Syndicated Loan Market Research Articles

The systemic risk of leveraged and covenant-lite loan syndications

By modelling the whole U.S. syndicated loan market as a financial network from 2000 to 2022, we find that highly connected institutions hold significant shares of leveraged and covenant-lite loans. Our analysis indicates that the size of leveraged and covenant- lite syndicated loan portfolios increases financial institutions' systemic risk, particularly during recession periods. Although banks commonly sell syndicated loans shortly after origination, our results suggest that they remain vulnerable to pipeline risk. Our study has significant implications for policymakers and regulators, as it can aid in identifying banks exposed to systemic risk associated with leveraged and covenant-lite loans and in ranking systemically important financial institutions accordingly.

Does firm carbon risk matter to banks? Evidence from the US syndicated loan market

Using two measures of firm carbon-risk exposure to capture convergent materiality, we examine whether the syndicated loan market considers borrowers’ carbon-risk exposure in loan pricing. We find that carbon intensity does not constitute material information for banks, whereas environmental scores have a statistically significant but incidental economic effect on loan spreads. We also find inconclusive evidence that the market differentiates between firms in high and low environmentally sensitive industries. Finally, we show that green banks charge higher loan spreads to more environmentally responsible firms. Overall, we provide strong evidence that environmental scores matter in loan pricing decisions.

Who Lends Before Banking Crises? Evidence from the International Syndicated Loan Market

Who Lends Before Banking Crises? Evidence from the International Syndicated Loan Market

Dual holdings and shareholder–creditor agency conflicts: Evidence from the syndicated loan market

AbstractWe examine implications from the expansion of private equity (PE) firms into the collateralized loan obligation (CLO) (i.e., leveraged lending) business. Due to similarities in the investment universes of CLO managers and PE firms, asset managers running both of them frequently hold debt and equity claims of the same company. Our results indicate lower credit costs for these companies through the mitigation of shareholder–creditor agency conflicts. The lower funding costs imply increased equity returns for the sponsoring PE firms. In addition, our findings suggest that PE‐affiliated CLO managers benefit from informed trading in the secondary leveraged loan market.

Curse and blessing: The effect of the dividend ban on euro area bank valuations and syndicated lending

At the outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic, the European Central Bank issued a strong recommendation towards banks to halt dividend payouts. The goal of this de facto dividend ban was to boost banks' capital to ensure the supply of credit. However, given the importance of dividends for investors, this unprecedented measure is likely to have impacted bank valuations. Hence, banks may have chosen to preserve their higher capital buffers to boost payouts after the lifting of the ban, rendering the intended positive effect on credit supply a priori uncertain. We first investigate the effect of the dividend ban announcement on euro area banks' valuations and find a significantly negative impact. Second, we show that banks significantly expanded credit supply in the syndicated loan market, without counteracting effect of the negative stock market reaction. Our findings are corroborated when we exploit the multi-bank nature of syndicated loans in a within-loan setup.

How Private Equity Fuels Non-Bank Lending

We show how private equity (PE) buyouts fuel loan sales and non-bank participation in the U.S. syndicated loan market. Combining loan-level data from the Shared National Credit register with buyout deals from Pitchbook, we find that PE-backed loans feature lower bank monitoring, lower loan shares retained by the lead bank, and more loan sales to non-bank financial intermediaries. For PE-backed loans, the sponsor’s reputation and the strength of its relationship with the lead bank further reduce the lead bank’s retained share and monitoring. Our results suggest that PE sponsor engagement substitutes for bank monitoring, allowing banks to retain less skin-in-the game in the loans they originate and to sell greater loan shares to non-banks.

The ESG washing in banks: Evidence from the syndicated loan market

We investigate whether banks practice environmental, social, and governance (ESG) washing in their lending decisions and how the market reacts. That is, do banks with worse ESG performance intentionally lend to firms with better ESG performance to improve their ESG reputations? Banks with worse ESG performance offer significantly lower loan spreads, longer loan maturities, fewer general covenants, and fewer collaterals to firms with better ESG performance. More importantly, the stock market generally reacts favorably to banks that make these kinds of deals, which could explain why banks engage in ESG washing. We also find that the effects of ESG washing are significantly stronger for borrowers from high-polluting industries and in the post-Kyoto Protocol period. These results support the idea that the banks with worse ESG performance use ESG-washing lending to improve their ESG reputations.

Information environment and participation of foreign banks in U.S. syndicated loan market

This study examines how financial information quality affects the participation and lending behavior of foreign banks in the loan syndicate of U.S borrowers. We utilize the implementation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) in the U.S. as our research setting. We demonstrate a significant increase in foreign banks loan shares to public firms in the post-SOX period. In parallel, we find that this increase in lending by foreign banks is accompanied by more favorable price and non-price contract terms. By contrast, we find no evidence of either more loans or more favorable loan contract terms offered to U.S. privately held borrowers by foreign banks. Further analysis shows that the impact of such an exogenous change on loan contract terms are more pronounced among public listed borrowers with higher ex ante information asymmetry. Overall, our findings imply that the increase in quality and reliability of corporate financial information brought about by SOX reduces the information disadvantage of foreign lenders.

The Recent History of Syndicated Loan Markets

The Recent History of Syndicated Loan Markets

Climate transition risk and bank lending

AbstractWe investigate whether and how banks in the global syndicated loan market adjusted the pricing and supply of credit to account for higher climate transition risk (CTR) in the years following the 2015 Paris Agreement. We measure CTR by considering the pollution levels of borrowers and the engagement of countries where borrowers are headquartered in addressing climate change issues. The evidence is mixed and points to nonlinear relations between lending variables and CO2 emissions. Policy events such as the Paris Agreement and government environmental awareness are significant climate risk drivers that, when combined, may amplify banks' perception of CTR.

Is tax return information useful to equity investors?

AbstractI examine whether tax return information is useful to equity investors. I do so indirectly, by exploiting unique features of the syndicated loan market, as evidence shows that lenders obtain tax returns from borrowers and that lenders’ private information is transmitted to equity markets when institutional investors are part of a loan syndicate. I find significant increases in tax expense valuation and decreases in tax-related market anomalies following the issuance of institutional syndicated loans, suggesting that equity investors find information about firm performance in tax returns that is useful for their trading decisions. I also find evidence suggesting that institutional investors may determine their loan syndicate participation in part based on the value of tax return information. This study extends prior research and informs policy debates over public disclosure of corporate tax return information by providing evidence to support that tax returns can be useful to investor decision making.

Contracting in the Dark: The rise of public-side lenders in the syndicated loan market

We document a novel trend in syndicated lending where some participants voluntarily waive their rights to borrowers' private information. We posit that “public-side” lending emerged to facilitate broad lender participation in the syndicated loan market by mitigating concerns about the leakage of borrowers' private information into public securities markets. In line with this proposition, we find that public-side lending facilitates the loan market participation of lenders for which maintaining robust information barriers is particularly costly. Furthermore, while public-side lending increases within-syndicate information asymmetry, our findings indicate that it does not materially increase interest spreads and is associated with lower coordination costs among syndicate participants. Collectively, we document how debt contracting practices evolved to address frictions associated with the protection of borrowers’ private information and the related changes in loan contracting equilibria.

Taxing banks leverage and syndicated lending: A cross-country comparison

Between 2010 and 2012 and with bank stability as the ultimate target, five European countries implemented a tax levy on banks’ liabilities thereby decreasing the cost of equity relative to the cost of debt. Using a difference-in-differences approach we assess the impact of this tax levy on banks’ participation in the syndicated loan market. We further investigate the impact of the tax levy along bank size and capital structure. We find that banks located in countries where the tax levy was implemented supply more credit. This increase is more significant for larger lenders and banks that are more capital constrained.

National development banks and loan contract terms: Evidence from syndicated loans

In this study, we examine whether national development banks (NDBs) fill market gaps in the syndicated loan market. Existing theories make conflicting arguments, but little empirical research has systematically investigated the roles of NDBs in credit markets. To fill the gap, we build a novel and comprehensive list of NDBs worldwide. Using a large, international sample of non-sovereign syndicated loans over the past two decades, we find that loans with NDBs have longer maturity and higher loan spreads than those without. These results hold using the propensity score matching technique and the treatment effects model that account for the endogenous selection of NDBs. We also find that NDBs provide financial support for credit-rationed borrowers and play a countercyclical role during global liquidity cycles. Our study implies that NDBs address market failures in the syndicated loan market.

Determinants of Syndicated Loan Spreads in Central, Eastern and South-Eastern European Countries

Despite the importance of the syndicated loan market as a source of international financing there is limited evidence on factors influencing syndicated loan pricing in European developing economies. Focusing in one particular region reduces the problem of cross-country heterogeneity and provides more specific policy recommendations for reducing the cost of funding for firms, in an environment where capital markets are less developed, and banks are seen as the main source of funding. This study investigates the determinants of syndicated loan spreads in a sample of 1004 syndicated loans from the Thomson One Banker database, granted to borrowers from 12 Central, Eastern and South-Eastern European countries. The results show that loan and country characteristics are the most significant determinants of syndicated loan spreads. Lenders seem to price loan characteristics in European transition economies in accordance with the existing academic literature – riskier loans are charged higher spreads. Augmenting the Thomson One Banker with the Worldscope database, we further find that borrower characteristics are generally significant determinants of syndicated loan spreads however their significance weakens once country characteristics are taken into account. Lender characteristics are found not to be significant determinants of syndicated loan spreads in European transition economies. The implication of these results is that governments of European transition countries have a major role to play in providing a macro-economic and legal infrastructure that will enable borrowing firms to get access to funding sources at lower spreads. Keywords: syndicated loans, spreads, emerging Europe, Thomson One Banker, Worldscope DOI: 10.7176/JESD/13-18-02 Publication date: September 30 th 2022

Banks' Strategic Responses to Supervisory Coverage: Evidence from a Natural Experiment

AbstractU.S. bank supervisors conduct frequent and comprehensive loan‐level exams of the syndicated loan market. These exams are costly as adverse exam loan ratings may increase supervisory scrutiny and reduce bank capital. Relying on an unexpected change in supervisory coverage in 1998, we estimate that the cost of bank credit for borrowers excluded from supervision decreases by approximately 18%. We show that large lenders use the coverage change to exclude deals from supervision, especially riskier deals. Strikingly, small lenders shift their lending to increase supervisory coverage, suggesting the potential importance of supervision in reducing information asymmetries within lending syndicates.

Exploring risks in syndicated loan networks: Evidence from real estate investment trusts

This study explores credit and systemic risks in the interconnected market for syndicated loans to Japan's real estate investment trusts (J-REITs). Although earlier studies have investigated various aspects of the syndicated loan market, few have considered the financial network and risk resilience perspectives. To bridge this gap, I conduct network analysis using credit exposures or Euclidean distance between loans and perform a macrostress test by extending Furfine's algorithm. The analysis results indicate that Japanese major banks, large regional banks, and J-REITs play a key role in terms of degree centrality. In addition, the test results show that no J-REIT's default causes default contagion of the lending institutions based on syndicated loans outstanding at the end of 2021. Overall, this study provides effective methodologies to evaluate the interconnectedness between loans as well as risk contagion from borrowers to lenders in a two-mode network for syndicated loans.

Is the syndicated loans market ready for distributed ledger technology?

ABSTRACT The syndicated loan market has a centralised nature dominated by intermediaries. Such a structure not only requires manual labour and back-office workloads, but it is also prone to human error and fraud. Distributed ledger technology (DLT) and smart contracts are promising tools to overcome the factors which adversely affect the efficiency of the current and classical business model in the primary and secondary market of syndicated loans. DLT eliminates the need for intermediaries; provides transparency, accuracy, and authenticity; lowers transaction costs; makes it easier to comply with Know Your Customer obligations; and provides efficiency in the secondary market for syndicated loans. However, existing legal rules and institutions fail to create a predictable and legally safe environment for the spread of DLT in the syndicated loans market. Therefore, proper regulation is required for the widespread use of DLT technology in the syndicated loan market.

Does amortization matter? Evidence from the syndicated loan market

AbstractIn this article, I investigate whether a firm's decision to adopt an amortizing payment schedule affects its cost of bank loans. Focusing on US syndicated loans from 1991 to 2018, I find that amortized loans on average have spreads that are 46 basis points lower than bullet unamortized loan facilities. This discount represents a decrease of $1.66 million in annual interest expenses. I also find that borrowers with higher fundamental volatility, debt rollover risk, or financial constraints enjoy a substantially larger amortization discount and stand a better chance of refinancing their loan debt. However, the discount on loan pricing is moderated if nonbank institutions such as hedge funds or collateralized loan obligations participate in the lending syndicate. My results remain robust when I measure the intensity of loan amortization, control for overall debt maturity profiles, and address the endogeneity issue with propensity score matching and within‐loan analyses. Overall, my article supports the liquidity risk hypothesis, which suggests that borrowing firms have incentives to spread loan payments across time to diversify their debt maturity structure and enhance the prospects of debt refinancing, thereby limiting the transmission of liquidity risk to credit risk.

The EU Taxonomy and the Syndicated Loan Market

The EU Taxonomy and the Syndicated Loan Market