Syllogistic Inference Research Articles

Attitudes of Turkish EFL Teachers and Native English Tutors towards Posters: The UK and Turkey Contexts

Since espousing posters as essential teaching materials to leverage learning is one of the mainstreams in the research paradigm, the great majority of studies on their effectiveness in language education are directly conducted on learners. However, approaching them through the lens of teachers in terms of their consideration as language teaching tools is underrepresented in research. Thus, this qualitative research was conducted in Turkey and the UK using semi-structured interviews, a survey and non-participant classroom observations to explore the attitudes of English as a Foreign Language (EFL) teachers towards using posters as a strategy for reading comprehension of learners. Besides demographic features, syllogistic inference through inductive high-level data coding was employed to ascertain teachers’ attitudes. In addition, some classroom practices were observed to test whether they overlap with teacher attitudes. Particular reading strategies the teachers employed throughout their instructions were also investigated to identify the role of visuals in their teaching. The findings indicate that although teachers in both countries exhibit positive attitudes towards using posters as a strategy, they do not in fact employ them properly in classes. Accordingly, some suggestions for further research considerations are also provided.

Implicitness of Logos and Explicitness of Logics in Ancient Philosophy

We consider semantic and syntactic transformations of the concept of "the logical" in the ancient philosophy in the form of crypto-logos, para-logismos, dia-logos, and syl-logismos. We interpret Heraclitus' concept of Logos as a cryptologos through which intuitive insight (epístasthai gnóomen) reveals hidden or implicit harmony (harmoníe aphanés) in nature (phýsis) as a conceptual unity of ontic opposites (tà enantía). In Pramenides' paraconsistent concept of the identity of Being and thought, we point to para-logical hypotheses about the One that are carried out through antithetical deductions of thought and which maintain the dynamics of the ontic determinations of being (ón) in the statics of the conceptual determinations of Being (tò eînai). As the beginning of the explicative granulation of ''the logical'' we consider Plato's concept of the dialectical skill (dialektikè tékhne) of dividing concepts of genus into species and sub-species that logically represent ontic opposites in problem-formulated questions. Finally Aristotle's concept of lógos as a statement-making sentence / proposition (lógos apophantikós) made explicit the Being (tò eînai), or the Being as Being (tò ón hê ón), in semantic and syntactic figures and modes of syllogistic inferences in which ontological (eînai), ontic (ón), conceptual (logikôos) and linguistic (légomenon) correspondence is shown. We conclude that with these changes in the concept of lógos, the path has been taken from the hidden or implicit Truth of the phenomena of nature and the world (pân) to explicit truthfulness of propositions as the unhiddeness (alétheia) of Being trough the semantical and syntactical visibility of the logical structures of being, thought and language in scientific knowledge based on demonstration (apoódeiksis).

Aristotle’s Empiricism

<i>Aristotle’s Empiricism</i>

Towards a Unity of Theoretical and Practical Reason: On the Constitutive Significance of the Transcendental Dialectic

AbstractThe article focuses on re-evaluating Kant’s Transcendental Dialectic by initially highlighting its seemingly negative function within theCritique of Pure Reasonas a mere regulative form for cognition and experience. The Dialectic, however, does not only have such a negative-regulative function but also its very own positive and founding character for cognition that even is present in the supposedly most immediate forms of intuition. In exploring this positive side of the Transcendental Dialectic it becomes clear that it manifests itself as a bridge between the so-called theoretical and practical reason inasmuch as it fills in their gap within Kant’s philosophy. From the practical side, the Dialectic is manifest as an action full of purposiveness, maxims, and imperatives within cognition, from a theoretical side it assumes the form of syllogistic inference, which is the adequate and acting theoretical form of practical reason. Therefore, the unity of reason is shown in presenting its inner gap as a dialectical misunderstanding that Kant not only highlights in the Transcendental Dialectic but also tends to leave unsolved mostly. Nevertheless, the Dialectic can be shown as thea priorisynthetic act of unifying reason, if investigated in the context of Kant’s complete critical endeavour.

Model-Based Explanation of Feedback Effects in Syllogistic Reasoning.

For decades, a significant number of models explaining human syllogistic inference processes were developed. There is profound work fitting the models' parameters and analyzing each model's ability to account for the data in order to support or reject the underlying theories. However, the model parameters are rarely used to extract explanations and hypotheses for phenomena that go beyond the original scope of the models. In this work, we apply three state-of-the-art models, the probability heuristics model (PHM), mReasoner, and TransSet, to data from reasoning experiments where participants received feedback for their conclusions. We derived hypotheses based on the models' explanations for the feedback effect and put these to the test by conducting an experiment targeting the hypotheses. The work contributes to the field in three ways: (a) the feedback effect could be replicated and was shown to be a robust effect; (b) we demonstrate the use of the model parameters in order to derive new hypotheses; (c) we present possible explanations for the feedback effect based on existingtheories.

Exploring literal and inferential reading comprehension among L2 adolescent learners: the roles of working memory capacity, syllogistic inference, and L2 linguistic knowledge

Exploring literal and inferential reading comprehension among L2 adolescent learners: the roles of working memory capacity, syllogistic inference, and L2 linguistic knowledge

Reasoning about properties: A computational theory.

We present a theory of how people reason about properties. Such inferences have been studied since Aristotle's invention of Western logic. But, no previous psychological theory gives an adequate account of them, and most theories do not go beyond syllogistic inferences, such as: All the bankers are architects; Some of the chefs are bankers; What follows? The present theory postulates that such assertions establish relations between properties, which mental models represent in corresponding relations between sets of entities. The theory combines the construction of models with innovative heuristics that scan them to draw conclusions. It explains the processes that can generate a conclusion from premises, decide if a given conclusion is necessary or possible, assess its probability, and evaluate the consistency of a set of assertions. A computer program implementing the theory embodies an intuitive system 1 and a deliberative system 2, and it copes with quantifiers such as more than half the architects. It fit data from over 200 different sorts of inference, including those about the properties of individuals, the properties of a set of individuals, and the properties of several such sets in syllogisms. Another innovation is that the program accounts for differences in reasoning from one individual to another, and from one group of individuals to another: Some tend to reason intuitively but some go beyond intuitions to search for alternative models. The theory extends to inferences about disjunctions of properties, about relations rather than properties, and about the properties of properties. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).

Corpus Delicti and the Subject of Proof: to the Discussion of the Relationship Between the Concepts

The authors analyze the opinions of scholars about the correlations between the categories «corpus delicti» and «subject of proof». The main object of their criticism is the idea, supported by some scholars, that the elements of corpus delicti equal the circumstances to be proven that are included in the key fact. The authors use the logical criterion to demonstrate that this claim is unsubstantiated. The circumstances stated in Clauses 1 and 2, Part 1, Art. 73 of the Criminal Procedure Code of the Russian Federation characterize the key features of corpus delicti only conditionally. In this connection, the key fact is the aggregate of factual circumstances that constitutes the basis of corpus delicti. In the logical aspect, the qualification of a crime is a syllogistic inference, according to which, if the essential features of the action under investigation coincide with the features of the concept of a specific crime as described in criminal law, then this crime becomes the concept of this action. According to the authors, from this standpoint it is possible to discuss not the equivalence of circumstances to be proven and corpus delicti, but only the equivalence of their essential features as determined by criminal law. They point out the specific character of criminal law and process terminology that also does not make it possible to equate the categories «corpus delicti» and «subject of proof». The significance of the existence of a formulated subject of proof in criminal procedure law and its interconnection with corpus delicti is demonstrated. It is concluded that proof in a criminal case is based on certain knowledge, which performs a methodological function. In this connection, the subject of proof, in the gnoseological sense, is a program of criminal procedure activities determined by the lawmaker. The norms of criminal law determined the parameters of criminal procedure proving, so the subject of proof is based on the criminal law characteristic of the action but does not equal it. The circumstances of the case, determined in the process of proving, are correlated with the norms of criminal law with the purpose of possible criminal law qualification of the action. Corpus delicti, determined in the criminal law, and the subject of proof, formulated in the criminal procedure law, ensure strict certainly and specification of the process of proving carried out by the preliminary investigation bodies and the court.

Ammonius and Philoponus on the Activity of Syllogizing

Abstract According to Philoponus, the activity of drawing syllogisms is a dynamic operation. Following the classical idea that actions are specified by their objects and habitual powers by their actions, Philoponus concludes that only a dynamic power can elicit the act of syllogizing. This power is identified with discursive reasoning (dianoia). Imagination, on the contrary, is a static power, that cannot elicit that particular motion of drawing a syllogistic inference. The issue, however, is not entirely uncontroversial, because Ammonius maintains that sophistical syllogisms can only be formed by imagination, since they involve “empty concepts” as terms and only imagination can form such concepts. In this paper I will reconstruct Philoponus’ and Ammonius’ theories about the “activity” of syllogizing, and I shall explain how Philoponus can deal with sophistical syllogisms in a consistent way.

What is an Emotion?

This paper distinguishes between two types of emotion: (1) “bottom-up” largely “prewired” or conditioned responses to environmental stimuli and (2) “top-down” “evaluative” emotions that are a function of a person’s evaluative inferences and use of “emotive” language. The paper, in turn, develops an analysis of the latter type of emotion and formulates a definition that tracks three interrelated levels of activity transpiring during an emotional episode: logico-linguistic (a chain of practical syllogistic inferences), phenomenological (interoceptive feelings), and neurological (cortical and subcortical brain activities). In the light of this analysis, it shows how Logic-Based Therapy (LBT), a prominent form of philosophical counseling created by the author, can be used to overcome self-destructive forms of evaluative emotions such as intense anxiety, anger, and guilt, and depression.

The Neurocognitive Correlates of Human Reasoning: A Meta-analysis of Conditional and Syllogistic Inferences.

Inferring knowledge is a core aspect of human cognition. We can form complex sentences connecting different pieces of information, such as in conditional statements like "if someone drinks alcohol, then they must be older than 18." These are relevant for causal reasoning about our environment and allow us to think about hypothetical scenarios. Another central aspect to forming complex statements is to quantify about sets, such as in "some apples are green." Reasoning in terms of the ability to form these statements is not yet fully understood, despite being an active field of interdisciplinary research. On a theoretical level, several conceptual frameworks have been proposed, predicting diverging brain activation patterns during the reasoning process. We present a meta-analysis comprising the results of 32 neuroimaging experiments about reasoning, which we subdivided by their structure, content, and requirement for world knowledge. In conditional tasks, we identified activation in the left middle and rostrolateral pFC and parietal regions, whereas syllogistic tasks elicit activation in Broca's complex, including the BG. Concerning the content differentiation, abstract tasks exhibit activation in the left inferior and rostrolateral pFC and inferior parietal regions, whereas content tasks are in the left superior pFC and parieto-occipital regions. The findings clarify the neurocognitive mechanisms of reasoning and exhibit clear distinctions between the task's type and content. Overall, we found that the activation differences clarify inconsistent results from accumulated data and serve as useful scaffolding differentiations for theory-driven interpretations of the neuroscientific correlates of human reasoning.

Growing into deduction

Psychologists have experimentally studied deductive reasoning since the beginning of the 20th century. However, as we will argue, there has not been much improvement in the field until relatively recently, due to how the experiments were designed. We deem the design of the majority of conducted experiments inadequate for two reasons. The first one is that psychologists have, for the most part, ignored the development of mathematical logic and based their research on syllogistic inferences. The second reason is the influence of the view, which is dogmatically still prevalent in semantics and logic in general, that the categorical notions, such as the notion of truth, are more important than the hypothetical notions, such as the notion of deduction. The influence of this dogma has been twofold. In studies concerning logical connectives in adults and children, much more emphasis has been put on the semantical aspects of the connectives - the truth functions, than on the deductive inferences. And secondly, even in the studies that investigated deductive inferences by using formal systems, the dogma still influenced the choice of the formal system. Researchers, in general, preferred the axiomatic formal systems over the systems of natural deduction, even though the systems of the second kind are much more suitable for studying deduction.

Lachelier’nin Yükleme Semantiği ve Tasım

The main doctrines of the traditional logic of terms (logica termini) are standardly organized according to the formation structure of syllogistic inferences. A syllogistic inference is analyzed into propositions, and propositions, in the last instance, to terms; the logic of terms, in line with this formation structure, is partitioned into the&nbsp;doctrines, respectively, of terms (terminorum), of propositions (propositionum) or judgments (judiciorum), and of immediate and mediate inferences or followings (consequentiarum immediatarum/mediatarum). This structure communicates the idea that a given doctrine could be treated, to a certain extent, independently of the next one to come, so that propositions, for instance, could be examined, at least to a certain extent, independently of syllogistic inferences. Some classical philosophers such as Immanuel Kant have developed approaches that break in part this order of analysis which finds its clearest expression in the Port-Royal logic (Arnauld &amp; Nicole’s Logic or the Art of Thinking). In Kant’s case the order is changed in favor of the doctrine of judgements. This paper examines the French philosopher Jules Lachelier’s (1832-1918) approach which similarly breaks the same doctrinal order, and which, more specifically, refines the typification of propositions according to the roles to be played by propositions in syllogisms. What lies at the core of this approach is the identification of the semantic values of categorical propositions (or, as Lachelier calls them, of propositions of inherence) in terms of modal statuses which are to determine these roles. Lachelier seems to use the set of values he assigns to the categorical forms as a tool for testing logical implication among types of predication, that is, as some sort of semantic theory in the modern sense. Lachelier also discusses the three-figured categorical syllogistic along with a method, effectively used by G. W. Leibniz, of transforming syllogistic moods into each other, and tries to confirm his semantic theory in terms of such syllogistic. This paper explains Lachelier’s analysis of meaning by treating it as a non-formal semantics of predication, and tries to make some modern sense of Lachelier’s general approach to syllogistic.

Exploring the Patterns of Dual Attitude Changes in the Context of Athlete Endorsement: The Interplay of Fit, Evaluative Conditioning, and Introspection Focus

Through this study, the author aimed to elucidate the asymmetrical patterns of dual attitude changes in the context of athlete endorsement. The main experiment included a test of the interactions of: Fit (low vs. high fit) × Evaluative conditioning (endorsement–positive vs. endorsement–negative feelings) × Introspection focus (logics vs. feelings). Based on the results, fit changed explicit attitudes, leaving implicit attitudes unchanged, whereas evaluative conditioning changed implicit attitudes to a greater extent. Introspection focus on logics (feelings) led participants to operate syllogistic inferences (associative evaluations); consequently, the logicality of fit (the conditioned feelings) determined both explicit and implicit attitudes and behavioral intentions. The study helps broaden current understandings of endorsement effectiveness by identifying situations in which dual attitude shifts intentions. Managers should be aware of the manipulability of consumers’ evaluation systems, and it is recommended to strategically employ either logic-reflected or feelings-elicited endorsement campaigns to leverage a brand’s equity.

Assertoric Syllogistic and the Periodic Table of Arguments

The Periodic Table of Arguments is based on a grammatical understanding of categorical statements. A commentator has pointed out that taking a logical understanding of such statements would render one of the distinctions constituting the theoretical framework of the table unwarranted. In this paper, it is examined how arguments based on syllogistic inferences are represented in the table by comparing the theoretical framework of the Periodic Table of Arguments to that of Aristotle’s assertoric syllogistic.

A Generalized Syllogistic Inference System based on Inclusion and Exclusion Relations

We introduce a simple inference system based on two primitive relations between terms, namely, inclusion and exclusion relations. We present a normalization theorem, and then provide a characterization of the structure of normal proofs. Based on this, inferences in a syllogistic fragment of natural language are reconstructed within our system. We also show that our system can be embedded into a fragment of propositional minimal logic.

Complexity provides a better explanation than probability for confidence in syllogistic inferences

AbstractBayesian rationality is an important contribution to syllogistic inference, but it has limitations. The claim that confidence in a conclusion is a function of informativeness of the max-premise is anomalous because this is the least probable premise. A more plausible account is that confidence is inversely related to complexity. Bayesian rationality should be supplemented with principles based on cognitive complexity.

Précis ofBayesian Rationality: The Probabilistic Approach to Human Reasoning

According to Aristotle, humans are the rational animal. The borderline between rationality and irrationality is fundamental to many aspects of human life including the law, mental health, and language interpretation. But what is it to be rational? One answer, deeply embedded in the Western intellectual tradition since ancient Greece, is that rationality concerns reasoning according to the rules of logic--the formal theory that specifies the inferential connections that hold with certainty between propositions. Piaget viewed logical reasoning as defining the end-point of cognitive development; and contemporary psychology of reasoning has focussed on comparing human reasoning against logical standards. Bayesian Rationality argues that rationality is defined instead by the ability to reason about uncertainty. Although people are typically poor at numerical reasoning about probability, human thought is sensitive to subtle patterns of qualitative Bayesian, probabilistic reasoning. In Chapters 1-4 of Bayesian Rationality (Oaksford & Chater 2007), the case is made that cognition in general, and human everyday reasoning in particular, is best viewed as solving probabilistic, rather than logical, inference problems. In Chapters 5-7 the psychology of "deductive" reasoning is tackled head-on: It is argued that purportedly "logical" reasoning problems, revealing apparently irrational behaviour, are better understood from a probabilistic point of view. Data from conditional reasoning, Wason's selection task, and syllogistic inference are captured by recasting these problems probabilistically. The probabilistic approach makes a variety of novel predictions which have been experimentally confirmed. The book considers the implications of this work, and the wider "probabilistic turn" in cognitive science and artificial intelligence, for understanding human rationality.

Правило Nota notae в силлогистике Канта

The article analyses the meaning of the Nota Notae rule in Kant's syllogistics; it defines two functions of the rule: justification of syllogistic inferences and regulation of modi reduction procedure.

‘Not quite right’: helping students to make better arguments

This paper looks at the need for a better understanding of the impediments to critical thinking in relation to graduate student work. The paper argues that a distinction is needed between two vectors that influence student writing: (1) the word-level–sentence-level vector; and (2) the grammar–inferencing vector. It is suggested that much of the work being done to assist students is only done on the first vector. This paper suggests a combination of explicit use of deductive syllogistic inferences and computer-aided argument mapping is needed. A methodology is suggested for tackling assignments that require students to ‘make an argument’. It is argued that what lecturers understand tacitly, now needs to be made a focus of deliberate educational practices.