Surprise Recognition Memory Test Research Articles

The dorsomedial prefrontal cortex prioritizes social learning during rest

Sociality is a defining feature of the human experience: We rely on others to ensure survival and cooperate in complex social networks to thrive. Are there brain mechanisms that help ensure we quickly learn about our social world to optimally navigate it? We tested whether portions of the brain's default network engage "by default" to quickly prioritize social learning during the memory consolidation process. To test this possibility, participants underwent functional MRI (fMRI) while viewing scenes from the documentary film, Samsara. This film shows footage of real people and places from around the world. We normed the footage to select scenes that differed along the dimension of sociality, while matched on valence, arousal, interestingness, and familiarity. During fMRI, participants watched the "social" and "nonsocial" scenes, completed a rest scan, and a surprise recognition memory test. Participants showed superior social (vs. nonsocial) memory performance, and the social memory advantage was associated with neural pattern reinstatement during rest in the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (DMPFC), a key node of the default network. Moreover, it was during early rest that DMPFC social pattern reinstatement was greatest and predicted subsequent social memory performance most strongly, consistent with the "prioritization" account. Results simultaneously update 1) theories of memory consolidation, which have not addressed how social information may be prioritized in the learning process, and 2) understanding of default network function, which remains to be fully characterized. More broadly, the results underscore the inherent human drive to understand our vastly social world.

Perceptual Generalization of Alcohol-Related Value Characterizes Risky Drinkers

Generalizing from past experiences to novel situations is critical for adaptive behavior, whereas overgeneralization can promote maladaptive responses (e.g., context-inappropriate fear in anxiety). Here, we propose that overgeneralizing alcohol-related associations characterizes risky drinking. We conducted two online experiments assessing generalization of alcohol-related gains (Study 1) and losses (Study 2) among individuals who engaged in light or risky patterns of drinking (Study 1: N = 88, 24–44 years old; Study 2: N = 87, 21–44 years old). After learning to associate cards with alcohol and non-alcohol-related outcomes, participants chose whether to play with cards varying in perceptual similarity to those shown during conditioning. Finally, participants completed a surprise recognition memory test for all outcomes. Although both groups showed comparable conditioning, we found that risky drinkers overgeneralized alcohol-related gains and losses. Risky drinkers also showed a bias toward recognizing alcohol-related images. These results indicate a novel role for overgeneralization of alcohol-related gains and losses as a mechanism associated with risky drinking.

Age differences in neural distinctiveness during memory encoding, retrieval, and reinstatement.

Robust evidence points to mnemonic deficits in older adults related to dedifferentiated, i.e. less distinct, neural responses during memory encoding. However, less is known about retrieval-related dedifferentiation and its role in age-related memory decline. In this study, younger and older adults were scanned both while incidentally learning face and house stimuli and while completing a surprise recognition memory test. Using pattern similarity searchlight analyses, we looked for indicators of neural dedifferentiation during encoding, retrieval, and encoding-retrieval reinstatement. Our findings revealed age-related reductions in neural distinctiveness during all memory phases in visual processing regions. Interindividual differences in retrieval- and reinstatement-related distinctiveness were strongly associated with distinctiveness during memory encoding. Both item- and category-level distinctiveness predicted trial-wise mnemonic outcomes. We further demonstrated that the degree of neural distinctiveness during encoding tracked interindividual variability in memory performance better than both retrieval- and reinstatement-related distinctiveness. All in all, we contribute to meager existing evidence for age-related neural dedifferentiation during memory retrieval. We show that neural distinctiveness during retrieval is likely tied to recapitulation of encoding-related perceptual and mnemonic processes.

Motor engagement enhances incidental memory for task-irrelevant items.

Actions shape what we see and memorize. A previous study suggested the interaction between motor and memory systems by showing that memory encoding for task-irrelevant items was enhanced when presented with motor-response cues. However, in the studies on the attentional boost effect, it has been revealed that detection of the target stimulus can lead to memory enhancement without requiring overt action. Thus, the direct link between the action and memory remains unclear. To exclude the effect of the target detection process as a potential confounder, this study assessed the benefit of action for memory by separating items from the response cue in time. In our pre-registered online experiment (N = 142), participants responded to visual Go cues by pressing a key (i.e., motor task) or counting (i.e., motor-neutral cognitive task) while ignoring No-go cues. In each trial, two task-irrelevant images were sequentially presented after the cue disappearance. After encoding the Go/No-go tasks, participants performed a surprise recognition memory test for those images. Importantly, we quantified the impact of overt execution of the action by comparing memories with and without motor response and the impact of covert motor processes (e.g., preparation and planning of action) by comparing memory between the motor and cognitive tasks. The results showed no memory differences between Go and No-go trials in the motor task. This means that the execution itself was not critical for memory enhancement. However, the memory performance in the motor No-go trials was higher than that in the cognitive No-go trials, only for the items presented away from the cues in time. Therefore, engaging the motor task itself could increase incidental memory for the task-irrelevant items compared to a passive viewing situation. We added empirical evidence on the online interaction between action and memory encoding. These memory advantages could be especially brought in action preparation and planning. We believe this fact may expand our present understanding of everyday memory, such as active learning.

The graded novelty encoding task: Novelty gradually improves recognition of visual stimuli under incidental learning conditions

It has been argued that novel compared to familiar stimuli are preferentially encoded into memory. Nevertheless, treating novelty as a categorical variable in experimental research is considered simplistic. We highlight the dimensional aspect of novelty and propose an experimental design that manipulates novelty continuously. We created the Graded Novelty Encoding Task (GNET), in which the difference between stimuli (i.e. novelty) is parametrically manipulated, paving the way for quantitative models of novelty processing. We designed an algorithm which generates visual stimuli by placing colored shapes in a grid. During the familiarization phase of the task, we repeatedly presented five pictures to the participants. In a subsequent incidental learning phase, participants were asked to differentiate between the “familiars” and novel images that varied in the degree of difference to the familiarized pictures (i.e. novelty). Finally, participants completed a surprise recognition memory test, where the novel stimuli from the previous phase were interspersed with distractors with similar difference characteristics. We numerically expressed the differences between the stimuli to compute a dimensional indicator of novelty and assessed whether it predicted recognition memory performance. Based on previous studies showing the beneficial effect of novelty on memory formation, we hypothesized that the more novel a given picture was, the better subsequent recognition performance participants would demonstrate. Our hypothesis was confirmed: recognition performance was higher for more novel stimuli. The GNET captures the continuous nature of novelty, and it may be useful in future studies that examine the behavioral and neurocognitive aspects of novelty processing.

Benefits and costs of predictive processing: How sentential constraint and word expectedness affect memory formation

This study investigated how the strength of schema support provided by strongly (SC) and weakly constraining (WC) sentences affects the encoding of expected and unexpected words, and how this is reflected in event-related potentials (ERPs). In a surprise recognition memory test, words studied on the previous day were presented together with new words and lures that were expected but not presented in the study phase. ERPs recorded in the study phase were compared for subsequently remembered and forgotten words. Better memory performance for expected over unexpected words was electrophysiologically supported by a parietal subsequent memory effect (SME) reflecting enhanced item-specific encoding of contextually expected words. SC sentences not only facilitated the semantic integration of sentence-ending words, as reflected in reduced N400 amplitudes, but also enabled the rapid successful encoding of these words into memory, which is evidenced by an SC > WC pattern in memory performance and correlations between pre- and post-stimulus SMEs for SC sentences. In contrast, words processed in WC sentence contexts necessitated sustained elaborative encoding processes as reflected in a late frontal slow wave SME. Expected but not presented words were associated with high rates of false positive memory decisions, indicating that these words remained in a state of high accessibility in memory even one day after the study phase. These mnemonic costs of predictive processing were more pronounced for expected words from SC sentences than from WC sentences and could reflect the lingering of strong semantic predictions which were associated with the pre-updating of sentence representations.

Learning from mistakes: Incidental encoding reveals a time-dependent enhancement of posterror target processing.

It has been known for >50 years that making an error leads to subsequent changes in performance, yet the exact nature of posterror adjustments in cognition remains debated. We posit that this is in large part due to traditional performance indices, like mean posterror response time and accuracy, being insensitive measures of trial-by-trial stimulus processing. To overcome this limitation, we devised a novel object flanker task that employed trial-unique target and distracter stimuli and was followed by a surprise recognition memory test. This allowed us to determine how errors influence incidental target and distracter encoding in a trial-specific manner. We used this approach to test the "adaptive orienting theory" of posterror processing, according to which an error triggers an initial inhibition of task processing-facilitating orienting to the error source-followed by a controlled retuning of attention to the task. To characterize the time-course of the posterror processing cascade, we combined our task with a manipulation of the response-stimulus interval (RSI), across four experiments (RSIs: 300 ms, 650 ms, ~1,000 ms; N = 96-100 per experiment). We document, for the first time, that making an error leads to a substantial (~10%) enhancement of target (but not distracter) memory on the subsequent trial, which interacts with RSI: Posterror targets were remembered better than postcorrect targets at the long (650 ms, ~1,000 ms) but not the short (300 ms) RSIs. These findings provide clear support for the adaptive orienting theory by demonstrating a novel cognitive phenomenon: a time-dependent posterror enhancement of target encoding (PETE). (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).

Late frontal positivity effects in Self-referential Memory: Unique to the Self?

ABSTRACT The self-reference effect in memory (SRE), in which stimuli related to self are better remembered than other stimuli, has been studied often in the fMRI literature, but much less with EEG. In two experiments, we investigated how self-referencing modulated event-related potential (ERP) markers of the subsequent memory effect, testing whether the same components that reflect memory success are impacted or whether unique components are modulated by self-referencing. Participants were asked to evaluate whether an adjective accurately described either the self or a given other by making a yes/no key press during EEG recording. Then participants were given a surprise recognition memory test where they judged each adjective as old or new. We observed a main effect of self-relevance on a late positivity at right frontal electrodes. A very similar effect was observed when comparing words subsequently remembered to those that were forgotten. However, no interaction was found between self-relevance and subsequent memory, suggesting the frontal positivity is not exclusive to the SRE, but instead a reflection of deeper encoding that leads to better memory. Thus, this frontal positivity may be a marker of a deeper encoding process that is elicited by self-referencing but not exclusive to the SRE.

Observers use facial masculinity to make physical dominance assessments following 100-ms exposure.

Research has consistently demonstrated that faces manipulated to appear more masculine are perceived as more dominant. These studies, however, have used forced-choice paradigms, in which a pair of masculinized and feminized faces was presented side by side. These studies are susceptible to demand characteristics, because participants may be able to draw the conclusion that faces which appear more masculine should be rated as more dominant. To prevent this, we tested if dominance could be perceived when masculinized or feminized faces were presented individually for only 100 ms. We predicted higher dominance ratings to masculinized faces and better memory of them in a surprise recognition memory test. In the experiment, 96 men rated the physical dominance of 40 facial photographs (masculinized = 20, feminized = 20), which were randomly drawn from a larger set of faces. This was followed by a surprise recognition memory test. Half of the participants were assigned to a condition in which the contours of the facial photographs were set to an oval to control for sexual dimorphism in face shape. Overall, men assigned higher dominance ratings to masculinized faces, suggesting that they can appraise differences in facial sexual dimorphism following very brief exposure. This effect occurred regardless of whether the outline of the face was set to an oval, suggesting that masculinized internal facial features were sufficient to affect dominance ratings. However, participants' recognition memory did not differ for masculinized and feminized faces, which could be due to a floor effect.

The Memory Effect of Reflected Self-Appraisals on Different Types of Others.

The development of one’s self-concept unfolds within early interactions with intimate significant others for childhood and adolescence. Previous studies suggest that people define themselves in part through internalized perceptions of other people’s beliefs about them, known as reflected self-appraisals. Even in adulthood, reflected self-appraisals still remain critically influential on direct self-appraisals, and the affect might depend on the different types of others. In the present study, for the first time, we extend the classic “other-reference” paradigm to the field of reflected self-appraisals in order to examine whether there is a difference in the memory performance of reflected self-appraisals on different types of others in an early adult sample. In the experiment, participants were told to encode personality trait words by judging how different types of others (romantic partners, friends, and classmates) think about the participants themselves. After a retention interval, they received a surprise recognition memory test. The results showed that the memory performance of romantic partners is significantly better than that of friends and classmates, indicating that the memory performance of reflected self-appraisals varies across the others with different levels of closeness. Specifically, the closer the relationship between people and others is, the better the memory performance of reflected self-appraisals will be. Meanwhile, the speed and the encoding deepness of the reflected self-appraisals vary among different genders, leading to the gender effect of recognition memory. This study might help deepen our understanding on the development of self-concept in adulthood.

Increasing control improves further control, but it does not enhance memory for the targets in a face\u2013word Stroop task

Recent research on the dynamics between attentional and memory processes have outlined the idea that applying control in a conflicting situation directly leads to enhanced episodic memory of the processed information. However, in spite of a small subset of studies supporting this claim, the majority of the evidence in the field seems to support the opposite pattern. In this study, we used a face–word Stroop task to enforce different control modes either from trial to trial or in an item-specific manner. Both manipulations of congruency proved to be effective in making participants’ responses to conflicting stimuli more efficient over time by applying a trial-specific control mode. However, these manipulations had no impact on memory performance on a surprise recognition memory test. To our knowledge, this is the first attempt at measuring the memory consequences of the application of specific control modes at the trial level. The results reported here call for caution and possibly reconceptualization of the relationship between cognitive control and memory.

Feedback timing modulates interactions between feedback processing and memory encoding: Evidence from event-related potentials.

Feedback-based learning relies on a procedural learning system driven by reward prediction errors (RPEs). The processing of temporally delayed feedback is supported by brain structures associated with declarative memory processes, but it is still unknown how delayed feedback processing and memory encoding interact. In this study, a subsequent memory paradigm was employed to investigate how the incidental encoding of feedback pictures presented with a short (SD, 500 ms) or long (LD, 6500 ms) delay in a probabilistic learning task affects the event-related potential (ERP) correlate of RPEs (i.e., the feedback-related negativity; FRN). In an ensuing test phase, a surprise recognition memory test for the feedback pictures was conducted. FRN amplitudes measured in the feedback-locked ERPs recorded during the learning phase (FRNpeak) and in the negative minus positive feedback difference wave (FRNdiff) were compared for subsequently remembered and forgotten feedback pictures. Feedback processing as reflected in the FRNpeak was diminished for remembered LD feedback pictures, indicating that delayed feedback processing and memory encoding competed for similar neural processing resources. As evidenced by large FRNdiff amplitudes in the SD condition, the evaluation of shortly delayed feedback strongly relied on the procedural learning system. A complementary model-based single trial analysis was conducted to validate models of the functional significance of the FRN. Consistent with previous studies, feedback-locked N170 and P300 amplitudes were sensitive to feedback delay. In the test phase, memory for LD feedback pictures was better than for SD pictures and accompanied by a late old-new effect, presumably reflecting extended recollective processing.

The effects of aversive-to-appetitive counterconditioning on implicit and explicit fear memory.

Counterconditioning (CC) is a form of retroactive interference that inhibits expression of learned behavior. But similar to extinction, CC can be a fairly weak and impermanent form of interference, and the original behavior is prone to relapse. Research on CC is limited, especially in humans, but prior studies suggest it is more effective than extinction at modifying some behaviors (e.g., preference or valence ratings) than others (e.g., physiological arousal). Here, we used a within-subjects design to compare the effects of aversive-to-appetitive CC versus standard extinction on two separate tests of long-term memory in human adults: implicit physiological arousal and explicit episodic memory. Participants underwent Pavlovian fear conditioning to two semantic categories (animals, tools) paired with an electric shock. Conditioned stimuli (i.e., category exemplars) from one category were then extinguished, while stimuli from the other category were paired with a positive outcome. Participants returned 24-h later for a test of skin conductance responses (SCR) to the conditioned exemplars, as well as a surprise recognition memory test for stimuli encoded the previous day. Results showed reduced SCRs at a test for unique stimuli from a category that had undergone CC, relative to stimuli from a category that had undergone standard extinction. Additionally, participants selectively remembered more stimuli encoded during CC than extinction. These results provide new evidence that aversive-to-appetitive CC, as compared to extinction, strengthens memory for items directly associated with a positive outcome, which may provide stronger retrieval competition against a fear memory at test to help diminish fear relapse.

Exploring the interaction between approach-avoidance conflict and memory processing

ABSTRACTThe medial temporal lobe (MTL) has been implicated in approach-avoidance (AA) conflict processing, which arises when a stimulus is imbued with both positive and negative valences. Notably, since the MTL has been traditionally viewed as a mnemonic brain region, a pertinent question is how AA conflict and memory processing interact with each other behaviourally. We conducted two behavioural experiments to examine whether increased AA conflict processing has a significant impact on incidental mnemonic encoding and inferential reasoning. In Experiment 1, participants first completed a reward and punishment AA task and were subsequently administered a surprise recognition memory test for stimuli that were presented during high and no AA conflict trials. In Experiment 2, participants completed a reward and punishment task in which they learned the valences of objects presented in pairs (AB, BC pairs). Next, we assessed their ability to integrate information across these pairs (infer A-C relationships) and examined whether inferential reasoning was more challenging across objects with conflicting compared to non-conflicting incentive values. We observed that increased motivational conflict did not significantly impact encoding or inferential reasoning. Potential explanations for these findings are considered, including the possibility that AA conflict and memory processing are not necessarily intertwined behaviourally.

Incidental image memorability

ABSTRACTRecent studies using intentional memory tasks showed that images differ consistently in memorability. Here, we used a surprise recognition memory test. We asked how incidental encoding would affect the consistency and ranking of the memorability scores. If memorability is truly an intrinsic property of the image, one should not expect large differences between incidental and intentional conditions. On the other hand, participants might process images differently when not anticipating a memory test, yielding different results. The study list of our incidental memory task was identical to our previous, intentional study. Participants were to watch the images of this list carefully as they appeared on the screen one by one (free viewing); supposedly for a study about eye movements. Afterwards, a surprise recognition memory test was administered. Despite the free viewing instructions during the study phase, the resulting incidental image memorability scores still showed high levels of consistency across participants. In addition, the overlap between the incidental and intentional memorability ranking was large. These results provide further support for the idea of memorability as an intrinsic image property and add to its ecological validity, as people rarely memorise images intentionally.

When Does Oxytocin Affect Human Memory Encoding? The Role of Social Context and Individual Attachment Style.

The neuropeptide oxytocin plays an essential role in regulating social behavior and has been implicated in a variety of human cognitive processes in the social domain, including memory processes. The present study investigates the influence of oxytocin on human memory encoding, taking into account social context and personality, which have previously been neglected as moderators for how oxytocin affects memory encoding. To examine the role of social context of encoding, we employed an established experimental paradigm in which participants perform a word-categorization task in either a joint (social) or individual (non-social) setting. To investigate the role of socially relevant personality factors, participants’ adult attachment style (AAS) was assessed. Previous research has identified attachment style as a potent moderator of oxytocin effects in the social-cognitive domain, but here we investigated for the first time its role in memory encoding. Participants were invited in pairs and received either placebo or oxytocin intranasally. Forty-five minutes later, they were instructed to react to different word categories within a list of successively presented words. This task was performed individually in the non-social condition and simultaneously with the partner in the social condition. After a 24-h delay, memory for all words was tested individually in a surprise recognition memory test. Oxytocin effects on memory accuracy depended on participants’ AAS. Specifically, oxytocin positively affected memory for participants who scored low on attachment dependence (who find dependence on others uncomfortable), but negatively affected memory for high scorers (who are comfortable depending on others). Oxytocin effects were not moderated by social vs. non-social context at encoding, and we discuss reasons for this outcome. Regardless of encoding condition or personality, oxytocin led to more liberal responding in the recognition memory test, which was also reflected in significantly higher false alarm rates (FARs) and a trend towards higher hit rates (HRs) compared to placebo. Overall, our results are consistent with an interactionist view on oxytocin effects on human cognitive functioning. Future research should further examine how oxytocin affects response biases via previous encoding and the ways in which biological dispositions linked to attachment style affect the process of memory encoding.

The lower bounds of massive memory: Investigating memory for object details after incidental encoding.

Visual long-term memory capacity appears massive and detailed when probed explicitly. In the real world, however, memories are usually built from chance encounters. Therefore, we investigated the capacity and detail of incidental memory in a novel encoding task, instructing participants to detect visually distorted objects among intact objects. In a subsequent surprise recognition memory test, lures of a novel category, another exemplar, the same object in a different state, or exactly the same object were presented. Lure recognition performance was above chance, suggesting that incidental encoding resulted in reliable memory formation. Critically, performance for state lures was worse than for exemplars, which was driven by a greater similarity of state as opposed to exemplar foils to the original objects. Our results indicate that incidentally generated visual long-term memory representations of isolated objects are more limited in detail than recently suggested.

How acute stress may enhance subsequent memory for threat stimuli outside the focus of attention: DLPFC-amygdala decoupling

Stress-related disorders, e.g., anxiety and depression, are characterized by decreased top-down control for distracting information, as well as a memory bias for threatening information. However, it is unclear how acute stress biases mnemonic encoding and leads to prioritized storage of threat-related information even if outside the focus of attention. In the current study, healthy adults (N = 53, all male) were randomly assigned to stress induction using the socially evaluated cold-pressor test (SECPT) or a control condition. Participants performed a task in which they were required to identify a target letter within a string of letters that were either identical to the target and thereby facilitating detection (low distractor load) or mixed with other letters to complicate the search (high load). Either a fearful or neutral face was presented on the background, outside the focus of attention. Twenty-four hours later, participants were asked to perform a surprise recognition memory test for those background faces. Stress induction resulted in increased cortisol and negative subjective mood ratings. Stress did not affect visual search performance, however, participants in the stress group showed stronger memory compared to the control group for fearful faces in the low attentional load condition. Critically, the stress induced memory bias was accompanied by decoupling between amygdala and DLFPC during encoding, which may represent a mechanism for decreased ability to filter task-irrelevant threatening background information. The current study provides a potential neural account for how stress can produce a negative memory bias for threatening information even if presented outside the focus of attention. Despite of an adaptive advantage for survival, such tendencies may ultimately also lead to generalized fear, a possibility requiring additional investigation.

When eye movements express memory for old and new scenes in the absence of awareness and independent of hippocampus.

Eye movements can reflect memory. For example, participants make fewer fixations and sample fewer regions when viewing old versus new scenes (the repetition effect). It is unclear whether the repetition effect requires that participants have knowledge (awareness) of the old–new status of the scenes or if it can occur independent of knowledge about old–new status. It is also unclear whether the repetition effect is hippocampus-dependent or hippocampus-independent. A complication is that testing conscious memory for the scenes might interfere with the expression of unconscious (unaware), experience-dependent eye movements. In experiment 1, 75 volunteers freely viewed old and new scenes without knowledge that memory for the scenes would later be tested. Participants then made memory judgments and confidence judgments for each scene during a surprise recognition memory test. Participants exhibited the repetition effect regardless of the accuracy or confidence associated with their memory judgments (i.e., the repetition effect was independent of their awareness of the old–new status of each scene). In experiment 2, five memory-impaired patients with medial temporal lobe damage and six controls also viewed old and new scenes without expectation of memory testing. Both groups exhibited the repetition effect, even though the patients were impaired at recognizing which scenes were old and which were new. Thus, when participants viewed scenes without expectation of memory testing, eye movements associated with old and new scenes reflected unconscious, hippocampus-independent memory. These findings are consistent with the formulation that, when memory is expressed independent of awareness, memory is hippocampus-independent.

Culture modulates implicit ownership-induced self-bias in memory

The relation of incoming stimuli to the self implicitly determines the allocation of cognitive resources. Cultural variations in the self-concept shape cognition, but the extent is unclear because the majority of studies sample only Western participants. We report cultural differences (Asian versus Western) in ownership-induced self-bias in recognition memory for objects. In two experiments, participants allocated a series of images depicting household objects to self-owned or other-owned virtual baskets based on colour cues before completing a surprise recognition memory test for the objects. The ‘other’ was either a stranger or a close other. In both experiments, Western participants showed greater recognition memory accuracy for self-owned compared with other-owned objects, consistent with an independent self-construal. In Experiment 1, which required minimal attention to the owned objects, Asian participants showed no such ownership-related bias in recognition accuracy. In Experiment 2, which required attention to owned objects to move them along the screen, Asian participants again showed no overall memory advantage for self-owned items and actually exhibited higher recognition accuracy for mother-owned than self-owned objects, reversing the pattern observed for Westerners. This is consistent with an interdependent self-construal which is sensitive to the particular relationship between the self and other. Overall, our results suggest that the self acts as an organising principle for allocating cognitive resources, but that the way it is constructed depends upon cultural experience. Additionally, the manifestation of these cultural differences in self-representation depends on the allocation of attentional resources to self- and other-associated stimuli.