Survey Of Small Business Finances Research Articles

Race Differentials in the Credit Market Experiences of Small Business Owners

AbstractSmall businesses employ more than half of the entire workforce, account for more than sixty percent of new jobs created in the United States, and are responsible for about fifty percent of private domestic gross product. It is noteworthy, however, that small business owners in credit markets, in particular minority owners, have difficulty in securing sources of capital for their business operation. The literature on credit market discrimination shows consistent results that can be interpreted as evidence that minority owners are discriminated against compared to their counterparts (i.e., White owners) in obtaining loans, which may be caused by lenders’ discrimination, although such behavior is prohibited under current fair-lending laws. This paper uses pooled cross-sectional data from the Survey of Small Business Finances (1993, 1998, and 2003) and a bivariate probit model based on James J. Heckman’s approach to deal with sample selection bias for those choosing to apply for loans. Those who didn’t apply for loans have been ignored in analyses of credit markets for small business owners. This paper adds to the small business lending market literature by 1) combining cross sectional data from the Survey of Small Business Finances (SSBF) for 1993, 1998, and 2003 to get more precise estimates and test statistics with more power; 2) conducting regression analyses with different model specifications to show the robustness of the empirical results; and 3) dealing directly with problems of sample selection based on Heckman’s approach with particular attention to the assumptions required to justify the identification of the effect (i.e., exclusion restrictions).The analysis confirms previous results, suggesting that minority owners are discriminated against in credit markets. These conclusions are supported in a variety of model specifications.

Racial disparities in the small business loan market

ABSTRACT We investigate patterns of racial bias in small business loans denial rates in the US across different credit risk scores. Using data constructed from the 1998 Survey of Small Business Finances and Kauffman Firm Survey, we find disparities in loan approval ratings between Black and White entrepreneurs in intermediate risk categories, but not for the best and worst categories. We explain these findings with a simple and generalizable statistical discrimination model where banks hold prior beliefs of repayment probability based on the applicant’s group and observe noisy signals of creditworthiness. Our model predicts that differences in loan denial rates across groups are more pronounced at middle range values and disappear at very high and very low credit scores. Identifying the likely cause of differential treatment in the market is an important first step in improving representation of minority groups as entrepreneurs. Our findings contribute to this critical effort by delineating the nature of racial bias in the credit market and informing remediation policies.

Access to Credit for Minority-owned Businesses

Equal access to small business credit is a critical underpinning to equity in economic opportunity; however, it is difficult to regularly assess the fairness of credit provision. Prior research has focused on the Federal Reserve Board’s Survey of Small Business Finance, but last data from this source covered 2003. This article provides preliminary results on new credit access question added to the Census Bureau’s 2021 Annual Business Survey. We find that minority-owned businesses were just as likely to apply for credit in 2020, but Black-, Asian-, and Hispanic-owned businesses were less likely than white-owned businesses to report receiving all of the credit that they sought. Black-, Asian-, and Hispanic-owned firms also more frequently reported that the credit was intended for meeting operating expenses and that their ongoing viability was weaker heading into 2022.

Why are there Racial Disparities in the Small Business Loan Market

We investigate patterns of racial bias in small business loans denial rates in the U.S. across different credit risk scores. We motivate this inquiry with a simple and generalizable statistical discrimination model where banks observe noisy signals of creditworthiness and hold prior beliefs of repayment probability based on the applicant’s group. Our model predicts that differences in approval rating across groups are more pronounced at middle range values and disappear at very high and very low credit scores. Using data constructed from the 1998 Survey of Small Business Finances and the restricted access Kauffman Firm Survey we find disparities in loan approval ratings between Black and White entrepreneurs in intermediate risk categories but not for the best and worst categories.

Entrepreneurial Finance: Analyzing the Demand for the Personal Guarantee

This study contributes to the current body of entrepreneurial finance literature by analyzing multiple aspects of personal guarantees. We conducted a survey yielding 1,462 responses from owners or managers of incorporated small businesses geographically dispersed throughout the United States. Of these, 383 C or S corporations had loans in place during 2014. The survey focuses on personal guarantees used on five types of loans: lines of credit, mortgages, equipment loans, vehicle loans, and a loan type referred to as "other loans." We found the variation increase in personal guarantees for equipment loans, vehicle loans, and other types of loans during the 27 years (1987 – 2014) to be significant with a 95% confidence level, with a 5% margin of error. We found an underinvestment problem (Ang, Lin & Tyler, 1995) exists as 12.5% of owners of incorporated small businesses have decided not to undertake a positive net present value project because the lender required a personal guarantee to obtain a loan for the project. We found lenders denied 10.9% of these 383 corporations a loan resulting in credit rationing because of these corporations' inability to meet the lender's personal guarantee requirements. We found more than 15% of the 383 corporation owners refused the lender's requirement to provide a personal guarantee. Almost 42% of the 15% still received a loan from the same lender after refusing to provide a personal guarantee. We found that only 22.2% of female small-incorporated business owners received a loan after refusing to provide a personal guarantee from the same lender. Compared to 51.4% of the male small incorporated business owners still received the loan after refusing to provide a personal guarantee. Overall, we found that only 37% of the 1,462 incorporated small business respondents had a loan in place during 2014 compared to 67% of incorporated businesses documented by the Federal Reserve Board's 1987 National Survey of Small Business Finances.

Determinants of Small Business Owner Loan

Shareholders and debtholders have diverging objectives. Shareholders are residual claimants whereas debtholders are fxed claimants to frm’s assets. In leveraged frms, shareholders may increase the value of their claims at the expense of debtholders. The presence of shareholders being debtholders is a smart interest alignment, providing a solution to shareholder-debtholder conflicts. This paper focuses on small businesses, which play an important role in the United States economy but are generally neglected by academia. Utilizing National Survey of Small Business Finance (NSSBF) data, this paper shows that frms with higher agency cost of debt are more likely to issue owner loan. The incidence of small business owner loan is positively associated with external lending diffculty, low shareholder agency cost and frm valuation diffculty.

An empirical investigation on loan applications and fear of rejection of external financing in the foodservice industry

ABSTRACTThis article examines the loan application decision patterns of small-cap foodservice firms and the causes of these firms’ discouragement (fear of rejection) in relation to their external finance-seeking efforts. We utilize information and data collected by the Survey of Small Business Finances on a variety of aspects related to small-cap foodservice firm owners and firms, including market-lender characteristics, use of financial services, and income and balance sheet information in the United States. Our primary findings reveal that sufficient liquidity and owner net worth reduce external finance seeking. In addition, firm credit quality and owner minority status increase discouragement toward external finance seeking, while education reduces fear of rejection.

Does Lending by banks and non-banks differ? Evidence from small business financing

Non-bank loans to corporate businesses have shown a dramatic increase compared to bank loans. Despite the increasing importance of non-bank lending, the differences between loans made by different types of lenders are mostly unknown. To uncover the distinctions, the author investigates whether bank and non-bank financial institutions deal differently with information scarcity of small firms by introducing lender-borrower distance as a proxy for information availability. Using the National Survey of Small Business Finances (NSSBF) provided by the Federal Reserve Board, estimate the loan approval probability models after controlling for various borrower characteristics. The NSSBF data is collected by using stratified sampling to ensure sufficient numbers of observations for minority-owned firms. To circumvent potential bias due to the sampling method, the author follows the approach suggested by Wooldridge (1999) and estimates a weighted maximum likelihood estimation to adjust for sampling design. This paper establishes novel evidence supporting the notion that banks and non-bank financial institutions are different in their ability to deal with information scarcity. Bank loan approval probability decreases as distance to their borrowers increases, while its effect on non-bank loan approval probability is statistically insignificant, supporting the notion that non-bank lending is different from bank lending in dealing with information asymmetry.

Credit ratings, relationship lending and loan market efficiency

PurposeUsing the small-business loan market, this paper aims to test whether a structural shift in access to borrowers’ financial information (i.e. credit ratings) improves market efficiency, thereby improving entrepreneurs’ access to external capital.Design/methodology/approachThis research uses the National Survey of Small Business Finance in a conditional logistic regression framework to tease out the marginal propensity to grant lines of credit given the firm’s credit rating – treating both of the events, namely, line of credit and credit ratings, as endogenous variables. This methodology overcomes potential reverse causality issues.FindingsThe results show that information brokers have allowed small firms to break away from long-term monopolistic lending relationships, thus contributing to more informationally efficient markets. Small businesses benefit from better-informed lenders by having better access to capital. Also, women appear less likely to receive a line of credit even after adjusting for credit ratings.Practical implicationsThis research highlights the importance of credit report awareness/monitoring by entrepreneurs, as the small-business credit rating grows rapidly. Relationship lending is not enough to reach optimal financing costs. These papers call for more regulated credit ratings industry to reduce potential moral hazards.Originality/valueThis paper tests whether bank lending relationships (soft information) still matter after accounting for credit ratings (hard information). Additionally, this study measures the extent to which information sharing by data services bureaus, a proxy for informational efficiency, has increased allocation efficiency in the small-business loan market.

Borrowing Challenges for Minorities: How Lending Technologies Affect Discrimination in the SME Credit Market

Can relationship-lending technology be used to overcome discrimination, as the Allport’s (1954) contact hypothesis suggests? Or should minorities stay away from the bank? Using a sample of SMEs from the Survey of Small Business Finances 2003, this article shows that though relationship-lending technology generally reduces the spread and probability of the need to provide collateral for a loan, use of such technology actually leads to greater discrimination against minorities. Asians are the most negatively affected by this effect, followed by Afro-Americans and Hispanics. However, this effect occurs only when the length of the relationship is short; it tends to disappear when relationships are longer. With regard to the area in which a firm is located, there is less discrimination in areas with high minority population rates than in areas with low minority population rates. These results are robust with regard to the self-selection problem.

Proposing a Financial Legitimacy Threshold in Emerging Ventures

Two decades of informative research has asserted that legitimacy attainment is essential to the survival and growth of emerging ventures, yet little empirical research has been conducted to either (a) validate the notion that emerging ventures transition from pre-legitimacy to legitimacy, or (b) identify when such a transition happens for the average new venture. Hence, the present research seeks to begin bridging this substantial gap by introducing and testing the notion that a financial legitimacy threshold (FLT) exists within emerging ventures. Using attainment of financing as a proxy for initial legitimacy, we test our hypothesis that an FLT exists on two large, independent data sets—the 1998 ( N = 3,033) and 2003 ( N = 3,751) Surveys of Small Business Finances. Results indicate that emerging ventures tend to finally transition to legitimacy and, thus, substantially shed external liabilities of newness at 12 years of age, six employees, and $379,000 in sales. Our findings that an FLT exists advance the literature by (a) suggesting that new venture legitimacy is a dichotomous variable that emerging firms either do or do not possess, and (b) articulating a point in size, age, and revenue that average emerging ventures must achieve before they are able to substantially neutralize external newness liabilities via legitimacy attainment.

Who needs credit and who gets credit? Evidence from the surveys of small business finances

We use data from the Surveys of Small Business Finances to classify small privately held firms into four groups based upon their need for credit. Our results reveal strong and significant differences among each of these four groups of firms. Firms that report no need for credit are significantly less levered, more liquid, older, and of higher credit quality than are firms that report a need for credit, and their owners are older, are more likely to be white, are more creditworthy, and have fewer bank and nonbank relationships. Firms reporting that they were discouraged from applying for credit significantly outnumber and are significantly different from firms that applied for and were denied credit on a number of dimensions such as size, profitability, owner age, and the number of sources of financial services. Our counterfactual analysis indicates that about one in three discouraged borrowers would have received credit had they applied for credit. Denied borrowers differ from approved borrowers across numerous characteristics, as previously documented in the literature.

Can Financing Constraints Explain the Evolution of the Firm Size Distribution?

This paper exploits a comprehensive data set on business credit decisions to examine the importance of financing constraints for the evolution of the firm size distribution. The survey of small business finances provides information on whether a firm was in need of external financing. Firms without access to external financing—either because they were denied credit or because they did not apply for credit because they expected to be denied credit—are significantly smaller. To tighten the link between financing constraints and firm dynamics, I estimate the effect of financing constraints on subsequent employment growth and find that firms without access to external financing exhibit up to 3.5 % points lower annual employment growth than do their unconstrained counterparts. These findings suggest that financing constraints are a potentially important factor for understanding firm dynamics.

Gender differences in Type 1 credit rationing of small businesses in the US

AbstractThis paper explores Type 1 credit rationing by gender using data from the 1998 and 2003 Survey of Small Business Finances (SSBF). Type 1 credit rationing occurs when borrowers receive a smaller loan than they requested. We use two measures of Type 1 credit rationing to examine whether it is related to gender discrimination in lending. Our results show that women business owners are not likely to be Type 1 rationed. However, newer female-owned firms receive significantly lower loan amounts than requested compared to their male-owned counterparts. We also find that less experienced women receive significantly lower loan amounts compared to less experienced men.

Do small businesses still prefer community banks?

We formulate and test hypotheses about the role of bank type – small versus large, single-market versus multimarket, and local versus nonlocal banks – in banking relationships. The conventional paradigm suggests that “community banks” – small, single-market, local institutions – are better able to form strong relationships with informationally opaque small businesses, while “megabanks” – large, multimarket, nonlocal institutions – tend to serve more transparent firms. Using the 2003 Survey of Small Business Finance (SSBF), we conduct two sets of tests. First, we test for the type of bank serving as the “main” relationship bank for small businesses with different firm and owner characteristics. Second, we test for the strength of these main relationships by examining the probability of an exclusive relationship and main bank relationship length as functions of main bank type and financial fragility, as well as firm and owner characteristics. The results are often not consistent with the conventional paradigm, perhaps because of changes in lending technologies and deregulation of the banking industry.

Why are female small business owners in the United States less likely to apply for bank loans than their male counterparts?

Female business owners are more likely to be discouraged from applying for a bank loan compared to male business owners because they fear that their application will be rejected. Analyzing data from three ‘Surveys of Small Business Finances,’ our study examines the likely reasons why they are discouraged. Using the maximum likelihood approach, we estimate the probability of loan denial. We found evidence of bank discrimination against female-owned businesses, which in turn prevents women entrepreneurs applying for credit (feedback effect). We recommend that further investigation of this feedback effect of loan denial on business owners' decision-making process be undertaken.

Geographical location: does distance matter or what is the value status of soft information?

Purpose – This study aims to examine empirically the relationship between loan denials and lender distance and location. Design/methodology/approach – This study uses the 2003 Survey of Small Business Finance (SSBF) to draw the sample. This survey, conducted by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve, collects information on small businesses' use of financial services. In total the survey gathered information representing 4,240 firms (all sample firms have fewer than 500 employees). A number of statistical tests are conducted to test the relationship between loan denials and lender characteristics. Findings – The results of this study indicate that credit scores have no impact on the geographical location and lender distance; however, lender distance decreases with the length of relationship with the lender and the age of the business. This suggests that informationally opaque businesses seek out lenders nearby to maximize the value of soft information, whereas established businesses put no value on that. However, the probability of loan denial is not affected by the distance between the borrower and the lender. At the same time borrowers in rural areas are more likely to be denied. Thus, there seems to be a location effect in lending. Originality/value – This study closes a gap in the literature with regard to the value of soft information in light of increasing bank consolidation. Furthermore, this paper uses borrower data, making this – to the authors' knowledge – the first study on lending distance that does not utilize lender data.

Credit Scores and Credit Market Outcomes: Evidence from the SSBF and KFS

This study utilizes data from the Federal Reserve Board’s Surveys of Small Business Finances (SSBFs) and from the Kauffman Foundation’s Kauffman Firm Surveys (KFSs) to provide new evidence on how business credit scoring affects the availability of credit to female- and minority-owned firms. SSBF and KFS data are analyzed using a three-step sequential model of (i) who needs credit, (ii) who applies for credit, and (iii) who gets credit. Analyses of data from both surveys show that firms with lower business credit scores are: (i) more likely to need additional credit because their credit needs have not already been met by past borrowings; (ii) more likely to be discouraged from applying for credit when they report a need for additional credit; and (iii) more likely to be denied credit when they need additional credit and apply for credit. However, when the analyses include a comprehensive set of control variables for firm characteristics, owner characteristics, and firm-lender relationships (SSBF data only), results indicate that business credit scores have no incremental explanatory power over that of the control variables, with the notable exceptions of denial of SSBF firms and discouragement of KFS firms. Moreover, the analyses find no evidence that business credit scores have a disproportionately adverse effect on the availability of credit either to (i) female-owned firms relative to male-owned firms or (ii) to minority-owned firms relative to non-Hispanic white-owned firms. Nor is there any evidence from the SSBF data that business credit scores reduce the importance of firm-lender relationships.

Organizational structure, ownership structure and credit ratings: evidence from SMEs.

This paper documents that credit ratings of closed corporations depend on their organizational structure and ownership structure (family management and family control). Using the data from the Survey of Small Business Finance (SSBF), we show that S-Corporations have higher credit ratings than C-Corporations. We argue that lower information asymmetries inherent in S-Corporations lead to better credit ratings. We also show that ownership structure – as explained by family control and family management – is also associated with higher credit ratings. We argue that increased monetary stake of a single entity – family – translates into his altruistic commitment and increased effort, thereby improving credit ratings.

Do Small Businesses Still Prefer Community Banks?

We formulate and test hypotheses about the role of bank type – small versus large, single-market versus multimarket, and local versus nonlocal banks – in banking relationships. The conventional paradigm suggests that "community banks" – small, single market, local institutions – are better able to form strong relationships with informationally opaque small businesses, while "megabanks" – large, multimarket, nonlocal institutions – tend to serve more transparent firms. Using the 2003 Survey of Small Business Finance (SSBF), we conduct two sets of tests. First, we test for the type of bank serving as the "main" relationship bank for small businesses with different firm and owner characteristics. Second, we test for the strength of these main relationships by examining the probability of multiple relationships and relationship length as functions of main bank type and financial fragility, as well as firm and owner characteristics. The results are often not consistent with the conventional paradigm, perhaps because of changes in lending technologies and deregulation of the banking industry.