Supreme Court Struck Research Articles

Supreme Court Strikes Down the Chevron Doctrine: Why Health Care Providers Need to Care.

The Supreme Court's creation of the "Chevron deference" or "Chevron doctrine" (Chevron) is arguably one of the most significant in American administrative law-fundamentally changing how the federal agency apparatus operates. Like many legal doctrines, it was largely unknown to the public until the Supreme Court's recent surprise overturning of Chevron. Now, it is making national headlines, appearing on many social media platforms, and reaching non-lawyers and everyday Americans. To participate in the ongoing debate surrounding Chevron within the press, media, and possibly your own colleagues, it is essential to understand the basic facts and principles regarding this monumental Supreme Court ruling. This article will delve into Chevron's 40-year influence on federal agencies, its recent overturning, and the profound impact it will have on the health care industry.

Impact of the U.S. Supreme Court's Struck Down of the Affirmative Action on Human Rights Protection Law

Impact of the U.S. Supreme Court's Struck Down of the Affirmative Action on Human Rights Protection Law

Constitutionalizing Women’s Equality in India: Assessing the Sabarimala Decision

In 2018, in Indian Young Lawyers Association (IYLA) v State of Kerala, popularly known as the Sabarimala case, the Indian Supreme Court struck down a rule that prevented girls and women in the 10-50 age group from entering the Sabarimala temple in Kerala. The Court, in a 4-1 decision, held that the temple rule violated women’s right to equality and right to worship and was not protected under the right to religious freedom. Sabarimala is a landmark decision. For the first time,the Court insisted that all discrimination must be tested against constitutional values and discrimination that perpetuates stereotypes and disadvantage will not withstand constitutional scrutiny. It emphasised the importance of substantive equality in contesting discrimination against women and challenging the structures of oppression that exclude women. Finally, the Court linked women’s equality rights with equal citizenship. Focusing on the Sabarimala decision, this paper evaluates the recognition of women’s rights in Indian constitutional jurisprudence and assesses its transformative potential. The paper aims to place women’s equality rights squarely within constitutional discourse; to further develop understandings of justice that will constitutionalize women’s equality rights and ensure their inclusion in constitutional doctrine and discourse and to create salient changes in women’s everyday lives.

Supreme Court Strikes Down Third Challenge to Affordable Care Act

Supreme Court Strikes Down Third Challenge to Affordable Care Act

The Conservative Court

The Conservative Court Aryeh Neier (bio) Supreme Inequality: The Supreme Court’s Fifty-Year Battle for a More Unjust America by Adam Cohen Penguin Press, 2020, 448 pp. In 1963, I started work at the American Civil Liberties Union. My assignment was to establish new affiliates of the organization in states such as Texas and Oklahoma and to upgrade the capacity of long-standing state affiliates, such as those in Michigan and Pennsylvania. It was a thrilling time [End Page 147] to be engaged in those tasks. ACLU activities were regularly punctuated by victories for civil liberties at the U.S. Supreme Court, many of them in cases argued by the lawyers I was working with. Those wins included cases substantially expanding the rights of criminal defendants to be treated fairly by the police and the courts, striking down loyalty oaths required of public employees, ending the censorship of movies, overturning the prohibition on interracial marriage, barring state-enforced religious practices, expanding the right to protest, upholding freedom of speech, equalizing the right to vote in state elections, requiring that welfare recipients should be treated fairly, and many more. Click for larger view View full resolution Chief Justice John Roberts in 2006 (Brooks Kraft LLC/Corbis via Getty Images) In 1970, fifty years after it was founded, I became the ACLU’s fourth national executive director, a post I held for the next eight years. It was a very different period on the court. Richard Nixon became president in 1969 and soon had the opportunity to designate Warren Burger as chief justice of the Supreme Court, replacing Earl Warren. He appointed three other justices during his first three years in office. The Nixon Court succeeded the Warren Court. The ACLU continued to prevail in some important cases. We supported the New York Times and the Washington Post in publishing the Pentagon Papers, helping to achieve a major victory for freedom of the press. We also established the pioneering Women’s Rights Project, directed by Ruth Bader Ginsburg, which won a series of victories before the Supreme Court that largely, though not completely, made overt discrimination against women as legally untenable as overt discrimination against racial minorities. Though we took pride in the quality of the legal work of Ginsburg and her colleagues in those cases, we recognized that more was involved than litigation strategy and skill. A crucial factor in our success was the transformative impact of the women’s rights movement on American society in the 1970s. Women were securing jobs and workplace responsibilities previously denied to them; they [End Page 148] were entering educational programs and professional specialties in which their presence had been scarce; they were enlisting men to share in domestic duties that most had previously disdained. Changes in the law required by our Supreme Court victories accompanied and facilitated these developments, but they did not take place in isolation. A similar process took place decades later when the Supreme Court struck down limits on gay rights, including the prohibition on same-sex marriage. Those decisions came down after the emergence of a substantial gay rights movement, which had already transformed American society by the early years of the twenty-first century. The Supreme Court’s decisions did not lead the way. ________ The legal victories for women’s rights and gay rights in the past half century have partially obscured the picture Adam Cohen paints in his important book, Supreme Inequality: The Supreme Court’s Fifty-Year Battle for a More Unjust America. Cohen, a former member of the New York Times editorial board, makes a compelling argument that since the advent of the Nixon Court, the highest court in the land has been a consistent ally of corporate interests and the wealthy and the enemy of Americans who are less economically fortunate, especially those who are racial minorities. He achieves this by systematically analyzing the Court’s decisions on welfare, education, voting rights, campaign finance, labor, corporate responsibility, and criminal justice over the past five decades. Cohen is particularly concerned with the Supreme Court’s treatment of poverty through its decisions dealing with welfare recipients. He writes that the Warren Court “appeared to be...

Disenfranchisement and Economic Inequality: Downstream Effects of Shelby County v. Holder

The 1965 Voting Rights Act (VRA) is considered by many to be the most effective civil rights law ever passed. In 2013, the Supreme Court struck down important provisions from the VRA in Shelby County v. Holder. This paper first discusses how the potential weakening of minority political power brought about by Shelby County may have made the government less responsive to minorities' policy demands. Then we proceed to show that the lack of minority power is already producing economic inequality that is reflected in public-sector wages and in private-sector occupations with a high number of public workers.

Tools for Identifying Partisan Gerrymandering (PA)

In League of Women Voters v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (2018) the Pennsylvania Supreme Court struck down as a “severe and durable” partisan gerrymander the congressional map drawn by Republicans in 2011 and used in elections from 2012-2016. It did so entirely on state law grounds after a three-judge federal court had rejected issuing a preliminary injunction against the plan. After Pennsylvania failed to enact a lawful remedy plan of its own (due to a total disagreement as to how to proceed between the newly elected Democratic governor and the still Republican-controlled legislature), the Court then ordered into place for the 2018 election a map of its own drawn for it by a court-appointed consultant. In a split court, the Court map was endorsed only by judges with Democratic affiliations. Here we compare the 2011 and 2018 congressional maps in terms of a variety of proposed metrics for detecting partisan gerrymandering. We also examine the remedy map proposed by a group of Republican legislators and that proposed by the Democratic governor. We conclude that the 2011 map was a blatant and undisguised pro-Republican gerrymander. Moreover, the remedy map proposed by Republican legislators was a covert pro-Republican gerrymander (what we refer to as a “stealth gerrymander”). The Democratic governor’s proposed plan cannot be classified as a pro-Democratic gerrymander and indeed has if anything, a slight pro-Republican tilt. The 2018 court-drawn remedial map, by all measures, was not a gerrymander.

The Credit Suisse Cases and Intra-Group Financing: Dutch Supreme Court Strikes a Balance between Tax Planning and Tax Avoidance

The Credit Suisse Cases and Intra-Group Financing: Dutch Supreme Court Strikes a Balance between Tax Planning and Tax Avoidance

Rethinking Riley: Applying Commensurate and Intermediate Scrutiny Standards to Judicial Evaluation of Charitable Solicitation Regulation

In Riley v. National Federation of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781 (1988), the Supreme Court struck down as unduly burdensome and unconstitutional a North Carolina statute requiring professional fundraisers to disclose to those solicited the average percentage of gross receipts actually turned over to the charity for all charitable solicitations conducted in the state within the previous twelve months. The Court applied a strict scrutiny standard of review of the regulated speech, rather than a more deferential intermediate or rational standard of scrutiny. The Court’s reasoning was that the commercial speech elements of the charity’s message were inextricably intertwined with the fully protected educational portions. It also held North Carolina’s regulations governing application of the statute were not narrowly tailored to achieve the state’s valid interests in protecting charities and informing donors how money contributed was spent. This article disagrees with Riley’s rationale that the educational elements in charitable solicitations are always so interwoven with commercial speech that a governmental regulation that impinges on a charity’s message should always be subject to strict judicial scrutiny review, and as a matter of course protected by the First Amendment. (Fraudulent solicitations do not receive constitutional protection.) The reality is that the educational component of many charitable solicitations is formulaic or an afterthought unconnected to the solicitation message. The article contends that if a charity’s costs of fundraising over several years exceeds eighty-five percent of the amount raised, and the actual amount that is used for the charity’s philanthropic mission is miniscule, should create a rebuttable presumption that the charitable program is not commensurate with the resources contributed to the organization. Absent certain exceptions, such organizations should lose their tax exempt status. Judicial review of such revocations should be subject to a lesser, intermediate standard of scrutiny of review by the courts. There are both common law and federal tax precedents for using a commensurate standard in evaluating whether a charity serves a public purpose relative to its resources and abilities. This approach should pass constitutional muster, and will protect the public from deception and manipulation.

Supreme Court Strikes Down Abortion Regulations; Texas Bill Found Unconstitutional.

Supreme Court Strikes Down Abortion Regulations; Texas Bill Found Unconstitutional - In Whole Woman's Health v. Hellerstedt, Supreme Court considered constitutionality of two provisions of Texas' House Bill 2.1 Texas passed bill in 2013 amid significant controversy, most notably when State Senator Wendy Davis filibustered bill for over eleven hours.2 Governor Rick Perry then called second special session of state legislature in his effort to make abortion a thing of past, or to at least impose more safety restrictions on abortion providers.3 Many other states had passed similar restrictions, often referred to as Targeted Regulation of Abortion Providers, or TRAP laws, which were all struck down by this ruling.4 The first provision required that any physician performing an abortion, active admitting privileges at hospital . . . located not further than 30 miles from location at which abortion is induced . . . .5 Previously, Texas required facilities to have written protocol describing what to do in event of medical emergency and working arrangement with physician with admitting privileges at hospital.6 The second provision required the minimum standards for an abortion facility [to] be equivalent to minimum standards . . . for ambulatory surgical centers.7 Texas abortion providers opposed both of these provisions, claiming they violated Fourteenth Amendment under Casey standard.8 The district court enjoined both provisions from being enforced and found them to be unconstitutional.9 Texas appealed judgment.10 The Fifth Circuit then reversed district court's decision.11 The Fifth Circuit determined that plaintiffs had not provided sufficient evidence to prove two provisions placed substantial obstacle in path of women's access to abortions.12In Justice Stephen Breyer's majority opinion, Supreme Court held 5-3 that both provisions were unconstitutional.13 Under undue burden standard, Court held that both admitting privileges and surgical center provisions placed substantial obstacles in path of woman seeking an abortion.14 When examining admitting privileges requirement, Court evaluated evidence presented in district court, such as studies and expert testimony finding that less than 0.5% of abortions resulted in complications requiring hospital admission.15 The state offered no concrete evidence as to how provisions could benefit women, and Court decided that lack of benefit to women made statutes unconstitutional.16 The number of abortion clinics would be dramatically reduced by requirement with virtually no benefit, and thus constituted an undue burden.17The Court further held that surgical center requirement forcing clinics to make particular changes to building dimensions and staff also posed an undue burden.18 The Court determined requirement would not actually provide any benefit because most complications from abortions arise after woman has left facility. …

Marooning by Gridlock: Armstrong and the Continuous Strain Between Medicaid Costs and Healthcare Access

Cost containment and access have long been the primary concerns in the American healthcare system. Naturally, the federal government has sought to manage both, but often the fiscal needs of healthcare practitioners directly conflict with the health needs of patients. Medicaid is a prime example of this constant tension. As healthcare costs have continued to rise, some states have reduced the amounts they are willing to pay healthcare practitioners in exchange for their services. Rather than forgo the business, a group of practitioners in the Supreme Court case, Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Center, challenged the state of Iowa for the right to sue for adequate compensation. However, the Supreme Court struck down this claim by holding that the practitioners had no right to sue based either on the Supremacy Clause or the Medicaid statute.This comment is the first to analyze potential legal alternatives for resolving the Medicaid compensation problem in light of the Armstrong decision. It will first assess both the Administrative Procedure Act and Constitutional Due Process Jurisprudence in connection with entitlement programs. This comment will ultimately propose an amendment to Medicaid’s reimbursement rate setting process that will allow healthcare providers to directly negotiate with the states so that gridlock will not ensue, leaving Medicaid patients without the healthcare they need.

Using Johnson v. United States to Reframe Retroactivity for Second or Successive Collateral Motions

The Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) provides a fifteen-year mandatory minimum sentence in federal prison for persons with at least three prior “violent felony” convictions who are subsequently convicted of being in possession of a firearm. In Johnson v. United States, the U.S. Supreme Court struck down one portion of this statute on the ground that it was unconstitutionally vague. In addition to an enumerated list of “violent felonies” that can result in a conviction, this portion included a catchall category that defined a violent felony as a crime that “otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.”This Note examines whether federal prisoners, whose convictions and sentences under this now-unconstitutional prong of the ACCA were final before Johnson, and who have previously petitioned for habeas corpus, may again petition in federal court based on Johnson’s holding. In other words, the question, which has become the subject of a widening circuit split and is under review by the Supreme Court, is whether Johnson’s new rule about the unconstitutionality of the ACCA has been “made retroactive . . . by the Supreme Court” to federal prisoners seeking habeas corpus relief in federal court. This Note addresses this question and the circuit split that has emerged on the issue and concludes that Johnson has indeed been “made retroactive.” Finally, this Note offers a modified framework for assessing the retroactivity of new rules to second or successive habeas petitions.

Are Violent Video Games a First-Amendment Issue?

Back to table of contents Previous article Next article ViewpointsFull AccessAre Violent Video Games a First-Amendment Issue?Louis KrausLouis KrausSearch for more papers by this authorPublished Online:16 Sep 2011https://doi.org/10.1176/pn.46.18.psychnews_46_18_16_1On June 27, in a 7-2 decision, the U.S. Supreme Court struck down a California law banning the sale of violent video games to children. The majority argument for the ruling was that banning the sale of these games to children is a violation of First Amendment rights protecting free speech. The California law would have imposed a $1,000 fine on stores selling violent video games to minors. Predictably, representatives of the video-gaming industry expressed strong support of the Supreme Court decision. California legislators, however, most of whom voted to pass the video-game restriction, felt that this ruling exemplified the high court majority's support and protection of corporate America under the mantle of First Amendment rights. In my opinion, this is not a First Amendment issue. The issue here, tragically overlooked by the Supreme Court, is the health and protection of America's children. As studies emerge on the impact of video games on children's growth and development, it is becoming increasingly clear that playing violent video games is correlated with increases in aggressive behaviors and aggressive cognitions in children. And the violence depicted in video games is becoming more realistic as computer graphics become ever more sophisticated. Some of the most popular games, and in particular first-person shooter games, depict the killing of people and animals in graphic detail. Drug and alcohol use, criminal behavior, disrespect toward authority and law, sexual exploitation and violence toward women, racial and gender stereotyping, and obscene language—the list of images these video games present to children is lengthy and distressing. A child cannot view an R-rated movie without parental consent or purchase pornographic magazines, so it is unfathomable that the Supreme Court has made other images that are clearly unsuitable for children readily available, via video games, for purchase by youngsters of any age. The majority of children in the United States play video games. The exact number of hours per week spent on video gaming remains unclear, although it is likely far more than the maximum two hours per day recommended by the American Academy of Pediatrics. What is clear, however, is that children are spending increasing amounts of time playing video games and that many of these games have extremely violent content. Moreover, beyond the impact of the violence, time spent playing video games has additional deleterious effects on children's health. Children who spend large amounts of time playing video games get less exercise and spend less time with family, engaged in positive social activities, and doing homework. This can result in poor social skills, poor academics, and poor physical health—consequences that will not quickly be ameliorated. Proponents of the Supreme Court decision will point to parents as the ones responsible for determining appropriate video-game content for their children. Often, however, parents lack an understanding of the current rating system, which can be confusing and misleading. Patents tend to buy games based on what their children say their friends have or on what they are told by clerks in the stores that sell the games. Do we really want store clerks recommending which games are appropriate for children? I strongly believe that not only should there be limitations on selling violent games to youngsters, but that the deleterious effects of the games on children should be clearly spelled out on the label. This is no different from a Food and Drug Administration "black box" warning prominently displayed on a variety of products from cigarettes to antidepressants. This type of warning would make parents aware of the potential for harm to children associated with involvement in these games. In reality, many products that are appropriate for adults are simply inappropriate for children, and we must protect children from the harmful impact of these products on their health and development. It is imperative for experts in child and adolescent mental health and physical health to explain this to the courts and to refocus the debate away from the First Amendment issue to the issue of what is in the best interests of our children. Louis Kraus, M.D., is chief of child and adolescent psychiatry at Rush University Medical Center in Chicago. ISSUES NewArchived

Table of Contents

AbstractIRS Closes Gift Tax AuditsIRS Issues Guidance on Community Health Needs AssessmentsAppellate Court Upholds Constitutionality of Health Insurance MandateSupreme Court Strikes Down State Campaign Finance LawHHS Proposes Rule to Implement CO‐OP ProgramIRS Approves Charity‐PAC ArrangementPrivate Foundation CornerPart II: Major Gift Opportunities and Techniques—Supporting OrganizationsParade of Other Recent Private Letter RulingsIRS Issues Clarification as to Booster Club Dues DeductibilityOther Developments

Table of Contents

AbstractLegislation Providing Accelerated Charitable Deduction for Haiti Relief Gifts EnactedIRS Holds Hearing on Church Tax Inquiry ProposalAGB and NACUBO Publish “Parallel Analysis” of Data in College, University IRS Questionnaire ResponsesCourt Upholds Bargain Sale Transaction Despite Government's Trio of ProtestsSupreme Court Strikes Down Limits on Independent Political Expenditures by CorporationsIRS Issues Procedural Rules for 2010JCT Issues Tax Expenditures for 2009–2013Other Developments

Certificate of Merit Requirement Violates Right of Access to Courts: Washington Supreme Court Strikes Down Law Requiring Expert Certification of Medical Malpractice Claims—Putman v. Wenatchee Valley Medical Center

San Francisco Care Ordinance Withstands ERISA Preemption Challenge- Golden Gate Rest. Ass'n v. City & County of S.F.1- The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that Section 514(a) of the federal Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 19742 (ERISA) did not preempt the spending requirements of the San Francisco Care Security Ordinance3 (Ordinance).4 Review of the Ninth Circuit's holding is now pending a grant of writ of certiorari from the United States Supreme Court.5 In July 2006, the City and County of San Francisco (City) passed the Ordinance, a pay-or-play law with two primary components: (1) a cityadministered health care called the Health Access Plan (HAP), and (2) employer spending requirements.6 The Ordinance requires that medium- and large-sized employers make minimum health care expenditures on behalf of covered employees,7 either by funding the employees' health benefits or by furnishing funds the HAP.8 Under the City-payment option, an employer may make payments directly the City, and its employees then receive medical benefits from the HAP after enrolling in the program.9 The Ordinance also includes administrative requirements, such as mandating that employers maintain accurate records of health care expenditures and provide local officials reasonable access these records.10 Golden Gate Restaurant Association (Association), a nonprofit trade association of restaurants, filed suit against the City in November 2006, alleging that ERISA preempted the Ordinance's spending requirements.11 The Association sought declaratory relief and a permanent injunction against enforcement of the spending provisions.12 The district court granted the Association's motion for summary judgment, declaring the spending requirements as preempted by ERISA and thereby enjoining enforcement of the provisions.13 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded, finding that Section 514(a) of ERISA does not preempt the Ordinance's spending requirements.14 The Court began its analysis with the language of Section 514(a), which states that ERISA preempts and all State laws insofar as they . . . relate any employee benefit under the Act.15 A law relates to an employee benefit plan when it [1] has a connection with or [2] such a plan.16 The Association argued that the Ordinance's administrative requirements create an ERISA and its amicus, the Secretary of Labor (Secretary), contended that the HAP itself is such a plan.17 Under either theory, the Ordinance creates an impermissible reference to an ERISA plan.18 Alternatively, the Association and the Secretary argued that an employer's requirement make payments at a certain level- regardless of whether the payments are made the City - relates to the ERISA plans of covered employers.19 Finally, the Association argued that ERISA preempts the Ordinance under the Fourth Circuit's analysis in Retail Industry Leaders Association v. Fielder20 and that hold otherwise would create a circuit split among the federal Courts of Appeals.21 In rejecting the first argument, the Ninth Circuit held that the Citypayment option does not create an ERISA defacto or otherwise.22 The first requirement of an employee welfare benefit plan under ERISA is the existence of a plan, fund or program because only such plans involve administrative activity vulnerable employer abuse.23 Although the Ordinance requires employers perform such tasks as tracking employee hours, these administrative obligations amount nothing more than the exercise of 'a modicum of discretion,' posing little risk of employer abuse.24 Also, the Court declined apply the criteria of Donovan v. Dillingham,' which courts have used analyze potential defacto ERISA plans rather than administrative obligations under state or local law.26 The Ninth Circuit also held that the HAP did not constitute an ERISA plan. …

Age Discrimination and Social Benefits

This article discusses discrimination on grounds of age which has played a prominent role in Canadian jurisprudence under the Charter of Rights. Looking specifically at the issue of social benefits, there have been a number of cases in which Canadian courts have struck down particular provisions as inconsistent with the Charter. The Supreme Court struck down an age restriction in the then Unemployment Insurance Act which removed persons aged 65 and over from normal unemployment benefit and provided them with a small lump sum retirement benefit. However, while that decision has never been explicitly called into question by the Supreme Court, it predates the now standard approach to the application of the equality clause first set out by the Court in Law. A number of state courts have considered somewhat similar issues concerning the termination of certain benefits at pension age and have upheld these either on the basis that, though in breach of s.15, they were justified by s.1 of the Charter or, more recently, that there was no breach of s.15.

Queer (Theory) Eye for the Straight (Legal) Guy: Lawrence v. Texas’ Makeover of Bowers v. Hardwick

In this article, I distill the complex discourse of queer theory into four claims and then employ those claims to construct an original interpretation of the 2003 decision of Lawrence v. Texas in which the U.S. Supreme Court struck down a Texas law criminalizing same-sex sodomy and overturned the 1986 case of Bowers v. Hardwick. Drawing on the queer performance in the reality television show Queer Eye for the Straight Guy, I characterize Lawrence as a makeover of Bowers. Using Queer Eye’s parody of sexual identity as a model, I offer a parody of judicial power, and conclude that my application of queer theory produces a better account of the complexity of constitutional change and a more savvy understanding of the persistence of power than that which is typically offered in conventional constitutional discourse.

Physician Assisted Suicide: Supreme Court Strikes Down Federal Rule Blocking Physician-Assisted Suicide — Gonzalez v. Oregon

Physician Assisted Suicide: Supreme Court Strikes Down Federal Rule Blocking Physician-Assisted Suicide - Gonzalez v. Oregon1-With its recent 6-3 decision in Gonzalez v. Oregon, the Supreme Court held that the General did not have the authority under the federal Controlled Substances Act (CSA) to prohibit physicians from prescribing lethal doses of controlled substances under a state statute decriminalizing physician-assisted suicide.2 In 1994, Oregon voters approved a ballot initiative making Oregon the first state to legalize physician-assisted suicide.3 Voters later affirmed that measure in 1997.4 The Oregon Death with Dignity Act (ODWDA) exempts state-licensed physicians who, in compliance with the specific safeguards in ODWDA, dispense or prescribe a lethal dose of drugs upon the request of a terminally ill patient from civil or criminal liability.5 ODWDA requires that patients seeking physician assistance in committing suicide first receive a diagnosis from their attending physicians that they suffer from incurable and irreversible disease that, within reasonable judgment, will cause death within six months.6 In addition, two separate physicians must review that patient's request in order to determine that it was made voluntarily and the patient's decision is informed.7 Since its enactment, about two hundred Oregonians have ended their lives pursuant to procedure approved by ODWDA.8 ODWDA, however, encountered resistance on the federal level from the General John Ashcroft.9 The drugs that doctors use to assist patients with suicide are federally regulated under the CSA.10 Enacted in 1970, the CSA's main objectives are combating drug abuse and controlling the and illegitimate traffic of controlled substances.11 Drugs used in physician-assisted suicide are grouped under Schedule II of the statutory scheme, and the CSA requires that patients receive a written, non-refillable prescription from a doctor before gaining access to them.12 The General must grant physicians a registration subject to the regulations of the Justice Department in order for that physician to lawfully prescribe these Schedule II drugs.13 Moreover, the CSA provides that the Attorney General may deny, suspend, or revoke this registration if ... the physician's registration would 'inconsistent with the public interest.'14 One such regulation under the CSA, promulgated by the General in 1971, requires that prescriptions be issued for a purpose by an individual practitioner acting in the course of his professional practice.15 Ashcroft, an opponent of physician-assisted suicide during his time in the Senate, issued an Interpretive Rule (the Rule) as General declaring that the use of controlled substances in physician-assisted suicide was not a legitimate practice, thus making prescriptions under ODWDA a federal offense.16 Accordingly, a physician who prescribed a lethal dose of a controlled substance under ODWDA would render his registration . . . inconsistent with the public interest and would possibly subjected to suspension or revocation of his license.17 Because doctors could not prescribe controlled substances without a registration, the Rule effectively blocked the practice of physician-assisted suicide under the ODWDA.18 The State of Oregon, along with a doctor, a pharmacist, and several terminally ill patients, brought a suit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief that would prevent enforcement of the Rule.19 The United States District Court for the District of Oregon found for the plaintiffs and permanently enjoined its enforcement.20 On review, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals struck down the Rule, holding that it altered the usual constitutional balance between the States and the Federal Government . . . without the requisite clear statement that the CSA authorized the action.21 The CSA, the Ninth Circuit held, only addresses conventional drug abuse and does not give the General the authority to make medical policy decisions. …

Medicare: The Home Office of Medicare Providers May Not Rely on the Approval of an Alternative Cost Allocation Approved by a Medicare Fiscal Intermediary — Mercy Home Health v. Leavitt

Medicare: The Home Office of Medicare Providers May Not Rely on the Approval of an Alternative Cost Allocation Approved by a Medicare Fiscal Intermediary-Mercy Home Health v. Leavitt, 2006 WL 259609 (3rd Cir. Feb. 3, 2006). Physician Assisted Suicide: Supreme Court Strikes Down Federal Rule Blocking Physician-Assisted Suicide-Gonzalez v. Oregon, 2006 WL 89200 (2006). Mental Health: District Court Could Revoke Release of a Mentally 111 Prisoner for Failing to Comply with Non-Treatment Related Requirements-United States v. Franklin, 2006 WL 167889 (8th Cir. (Mo.) Jan. 25, 2006). Medicare: The Home Office of Medicare Providers May Not Rely on the Approval of an Alternative Cost Allocation Approved by a Medicare Fiscal IntermediaryMercy Home Health v. Leavitt1-The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit upheld the secretary of Health and Human Services' secretary) decision to disallow the use of an alternative cost allocation method for home office costs that had previously been approved by a Medicare fiscal intermediary.2 The Plaintiff, Mercy Home Health (Mercy) is a subsidiary of Mercy Home Health Services (Home Office), the home office of four health care providers.3 Pursuant to § 2150.3(D)(2)(b) of the Provider Reimbursement Manual (PRM),4 which sets out the procedure a home office should follow if it wants to depart from the default cost-to-total cost allocation method of reimbursement,5 the Home Office requested permission to use an alternative method from its fiscal intermediary, Independence Blue Cross.6 Based upon the Home Office's claim that the default method would inappropriately place large allocations on its medical equipment subsidiary, Independence Blue Cross approved the request.7 Home Office thus used the alternative method throughout the fiscal year 1996, but on June 26th 1996, Independence Blue Cross notified Home Office that it would no longer accept the use of the alternative method beginning in 1997.8 Subsequently, Home Office implemented a new alternative method, similar to the first, without Independent Blue Cross' permission.9 That same year, Independence Blue Cross terminated its contract with Home Office.10 In 1998, Independent Blue Cross' successor reopened and adjusted the cost reports of Mercy and Home Office for fiscal years 1995-1996 (under the approved alternative) and 1997-1999 (under the second unapproved alternative). Using the default method prescribed in the PRM, the successor intermediary reduced Mercy's allowable costs by $272,000 in 1995 and reduced Medicare reimbursement by $495,868 in 1996.12 Mercy appealed the adjustments to the secretary's Provider Reimbursement Review Board (the Board). The Board reinstated the adjustments to the 1997-1999 cost reports under the unapproved method, but reversed the disallowance for 19951996, finding that Mercy reasonably relied on Independent Blue Cross' written approval of its alternative method.13 The parties sought review of the Board's decision. On behalf of the secretary, the Acting Deputy Administrator of the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services Administrator) rejected Mercy's reliance argument for two reasons.14 First, the Administrator found that prior approval could not negate the clear dictates of the Medicare program under § 186 l(v)( I)(A), which limits reimbursement to Medicare patient costs and prohibits cross-subsidization of costs.15 Furthermore, the Administrator found that Mercy had failed to articulate a valid rationale supporting its methodology, and hence, disallowance was proper.16 On appeal, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Administrator.17 Recognizing the congressional directive to provide retroactive corrective adjustments of prior cost reports under § 1395x(v)(I)(A), the district court also rejected Mercy's reliance claim, and concluded that substantial evidence supported the Administrator's rejection of the alternative allocation method. …