Contact Tracing System Research Articles

Usage of Information technology for the success of managing various stages of the COVID-19 pandemic

This study explores the crucial role of Information and Communication Technology (ICT) in managing the COVID-19 pandemic, focusing on its impact on surveillance, contact tracing, patient monitoring, telemedicine, artificial intelligence (AI), vaccination logistics, communication, and public education. ICT has facilitated the collection and analysis of real-time data, enabling authorities to make informed decisions about containment strategies. Digital contact tracing systems have been instrumental in limiting the virus's spread, while remote patient monitoring and telemedicine have allowed healthcare services to continue with minimal transmission risk. AI and machine learning have enhanced the speed and accuracy of COVID-19 diagnosis, and ICT has streamlined vaccine distribution and monitoring to ensure equitable access. Additionally, online platforms have played a key role in public education, fostering collaboration among researchers and promoting interdisciplinary research efforts. The study emphasizes that the continued integration of ICT into healthcare systems is critical for addressing future global health crises. However, policymakers must invest in ICT infrastructure, bridge the digital divide, and ensure that marginalized populations have equitable access to these technologies. The findings highlight the importance of ongoing ICT development to improve healthcare outcomes in future pandemics and suggest that collaboration across sectors is essential for maximizing the potential of these digital tools. Ultimately, ICT has been pivotal in the effective management of the COVID-19 pandemic and will be vital in future crisis preparedness.

Contact Tracing Different Age Groups During the COVID-19 Pandemic: Retrospective Study From South-West Germany.

Contact tracing was implemented in many countries during the COVID-19 pandemic to prevent disease spread, reduce mortality, and avoid overburdening health care systems. In several countries, including Germany, new systems were needed to trace potentially infected individuals. Using data collected in the Rhine-Neckar and Heidelberg (RNK/HD) districts in southwest Germany (population: 706,974), this study examines the overall effectiveness and efficiency of contact tracing in different age groups and stages of the pandemic. From January 27, 2020, to April 30, 2022, the RNK/HD Health Authority collected data on COVID-19 infections, quarantines, and deaths. Data on infection, quarantine, and death was grouped by age (young: 0-19 years; adult: 20-65 years; and senior citizens: >65 years) and pandemic phase (infectious wave plus subsequent lull periods) and analyzed for proportion, risk, and relative risk (RR). The overall effectiveness and efficiency of contact tracing were determined by calculating quarantine sensitivity (proportion of the infected population captured in quarantine), positive predictive value (PPV; proportion of the quarantined population that was infected), and the weighted Fβ-score (combined predictive performance). Of 706,974 persons living in RNK/HD during the study period, 192,175 (27.2%) tested positive for SARS-CoV-2, 74,810 (10.4%) were quarantined, and 932 (0.132%) died following infection. Compared with adults, the RR of infection was lower among senior citizens (0.401, 95% CI 0.395-0.407) and while initially lower for young people, was ultimately higher for young people across all 5 phases (first-phase RR 0.502, 95% CI 0.438-0.575; all phases RR 1.35, 95% CI 1.34-1.36). Of 932 COVID-19-associated deaths during the study period, 852 were senior citizens (91.4%), with no deaths reported among young people. Relative to adults, senior citizens had the lowest risk of quarantine (RR 0.436, 95% CI 0.424-0.448), while young people had the highest RR (2.94, 95% CI 2.90-2.98). The predictive performance of contact tracing was highest during the second and third phases of the pandemic (Fβ-score=0.272 and 0.338, respectively). In the second phase of the pandemic, 5810 of 16,814 COVID-19 infections were captured within a total quarantine population of 39,687 (sensitivity 34.6%; PPV 14.6%). In the third phase of the pandemic, 3492 of 8803 infections were captured within a total quarantine population of 16,462 (sensitivity 39.7%; PPV 21.2%). The use of quarantine aligned with increasing risks of COVID-19 infection and death. High levels of quarantine sensitivity before the introduction of the vaccine show how contact tracing systems became increasingly effective at capturing and quarantining the infected population. High levels of PPV and Fβ-scores indicate, moreover, that contact tracing became more efficient at identifying infected individuals. Additional analysis of transmission pathways is needed to evaluate the application of quarantine in relation to infection and death risks within specific age groups.

Enhancing cross-border contact tracing in Europe: Lessons learned from COVID-19 and future directions

Abstract Introduction Health systems in the EU operate at the national level, granting Member States autonomy for outbreak preparedness and response within their territories whilst coordinating at EU level to combat serious cross-border threats. The EU’s Early Warning and Response System (EWRS) provides the platform to exchange personal data for contact tracing across 30/EEA countries and was extensively utilized during COVID-19. This study examines insights from EU/EEA countries and assesses the feasibility of integrating national digital systems with EWRS to increase its effectiveness. Methods A comparative case study surveyed representatives from 24 countries and interviewed nine, analyzing contact tracing processes, actors, digital technologies, and challenges/facilitators during COVID-19. Thematic analysis was complemented by two webinars engaging EU/EEA countries to validate findings and gather additional perspectives. Results EWRS was valued for safety and efficiency but faced challenges during peak pandemic periods due to the heavy manual workload. Integrating national digital systems with EWRS could enhance data quality, timeliness, and coordination between countries. However, countries have varied and incompatible digital contact tracing systems, limiting the feasibility of their integration with EWRS. Moreover, most countries organize contact tracing at the subnational level, with regional entities developing and managing their own digital technologies under national guidance. Smaller countries excluded, subnational contact tracing case management systems were often not integrated with each other to exchange personal data in an automated way at a national level. Conclusions While integrating national digital systems with EWRS could bolster efficiency of contact tracing across EU/EEA, the presence of diverse technologies and decentralized governance poses feasibility challenges. Other improvements are needed to enhance cross-border contact tracing during outbreaks. Key messages • Integrating national digital systems with EWRS promises enhanced efficiency for contact tracing across EU/EEA in line with Regulation (EU) 2022/2371 on serious cross-border threats to health. • Diverse technologies and decentralized governance pose feasibility challenges, underscoring the need for further enhancements in cross-border contact tracing in EU/EEA during large outbreaks.

Privacy-Preserving Contact Tracing System based on a Publish-Subscribe Model

Privacy-Preserving Contact Tracing System based on a Publish-Subscribe Model

Listening to Your Own Willingness to Continue Using Contact Tracing Apps: The Roles of Personal Norms

COVID-19 became a global epidemic after its breakout in December 2019. With the help of information technology, many countries developed contact tracing systems to reduce the spread of the epidemic. Although the WHO declared in May 2023 that COVID-19 is no longer a global public health emergency, the virus is still constantly changing and endangering individuals worldwide. In Taiwan, Social Distancing APP is a voluntary contact tracing app that has been downloaded and utilized approximately 9.5 million times. However, adoption remains low. To prevent the spread of the epidemic and encourage more people to use it, understanding the factors influencing continuance intentions to use social distancing apps is an important topic. The research model is composed of two parts: the modified expectation confirmation model (ECM) and personal norms. Our research model was assessed using data from a sample of 501 users of social distancing apps and was analyzed using the partial least squares structural equation model (PLS-SEM). The results of this study suggest that (1) personal norms are the most important factor influencing continuance intention, followed by satisfaction, perceived usefulness, and descriptive norms; (2) personal norms fully mediate the relationship between injunctive norms and continuance intention; (3) personal norms partially mediate the relationship between descriptive norms and continuance intention; (4) personal norms negatively moderate the relationship between satisfaction and continuance intention; and (5) personal norms positively moderate the relationship between disappointment and continuance intention. This study also discusses the implications of a modified ECM and personal norms for continuance intention to use contact tracing apps.

Updated Surveillance Metrics and History of the COVID-19 Pandemic (2020-2023) in Latin America and the Caribbean: Longitudinal Trend Analysis.

In May 2020, the World Health Organization (WHO) declared Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) the epicenter of the COVID-19 pandemic, with over 40% of worldwide COVID-19-related deaths at the time. This high disease burden was a result of the unique circumstances in LAC. This study aimed to (1) measure whether the pandemic was expanding or contracting in LAC when the WHO declared the end of COVID-19 as a public health emergency of international concern on May 5, 2023; (2) use dynamic and genomic surveillance methods to describe the history of the pandemic in the region and situate the window of the WHO declaration within the broader history; and (3) provide, with a focus on prevention policies, a historical context for the course of the pandemic in the region. In addition to updates of traditional surveillance data and dynamic panel estimates from the original study, we used data on sequenced SARS-CoV-2 variants from the Global Initiative on Sharing All Influenza Data (GISAID) to identify the appearance and duration of variants of concern (VOCs). We used Nextclade nomenclature to collect clade designations from sequences and Pangolin nomenclature for lineage designations of SARS-CoV-2. Additionally, we conducted a 1-sided t test for whether the regional weekly speed (rate of novel COVID-19 transmission) was greater than an outbreak threshold of 10. We ran the test iteratively with 6 months of data across the period from August 2020 to May 2023. The speed of pandemic spread for the region had remained below the outbreak threshold for 6 months by the time of the WHO declaration. Acceleration and jerk were also low and stable. Although the 1- and 7-day persistence coefficients remained statistically significant for the 120-day period ending on the week of May 5, 2023, the coefficients were relatively modest in magnitude (0.457 and 0.491, respectively). Furthermore, the shift parameters for either of the 2 most recent weeks around May 5, 2023, did not indicate any change in this clustering effect of cases on future cases. From December 2021 onward, Omicron was the predominant VOC in sequenced viral samples. The rolling t test of speed=10 became entirely insignificant from January 2023 onward. Although COVID-19 continues to circulate in LAC, surveillance data suggest COVID-19 is endemic in the region and no longer reaches the threshold of the pandemic definition. However, the region experienced a high COVID-19 burden in the early stages of the pandemic, and prevention policies should be an immediate focus in future pandemics. Ahead of vaccination development, these policies can include widespread testing of individuals and an epidemiological task force with a contact-tracing system.

COVID-19 cluster surveillance using exposure data collected from routine contact tracing: The genomic validation of a novel informatics-based approach to outbreak detection in England.

Contact tracing was used globally to prevent onwards transmission of COVID-19. Tracing contacts alone is unlikely to be sufficient in controlling community transmission, due to the pre-symptomatic, overdispersed and airborne nature of COVID-19 transmission. We describe and demonstrate the validity of a national enhanced contact tracing programme for COVID-19 cluster surveillance in England. Data on cases occurring between October 2020 and September 2021 were extracted from the national contact tracing system. Exposure clusters were identified algorithmically by matching ≥2 cases attending the same event, identified by matching postcode and event category within a 7-day rolling window. Genetic validity was defined as exposure clusters with ≥2 cases from different households with identical viral sequences. Exposure clusters were fuzzy matched to the national incident management system (HPZone) by postcode and setting description. Multivariable logistic regression modelling was used to determine cluster characteristics associated with genetic validity. Over a quarter of a million (269,470) exposure clusters were identified. Of the eligible clusters, 25% (3,306/13,008) were genetically valid. 81% (2684/3306) of these were not recorded on HPZone and were identified on average of one day earlier than incidents recorded on HPZone. Multivariable analysis demonstrated that exposure clusters occurring in workplaces (aOR = 5·10, 95% CI 4·23-6·17) and education (aOR = 3·72, 95% CI 3·08-4·49) settings were those most strongly associated with genetic validity. Cluster surveillance using enhanced contact tracing in England was a timely, comprehensive and systematic approach to the detection of transmission events occurring in community settings. Cluster surveillance can provide intelligence to stakeholders to support the assessment and management of clusters of COVID-19 at a local, regional, and national level. Future systems should include predictive modelling and network analysis to support risk assessment of exposure clusters to improve the effectiveness of enhanced contract tracing for outbreak detection.

An evaluation of the COVID-19 self-service digital contact tracing system in New Zealand

BackgroundDigital contact tracing (DCT) aims to improve time-to-isolation (timeliness) and find more potentially exposed individuals (sensitivity) to enhance the utility of contact tracing. The aim of this study was to evaluate the public uptake of a DCT self-service survey and its integration with the Bluetooth exposure notification system within the New Zealand Covid Tracer App (NZCTA). MethodsWe adopted a retrospective cohort study design using community COVID-19 cases from February 2022 to August 2022 in New Zealand (1.2 million cases). We examined the proportion of cases completing a self-service survey and the time to complete the survey by age, sex and ethnicity. ResultsOverall, 66 % of cases completed their self-service survey. Completion was influenced by age, sex and ethnicity. The median completion time was 1.8 h (IQR 0.2, 17.2), with 95 % of those completing this survey doing so within 48 h of case identification. Around 13 % of all survey completers also uploaded their Bluetooth data, which resulted in an average of 663 cases per day notifying 4.5 contacts per case. ConclusionThe combination of high public uptake and rapid response times suggest self-service DCT could be a useful tool for future outbreaks, particularly if implemented in conjunction with manual processes and other DCT tools (e.g. Bluetooth) to address issues related to performance (sensitivity, timeliness), effectiveness, and health equity.

Digital Contact Tracing Solutions: Promises, Pitfalls and Challenges

The COVID-19 pandemic has caused many countries to deploy novel digital contact tracing (DCT) systems to boost the efficiency of manual tracing of infection chains. In this paper, we systematically analyze DCT solutions and categorize them based on their design approaches and architectures. We analyze them with regard to effectiveness, security, privacy and ethical aspects and compare prominent solutions based on these requirements. In particular, we discuss shortcomings of the Google and Apple Exposure Notification API (GAEN) that is currently widely adopted all over the world. We find that the security and privacy of GAEN has considerable deficiencies as it can be compromised by severe large-scale attacks. We also discuss other proposed approaches for contact tracing, including our proposal <sc xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">TraceCORONA</small> , that are based on Diffie-Hellman (DH) key exchange and aim at tackling shortcomings of existing solutions. Our extensive analysis shows that <sc xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">TraceCORONA</small> fulfills the above security requirements better than deployed state-of-the-art approaches. We have implemented <sc xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">TraceCORONA</small> and its beta test version has been used by more than 2000 users without any major functional problems <uri xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">https://tracecorona.net/download-tracecorona/</uri> , demonstrating that there are no technical reasons requiring to make compromises with regard to the requirements of DCT approaches.

Estimating the impact of test–trace–isolate–quarantine systems on SARS-CoV-2 transmission in Australia

Background:Australian states and territories used test–trace–isolate–quarantine (TTIQ) systems extensively in their response to the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020-2021. We report on an analysis of Australian case data to estimate the impact of test–trace–isolate–quarantine systems on SARS-CoV-2 transmission. Methods:Our analysis uses a novel mathematical modelling framework and detailed surveillance data on COVID-19 cases including dates of infection and dates of isolation. First, we directly translate an empirical distribution of times from infection to isolation into reductions in potential for onward transmission during periods of relatively low caseloads (tens to hundreds of reported cases per day). We then apply a simulation approach, validated against case data, to assess the impact of case-initiated contact tracing on transmission during a period of relatively higher caseloads and system stress (up to thousands of cases per day). Results:We estimate that under relatively low caseloads in the state of New South Wales (tens of cases per day), TTIQ contributed to a 54% reduction in transmission. Under higher caseloads in the state of Victoria (hundreds of cases per day), TTIQ contributed to a 42% reduction in transmission. Our results also suggest that case-initiated contact tracing can support timely quarantine in times of system stress (thousands of cases per day). Conclusion:Contact tracing systems for COVID-19 in Australia were highly effective and adaptable in supporting the national suppression strategy from 2020–21, prior to the emergence of the Omicron variant in November 2021. TTIQ systems were critical to the maintenance of the strong suppression strategy and were more effective when caseloads were (relatively) low.

Monitoring and Characteristics of Mpox Contacts, Virginia, USA, May-November 2022.

During 2022, a global outbreak of mpox resulted primarily from human-to-human contact. The Virginia Department of Health (Richmond, VA, USA) implemented a contact tracing and symptom monitoring system for residents exposed to monkeypox virus, assessed their risk for infection, and offered interventions as needed. Among 991 contacts identified during May 1-November 1, 2022, import records were complete for 943 (95.2%), but 99 (10.0%) were not available for follow-up during symptom monitoring. Mpox developed in 28 (2.8%) persons; none were healthcare workers exposed at work (n = 275). Exposure risk category and likelihood of developing mpox were strongly associated. A total of 333 persons received >1 dose of JYENNOS (Bavarian Nordic, https://www.bavarian-nordic.com) vaccine, most (n = 295) administered after virus exposure. Median time from exposure to vaccination was 8 days. Those data tools provided crucial real-time information for public health responses and can be used as a framework for other emerging diseases.

Lessons Learned from Contact Tracing COVID-19 cases in Dental Settings in East Scotland.

Dental settings were considered high risk settings for COVID-19. A Dental Public Health Team in East Scotland worked to risk assess each situation timeously to break chains of transmission. To present learning from routine data collected from contact tracing COVID-19 cases in the dental setting. Retrospective analysis of a routine data set of COVID-19 cases associated with a dental setting reported via the national contact tracing system for two health board areas in the East of Scotland. Descriptive statistics summarise the data collected over a 13-month period (Oct 2020-Dec 2021) during which all included COVID-19 cases were confirmed by PCR. A narrative presents output from contact tracing of all cases and includes themes identified during contact tracing that led to transmission within a dental setting. A case study illustrates impact of transmission. 752 cases are included. No evidence of staff to patient transmission or vice versa was found in this study. Staff to staff transmission occurred in non-clinical areas contributing to 33% of total staff cases with the remainder assessed to result from community transmission. Transmission of COVID-19 in a dental setting, in the context of this study, appears to be confined to non-clinical areas with the majority of staff cases resulting from community transmission. Future pandemic plans should include tools to aid with implementation of guidance in non-clinical areas.

An AI-empowered indoor digital contact tracing system for COVID-19 outbreaks in residential care homes

An AI-empowered indoor digital contact-tracing system was developed using a centralized architecture and advanced low-energy Bluetooth technologies for indoor positioning, with careful preservation of privacy and data security. We analyzed the contact pattern data from two RCHs and investigated a COVID-19 outbreak in one study site. To evaluate the effectiveness of the system in containing outbreaks with minimal contacts under quarantine, a simulation study was conducted to compare the impact of different quarantine strategies on outbreak containment within RCHs. The significant difference in contact hours between weekdays and weekends was observed for some pairs of RCH residents and staff during the two-week data collection period. No significant difference between secondary cases and uninfected contacts was observed in a COVID-19 outbreak in terms of their demographics and contact patterns. Simulation results based on the collected contact data indicated that a threshold of accumulative contact hours one or two days prior to diagnosis of the index case could dramatically increase the efficiency of outbreak containment within RCHs by targeted isolation of the close contacts. This study demonstrated the feasibility and efficiency of employing an AI-empowered system in indoor digital contact tracing of outbreaks in RCHs in the post-pandemic era.

Time trends and modifiable factors of COVID-19 contact tracing coverage, Geneva, Switzerland, June 2020 to February 2022.

BackgroundContact tracing was one of the central non-pharmaceutical interventions implemented worldwide to control the spread of SARS-CoV-2, but its effectiveness depends on its ability to detect contacts.AimEvaluate the proportion of secondary infections captured by the contact tracing system in Geneva.MethodsWe analysed 166,892 concomitant infections occurring at the same given address from June 2020 until February 2022 using an extensive operational database of SARS-CoV-2 tests in Geneva. We used permutation to compare the total number of secondary infections occurring at the same address with that reported through manual contact tracing.ResultsContact tracing captured on average 41% of secondary infections, varying from 23% during epidemic peaks to 60% during low epidemic activity. People living in wealthy neighbourhoods were less likely to report contacts (odds ratio (OR): 1.6). People living in apartment buildings were also less likely to report contacts than those living in a house (OR: 1.1-3.1) depending on the SARS-CoV-2 variant, the building size and the presence of shops. This under-reporting of contacts in apartment buildings decreased during periods of mandatory wearing of face masks and restrictions on private gatherings.ConclusionContact tracing alone did not detect sufficient secondary infections to reduce the spread of SARS-CoV-2. Campaigns targeting specific populations, such as those in wealthy areas or apartment buildings, could enhance coverage. Additionally, measures like wearing face masks, improving ventilation and implementing restrictions on gatherings should also be considered to reduce infections resulting from interactions that may not be perceived as high risk.

Mixed messages, broken trust, avoidable deaths: A critical appraisal of the UK government’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic

Abstract This short commentary draws on academic and grey literature to critically evaluate the UK response to the COVID-19 pandemic, highlighting aspects in which the response fell short and their ramifications on public trust and compliance with preventive measures. Such aspects include the initial delay in response to the outbreak, the controversial “herd immunity approach,” the mismanagement of care home patients, the inadequacy of the contact tracing system, the scandals around the procurement of personal protective equipment, and the breach of lockdown/social distancing regulations by government officials. Based on the lessons learned from these shortcomings, this commentary seeks to provide suggestions for effective public governance in the face of future health emergencies.

Factors affecting the intention to use COVID-19 contact tracing application "StaySafe PH": Integrating protection motivation theory, UTAUT2, and system usability theory.

StaySafe PH is the Philippines' official contact tracing software for controlling the propagation of COVID-19 and promoting a uniform contact tracing strategy. The StaySafe PH has various features such as a social distancing system, LGU heat map and response system, real-time monitoring, graphs, infographics, and the primary purpose, which is a contact tracing system. This application is mandatory in establishments such as fast-food restaurants, banks, and malls. The purpose of this research was to determine the country's willingness to utilize StaySafe PH. Specifically, this study utilized 12 latent variables from the integrated Protection Motivation Theory (PMT), Unified Theory of Acceptance and Use of Technology (UTAUT2), and System Usability Scale (SUS). Data from 646 respondents in the Philippines were employed through Structural Equation Modelling (SEM), Deep Learning Neural Network (DLNN), and SUS. Utilizing the SEM, it is found that understanding the COVID-19 vaccine, understanding the COVID-19 Delta variant, perceived vulnerability, perceived severity, performance expectancy, social influence, hedonic motivation, behavioral intention, actual use, and the system usability scale are major determinants of intent to utilize the application. Understanding of the COVID-19 Delta Variant was found to be the most important factor by DLNN, which is congruent with the results of SEM. The SUS score of the application is "D", which implies that the application has poor usability. It could be implicated that large concerns stem from the trust issues on privacy, data security, and overall consent in the information needed. This is one area that should be promoted. That is, how the data is stored and kept, utilized, and covered by the system, how the assurance could be provided among consumers, and how the government would manage the information obtained. Building the trust is crucial on the development and deployment of these types of technology. The results in this study can also suggest that individuals in the Philippines expected and were certain that vaccination would help them not contract the virus and thus not be vulnerable, leading to a positive actual use of the application. The current study considered encompassing health-related behaviors using the PMT, integrating with the technology acceptance model, UTAUT2; as well as usability perspective using the SUS. This study was the first one to evaluate and assess a contact tracing application in the Philippines, as well as integrate the frameworks to provide a holistic measurement.

Evaluation of mpox contact tracing activities and data collection in EU/EEA countries during the 2022 multicountry outbreak in nonendemic countries.

To control human-to-human mpox transmission during the 2022 outbreak, European Union (EU)/European Economic Area (EEA) countries conducted case investigation and contact tracing (CT). We aimed to provide an overview of CT activities, describe CT data collection practices, and identify related facilitators, barriers, and potential opportunities for improvement. Between April 03, 2023 and May 12, 2023, a survey was distributed to CT stakeholders in 30 EU/EEA countries, asking about mpox CT activities and data collection and requesting to rank enablers, barriers, and improvements for CT on a five-point Likert scale. The 139 respondents from 27 countries indicated having performed case investigations (96%, n = 133), backward CT (88%, n = 122), forward CT (87%, n = 121), and follow-up on contacts' outcomes (77%, n = 107). Sixty percent (n = 80/134) used standardized data collection forms and 73% (n = 91/124) used databases. The highest-rated enablers were clear guidelines (mean = 3.9), quick access to laboratory results (3.6), and sufficient expertise (3.6). Highly rated barriers were inability to contact contacts (3.0) or cases (2.5) and lack of staff (2.4). The most needed improvements were availability of staff (3.5), expertise on affected populations (3.4) and data reporting tools and systems (3.3). To improve CT of mpox and diseases with similar transmission patterns, EU/EEA countries should increase workforce capacity in public and sexual health, offer training on CT operations and communication with affected communities, and use common CT data collection tools and systems.

Ensuring Community Engagement in Disease Surveillance: The Municipal Case Investigation and Contact Tracing System for COVID-19 in Puerto Rico.

Objectives. To describe the implementation of a novel disease surveillance model in Puerto Rico, the Municipal Case Investigation and Contact Tracing System for COVID-19, established during the pandemic as the primary response. Methods. We analyzed data from July 2020 to June 2021, including all COVID-19 cases reported by public and private laboratories in Puerto Rico to describe the accomplishments and limitations of the surveillance. Results. During the first year, the system was successfully implemented in all Puerto Rican municipalities, collecting data on more than 132 000 confirmed COVID-19 cases. It improved case investigation coverage, reduced laboratory reporting times, and facilitated community engagement for ongoing response enhancements. Conclusions. Surveillance systems of this scale were new to Puerto Rico's Health System, and there was a steep learning and improvement curve. This approach enabled tailored health education, equitable distribution of testing and treatments, and surveillance by educational institutions. Public Health Implications. Near-real-time epidemiological data publication promoted trust, education, and evidence-based policymaking. (Am J Public Health. 2024;114(S1):S96-S102. https://doi.org/10.2105/AJPH.2023.307493).

감염자 접촉추적 시스템 구축에 따른 프라이버시 침해 문제 및 법적 대응방안

On May 5, 2023, the World Health Organization(WHO) announced that COVID-19 was no longer a “public health emergency of international concern.” The South Korean government also declared the end of the COVID-19 pandemic on the 11th of the same month. After more than three years, the COVID-19 crisis is over. Now is the time to look back on the experience of the past three years and make a comprehensive assessment of the national system for prevention of epidemics. In other words, the assessments are to evaluate the effectiveness of the current system in preventing and controlling the spread of infectious diseases, and to evaluate the constitutionality of the legal basis underlying the system.&#x0D; During the three years of the COVID-19 emergency, the government’s system for prevention of epidemics has evolved after much experience and criticisms, and Infectious Diseases Control and Prevention Act has been revised several times. In this article, I will focus on contact tracing system among the many systems contained in the Act.&#x0D; First of all, the contact tracing has been practiced for a long time as part of epidemiological investigations. However, advances in technology have made contact tracing more efficient, faster, and more accurate. Technology-Assisted Contact-Tracing systems can be divided into two main types: the first is the method used in South Korea, which tracks the movement of infected people through location data based on GPS signals, immigration records, credit card usages and etc. and combines them with visitation records to identify contacts. The second is the method used in Europe and the United States to identify contacts by utilizing Bluetooth-based Technology-Assisted Contact-Tracing, which is based on storing contact information using a smart phone app and Bluetooth, and then send a warning message to the stored contacts if they are tested positive for corona. This can be further divided into centralized and decentralized types based on whether the government is involved in verification and identification of contact.&#x0D; In this paper, I compare and analyze the two contact tracing systems to finally check the contact tracing system in Korea.&#x0D; First of all, South Korea’s contact tracing system involves the processing of a wide range of personal data by the state. Various personal data is integrated and analyzed through the KCDC’s data processing system. However, there is a risk that the right to the protection of personal data may be eroded through non-transparent data processing. This constitutes a serious violation of the principle of proportionality and the principle of transparency.&#x0D; On the other hand, contact tracing system via apps and Bluetooth has the advantage of being a privacy-friendly method that minimizes government intervention and excludes the collection of location data. However, this approach starts with the voluntary participation of citizens, and its success depends on their active participation. The basic premise for this method to work is that the app must be trustworthy in terms of privacy protection.&#x0D; In any contact tracing system, the process of contact tracing necessarily involves the processing of various personal data, so the principles relating to processing of personal data must be strictly observed. This should not be overlooked in the design of the system.

Key informant perspectives on a centralised contact tracing system for sexually transmitted infections.

To meet the demand of contact tracing requirements associated with Aotearoa New Zealand's COVID-19 pandemic response, a national contact tracing service was established. Contact tracing for sexually transmitted infections (STIs) like chlamydia, gonorrhoea and syphilis is usually done at the clinic level, and evidence suggests it is under-resourced and often incomplete. We considered the utility of a centralised contact tracing service for STIs by interviewing key informants. Interviews took place between December 2021 and March 2022, and were audio-recorded, transcribed and analysed using thematic analysis. Twelve key informants from disciplines including sexual health, primary care, public health, research and contact tracing participated. Perceived benefits of a centralised system included efficiency, standardisation and reduced demands on clinician time. Potential challenges and considerations included concerns about trust and privacy, the importance of cultural safety, meeting the needs of priority populations and lack of local-level knowledge. A centralised contact tracing service could enable a more consistent and comprehensive approach to contact tracing for STIs and alleviate some of the burden on already stretched clinicians. However, successful contact tracing requires high levels of trust and for some populations this may be best achieved through trusted local providers, who could be supported, if needed, by centralised expertise.