Asset Price Swings Research Articles

Monetary policy and speculative asset markets

I study monetary policy in an estimated financial New-Keynesian model extended by behavioral expectation formation in the asset market. Credit frictions create a feedback between asset markets and the macroeconomy, and behaviorally motivated speculation can amplify fundamental swings in asset prices, that potentially cause endogenous, nonfundamental bubbles and bursts. Booms in asset prices improve firms financing conditions and are therefore deflationary. These features significantly improve the power of the model to replicate empirical key moments. A monetary policy that targets asset prices can dampen financial cycles and reduce volatility in asset markets (dampening effect). This comes at the cost of creating an additional channel through which asset price fluctuations transmit to macroeconomic fundamentals (spillover effect). I find that unless financial markets are severely overheated, the undesirable fluctuations in inflation and output caused by the spillover effect more than outweigh the benefits of the dampening effect.

Beyond Mechanical Markets: Asset Price Swings, Risk, and the Role of the State (Book Review)

Beyond Mechanical Markets: Asset Price Swings, Risk, and the Role of the State (Book Review)

Equity return predictability, time varying volatility and learning about the permanence of shocks

I consider a consumption based asset pricing model where the consumer does not know if shocks to dividends are stationary (temporary) or non-stationary (permanent). The agent uses a Bayesian learning algorithm with a bias towards recent observations to assign probability to each process. While the true process is stationary, the consumer’s beliefs change as he misinterprets a drift in dividends from their steady state value as an increased likelihood that the dividend process is non-stationary. Belief changes result in large swings in asset prices which are subsequently reversed. The model then is consistent with a broad array of asset pricing puzzles. It predicts the negative correlation between current returns and future returns and the PE ratio and future returns. Consistent with the data, I also find that consumption growth negatively correlates with future returns and the PE ratio and consumption growth forecast future consumption growth. The model amplifies return volatility over the benchmark rational expectations case and exactly matches the standard deviation of consumption. Finally, the model generates time varying volatility consistent with the data on quarterly equity returns.

The Response of Asset Prices to Monetary Policy Shocks: Stronger than Thought

Mainstream macroeconomic theory predicts a rapid response of asset prices to monetary policy shocks, which conventional empirical models are unable to reproduce. We argue that this is due to a deficient information set: Forward-looking economic agents observe vastly more information than the handful of variables included in standard VAR models. Thus, small-scale VARs are likely to suffer from nonfundamentalness and yield biased results. We tackle this problem by estimating a Structural Factor Model for a large euro area dataset. We find quicker and larger effects of monetary policy shocks, consistent with mainstream theory and the observed large swings in asset prices. Our results point to stronger financial stability consequences of an exogenous monetary policy tightening, also in the form of a quicker than expected unwinding of QE, than commonly thought. JEL Classification: C32, E43, E44, E52

Innovation, Delegation, and Asset Price Swings

We propose a dynamic asset-market equilibrium model in which (1) an innovative asset with as-yet-unknown average payoff is traded, and (2) investors delegate investment to experts. Experts secretly renege on investors' orders and take on leveraged positions in the asset to manipulate investors' beliefs, thereby attracting more orders and fees. Despite agents' full rationality, the combination of experts' moral hazard and investors' learning generates bubble-like price dynamics: gradual upswing, overshoot, and reversal. Consistent with empirical observations, hedge funds ride price swings, adjusting holdings counter-cyclically to other financial intermediaries. Capping fees may lower fund leverage, dampen price swings, and improve welfare.

Equity Return Predictability, Time Varying Volatility and Learning About the Permanence of Shocks

I consider a consumption based asset pricing model where the consumer does not know if shocks to dividends are stationary (temporary) or non-stationary (permanent). The agent uses a Bayesian learning algorithm with a bias towards recent observations to assign probability to each process. While the true process is stationary, the consumer's beliefs change as he misinterprets a drift in dividends from their steady state value as an increased likelihood that the dividend process is non-stationary. Belief changes result in large swings in asset prices which are subsequently reversed. The model then is consistent with a broad array of asset pricing puzzles. It predicts the negative correlation between current returns and future returns and the PE ratio and future returns. Consistent with the data, I also find that consumption growth negatively correlates with future returns and the PE ratio and consumption growth forecast future consumption growth. The model amplifies return volatility over the benchmark rational expectations case and exactly matches the standard deviation of consumption. Finally, the model generates time varying volatility consistent with the data on quarterly equity returns.

Beyond Mechanical Markets: Asset Price Swings, Risk, and the Role of the State, by RomanFrydman and Michael D.Goldberg (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2011), pp. xv + 285.

The article reviews the book Beyond Mechanical Markets: Asset Price Swings, Risk, and the Role of the State by Roman Frydman and Michael D. Goldberg.

Against Psychosis: A Review of Roman Frydman and Michael D. Goldberg’s Beyond Mechanical Markets: Asset Price Swings, Risk, and the Role of the State

A review essay of Roman Frydman & Michael D. Goldberg’s Beyond Mechanical Markets: Asset Price Swings, Risk, and the Role of the State.

Financial Deepening and International Monetary Stability

Recent discussions at the IMF and the G-20 on strengthening the international monetary system have emphasized, among other efforts, increasing the financial depth of emerging markets. Such deepening is widely believed to confer important stability benefits, helping countries limit swings in asset prices, find alternative sources of funding, and attenuate the need for reserve accumulation. This paper seeks to shed light on the role of financial deepening in promoting the stability of the system as a whole. A simple balance sheet metric of financial depth shows a growing divergence in the financial depth of advanced versus emerging markets, pointing to scope for catch-up. But catch-up has implications for global imbalances, insofar as international adjustment requires slower growth of domestic claims in advanced deficit countries (slower credit growth lowers domestic demand) and faster growth in surplus economies and emerging markets (which would raise domestic demand). Deepening is also related to crisis incidence and costs. Crisis risks and costs are high in the initial stages of deepening, during which policymakers tend to build reserve buffers, constrain capital mobility, and limit exchange rate flexibility. In later stages, alongside flexible exchange rates, open capital accounts and smaller reserve buffers, crisis incidence is found to decline. Although financial deepening can contribute to lowering imbalances and crisis incidence and costs, it is a long-term process. Therefore, it remains crucial to make progress in the near term to strengthen the international monetary system, including building a strong global financial safety net and developing a framework for coping with capital flows.

Heterogeneous Gain Learning and Long Swings in Asset Prices

This chapter focuses on heterogeneous gain learning and long swings in asset prices. Many asset prices deviate from their fundamental values, yielding potential long-run predictability. Asset price swings can be both short or long in duration, and their time series shows few regular patterns when one analyzes their long-range behavior. This chapter considers an underparameterized learning model with heterogeneous gain parameters and traders using differing perspectives on history. It first provides an overview of the basic model and some benchmark simulation runs before discussing the output of the model compared to actual financial time series. It then describes a range of internal mechanisms of the agents and forecasts in use and how wealth moves across them over time. It shows that learning algorithms appear to be behaving in a predictable fashion, and that interesting dynamics come from how agent wealth selects rules over time. The chapter concludes by addressing some questions for researchers working on learning in financial markets.

Imperfect Knowledge, Asset Price Swings and Structural Slumps: A Cointegrated VAR Analysis of Their Interdependence

This paper discusses interactions between speculative behavior in the currency markets and aggregate ‡uctuations in the real economy. It builds on the Structural Slumps theory in Phelps (1994) and the recent theory of Imperfect Knowledge Economics in Frydman and Goldberg (2007). The former emphasizes real interest rates and real exchange rates as potentially important determinants underlying the persistent ‡uctuations in aggregate activities, and the latter provides the conditions under which speculative behavior in currency markets generates such persistence. The paper argues that by combing the two theories we can shed new light on the two-way interdependence between persistent swings in asset markets and persistent ‡uctuations in the real economy. In particular, we may improve our understanding of the mechanisms behind the long recurrent spells of high unemployment that continue to mar our economies. � The views in this paper are strongly in‡uenced by previous and ongoing research with Roman Frydman, Michael Goldberg and Soren Johansen. I am deeply grateful to Roman and Michael for sharing with me their profound insight in international macro and how imperfect knowledge economics can resolve its many empirical puzzles and to my son, Mikael Juselius, for numerous valuable comments on an early version of this paper.

Asset Price Fluctuations, Financial Crises and the Stabilizing Effects of a General Transaction Tax

The deepening of the recent crisis was driven by the simultaneous devaluation of stock wealth, housing wealth and commodity wealth. The potential for this devaluation process had been “built up” during the boom of stock prices, house prices and commodity prices between 2003 and 2007. Hence, this paper sketches the main causes and effects of long swings in asset prices in the context of the current crisis. It is shown that bull markets are brought about by upward price runs (i.e., monotonic movements) lasting longer than counter-movements for an extended period of time (and vice versa for bear markets). This pattern of asset price dynamics is the result of “trading as usual” on (highly regulated) derivatives exchanges. The most popular trading practices like “technical analysis” contribute significantly to asset price overshooting. These practices strengthened both, the boom of asset prices until mid 2007 as well as their collapse in recent months. A general financial transaction tax would limit the wide fluctuations of stock prices, exchange rates and commodity prices.

Boom-Bust Cycles and Trading Practices in Asset Markets, the Real Economy and the Effects of a Financial Transactions Tax

This paper begins with a puzzle. Over the past three decades, in asset has become progressively more short-term oriented (faster), with traders attempting to exploit intraday price trends. Yet, over this time, asset prices have continued to move in a sequence of alternating markets and markets, often lasting several years. Which type of behavior over the (very) short run leads to the irregular bull and bear phases over the longer run? The paper finds that (bear) markets are brought about because upward (downward) price runs last longer than counter-movements for an extended period of time. This pattern results from trading as usual, which employs so-called technical analysis to exploit asset price trends and, in doing so, reinforces the price trends. The recent financial crisis spilled over to the real economy mainly through the simultaneous devaluation of stock, housing and commodity wealth. The severity of these markets was the result of the upward climb of prices during the preceding markets. The paper argues that a financial transactions tax (FTT) would reduce the profitability of short-term trend-chasing in derivatives (fundamentals-oriented would hardly be affected). By doing so, a FTT would limit the magnitude of the long swings in asset prices.

Countercyclical Macro Prudential Policies in a Supporting Role to Monetary Policy

This paper explores how prudential regulations can support monetary policy in reducing output fluctuations while maintaining financial stability. It uses a new framework that blends a standard model for monetary policy analysis with a contingent claims model of financial sector vulnerabilities. The results suggest that binding countercyclical prudential regulations can help reduce output fluctuations and lessen the risk of financial instability. More specifically, countercyclical rules such as countercyclical capital adequacy rules, can allow monetary authorities to achieve the same output and inflation objectives but with smaller adjustments in interest rates. The countercyclical rules can help stem swings in asset prices, lean against a financial accelerator process, and thereby help to lower risks of macroeconomic and financial instability. In economies with fixed exchange rates, where countercyclical monetary policy is not possible, prudential regulations can provide a useful mechanism for mitigating a run-up in asset prices and for promoting output stability.

MONETARY POLICY AND ASSET PRICES IN A SMALL OPEN ECONOMY: A FACTOR-AUGMENTED VAR ANALYSIS FOR SINGAPORE

The ongoing global financial turmoil has revived the question of whether central bankers ought to tighten monetary policy pre-emptively in order to head off asset price misalignments before a sudden crash triggers financial instability. This study explores the issue of the appropriate monetary policy response to asset price swings in the small open economy of Singapore. Empirical analysis of monetary policy based on standard vector autoregression (VAR) models, unfortunately, is often hindered by the use of sparse information sets. To better reflect the extensive information monitored by Singapore's central bank, including global economic indicators, we augment a monetary vector autoregression (VAR) model with common factors extracted from a large panel dataset spanning 122 economic time series and the period 1980q1–2008q2. The resulting FAVAR model is used to assess the impact of monetary policy shocks on residential property and stock prices. Impulse response functions and variance decompositions suggest that monetary policy can potentially be used to lean against asset price booms in Singapore.

Countercyclical Macro Prudential Policies in a Supporting Role to Monetary Policy

This paper explores how prudential regulations can support monetary policy in reducing output fluctuations while maintaining financial stability. It uses a new framework that blends a standard model for monetary policy analysis with a contingent claims model of financial sector vulnerabilities. The results suggest that binding countercyclical prudential regulations can help reduce output fluctuations and lessen the risk of financial instability. More specifically, countercyclical rules such as countercyclical capital adequacy rules, can allow monetary authorities to achieve the same output and inflation objectives but with smaller adjustments in interest rates. The countercyclical rules can help stem swings in asset prices, lean against a financial accelerator process, and thereby help to lower risks of macroeconomic and financial instability. In economies with fixed exchange rates, where countercyclical monetary policy is not possible, prudential regulations can provide a useful mechanism for mitigating a run-up in asset prices and for promoting output stability.

Countercyclical Macro Prudential Policies in a Supporting Role to Monetary Policy

This paper explores how prudential regulations can support monetary policy in reducing output fluctuations while maintaining financial stability. It uses a new framework that blends a standard model for monetary policy analysis with a contingent claims model of financial sector vulnerabilities. The results suggest that binding countercyclical prudential regulations can help reduce output fluctuations and lessen the risk of financial instability. More specifically, countercyclical rules such as countercyclical capital adequacy rules, can allow monetary authorities to achieve the same output and inflation objectives but with smaller adjustments in interest rates. The countercyclical rules can help stem swings in asset prices, lean against a financial accelerator process, and thereby help to lower risks of macroeconomic and financial instability. In economies with fixed exchange rates, where countercyclical monetary policy is not possible, prudential regulations can provide a useful mechanism for mitigating a run-up in asset prices and for promoting output stability.

Why Central Banks Should Not Burst Bubbles

Central banks should not be in the business of trying to prick asset price bubbles. Bubbles generally arise out of some combination of irrational exuberance, technological jumps, and financial deregulation (with more of the second in equity price bubbles and more of the third in real estate booms). Accordingly, the connection between monetary conditions and the rise of bubbles is rather tenuous, and anything short of inducing a recession by tightening credit conditions prohibitively is unlikely to stem their rise. Even if a central bank were willing to take that one-in-three or less shot at cutting off a bubble, the cost-benefit analysis hardly justifies such preemptive action. The macroeconomic harm from a bubble bursting is generally a function of the financial system's structure and stability - in modern economies with satisfactory bank supervision, the transmission of a negative shock from an asset price bust is relatively limited, as was seen in the United States in 2002. However, where financial fragility does exist, as in Japan in the 1990s, the costs of inducing a recession go up significantly, so the relative disadvantages of monetary preemption over letting the bubble run its course mount. In the end, there is no monetary substitute for financial stability, and no market substitute for monetary ease during severe credit crunch. These two realities imply that the central bank should not take asset prices directly into account in monetary policymaking but should be anything but laissez-faire in responding to sharp movements in inflation and output, even if asset price swings are their source.

Why Central Banks Should Not Burst Bubbles*

Central banks should not be in the business of trying to prick asset price bubbles. Bubbles generally arise out of some combination of irrational exuberance, technological jumps, and financial deregulation (with more of the second in equity price bubbles and more of the third in real estate booms). Accordingly, the connection between monetary conditions and the rise of bubbles is rather tenuous, and anything short of inducing a recession by tightening credit conditions prohibitively is unlikely to stem their rise. Even if a central bank were willing to take that one-in-three or less shot at cutting off a bubble, the cost-benefit analysis hardly justifies such preemptive action. The macroeconomic harm from a bubble bursting is generally a function of the financial system's structure and stability—in modern economies with satisfactory bank supervision, the transmission of a negative shock from an asset price bust is relatively limited, as was seen in the United States in 2002. However, where financial fragility does exist, as in Japan in the 1990s, the costs of inducing a recession go up significantly, so the relative disadvantages of monetary preemption over letting the bubble run its course mount. In the end, there is no monetary substitute for financial stability, and no market substitute for monetary ease during severe credit crunch. These two realities imply that the central bank should not take asset prices directly into account in monetary policymaking but should be anything but laissez-faire in responding to sharp movements in inflation and output, even if asset price swings are their source.(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Bank lending and property prices in Hong Kong

This paper studies the relationship between residential property prices and bank lending in Hong Kong. This is an interesting topic for three reasons. First, swings in property prices have been extremely large and frequent in Hong Kong. Second, under the currency board regime, monetary policy cannot be used to guard against asset price swings. Third, despite the collapse in property prices since 1998, the banking sector remains sound. While the contemporaneous correlation between lending and property prices is large, our results suggest that the direction of influence goes from property prices to bank credit rather than conversely.