Summa Contra Gentiles Research Articles

Providence and Science in a World of Contingency: Thomas Aquinas’ Metaphysics of Divine Action

Providence and Science in a World of Contingency: Thomas Aquinas’ Metaphysics of Divine Action

Providence and Science in a World of Contingency: Thomas Aquinas’ Metaphysics of Divine Action

Providence and Science in a World of Contingency: Thomas Aquinas’ Metaphysics of Divine Action

Causality and the Procession of the Holy Spirit in Manuel Kalekas’s De fide deque principiis catholicae fidei

AbstractThis article examines the way in which Manuel Kalekas describes the procession of the trinitarian persons in one of his earliest systematic treatises. As a member of so-called “Kydones circle,” Kalekas was part of a fourteenth-century group of Latinophrone Byzantine theologians who were interested in ecclesial union with the Latin West and in Latin theological sources. In addition to certain texts from Augustine, during the fourteenth century several works by Thomas Aquinas became available in Greek translation. Kalekas’s De fide is of interest because it integrates conceptual and structural insights from Aquinas even as it draws on Greek traditions from Cappadocia and Byzantium. Although the importance of Aquinas’s Summa contra gentiles for the work of the Kydones circle is often cited, this article argues that Aquinas’s Summa theologiae was also a significant influence for Kalekas.

Incunabula at the Manchester Grammar School

The article describes copies of three early-printed books at the Manchester Grammar School, which have not previously been noted in the bibliographies. These are the Missale Romanum (Venice, 1494), De Re Militari (Rome, 1494), and Aquinas, Summa contra Gentiles (Cologne, 1501). Two of the books have Hungarian connections, as is shown by inscriptions in them. They appear to have been at the grammar school since the late nineteenth or early twentieth century, but their detailed provenance remains obscure.

The Presence of Christ in the Eucharist κατ' οὐσίαν. On the interpretation and the source of a fragment from the Homily of George Scholarios and its impact on the Eucharistic doctrine of the Greek Orthodox Church

The Homily On the mystical body of our Lord Jesus Christ by George Gennadios II — Scholarios (ca. 1400 — paulo post 1472) was the first original Orthodox theological text to use the word μετουσίωσις (transubstantiatio) as an ex professo Eucharistic term and to adopt the doctrine associated with it. In this paper I propose a new reading of the fragment, in which Scholarios writes that God communicates with the faithful in the Eucharist by substance (κατ’ οὐσίαν). I argue that this fragment was a paraphrase of the third paragraph of chapter 61, book four of Thomas Aquinas’ Summa contra gentiles and should not be interpreted in the context of Palamite theology as has been proposed hitherto. I find support for my case in the manuscript Taurinensis XXIII (C-II-16), a compilation encouraged by Scholarios in 1432 and which contained the translation of the Summa contra gentiles by Demetrios Kydones. In addition, I outline the post Scholarium history of the expression κατ’οὐσίαν (secundum substantiam), which played a key role for the later development of the Eucharistic doctrine of the Orthodox Church in the post-Byzantine period.

What Has Metaphysics to Do with Wisdom?

What Has Metaphysics to Do with Wisdom? John Haldane There are two loci of ambiguity in the title of the symposium from which this essay derives—"Is Belief in God Reasonable? Aquinas's Summa contra gentiles in a Contemporary Context."1 The first concerns the opening question, "is belief in God reasonable?" and the second the closing clause "in a contemporary context." I observe this not in the spirit of pedantry, but because I want to consider certain interpretations of what is at issue, ones which may be different from those of other contributors but which are relevant to Aquinas's circumstances and interests and to ours. So far as the Summa contra gentiles [SCG] is concerned, I will touch mainly on issues discussed by Thomas at the outset of book I, in chapters 1–15, which deal with philosophical knowledge of first principles and arguments to the existence of God. First, however, the general issue of reasonable belief. I Concerning the first locus of ambiguity, the question of the reasonability of belief in God is multiply interpretable. It may be treated as relative to a subject's other beliefs and attitudes, where that subject e may be an individual or a group. Given that S believes p and q (and these can each be conjunctions of any number of propositions), is it reasonable for S to believe r? This aspect of relative credibility is itself ambiguous because it [End Page 1249] can be viewed narrowly, without regard to the status of those antecedent beliefs and attitudes, or broadly, as also asking whether those are themselves reasonable. In a court setting, for example, it may be asked whether it was reasonable for someone to have believed (or done) something given their antecedent beliefs, but it may well be countered that this is an insufficient standard of reasonability, since the prior attitudes may be incredible, or credible but irresponsibly held. The issue of reasonable belief, foresight and foreseeability are common courtroom examples. In these respects, then, it may be granted by someone A, who holds that believing in God is not reasonable, that it was nevertheless reasonable for S to do so given S's antecedent beliefs. This need not be a matter of condescension, however, since A may grant that the prior beliefs were themselves reasonable for S to hold, and would also have been reasonable by some more objective standard prevailing at the time or in the circumstances. A "rationalist" objector may counter, however, that this is all beside the point, since the question to consider is not the relative, but the absolute one: is belief in God reasonable? Full stop. I agree that there is nothing to be gained by unconstrained relativizing, but if "absolutism" is the implied contrast, it is over-stated. First, if reasonability is related to having (or having access to) reasons, and to the "quality" of those reasons, then some degree of relativity is entailed, and the only standard of reasonability that can be applied is a contextual one. To ask simpliciter whether it is reasonable to believe p carries an unacknowledged implicit reference either to something such as prevailing commonly held beliefs and associated normal cognitive processes or to an idealized thinker with access to relevant proofs or evidence. On further consideration, however, the latter, somewhat like Adam Smith's "impartial spectator" in ethics,2 tends just to be a more abstract version of the contextually reasonable thinker. There is perhaps a step beyond this, namely to the Omniscient Reasoner (OR) but it is a sophistical move, since it amounts to saying that a belief is reasonable if and only if it would be held by someone who knows everything relevant to its justification. which given that we cannot know antecedently the range of relevant considerations, is for us an inapplicably high standard. There is also some irony in asking if OR would judge belief in God Reasonable since OR would be God or at least God-like in respect of being all-knowing. [End Page 1250] II The other respect in which the question "is belief in God reasonable?" is ambiguous (in this first of the two areas ambiguity noted at the...

Vetera Novis Augere et Perficere: Thomas Aquinas and Christian-Muslim Dialogue

Vetera Novis Augere et Perficere:Thomas Aquinas and Christian-Muslim Dialogue Joseph Ellul, O.P. Pope Leo XIII's encyclical letter Aeterni Patris, issued on August 4, 1879, sought to address many issues that were challenging nineteenth-century Catholic scholarship and academic life. In proposing the thought of Thomas Aquinas as a model of Catholic teaching, the Pope intended, in his own words, "to strengthen and complete the old by aid of the new,"1 not only by reviving the study of the works and teachings of the Angelic Doctor, especially in the realm of philosophy, but also to uphold as perennial his method of engaging with his contemporaries within and without the Catholic faith.2 It is within this context that we are called upon to reflect upon this appeal: "vetera novis augere et perficere." The thirteenth century was indeed a time of intellectual upheaval, following the introduction of Aristotle and, later on, the translations into Latin of the Arabic commentaries on Aristotle by Ibn Rušd (Lat. Averröes; d. 1198). This event was met within the ecclesiastical world with apprehension, if not outright fear. Neo-Platonic philosophy and its interpretation by Ibn Sina (Lat. Avicenna; d. 1037) was already perfectly acceptable to Mediaeval Christian scholars. The latter was in fact considered an essential tool for understanding the illuminationist thought of St. Augustine. Étienne Gilson even spoke of Augustinisme avicennisant (Avicennized [End Page 1231] Augustinianism).3 The problem was Aristotle and his renowned commentator Ibn Rušd: a pagan commented on by an infidel. One must also note, however, that mediaeval Western intellectuals and institutions were able to encounter and adapt the Islamic legacy, because they already possessed a sufficient scientific base (with of course the contribution of translations of Greek together with Latin works) with which to understand, assimilate, and build upon this new knowledge that appeared from the East. In sum, mediaeval Christendom created living, vibrant societies, constantly searching, always discovering something new. In dealing with the specific (and delicate) subject of Aquinas's dialogue with Islamic thought, it would be necessary to reflect in particular upon two key works of his: the Liber de Veritate Catholicae Fidei contra Errores Infidelium (A Book on the Truth of the Catholic Faith against the Errors of Unbelievers),4 popularly known as the Summa contra gentiles [SCG], together with his De rationibus fidei contra Saracenos, Gnæcos et Armenos ad Cantorem Antiochenum, better known simply as De rationibus fidei. At this point it would be necessary to articulate the term "Islamic thought." Of itself it should not be identified with Islam as a religion. Rather, it should be considered as embracing classical Greek philosophy as interpreted by the Neo-Platonic movement and disseminated through Oriental Christian and Jewish schools of thought. Islamic civilization absorbed these teachings and built its own proper ediice upon these foundations. A Model for Interreligious Dialogue? Proposing Thomas Aquinas as a model for engagement with Islamic thought may also raise a few eyebrows. Hence, it would be appropriate to pose an essential question: "What type of dialogue existed in mediaeval times?" One should begin with an a priori exclusion of dialogue as it is understood today, given the fact that there existed neither the motive nor the means to implement it. In fact mediaeval society was aware of only three religions: the pagan, which had been replaced by Christianity; the Jewish, founded upon the precepts of the First Covenant which "Christ fulilled by his actions and [End Page 1232] by his teaching"5 and which was also believed to prefigure the everlasting New Covenant sealed by Jesus on the Cross; and finally, the Christian, which believed in Jesus as the final revelation of God to humanity.6 With such a vision in mind it is obvious that any doctrine that is not situated within these parameters, or which proposes some form of belief or conduct which was different from, if not contrary to, the Christian vision of God, the cosmos, and society, would be considered as heretical and its promoter an impostor.7 When Islam made its appearance in the Christian world, it carried with it a book that it considered of divine provenance, and...

The Summa Contra Gentiles and Aquinas's Way to God

The Summa Contra Gentiles and Aquinas's Way to God

Triplex Via and the ‘Gap Problem’ with Cosmological Arguments

AbstractAquinas’ five ways are often criticized because, unless further argumentation is supplied, their conclusion is not obviously identical to the God of classical theism. Such criticism overlooks the semantic and hermeneutic functions of natural theology. By fixing the referent for the word ‘God’, the five ways allow the philosopher to provide an intelligible account of divinity. This knowledge of the cause through its effects follows the systematic structure of the triplex via (causation, negation, and eminence), a program that guides Aquinas’ account of divine attributes all the way through Summa Theologiae I qq.2-26 and Summa Contra Gentiles I. By following this rational itinerary the demonstrative power of the ways can be better assessed, looking at them not as an apologetic exercise, but as a first step in the seek for a deeper understanding of the divine source of Creation.

Dei Filius I: On God, Creation, and Providence

Dei Filius I:On God, Creation, and Providence Rudi A. Te Velde In this essay, I want to share my impressions of the first chapter of the dogmatic constitution Dei Filius of Vatican I. It begins its declaration of the basic truths of Christian faith in a language which is similar, and probably intended to be similar, to that of a solemn confession of faith: "The holy, catholic, apostolic, and Roman church believes and acknowledges that there is one true living God, creator and lord of heaven and earth."1 It reminds one, in some of its formulations, of the Nicene Creed, but with a remarkable difference: here, in the text of the constitution, the object of the confession is formulated as a proposition about God's existence.2 What is said is not, for example, "I believe in one God, the Father almighty"; but the Church believes and holds it to be true that there exists a God. One can notice a subtle shift from a confession of faith to the proclamation of a (rational) truth. The Pope, gathered with all the bishops of the Church, declares that there exists a God, the one and true living God, a doctrinal statement directed, by implication, against those who dare to deny the existence of God. The opening sentence of chapter 1 corresponds with its canon, which says that, "if anyone denies the one true God, creator and [End Page 823] lord of things visible and invisible: let him be anathema."3 Thus the constitution says that the "one, true living God" of the biblical faith exists, that this is a truth, and that, as consequence, the opposed thesis of atheism is false and must be rejected. Who is asserting this truth? Who is speaking and with which authority? The text leaves no doubt about the speaking subject. It is the Church, entitled to speak with authority about matters of faith, because it is the Roman Church, holy, catholic, and apostolic. The Church speaks, in the person of the pope, the legitimate successor of St. Peter, with authority granted to her by God himself through his Son Jesus Christ. In the preface preceding chapter 1 of the constitution, it is said that the Church is appointed by God to be "mother and mistress of nations." Hence: She can never cease from witnessing to the truth of God . . . and from declaring it, for she knows that these words were directed to her: "My spirit which is upon you, and my words I have put in your mouth, shall not depart out of your mouth from this time forth and for evermore" (Is 59:21).4 This gives the pope, sitting in the chair of Peter, the authority of "teaching and defending Catholic truth and condemning erroneous doctrines."5 And the first thing to be declared, as part of the Church's task to proclaim the Catholic truth to all the nations, is to assert the existence of God against the error of atheism. It is important to understand the genre of a dogmatic constitution. It is a document in which the Church, by mouth of the pope together with the bishops, expounds the basic tenets of Christian teaching. The purpose of a dogmatic constitution is to reaffirm the basic truths of Christian doctrine, to clarify the fundamentals of faith in a message to the world. A constitution may be occasioned by actual developments in the world and society, but it speaks as it were from the standpoint of eternity. In case of the constitution Dei Filius, the addressee is the world of the mid-nineteenth century, a time of dominance of scientific reason, of materialism, naturalism, atheism, and not unimportantly, of current forms of idealistic pantheism (Georg Hegel, Friedrich Schelling, the influence of German Idealism in general); what the constitution especially stands opposed to [End Page 824] is the view of supernatural religion as being irrational. For this purpose it wants to reclaim reason and to overcome the disastrous gap between faith and (modern) rationality. The double program underlying the constitution—teaching the Catholic truth and condemning erroneous doctrines—reminds one of the Summa contra gentiles [SCG] of Thomas Aquinas.6 The...

The Virtue of Husband and Wife: Understanding Marital Friendship in Aquinas (with a Little Help from Homer)

The Virtue of Husband and WifeUnderstanding Marital Friendship in Aquinas (with a Little Help from Homer) Scott G. Hefelfinger (bio) Introduction Thomas Aquinas is well known for drawing on Aristotle’s analysis of friendship in order to understand and to define charity. Less familiar is Aquinas’s approach to marriage in terms of friendship. “Marriage,” writes Aquinas, “is the greatest friendship,”1 and he elaborates this elsewhere by means of Aristotle’s threefold division of friendship: friendship of utility, of pleasure, and of virtue.2 This already contains a great richness to be explored, but Aquinas goes further, adding suggestively: “There is a virtue proper to both husband and wife that renders their friendship delightful to each other.”3 But what exactly is this virtue, and how does it relate to the three kinds of friendship? The Angelic Doctor does not say. Whatever this virtue is, we seem to stand in great need of it. The world today seems a stranger to the delight that Aquinas mentions and is instead overly familiar with serial cohabitation, broken homes, and more recently, what has been termed “sexless marriages,” which result in no small part from the proliferation of pornography. Such sadness, discontentment, and even despair in the arena of marriage renders Aquinas’s provocative remark all the more striking, and so this short article is an attempt to tease out its meaning. [End Page 126] To do this, I will draw from the theory of Aristotle and the poetry of Homer to put meat on the bones of Aquinas’s skeletal remark, namely, that there is a virtue proper to spouses. In a first step, I will argue based on Aristotle and Aquinas that there is an excellence specific to the coordinated and cooperative work of the household. In a second step, I will turn to Homer’s Odyssey, where, I propose, we catch a glimpse of what this mutual work looks like, and in particular the kind of friendship between equals that it entails. Taken all together, Aquinas, Aristotle, and Homer offer resources for a renewed vision of marriage that is strikingly relevant in a world longing for delight and pining for a renewal of culture—a renewal that begins with the friendship, and virtue, of husband and wife. Aristotelian Roots When, in the Summa contra gentiles, Aquinas speaks of marriage as “the greatest friendship,” he offers two reasons to justify the superlative: he holds that husband and wife are “united not only in the act of fleshly union, which produces a certain gentle association even among beasts, but also in the partnership of the whole range of domestic activity [ad totius domesticae conversationis consortium].”4 Admittedly, these reasons might seem a little thin. Indeed, it almost sounds like Aquinas is suggesting that what makes the greatest friendship between husband and wife is that they sleep in the same bed at night and make the bed together in the morning. Understandably, we’re left wanting a little more than that. If we turn to his commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, it helps us to appreciate that, as we expect, there is more going on here. The friendship between husband and wife is a complex, multi-faceted reality. One facet is its usefulness; it is a friendship of utility, Aquinas points out, since it “furnishes a sufficiency [of things] for family life.”5 Another facet of this friendship is that it is pleasant or pleasurable; thus, it is a friendship of pleasure, seen most clearly— but by no means exclusively—in marital intimacy. The last facet is [End Page 127] that related to virtue; Aquinas holds that marital friendship can also be based on virtue and thus it can reach the level of a noble or virtuous friendship.6 What is a virtuous friendship for Aristotle and Aquinas? Friendships are based on love and thus the precise object of love will determine the sort of friendship. Because friendships of utility and of pleasure are based on a love that targets some good other than a person, Aristotle sees them as incomplete or incidental. Complete friendship includes the dimensions of utility and pleasure but also goes beyond them. This...

The Absence of Divine Ideas in the Summa Contra Gentiles

AbstractIn the 20th century, some prominent Thomists questioned whether St. Thomas Aquinas is really committed to a theory of divine ideas. There is no doubt that Aquinas articulates such a theory in his Sentences Commentary, Disputed Questions on Truth, and Summa theologiae. Still, he seems to omit an account of divine ideas in the Summa Contra Gentiles. If St. Thomas thinks divine ideas are necessary for understanding God's knowledge, why would he skip discussing them in this ex professo work? This paper will argue two points. First, St. Thomas does articulate a theory of divine ideas in the Summa Contra Gentiles, even though he changes his terminology. His account of divine reasons (rationes) is equivalent to a theory of divine ideas. Second, Aquinas changes his vocabulary because of the more apologetic aim of the work. Use of the term ‘ideas’ would be less effective in dialogue with his Muslim and pagan interlocutors.

Reading Ancient and Medieval Philosophers after Vollenhoven

Abstract This is a study of D. H. Th. Vollenhoven’s type-focused historiography of philosophy and its development with respect to pre-Socratic philosophy. It uses the work of Pierre Hadot on philosophical askesis, the work of Martha Nussbaum on therapeutic argument, and recent work on the transformative character of Aquinas’s Summa contra Gentiles and Summa theologiae to question some of the central assumptions of Vollenhoven’s methodology. In the process, Vollenhoven’s practice is compared to and contrasted with the historiographical practice of Aristotle in his Metaphysics. What emerges is a way to acknowledge the continued worth of type-focused reading and the religious intuitions that gave rise to it, but on the basis of different methodological assumptions and to different historiographical effects.

Thinking about Animals in Thirteenth-Century Paris: Theologians on the Boundary between Humans and Animals

Thinking about Animals in Thirteenth-Century Paris: Theologians on the Boundary between Humans and Animals

Thinking about Animals in Thirteenth-Century Paris: Theologians on the Boundary between Humans and Animals

Thinking about Animals in Thirteenth-Century Paris: Theologians on the Boundary between Humans and Animals

Contemporary Naturalism, God, and the Methodological Relevance of Thomas Aquinas

AbstractThis article claims that the strict methodological considerations of contemporary philosophical naturalism do not hinder serious philosophical reference to the thought of Thomas Aquinas because his methodological principles are just as rigorous. The methodology of Thomas Aquinas is not explicitly stated in the Summa Theologiae. Therefore, the Summa contra Gentiles and On being and essence are referenced to clarify what Thomas seems to have thought about relationship between philosophy and theology. The work of Fiona Ellis is an example of how a contemporary philosopher can methodologically justify taking a position of qualified naturalism. Ellis calls this expansive naturalism. This methodology desires to accept a type of naturalistic philosophy. Yet, Ellis holds that expansive naturalism is able to employ theology as a resource for philosophy without falling into the trap of superstition. In order to arrive at this contemporary reflection, there is a very brief sketch of recent intellectual history concerning the relationship between philosophy and theology.

Brian Davies, "Thomas Aquinas's Summa Contra Gentiles: A Guide and Commentary."

Brian Davies, "Thomas Aquinas's Summa Contra Gentiles: A Guide and Commentary."

Understanding Holiness in Exodus 3 from the Lens of Biblical Spirituality

Holiness is studied from the lens of Biblical Spirituality. Situated in the Divine-Huma relational process, the movement from being un-holy to holy; from being unclean to Divine Purity is given close attention. God as the רק קדוש, draws his people into Himself through purification and in intimacy with Him. The human reality responds with respect and reverence not only to God but to his people as well. However, God has a special preference for the poor and helpless for the clothes them with Himself like a soldier wears his armor. Through a spiritual reading of Exodus 3 and other related Scriptural narratives, these understanding of holiness is surfaced specifically, in the lived experience of Holiness, its nearness in day-to-day life.
 References
 
 Aquinas, Thomas. Summa Theologica, Prima Pars.
 __________. Summa Contra Gentiles.
 Carmody, Denise and John Carmody. Mysticism, Holiness East and West. New York: Oxford University Press, 1996.
 Ciorra, Anthony. Everyday Mysticism. Cherishing the Holy. Spring Valley: Crossroad Publishing Company, 1995.
 Christian Spirituality. Five Views of Sanctification. ed. Donald Alexander. Illinois: InterVarsity Press, 1988.
 Sheldrake, Philip. Images of Holiness, Exploration in Contemporary Spirituality. US: Ave Maria Press, 1988. Sproul, R. C. The Holiness of God. Illinois: Tyndale House Publishers, 1998.
 The Holy Bible, New Revised Standard Version. UK: Bible Society Resources Ltd., 2011.
 Waaijman, Kees. Spirituality: Forms, Foundations, Methods. Leuven: Peeters, 2002.
 __________. Holiness in Spirituality, HTS Teologiese Studies/Theological Studies, 72:4 (2016), a3463. http://dx.doi.org/10.4102/hts.v7214.3463
 Welzen Huub. Contours of Biblical Spirituality as a Discipline, Acta Theologica, 15 (2011), 37-60.

“To Give Us an Example of Making Progress”: Aquinas on the Perfection and Growth of Christ’s Virtue

“To Give Us an Example of Making Progress”: Aquinas on the Perfection and Growth of Christ’s Virtue Michael A. Wahl ONE OF THE CENTRAL ethical themes of the New Testament is that Jesus provides a model for his followers to imitate.1 In his Last Supper Discourse in John’s Gospel, Jesus himself declares to his apostles, “I have set you an example, that you also should do as I have done to you” (John 13:15). Likewise, the First Epistle of Peter reminds its readers, “Christ also suffered for you, leaving you an example, so that you should follow in his steps” (1 Pet 2:21). Saint Paul, too, instructs the Philippians to “let the same mind be in you that was in Christ Jesus” (Phil 2:5), and he urges the Corinthians to “be imitators of me, as I am of Christ” (1 Cor 11:1). The biblical authors insist that throughout Jesus’ life and ministry, and especially in his passion and death, he exemplifies most perfectly the pattern to which his disciples must be conformed. The exemplarity of Christ is also a prominent and recurring motif in the theology of St. Thomas Aquinas.2 Indeed, in the very [End Page 585] opening question of the Tertia pars of the Summa theologiae, Aquinas submits that it was fitting that the Word should become flesh, “with regard to right operation, in which he set us an example.”3 Aquinas thus views the incarnation as, among other things, a form of embodied instruction for humanity.4 In the Summa contra gentiles, he expands on this insight, suggesting that “so that man might be strengthened in virtue, it was necessary for him to receive from God made man both the teaching and the examples of virtue.”5 Aquinas embeds this view of Christ as moral exemplar within a broader metaphysical and soteriological account of Christ’s ontological exemplarity so that the actions of Christ are not only morally instructive but also efficiently salvific. Through the hypostatic union, Christ’s human actions serve instrumentally as efficacious causes of the grace which, by virtue of his headship, he mediates to human beings.6 Moreover, because the nature of an instrument leaves its mark on the effect produced, Christ’s humanity imparts its own distinctive character to the divine grace that is mediated through it. Consequently, the grace that Christ bestows to human beings conforms them to himself as their [End Page 586] ontological exemplar.7 For Aquinas, then, Jesus not only models perfect virtue through his actions, but he also mediates, through those same actions, the grace that conforms the human person to himself and that enables the human person to exercise the very virtues that he displays.8 Christ makes possible the imitation of his moral example by the grace that conforms human beings to him ontologically. Therefore, Aquinas can say not only that “Christ’s action is our instruction,”9 but also that “all Christ’s actions and sufferings operate instrumentally by virtue of his divinity for human salvation.”10 One of the most interesting, but also most frequently overlooked, places where Aquinas takes up this theme of Christ’s exemplarity is in a sermon composed for the First Sunday after Epiphany, likely preached in 1271 during his second regency at Paris.11 The sermon’s opening line foregrounds Christ’s salvific exemplarity as Aquinas declares that “all the things together that the Lord has done or undergone in the flesh are salutary lessons and examples.”12 Aquinas does not intend for this opening flourish to serve merely as a general claim about Christ’s action as instructive, overlooking the concrete particulars of his embodied, salvific teaching. On the contrary, he insists, Because there is not any age from which the way of salvation is absent—and to the highest extent this applies to the years in which one comes to discernment— the adolescence of Christ is made an example for adolescents. Growth and [End Page 587] progress are proper to adolescents. Therefore, the progress of Christ is made an example for adolescents.13 With these words, Aquinas narrows the sermon’s scope and directs his hearers’ attention to...

Thomas Aquinas's Summa Contra Gentiles: A Guide and Commentary by Brian Davies

Reviewed by: Thomas Aquinas's Summa Contra Gentiles: A Guide and Commentary by Brian Davies Raymond Hain Thomas Aquinas's Summa Contra Gentiles: A Guide and Commentary by Brian Davies (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), xxviii + 485 pp. Brian Davies's Thomas Aquinas's Summa Contra Gentiles: A Guide and Commentary comes two years after the publication of his delightfully (some would say quixotically) ambitious Thomas Aquinas's Summa Theologiae: A Guide and Commentary. Like the first, this second book "aims to be introductory, if also comprehensive, and it does not presume that its reader is already familiar with medieval thinking" (xvii). But while both volumes run close to five hundred pages, the much shorter length of the Summa contra gentiles [SCG] allows Davies a little more breathing room, and the result is a smooth and thoughtful overview of the entire text immensely useful for nonspecialists and worth consulting for specialists. After a brief discussion of Aquinas's life and writings, Davies rejects the view that the SCG was written to aid missionaries, Dominican or otherwise, and instead claims (with the help of the opening chapters of the SCG) that Aquinas has provided "an extended essay in natural theology" in books I–III and then offers "defenses of the articles of faith" in book IV. "And that," he concludes, "is all that we can confidently refer to [End Page 1291] when it comes to the question 'Why did Aquinas write the SCG?'" (15). (But why the need to remark in a footnote that Aquinas "does refer to Islam" in these sections, offering "a brief tirade against Mohammed," even though this "little anti-Islamic outburst" is hardly evidence of a missionary purpose? [397]) Of the remaining seventeen chapters, eight address God's existence, nature, and creative power, six address creatures and their relation to God's providential plan, and the final three address the Trinity, the Incarnation, and the sacraments and salvation. Each chapter follows the same plan: a section of the SCG is explained, with copious quotations and sometimes exhaustive (and exhausting) lists of arguments with lots of examples to make Aquinas's claims both clear and attractive. Each expository section is then followed by Davies's own evaluation of the text. These are the most interesting and readable sections (and worth perusing for a specialist working on the topic at hand), and they make many references to contemporary challenges one might offer to Aquinas, as well as arguments in defense of, and occasionally critical of, Aquinas's views. Davies is most comfortable, and confident, in the eight chapters on God. These make up more than one third of his text (though treating about one fifth of the SCG), and an entire chapter is spent on SCG I, chapter 13 (arguments for God's existence). Davies is certain that Aquinas's arguments for God's existence are not obvious failures, but stops short of calling them successful demonstrations. "My view is that [whether or not they are successful demonstrations] is not an easy question to answer since some of the arguments contain stages that are difficult to understand" (45). Like most defenders of Aquinas, he constructs an example of a causal chain with two types of causes. If my hand holds a stack of books, then each book keeps the book above it from falling to the ground. But my hand is a cause of a different sort, something "whose causal power runs through the chain in such a way as to make the members of the chain do what they do or be what they are" (52). But does Davies think the arguments work? As he often does throughout the commentary, he ends only by quoting from another Aquinas scholar, in this case Edward Feser's defense of this type of argument, and then concludes: "I take it that Feser is suggesting that something that actually exists, but does not have to exist, is potentially nonexistent, and that its sheer existence depends on it being actualized by what cannot not-exist" (55). The remaining chapters on God focus on the divine attributes, which flow (as they do in the parallel questions in the Summa theologiae) from...