Sustainable Common Pool Resource Management Research Articles

Do social identity and cognitive diversity correlate in environmental stakeholders? A novel approach to measuring cognitive distance within and between groups.

Groups with higher cognitive diversity, i.e. variations in how people think and solve problems, are thought to contribute to improved performance in complex problem-solving. However, embracing or even engineering adequate cognitive diversity is not straightforward and may even jeopardize social inclusion. In response, those that want to promote cognitive diversity might make a simplified assumption that there exists a link between identity diversity, i.e. range of social characteristics, and variations in how people perceive and solve problems. If this assumption holds true, incorporating diverse identities may concurrently achieve cognitive diversity to the extent essential for complex problem-solving, while social inclusion is explicitly acknowledged. However, currently there is a lack of empirical evidence to support this hypothesis in the context of complex social-ecological systems—a system wherein human and environmental dimensions are interdependent, where common-pool resources are used or managed by multiple types of stakeholders. Using a fisheries example, we examine the relationship between resource stakeholders’ identities and their cognitive diversity. We used cognitive mapping techniques in conjunction with network analysis to measure cognitive distances within and between stakeholders of various social types (i.e., identities). Our results empirically show that groups with higher identity diversity also demonstrate more cognitive diversity, evidenced by disparate characteristics of their cognitive maps that represent their understanding of fishery dynamics. These findings have important implications for sustainable management of common-pool resources, where the inclusion of diverse stakeholders is routine, while our study shows it may also achieve higher cognitive coverage that can potentially lead to more complete, accurate, and innovative understanding of complex resource dynamics.

Governance of alluvial aquifers and community participation: a social-ecological systems analysis of the Brazilian semi-arid region

Small and shallow alluvial aquifers in arid and semi-arid regions compose an important water system that smallholder farmers rely on for irrigation and livestock feeding. Geological settings and the small scale of these aquifers suggest the need for governance at the local level, but research supporting its development is still scarce. Treating a case of alluvial aquifers exploited by smallholder farmers located in the Brazilian semi-arid region as a common pool resource (CPR), this paper analyses the governance of a social-ecological system (SES) for which an alluvial aquifer is an essential source of water. The paper applies the SES Framework to analyse the SES in light of Ostrom’s principles for sustainable CPR management to answer the questions: (1) can the governance arrangements support sustainable common pool resource management of the alluvial aquifers? (2) what opportunities are there to make the management of the aquifer more sustainable through community-based governance? (3) can Ostrom’s design principles lead the transition to more sustainable governance of alluvial aquifers? Despite a water policy aiming for decentralisation and participatory governance, gaps in the implementation of these policies are identified. Taking into account the challenges imposed by the aquifer characteristics to impact efficient groundwater exploitation, equity in water distribution and conservation of the CPR, the analysis reveals opportunities to improve CPR management by supporting the community to increase participation in the governance of the aquifer in coordination with existing policies. This work concludes with suggestions that could empower community progress towards more sustainable governance of the aquifer.

Protective Rules and Collaborative Governance: Modeling Anticipated Success in Sustainable Management of Common-Pool Resources

When organizations collaborate to address resource sustainability dilemmas caused by environmental change, they must decide how to structure the rules governing collective decisions. Concerns about the risk of losing autonomy dissuade organizations from collaborating, yet the study of such governing rules has not been a central focus in both environmental and organizational literatures. We argue that governing rules designed to protect agency autonomy can entice participation from diverse stakeholders, including underprivileged and often marginalized environmental actors while enhancing confidence in the collaboration’s ongoing and anticipated sustainability efforts. We test this argument in the context of large-scale governance reform in California, in which the state recently mandated local governing entities to collaborate for sustainable groundwater planning or risk state intervention. Using data collected from both archival records and a state-wide survey of local groundwater managers, the analysis shows that inclusive representation, unweighted voting power structures, and unanimity decision rules constitute protective governance, which in turn boosts participating agencies’ confidence in sustainability efforts. This study provides theoretical and empirical insights into how organizations can address constitutional issues to improve collaborative processes and outcomes of environmental sustainability efforts.

Teaching the tragedy of open access: a classroom exercise on governing the commons

This paper addresses a prominent misconception in environmental economics and environmental studies concerning the 'tragedy of the commons' and sustainable management of common-pool resources. The open-commons dilemma prevents many students and instructors from realising the important role of common property regimes in sustainably managing resources. And, recognising the important role simulations play in enhancing student comprehension and retention of complex material, this paper outlines a unique way for students to participate in the development of common property relationships through the use of the online simulation Fishbanks. This activity has been highly successful when conducted in my classes, and students have responded to the exercise with enthusiasm.

Collective attention and active consumer participation in community energy systems

Community energy systems, which rely on demand-side self-organisation of energy distribution, can encounter situations in which demand exceeds supply, and unless the community members schedule energy usage by and between themselves, there will be a blackout. This is effectively a collective action dilemma typically modelled as a repeated game and analysed using Game Theory. In this paper, we investigate the situation from an empirical (rather than analytic) perspective using instead a Serious Game. Motivated firstly by Elinor Ostrom's institutional design principles for sustainable common-pool resource management, and secondly by the idea that collective attention is a prerequisite for successful collective action, we present the design and implementation of a Serious Game which both encapsulates (some of) the design principles and promotes collective attention within the game's interface, affordances and interactions. Our experimental results show that as more interface design features which promote collective attention are enabled, then more often successful collective action is observed. These results have, we argue, important implications for Smart Meter design and roll-out programmes, as well as leveraging the active participation of prosumers in innovative operational and management principles for future Smart Grids.

Rethinking the sustainability and institutional governance of electricity access and mini-grids: Electricity as a common pool resource

Rural mini-grids are viewed as a key technology for providing access to electricity to the billion or more people that lack it by 2030 (in line with the UN’s Sustainable Energy for All commitment). But at present no model for the sustainable management of rural mini-grids exists, which contributes to high failure rates. This paper makes a number of contributions. First, it explores how electricity in mini-grids might be understood as a Common Pool Resource (CPR), opening up potential to learn from the extensive literature on institutional characteristics of sustainable CPR management in the natural resource management literature. Second, it refines Agrawal’s (2001) overarching framework of enabling conditions for sustainable CPR management institutions to develop a framework applicable to rural mini-grid management in developing countries. Thirdly, the utility of this refined framework is demonstrated by applying it to analyse data from 27 semi-structured interviews with actors with expertise in mini-grid development and management in Kenya and 2 field visits to rural mini-grids there. This contributes a nuanced basis for future application of CPR theory to mini-grids and a systematic analysis of institutional challenges and possible solutions, which have hitherto received limited attention in the energy and development literature.

Using qualitative models to define sustainable management for the commons in data poor conditions

Nearly 50 years after Hardin’s “tragedy of the commons” we have not yet found predictive tools to guide us towards sustainable management of common-pool resources (CPR). We often have a good understanding of the qualitative relationships between the principal actors in socioecological systems (SESs), but classical quantitative approaches require a tremendous amount of data to understand the drivers of SESs sustainability. Here we show that qualitative modelling approaches can provide important governance insights for SESs that are understood but not quantified.We used Loop Analysis to test the outcomes of different management regimes on a simple nature-based tourism SES described by economic, social and environmental variables. We tested the sustainability of different management scenarios on this system and we identified the necessary conditions to achieve it.We found that management regimes where property rights and responsibilities are shared between different stakeholders are more likely to be successful. However, the system is generally highly unstable and it is important to tune each strategy to each particular situation.The conditions for sustainability found across the different systems tested were: a low reinvestment rate of tourist revenues into new infrastructures and a low growth rate of the environment. Management strategies based on maximum sustainable yield, which keep the environment far from its carrying capacity, have less chance to be sustainable.Qualitative models of SESs are powerful diagnostic tools; they can help identifying variables that play an important role in determining socioecological sustainability in data-poor circumstances and guide the design of efficient data collection programmes. Our results highlight the importance of careful planning when designing management strategies for nature-based tourism. The application of one-size-fits-all solutions to every situation is likely to lead to the failure of the commons; however tourism-based SESs can be sustainable if management strategies are tuned to each particular case.

Local Rules and Their Enforcement in the Arabuko-Sokoke Forest Reserve Co-Management Arrangement in Kenya

ABSTRACT The management of common-pool resources is a key problem in global environmental governance: forests, freshwater resources, pastures, and land are often managed by communities and organisations (bureaucracies, NGOs) at different organisational scales that are competing for the right to manage the resource in question, and often find ambiguous negotiated institutional solutions to co-management problems. Often these solutions are the result of complex bargaining processes rather than of institutional design. In the context of the ongoing debate over the kinds of rules that are appropriate for the sustainable management of common-pool resources (CPRs), this paper examines the local rules and their enforcement emerging from comanagement between government agencies and local project communities in Arabuko-Sokoke Forest Reserve (ASFR), Kenya's largest remaining coastal forest. Arabuko-Sokoke has been a national forest reserve for many decades, but only during the past two decades have communities been...

Self-Governance and Sustainable Common Pool Resource Management in Kyrgyzstan

How to best govern natural resources in order to enable a sustainable way of handling them is what both research and practice aim to achieve. Empirical findings from several studies indicate that resource users are able to successfully cooperate in the management of common pool resources and solve social dilemmas through self-governance arrangements. The authors explore the potential success of self-governance in irrigation systems, focusing primarily on the factors influencing compliance of irrigation water users under self-crafted and self-enforced rules in two Kyrgyz communities. A field experiment is employed to provide insights and some quantitative empirical data, further complemented by qualitative methods (questionnaires, group discussions and interviews) to enhance the analysis of the findings about working rules in irrigation at the community level. The results show that Kyrgyz irrigation users of the selected communities generally respond better in a self-governance setting in terms of rules compliance, distribution efficiency and equity. Compliance and cooperative behavior depend on group as well as individual variables including communication, social norms and the legitimacy of rules.

Exogenous regulatory institutions for sustainable common pool resource management: Application to groundwater

This paper focuses on introducing and comparing various types of external regulatory institutions for management of common pool resources (CPRs), namely the quota-based management, resource status-based management, tax-based management, and bankruptcy management institutions. The performance of these regulatory institutions in a heterogeneous set of physical conditions is demonstrated using a stylized numerical groundwater exploitation example. Results suggest that the benefits to different types of users as well as the sustainability of the CPR vary by the regulator's choice of management institution. More specifically, quota-based management and CPR status-based management institutions can lead to increased benefits to CPR beneficiaries, prolong the CPR's life, and prevent “tragedy of the commons.” In contrast, tax-based management institutions may fail to secure sustainable use of the CPRs. Bankruptcy-based management institutions may also be used toward sustainable use of the CPRs and to increase the benefits to the users; however, their overall effectiveness is not as desirable as the quota-based and resource status-based management institutions, especially when enforcing social justice is an issue of concern for the regulator.

Cooperative institutions for sustainable common pool resource management: Application to groundwater

Beneficiaries of common pool resources (CPRs) may select available noncooperative and regulatory exogenous institutions for managing the resource, as well as cooperative management institutions. All these institutions may increase the long‐term gains, prolong the life of the resource, and help to escape the tragedy of the commons trap. Cooperative game theory approaches can serve as the backbone of cooperative CPR management institutions. This paper formulates and applies several commonly used cooperative game theoretic solution concepts, namely, the core, Nash‐Harsanyi, Shapley, and nucleolus. Through a numerical groundwater example, we show how CPR users can share the gains obtained from cooperation in a fair and efficient manner based on these cooperative solution concepts (management institutions). Although, based on their fairness rationales, various cooperative management institutions may suggest different allocations that are potentially acceptable to the users, these allocation solutions may not be stable as some users may find them unfair. This paper discusses how different methods, such as application of the plurality rule and power index, stability index, and propensity to disrupt concepts, can help identify the most stable and likely solutions for enforcing cooperation among the CPR beneficiaries. Furthermore, how the noncooperative managerial characteristics of the CPR users can affect the stability and acceptability of the different cooperative CPR management institutions is discussed, providing valuable policy insights for cooperative CPR management at community levels.

Weeden and Chow: Commentary from a legal perspective

The paper, ‘Space sustainability through the sustainable management of common-pool resources: a framework and potential policies’ by Brian Weeden and Tiffany Chow, researches Long-Term Sustainability issues (LTS) from the perspectives of both economics and governance, focusing on analyzing Elinor Ostrom's principles, and puts forward the main elements for a management regime. Their paper will be helpful for the international community to understand the importance of LTS, to further discussions in this field and even to shape a framework for tackling LTS. On the other hand, some of the principles raised by Ostrom still need to be clarified and deliberated throughout the international community. This commentary will analyze some of Ostrom's principles from the perspective of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty (OST) and put forward the values LTS should encompass based on an analysis of its relations with provisions in the OST.

Non-cooperative institutions for sustainable common pool resource management: Application to groundwater

As demands for limited natural resources increase, developing management institutions that ensure the sustainability of such resources is essential. Many natural resources are Common Pool Resources (CPRs), managed under different non-cooperative, cooperative, and externally imposed management frameworks. While early studies of non-cooperative CPR management suggest inevitable “tragedy of the commons,” here we discuss how users can avoid tragic outcomes by changing their decision making rationales and exploitation strategies even in a non-cooperative environment. This paper introduces and compares various types of non-cooperative institutions that are available to manage CPRs. These management institutions are then applied, using a numerical groundwater exploitation example, to determine how different planning variables are affected by the choice of management institution. Results indicate that CPR users can improve their gains by considering the externalities and developing long-term exploitation plans, as opposed to short-term plans with no consideration of externalities that result in rapid exhaustion of the resource and lead to the so-called “tragedy of the commons.”

Multilevel water, biodiversity and climate adaptation governance: evaluating adaptive management in Lesotho

In many cases in which climate change affects natural resources, impacts are uncertain and adaptation to climate change often involves collective action problems at the local level, which are embedded in multilevel governance regimes. Adaptive management (AM) is an emerging approach to deal with such uncertainty and complexity by promoting multilevel institutions that are robust to change and able to learn. Much of the literature evaluating AM in multilevel governance regimes, however, focuses only on the adherence to certain structural features said to make AM successful, leaving aside the question whether AM actually produces desired outcomes. This paper evaluates AM in multilevel regimes also in terms of the outcomes they produce. To this end, we first apply the Management and Transition Framework (MTF) in order to describe three multilevel regimes in Lesotho. For each regime we then observe whether it adheres to the structure features of AM. Finally, we evaluate the extent to which the outcomes, natural resource management projects, are conducive to Ostrom's (1990) ‘design principles’ for sustainable common-pool resource management. We find that, though no ideal ‘adaptive regime’ is found in Lesotho, the results confirm the AM hypotheses that decentralised decision-making, open information sources, and plurality of user interests lead to improved outcomes. Conversely, elements of the climate regime are found not to be adaptive. Our findings also confirm the appropriateness of AM as a governance approach to climate adaptation.

From public open access to common property: the prospects and challenges of institutionalizing boundaries for self-governance and management of community irrigation dams in the Upper East Region, Ghana

The Hardian solutions to the excessive abuses of common-pool resources are still being contested. On the one hand public ownership is seen as a major draw back to the efficient and sustainable management of common-pool resources, and on the other the challenges of private ownership in addressing issues of equity and access. Self-governing community management groups are now seen as the panacea. The paper explores the mechanisms that the Water User Associations are using to address the critical issues of boundaries. It addresses three interrelated questions, i.e. how do communities: (1) delimit the territoriality of their irrigation schemes? (2) define authority spheres within the context of the traditional land ownership system? (3) define the limits of each individual user within the context of competing users such that conflicts are minimized? The central finding is that, although successes are not uniform across the board, the WUAs are employing ingenious mechanisms to define clear resource, authority and user boundaries to enable them set up workable systems for self-governance and the management of their communal dams in more sustainable ways. On the basis of the findings, it is recommended that for a lasting impact, the Ministry of Food and Agriculture (MoFA) will need to assist the emerging WUAs in this process of institutionalization. Ghana Journal of Development Studies Vol. 3(1) 2006: 102-118

A Framework for Resolving the Transboundary Water Allocation Conflict Conundrum

This paper describes a methodology for resolving transboundary water disputes that arise when people/states/nations sharing a resource that crosses legal/political jurisdictions disagree about the use of the resource. Laws and treaties written in an attempt to settle disputes are frequently neither enforced nor effective, and disagreements continue. Crises, arising through resource overuse or shortages, worsen the conflict and typically result in further discord, lawsuits, depletion of the resource, and even open-armed hostility. Many water management experts call for either private/market-based or state/command-and-control resource management systems, but these eventually break down during crisis. The crises therefore necessitate the adoption of a more effective institutional arrangement to address and resolve present and future problems. A better alternative to management by private or state entities and the resolution of conflicts by the mere application of law is a cooperative approach. The Rowland-Ostrom Framework, introduced in this paper, incorporates Ostrom's eight design principles for sustainable common pool resource management within the context of crisis that involves an urgent threat to the quantity or quality of a resource such as water, as described by the author. This paper demonstrates that although established 15 years ago, Ostrom's design principles remain applicable today for effective, sustainable transboundary water management, and the Rowland-Ostrom Framework is a model for the equitable use of shared water resources throughout the world.