporary and wide significance” of Stevens’s modernist poetry (11) and argues for the continuing interest in taking philosophical approaches to his work. It sketches briefly Stevens’s contribution to the aesthetic shifts in modernist poetry as well as the philosophical context (William James, George Santayana) in which his thinking about poetry developed. It also provides summaries of the essays and points to the growing scholarship that continues to read Stevens through the prism of philosophical approaches to knowledge and language, extending from Kant, Nietzsche, James, Husserl, and Heidegger to Derrida, Rorty, Murdoch, and Davidson. The eight essays are divided into two parts: the first four focus on the relation between poetry and philosophy while the second group addresses Stevens’s understanding of metaphor in the context of various philosophical and literary notions of metaphorical language. The essay opening the collection, “One Reason the Poetry of Wallace Stevens Matters Today,” by Charles Altieri, challenges the New Materialist approaches to aesthetic experience, which emphasize sensible, natural energy as influencing decisively the workings of the mind. Altieri invokes Hegel’s Lectures on Aesthetics, in particular his notion of “inner sensuousness,” to stress the formative role of consciousness in shaping poetic sensibility. Wit Pietrzak’s “‘They Will Get It Straight One Day at the Sorbonne’: Wallace Stevens’ Intimidating Thesis,” critiques what he sees as reductive philosophical approaches to Stevens’s poetry, turning to the work of Simon Critchley, Richard Rorty, and American pragmatism to argue that the poetry resists any finality that philosophy (in Pietrzak’s and Stevens’s view) tries to impose upon it. Instead, poetry continues to develop new fictions, and this is what philosophers will get straight one day. The third essay, by Karl-Friedrich Kiesow, consists of two shorter texts, which explore the relationship between philosophy and poetry in Stevens and Paul Weiss. Its contribution lies in focusing on the role that Stevens’s work, especially the notion of “supreme fiction,” plays in Weiss’s understanding of human equality and dignity and in his theory of art. The essay closing the first part, Mácha’s “Reality Is Not a Solid: Poetic Transfigurations of Stevens’ Fluid Concept of Reality,” offers a very interesting conception of multiple layers or dimensions of reality in Stevens, outlined against the backdrop of Schelling’s System of Transcendental Idealism. Part of his argument, contra Critchley, is that Stevens’s poetry can in fact help elucidate the obscurity of Schelling’s philosophical approach to the work of art. The most illuminating aspect of Mácha’s discussion is the fluid movement he traces in Stevens’s exploration of the changing relation between the mind and [End Page 292] the world through the various layers of “reality”—extending from what he terms initial reality through imagined reality to the final and then total reality. Crucial to his argument is the insistence on the essentially fluid character of reality in Stevens, which accounts for the fact that what Mácha calls the “agency” (more than human agency) moving and motivating reality in Stevens— sometimes called “Being”—cannot in fact be given any final or unique name. This Stevensian sense “of mere Being” can in turn help us understand how Schelling’s ground of all beings is no longer conceivable as a subject. Part Two of the collection offers essays devoted to language and metaphor in Stevens. Chris Genovesi’s “Au Pays de la Métaphore: Wallace Stevens and Interaction Theory” casts metaphor as a creative force that, though subjective, contributes to understanding and meaning on an objective level. Genovesi...

F.W.J. Schelling and the rise of historical theology

ABSTRACTThis article gauges the significance of Schelling’s thought for the emergence of nineteenth century German, Protestant historical theology. The article first considers Schelling’s relevant texts, mostly the System of Transcendental Idealism and the Lectures on University Studies. A second part looks at their theological readers considering in depth the early Philipp Marheineke and F.C. Baur. It becomes apparent that this reception occurs within intellectual networks comprising individuals who are nowadays considered philosophers, historians, theologians, or classicists, but who at the time participated in the same debates about history, mythology, speculation, and religion.

Schelling y la música

Schelling and music.- Music is a theme which enables us to have more direct access to the philosophy of Schelling. This is because in the Romantic period it is typical to find the conceptual framework provided by affirming a unity between reason and sensibility, while thought of the modern period tends to split these two. Here music is dealt with on the basis of a study of the meaning of art in the System of transcendental idealism, and of the question of philosophy as a system of identity.

Автономия разума и религия Откровения в философии религии Германа Когена

The article substantiates the idea that the philosophy of the religion of Cohen is an attempt at the synthesis of Kantianism and Judaism, and analyzes the main ideas of the head of the Marburg school of Neo-Kantianism, which, in his opinion, were to implement this synthesis within the framework of transcendental philosophy. There are two reasons that motivated Cohen to review Kant's assessment of the place and role of religion in the cultural progress of mankind: the desire to more accurately and consistently build his philosophical system, avoiding the dualism of the logical and ethical principles of thinking and at the same time breaking the formalism of the ethical principle itself, as well as the desire to write Judaism in the European tradition of the Enlightenment. The article traces three periods in the evolution of Cohen's views on religion, its place and role in the system of transcendental idealism and in the system of human culture: the first period conditionally covers the time from the appearance of the first fundamental work of the Marburg ethical philosopher “Kant's Foundation of Ethics” and ends with the first edition another fundamental work on the ethics “Ethics of Pure Will”, the third period, which provokes the most contradictory evaluations among researchers, marks two of Cohen's main works devoted to his philosophy of religion: “The Concept of Religion in the System of Philosophy” and “Religion of Reason from Jewish Sources”. It is in the latter work that there appears the theme of Revelation, which is described by the Marburgian thinker strictly within the framework of the correlation between God and man and the relationship through the mind of the man of Creation and Revelation.

Autoposição e autodestruição na filosofia de Schelling

Talking about the possibility or impossibility annihilation of nature by man, is in the end an endless polemic for the unsustainable use of natural resources implies the annihilation of humanity itself, and also, insofar every individual imaginary, as an ideal, contains the notion of self-preservation. However, the fact is that in our day such possibility achieved a high degree of probability. Therefore, we ask ourselves: how did that happen? In this work, we shall discuss this problem through Schelling’s notion of self-positing of the Geist as uncon ditional freedom. Firstly seeking to clarify the reasons why we have come to an impasse in our day, we will present the difficulty Schelling faced in considering the I as the principle in the System of Transcendental Idealism. Then we show the passage to his philosophy of identity as an attempt to show how the individual of empirical consciousness can be free and at the same time establishes an universal-historical relationship, valid for the whole diversity of finite consciousnesses. In a third moment, we will present his notion of Abfall (“Philosophy and Religion”) through which the author demonstrates how the particular intuits the universal. Finally, taking into account the dialectic of the imagination implicit in the notion of Abfall, we will attempt to point a guiding direction on the issue of preservation of nature and therefore of man.

Schelling und der Selbstrepräsentationalismus über phänomenales Bewusstsein

Abstract This paper explores Schelling’s theory of phenomenal consciousness in the System of Transcendental Idealism. It is shown that Schelling’s description and explanation of phenomenal consciousness is in accord with contemporary self-representationalist accounts of phenomenal consciousness. Thus, it is argued that Schelling develops a self-representationalist approach of phenomenal consciousness. Furthermore, it is demonstrated on the basis of Schelling’s account that analytic self-representationalism fails to completely explain phenomenal consciousness. Finally, however, a fundamental critique of Schelling’s theory of phenomenal consciousness is presented. Thus the central theses of the paper are, on the one hand, that Schelling is of systematic importance for contemporary debates, on the other hand, that his account is not convincing.

Los problemas del concepto de “idealismo trascendental” en el Sistema del idealismo trascendental de F.W.J. Schelling

In this paper I will investigate the concept of “transcendental idealism” in the System of Transcendental Idealism (1800). My aim is to outline the difficulties surrounding the concept. This paper argues that there is a marked tension between the different senses of the expression “transcendental idealism” and that in order to solve this tension Schelling tends to relativize the role of idealism in his system. In furtherance of this, I read this work of Schelling in the context of other texts, in particular, On the True Concept of the Philosophy of Nature and the Presentation of My System of Philosophy, both of 1801.

Schelling’s Concept of Self-Consciousness in his System of Transcendental Idealism (1800)

Schelling’s Concept of Self-Consciousness in his System of Transcendental Idealism (1800)

Schelling’s Aesthetic Turn in the System of Transcendental Idealism

This paper inquires into what the philosopher F.W.J. Schelling saw was the fundamental relationship between art and philosophy. Widely regarded only as a transitional thinker between Fichte and Hegel in the development of idealism, Schelling in his System of Transcendental Idealism (1800) develops the rather novel insight that finds its full expression in the of art. Taking into account the nature and the limits of both transcendental philosophy, which begins with the thought and consciousness of the I, and also of natural philosophy or science, which begins with the sensible and the non-conscious world, Schelling saw that it would be the responsibility of art to synthesize and unite the two opposing branches of philosophy. After describing the artistic genius and determining the nature of the work of art toward the last part of the System, Schelling boldly claims that in his creations the artist is able to resolve the contradiction between the ideal and the real, between the I and the world. Well before Hegel, Schelling thus foresaw that science and are destined to return to poetry and art in the course of history.

Das Gespräch Zwischen Hölderlin, Hegel und Schelling Über Kants Antinomien

«Die Art, wie er den Mechanismus der Natur mit ihrer Zweckmäßigkeit vereiniget, scheint mir eigentlich den ganzen Geist seines Systems zu enthalten»; This quotation, which originated the present essay, is solely extracted from a letter sent by Hölderlin to Hegel, and yet, it condensates three different approaches from the three Tübingen friends to the problem of Kant’s philosophy of religion and to its possible resolution between 1795 and 1796. From this epistolary dialogue emerges a simultaneous study of Kant, originated by the growing dissension towards the orthodox thought of the Stift. The tuming point - or the maximum cumulative point - of this discordance happens precisely with the discovery of the «spirit of Kant’s System», as a combined explanation of the religious and philosophical phenomena [«Die Art, wie er den Mechanismus der Natur mit ihrer Zweckmässigkeit vereiniget»]. This, I think, is something which the three friends discover gradually and not independently from the concept of «providence», which Kant himself, according to Hölderlin, had used to «attenuate his antinomies», which Hegel uses in his first religious writings and the initial formation of his own philosophy and which Schelling will later explore in his System of Transcendental Idealism. In a word, providence is consensually the comprehension axis between man, God and nature and, thus, the explanatory link between the antinomical poles which regulate human existence. On the other hand, however - this being the aspect I would like to stress - , this decisive moment for a whole generation, for the history of philosophy itself, means the consummation of a new revolutionary perspective born in Kant, a new vision of the absolute and the divine and, therefore, a new way to write philosophy about philosophy, less philosophical than before, to the extent that the new situation of man and his reflection within the problem ultimately destined them - as is the case in the three young philosophers - to silence and death. The final aim of this essay is, therefore, to know what this «last step of philosophy» is and what dies along with it, what such a step may have meant and what it already foretold in terms of the development of philosophy.

Philosophy of History as the History of Philosophy in Schelling’s System of Transcendental Idealism

Schelling's System of Transcendental Idealism is usually considered to he either (1) an early Fichtean-influenced work that gives little insight into Schelling's philosophy or (2) a text focusing on self-consciousness andaesthetics. I argue that Schelling's System develops a subtle conception of history which originates in a dialogue with Kant and Hegel (concerning the question of teleology) and concludes in proximity to an Idealist version of Spinoza. In this way, Schelling develops a philosophy of history which is, simultaneously, a dialectical engagement with the history of philosophy.

The Role of the Unconscious in Schelling’s System of Transcendental Idealism

The Role of the Unconscious in Schelling’s System of Transcendental Idealism

Kant's Transcendental Problem as a Linguistic Problem

Kant's system of Transcendental Idealism may be regarded, in the contemporary philosophical perspective, as concerned with the problem whether any linguistic or conceptual system can be regarded as adequately explained in terms of the facts which the system organises. ‘Transcendental’ may be understood as what is ‘non-reducible’. Kant seems to hold that a linguistic scheme cannot be reduced to the facts which fall within the scheme, and thus it is transcendental to those facts. Formulated in such terms, the Kantian doctrine does not, apparently, propound anything which is new; that facts are tailored to a linguistic scheme is pretty much a well-known doctrine these days. But then, as we shall see, it does say something new; and when we extract that novel element in it, we shall discover also the positive import in the Kantian term, ‘Transcendental’.