Swedish Diplomacy Research Articles

Turning towards the inland sea? Swedish ’soft diplomacy‘ towards the Baltic Soviet republics before independence

ABSTRACT The period of relative openness in the Soviet Union from the mid 1980s provided an opportunity for Sweden to establish contacts with the neighbouring Baltic Soviet republics. The political situation on both sides did not allow any direct diplomatic relations, and all endeavours had to be taken with utmost care. While modest at first, even programmatically so, these initiatives served to establish links with the independence movements in the Baltic republics. Besides the Local consular branch of the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) in Leningrad, often acting without clear instructions from Stockholm, the Swedish government preferred to channel its first contacts with the Baltic republics through its primary institution for cultural and public diplomacy, the Swedish Institute (SI), later supplanted in this role by the Swedish International Development Authority (SIDA). In their low profile, these activities can be analysed as early examples of the ‘soft diplomacy’ which have characterized later Baltic-Nordic ‘new regionalism.’. Drawing upon archival materials of the SI, the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and interviews with key actors, this article shows how Swedish outreach to the Baltic republics was probed by Swedish diplomacy under considerable uncertainty of the development in the Eastern Baltic Sea region.

Chilean coup d’état and Swedish diplomacy

The neutrality of Sweden during the Cold War allowed it to take an active part in international politics, without joining any of the opposing blocs. This was particularly reflected in the so-called good offices and a series of mandates in Sweden, culminating in the Sweden mandate for the representation of interests in Chile (1973-1994). The article presents a brief historical insight into the development of diplomatic relations between Chile and Sweden. Based on the official Swedish diplomatic documents the authors explores the reaction of the Government of the Swedish Kingdom and society to the 1973 Chilean coup d'état and a policy towards the newly elected authorities. The article has placed a special emphasis on the activity of the Swedish Ambassador to Chile (1972-1973), the outstanding diplomat - Harald Edelstam, who, using his powers, was able to save more than 1,500 people persecuted by the government junta of Chile during the military dictatorship. They also identified the causes and circumstances under which Sweden assumed a mandate to represent Cuba’s interests in Chile and became political patron. At the same time, Stockholm did not request to represent the interests of Santiago, but they them-selve took the initiative. Thus, the protective mandate of Sweden to ensure Cuba’s interests in Chile became the longest among all the protective mandates of neutral European countries and had no precedent in the second half of the XXth century.

Swedish Diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific Region

The year 2018 marks the 150th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between Japan and Sweden. It is believed that the first contact between Sweden and Japan came during the Edo Period and was mediated by the Netherlands. The Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between Japan and Sweden, signed in 1868, also came into being thanks to the good offices of the Dutch. This treaty, like many others into which Japan entered at that time, was an “unequal treaty.” As Japan increased its presence in East Asia, this unequal treaty with Sweden was revised in 1911. The world was changing. Sweden and Japan shared a common interest in opposing Russia’s ambitions. Russia in particular was a common threat to the diplomatic posture and security of both Japan and Sweden. These two nations, positioned like bookends on either side of Russia, could be important strategic partners for one another and allies in their relationships with Russia. Considering the current issue of North Korea, Sweden also has the potential to act as a mediator because it maintains diplomatic relations with North Korea. There is reason to believe that the diplomatic relationship between Japan and Sweden will develop further.

An attempt to appoint a Swedish vice consul to Bucharest (1834-1835)

The economic development of Sweden at the end of the second decade of the nineteenth century accentuated the interest of the Swedish ruling circles to valorize the new economic potential. A series of measures, as the dissolution of the terrestrial customs between Sweden and Norway in 1825, or the abolition of the protectionist policy in imports, opened the way for the conclusion of certain commercial treaties with other states, such as that with Great Britain in 1826 or with the Ottoman Empire in 1827. Consequently, the commercial fleet, especially the Norwegian one, registered a substantial development. In this context, the Swedish diplomacy continued to pay close attention to Eastern Europe where favorable conditions for the extension of the foreign trade of Sweden and Norway could be found. This space, where the Romanian Principalities were located, had a geostrategic position and economic potential that had to be valorized. In order to achieve this goal, Sweden appointed consuls and vice consuls in the Romanian Principalities. The attempt to appoint a vice consul to Bucharest between 1834 and 1835 circumscribes this effort. The information regarding these demarches came from Swedish diplomatic reports, held in the funds of the National Archives of Sweden (Sveriges Riksarkivet), from Stockholm and offers, among many other details which may serve to broaden the horizon of the research regarding the history of Romanian-Swedish relations in the first half of the nineteenth century, an image of the Lutheran community from the capital of Wallachia.

Data pertaining to the outbreak of the Lithuanian insurrection (25 March 1831), retrieved from Swedish diplomatic sources

Similarly to the Polish insurrection of November 1830, the Lithuanian one, occurring in March 1831, retained the attention of the Swedish diplomacy from the very beginning. This was made possible, in the first place, by the fact that the events were connected by a strong link of causality, in the sense that they aimed at severing Poland and Lithuania from the political-institutional system of the Russian Empire and at reconstituting the old one, i.e. the Polish-Lithuanian Union. But the latter’s victory would have first resulted in the radical upheaval of the ratio of forces in North-Eastern Europe, which could have also affected the Swedish-Norwegian political-institutional system, since it was assumed that the Norwegians would not have spared any time in following the Lithuanian and Polish example by denouncing the personal union with Sweden. Moreover, the revolutionary wave sweeping over Europe in 1830 was not one to avoid Sweden. Unlike other areas, the Swedes that opposed King Karol XIV Jan’s government went no further than to criticise it, despite the fact that both the criticism and the programme of the opposition kept increasing in boldness. The Swedish diplomacy therefore approached the issue of the Polish and Lithuanian insurrections from the same perspective, taking particular care to observe their evolution, placing itself in a position of reserveless condemnation of such behaviour. The documents transcribed in the following pages are the diplomatic reports of N. Fr. Palmstjerna, the chargé d’affaires of Sweden in Petersburg, and were selected from the Sveriges Riksarkivet, Kabinettet/UD Huvudarkivet, E2D, 702, the Petersburg fund, 1821, Jan.-iuni. They sometimes contain very detailed information pertaining to the early phase of the Lithuanian insurrection. By introducing them to the academic circuit, we express our hope that they will contribute to the expansion of the research horizon of the history of North-Eastern Europe from the first half of the 19th century.

Multilateralism and the Shaping of an ‘Active Foreign Policy’: Sweden during the preparatory phase of the CSCE

This article deals with the early reactions of Swedish decision-makers and diplomats on the idea and preparations for the convocation of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), mainly during the years 1969–1971. On the basis of recently declassified diplomatic sources from the archive of the Swedish Foreign Ministry, the study outlines the role of Swedish diplomacy in the preparatory phase of the security conference as part of the wider context of European neutrality during détente. It is the very first contribution to the historiography of the Helsinki process based on Swedish archival material, and suggests that the picture of Sweden's widely mentioned active foreign policy at that time should be further scrutinized. It also sheds new light on the paradox between Swedish involvement in European and global politics.

One Day during the Holocaust: An Analysis of Raoul Wallenberg’s ‘Budapest Report’ of 12 September 1944

Click to increase image sizeClick to decrease image size Additional informationNotes on contributorsPaul A. LevinePaul. A. Levine is Senior Lecturer (Universitetslektor) in Holocaust history at Uppsala University. He has written extensively on Swedish diplomacy, and neutrality, during the Holocaust and Second World War. Most recently he has co-edited Collaboration and Resistance During the Holocaust: Belarus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania (2004).