Subsidy Decisions Research Articles

Manufacturer vs. Retailer: A Comparative Analysis of Different Government Subsidy Strategies in a Dual-Channel Supply Chain Considering Green Quality and Channel Preferences

As escalating environmental pollution results from economic development, the green supply chain is vital in enhancing ecological quality. In light of the rapid growth of online shopping, the dual-channel supply chain has gained significant popularity. Governments have implemented policies to achieve carbon peaks and neutrality worldwide. Considering green quality and channel preferences, this study constructs a Stackelberg model led by the manufacturer within a dual-channel supply chain to compare the effects under two government subsidy strategies. A Stackelberg game-theoretic approach is applied to analyze the model. The findings indicate the following: (1) Increases in the subsidy coefficient can increase product greenness and the overall profit in both subsidy strategies, which makes sense; (2) When direct sales channels become dominant, subsidizing the manufacturer proves superior to subsidizing the retailer in terms of promoting green quality and overall profit, which extends existing studies of government subsidy decisions. Furthermore, subsidizing the retailer may negatively affect the total supply chain profit; (3) Consistent with previous literature, intense competition between manufacturers and retailers is expected to enhance the overall profit of the supply chain; (4) Interestingly, customer preference for online channels does not influence product green quality under manufacturer subsidization strategies but exhibits a negative impact under retailer subsidization strategies. Finally, this research provides managerial implications for decision-makers and potential issues for future research.

Signaling Game Model between Enterprises and Government under Healthcare Subsidy Policies

The Research and Development (R&D) activities of pharmaceutical enterprises are crucial for driving industry advancement, yet they also confront significant challenges of high risk and high cost. Consequently, government subsidies have emerged as vital means to support R&D in pharmaceutical enterprises and foster their growth. However, a persistent challenge remains for governments in effectively identifying and supporting low-risk enterprises genuinely in need of assistance when implementing subsidy policies.This study aims to investigate how enterprises influence government subsidy decisions by disclosing information regarding drug R&D activities and how governments formulate subsidy strategies based on enterprise information, within the context of asymmetric information. By constructing a signaling game model between pharmaceutical enterprises and the government, the research explores the impact of enterprise information disclosure on government subsidy decisions under conditions of information asymmetry. Additionally, the study examines how governments can design subsidy policies to encourage R&D investment effectively. Through model analysis, the research elucidates equilibrium states that may arise under different conditions and proposes strategies and recommendations to enhance incentives for enterprise information disclosure, thereby promoting the healthy development of the pharmaceutical industry and maximizing societal benefits.

Environmental Regulation Design: Motivating Firms’ Clean Technology Investments With Penalties and Subsidies

The recently enacted Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) includes a number of incentive-based programs (e.g., tax credits) designed to motivate firms to develop new clean technologies for fighting climate change. However, the IRA also includes a fee firms incur for excessive methane emissions. This represents the first time the United States government has ever levied a fee on greenhouse gas emissions, and it raises an interesting research question—how should a budget-constrained regulator balance the use of both incentive and penalty-based levers for stimulating investment in clean technology development? In this paper, we examine a regulator’s optimal penalty and subsidy decisions for motivating firms to invest in clean technology development. We illustrate how the level of competitive intensity in the market can influence a budget-constrained regulator with multiple competing objectives—the environment, firm profits, and consumer welfare. We find that a subsidy is always beneficial, irrespective of the regulator’s objective. While imposing a firm penalty always benefits the environment, it always negatively impacts the sum of firm profits and consumer welfare. However, depending on the level of competition in the market, instances can occur where imposing a high penalty actually benefits total firm profits or consumer welfare (separately). Interestingly, a regulator that cares about all three dimensions of its objective equally, should always set the penalty to either its minimum or maximum value, depending on whether the environmental cost of the harmful product is high or low.

PP127 Early Health Technology Assessment (HTA) Of Medical Technologies To Inform Subsidy Decision-making In Singapore

IntroductionMedical technologies are evolving rapidly, with many new and expensive technologies entering the market constantly, challenging the sustainability of the public healthcare system. Early health technology assessment (HTA) to inform subsidy decision for innovative medical technologies, before they diffuse into the public healthcare system, may drive appropriate early adoption or curtail inappropriate use. This abstract describes the Agency for Care Effectiveness (ACE)’s experience in conducting early HTAs and key challenges faced.MethodsDuring ACE’s 2021 topic prioritization exercise, ACE took a proactive approach by considering medical technologies identified from horizon scanning (HS) for subsidy evaluation. Two topics were shortlisted from HS. Standard HTA evaluation framework and local clinician consultation were used to define the evaluation scope and clinical pathways. Literature search and appraisal were conducted for safety, effectiveness, and economic evidence. Budget impact estimations and organizational feasibility assessment were additional domains considered for subsidy decision-making by the Ministry of Health Medical Technology Advisory Committee (MTAC).ResultsMTAC did not recommend subsidy for the two technologies due to weak evidence base, largely due to a lack of comparative evidence, small samples, short-term follow-ups, or heterogeneity of population. Additional considerations included potentially high budget impact or organizational feasibility issues such as substantial capital and maintenance cost and infrastructure reconfiguration required. During the evaluation, key challenges of assessing such technologies in their early diffusion within the healthcare system were: (i) differing clinical opinions on whether the technology meets an unmet need; (ii) uncertain place in the clinical management algorithm for the relevant indications; (iii) sparse and weak evidence; (iv) uncertain financial implications to the healthcare system due to a lack of available local costs.ConclusionsEarly HTA on medical technologies identified from HS can be a useful tool to guide subsidy decisions; however, several challenges exist. Careful selection of technologies and timing of evaluation are critical. Seeking stakeholder inputs earlier would ensure shortlisting appropriate technologies with greater clinical need for HTA.

HTA312 The Association of ESMO-Magnitude of Clinical Benefit Scale Scores and Subsidy Decisions of Targeted Therapies for Solid Tumors in Singapore

HTA312 The Association of ESMO-Magnitude of Clinical Benefit Scale Scores and Subsidy Decisions of Targeted Therapies for Solid Tumors in Singapore

Deciphering the Innovation Subsidy Puzzle: Government Choices amid Supply Chain Encroachment

Although the impact of government subsidies on private innovation has been widely recognized and researched in numerous studies, few have considered the increasingly prevalent phenomenon of supply chain encroachment in their analysis. This paper explores this phenomenon through a game-theoretic model that takes into account a government entity, a supplier, and a manufacturer. The primary aim is to understand how the government can make optimal subsidy decisions when the supplier moves into the supply chain. Several interesting conclusions have been drawn: (1) under governmental innovation subsidies, the supplier will raise the price of the new technology to obtain more potential revenue, which is termed the inverse wholesale price effect; (2) different kinds of innovation subsidies are shown to have varied effects on R&D, production, and consumption behavior; and (3) different subsidy strategies are made compatible with the characteristics of innovative activities to maximize social welfare as much as possible. These findings shed light on inconsistent results surrounding the impacts of government subsidies on private innovations in the existing literature, providing municipalities with helpful guidance when encouraging private innovation initiatives amid supply chain encroachment.

Cost-effectiveness of alternative first- and second-line treatments for benign prostatic hyperplasia in Singapore

BackgroundMinimally invasive surgical therapies, such as water vapor thermal therapy (WVTT) and prostatic urethral lift (PUL), are typically second-line options for patients in whom medical management (MM) failed but who are unwilling or unsuitable to undergo invasive transurethral resection of the prostate (TURP). However, the incremental cost-effectiveness of WVTT or PUL as first- or second-line therapy is unknown. We evaluated the incremental cost-effectiveness of alternative first- and second-line treatments for patients with moderate-to-severe benign prostatic hyperplasia (BPH) in Singapore to help policymakers make subsidy decisions based on value for money.MethodsWe considered six stepped-up treatment strategies, beginning with MM, WVTT, PUL or TURP. In each strategy, patients requiring retreatment advance to a more invasive treatment until TURP, which may be undergone twice. A Markov cohort model was used to simulate transitions between BPH severity states and retreatment, accruing costs and quality-adjusted life-years (QALYs) over a lifetime horizon.ResultsIn moderate patients, strategies beginning with MM had similar cost and effectiveness, and first-line WVTT was incrementally cost-effective to first-line MM (33,307 SGD/QALY). First-line TURP was not incrementally cost-effective to first-line WVTT (159,361 SGD/QALY). For severe patients, WVTT was incrementally cost-effective to MM as a first-line treatment (30,133 SGD/QALY) and to TURP as a second-line treatment following MM (6877 SGD/QALY). TURP was incrementally cost-effective to WVTT as a first-line treatment (48,209 SGD/QALY) in severe patients only. All pathways involving PUL were dominated (higher costs and lower QALYs).ConclusionBased on the common willingness-to-pay threshold of SGD 50,000/QALY, this study demonstrates the cost-effectiveness of WVTT over MM as first-line treatment for patients with moderate or severe BPH, suggesting it represents good value for money and should be considered for subsidy. PUL is not cost-effective as a first- nor second-line treatment. For patients with severe BPH, TURP as first-line is also cost-effective.

Real-world utilization and healthcare costs for multiple myeloma: A retrospective analysis of patients in Singapore.

Multiple myeloma, a hematological malignancy, imposes a significant financial burden on healthcare systems. Health technology assessments (HTA) and economic evaluations play vital roles in reimbursement decisions and cost containment. This study aimed to explore healthcare utilization patterns and costs among myeloma patients in Singapore through a retrospective analysis of 605 patients treated at two cancer centers. Data encompassing demographics, treatment utilization, and billing were extracted from electronic records, and a cost analysis was performed from the perspective of the Singapore healthcare system. The results revealed common usage of immunomodulatory agents (52%) and proteasome inhibitors (37%), with bortezomib being the most frequently used targeted treatment. Treatment costs increased with disease progression, displaying variations depending on the therapeutic agent used. Notably, hospitalization costs due to adverse events were substantial, with pneumonia as the leading cause. This study highlights the high cost of myeloma therapy in Singapore, posing a financial burden for households. Findings may inform economic evaluations, evidence generation, reimbursement, and subsidy decisions. Leveraging real-world data from electronic records provides valuable insights into local healthcare utilization patterns. Future studies may explore integrating billing databases with clinical repositories for a more comprehensive analysis, and consider limitations such as incomplete clinical information and potential selection bias.

Optimal Government Subsidy Decision and Its Impact on Sustainable Development of a Closed-Loop Supply Chain

Government subsidies generally play an important role in the sustainable operations management of a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC). This paper investigates the optimal government subsidy decision and its influence on the sustainable development of the CLSC, consisting of one manufacturer, one retailer, and one third-party collector, from the economic, environmental, and social perspectives. Based on game analysis technology, different Stackelberg game models among the government and the CLSC members are formulated to analyze the optimal decisions under different power structures. By conducting theoretic comparative and sensitivity analyses and a case study, the effects of the government subsidy and the power structure are explored from the total profit, environmental benefit, and social welfare. Results show that the subsidy is good for sustainable development of the CLSC, which improves the total profit of the CLSC members, environmental benefit, and social welfare and the improvement effect is more prominent when the CLSC members have unequal bargaining power. Moreover, according to the growth proportion of profit, the retailer and collector benefit more from the subsidy among the CLSC members when they have different bargaining power, otherwise, the CLSC members benefit equally from the subsidy, and the subsidy is more beneficial to the environment compared with the total supply chain profit and social welfare.

Co‐op advertising in randomly fluctuating markets

We consider a dynamic Stackelberg game between a manufacturer and a retailer facing a randomly changing market environment (boom–bust cycle) modeled as a Markov process over time. The manufacturer announces the national advertising effort and a cooperative (co‐op) advertising subsidy, and the retailer sets the local advertising effort. We derive the optimal feedback equilibrium advertising strategies and show that the channel members are forward‐looking in their advertising decisions. In the single‐crisis case, both the necessary and sufficient conditions for a positive subsidy reveal that the subsidy decision hinges on the relative profit margins before and after the crisis. Our comparative statics analysis indicates that the presence of national advertising enriches the members' advertising behaviors significantly. Furthermore, the pre‐crisis (post‐crisis) aggregate advertising contribution of the supply chain generally decreases (increases) in the damage rate and the crisis likelihood, as in the single‐firm case. But the individual advertising behaviors of the members may exhibit richer structures, depending on the comparative advantages of the members in each state. In addition, our numerical studies demonstrate that channel members can suffer sizable losses when they adopt myopic advertising strategies over their regime‐switching counterparts. Finally, we extend our analysis to incorporate retail and brand competition and show that the channel members' advertising behaviors are reasonably consistent with those without competition.

Can government subsidy and marine carbon capture, utilization and storage technology improve the decision level of supply chain intellectual property pledge financing?

Although it is an innovative technology with great potential for emission reduction, there are some problems such as high financing risk and lack of market for related products in marine carbon capture, utilization and storage (CCUS) technology. Its evolution depends largely on the support of the government. Based on supply chain perspective, this article constructs a two-level supply chain composed of one manufacturer and only one retailer. The intellectual property pledge financing decisions for the supply chain marine CCUS technology in no financing model, without government subsidy model, and under government subsidy model are considered separately. Through numerical simulation, the effect of government subsidies and marine CCUS technology intellectual property pledge financing on the optimum making decision and earning of members in supply chain are emphatically analyzed. According to the research results, the intellectual property pledge financing and government subsidy policy of marine CCUS technology have different impacts on manufacturers with diverse own funds and their supply chains. For the subsidy decision, the government needs to combine the capital constraints of the supply chain and the product's marine CCUS level to formulate the optimal decision, so as to encourage as many companies as possible to develop products related to marine CCUS product. This paper not only provides reference for the intellectual property pledge financing decision of marine CCUS technology, but also provides practical guidance for the government to lay down subsidy policies for the application and growth of marine CCUS technology.

Optimal government subsidy scheme for lean-oriented innovation in the textile industry

The increasing environmental burden posed by the textile industry has placed pressure on firms to shift to sustainability through lean-oriented innovation (LOI). However, firms' LOI incentives may be weakened by high investment costs. Recognizing firms' predicaments, governments are developing subsidy policies to promote LOI. This study builds a two-period game model to explore optimal government's subsidy decisions for LOI in an evolving textile industry, incorporating government subsidies, LOI investment, and firms' production decisions. The study reveals that the social welfare in period two exceed those in period one, implying that competition in the industry improves social welfare. Furthermore, we derive government subsidy decisions for maximal environmental protection and social welfare and find that the former does not necessarily lead to a superior environmental performance to the latter. Moreover, we find that under some conditions, a “win-win-win” situation can be reached when the government pursues social welfare optimum.

The platform competition with multihoming on both sides in the omnichannel – —fee or subsidy?

PurposeOmnichannel has become increasingly important with the development of e-commerce. In omnichannel, merchants expect customers to get the products and services at anytime, anywhere and in any way, and the same is true for customers. This drives multihoming in online platforms for both merchants and customers. Thus, once both customers and merchants are multihomed, what price and subsidy decisions should be made between platforms to compete to obtain optimal profits? The main purpose of this paper is to solve these problems and provide decision-making for two-sided platforms in omnichannel.Design/methodology/approachThis study builds a dual Hotelling model to capture the utility and network effects of customers and merchants on two-sided platforms. This study introduces the exposure effect and convenience effect of multihomed customers and merchants in the model and analyzes the impact of these effects in the market with multihoming on one side. Then, this study extends the model to the market with multihoming on both sides and makes the pricing decision for two-sided platform when considering the exposure effect and convenience effect through an equilibrium solution. Finally, this study also uses numerical analysis to simulate the decision and profit of the platform.FindingsThis paper finds that the convenience effect will only increase social welfare when customers are single-homed and merchants are multihomed. In addition, when both users are multihomed, the platform will subsidize to attract merchants and customers if the convenience effect and exposure effect are relatively high. This study also finds that network effects come not only from the same platform but also from another platform in the case with multihoming on both sides. And network effects in the heterogeneous platform will be reduced by the convenience effect and exposure effect.Originality/valueAccording to the behavioral characteristics of merchants and customers in omnichannel, this paper first adopts the dual Hotelling model to study the pricing of two-sided platforms with multihoming on both sides. This paper shows that network effects originate not only from the same platform but also from another platform and that the exposure effect and the convenience effect can exist as cross-platform network effects, which provides a new explanation for network effects in markets with multihoming on both sides. This research extends the theory of network effects and plays an important role in the development of two-sided platforms in omnichannel.

Optimal electric vehicle subsidy and pricing decisions with consideration of EV anxiety and EV preference in green and non-green consumers

Electric vehicles (EVs) are an important part of the solution to climate change due to their reduction in carbon emissions. Purchase subsidies have been efficient tools in overcoming the cost barrier. In this paper, we formulate an analytical model to study the impact of EV anxiety and EVs’ environmental benefits on optimal subsidy and pricing decisions. We consider a market consisting of a vehicle manufacturer, a social planner and two segments of consumers: green and non-green. Both segments have EV anxiety. The manufacturer produces and sells both EVs and traditional vehicles. EV purchase decisions are influenced by consumers’ EV anxiety, preference for EVs, EV subsidy amounts, and retail prices for both EVs and traditional vehicles. Our results justify the necessity of a subsidy program in promoting EV sales. We identify the optimal subsidy under various market conditions. We further analyze how environmental benefit and consumers’ EV anxiety impact the optimal subsidy decisions. We find that it is optimal to offer the maximum level of subsidy when the environmental benefit is above a certain threshold value. Our results also show that the optimal subsidy either decreases or increases in consumers’ EV anxiety, depending on the level of environmental benefit of EVs. In addition, we show that EV anxiety has both positive and negative effects on the demand for EVs, but overall harms EV adoption.

PD15 Horizon Scanning To Nominate Subsidy Evaluation Topics For Medical Technologies: Early Experience From Singapore

IntroductionHorizon scanning (HS) is an early health technology assessment (HTA) method for raising early awareness among policymakers of promising new and emerging health technologies. The Agency for Care Effectiveness (ACE) in Singapore established a HS system in 2019 to complement its HTA process. While the HS system initially focused on cell and gene therapies, this was expanded in 2020 to include medical technologies (MTs). This abstract focuses on the role of HS in nominating MTs for early evaluation to guide subsidy decisions, with the intention of avoiding challenges in altering deeply entrenched practices.MethodsThe ACE methodology for HS aligns with the core principles and methods of international best practice. Generally, MTs addressing national healthcare priorities are tracked. To identify topics for subsidy evaluation, the local registration status of an MT was used as the main selection criterion because of its proximity to the technology’s early diffusion into the healthcare system. MTs with regulatory approval were selected for HTA and subsidy consideration. All nominated technologies were checked against eligibility criteria for HTA and then assessed against a standard checklist for prioritizing HTA topics.ResultsAmong the 1,025 MTs tracked by the HS system, 89 were locally registered and nominated for HTA. Following eligibility assessment, 26 topics remained. After the prioritization exercise six topics were shortlisted. To date, two evaluations have been completed to guide subsidy decisions and four topics are undergoing evaluation. Notably, 16 of the 26 eligible topics were excluded due to a lack of sufficient evidence, in terms of both quantity and quality, for evaluation.ConclusionsHS can be a useful tool for identifying new MTs for evaluation and possible funding prior to further diffusion, but careful selection of the technologies is required to ensure a sufficient evidence base for evaluation. Moving forward, HS can also play a more active role in disinvestment of obsolete or low value health technologies.

Real-world impact of a subsidy decision of sofosbuvir-velpatasvir for treatment of chronic hepatitis C on clinical practice and patient outcomes.

Sofosbuvir-velpatasvir was recommended for subsidy to treat chronic hepatitis C in Singapore in 2018. We measured the impact of the subsidy decision on clinical practice and patient outcomes. Specifically, we looked at pre- and post-subsidy changes in the utilization and prescribing pattern of chronic hepatitis C treatment and the real-world clinical effectiveness. Utilization trends and prescribing patterns were assessed using aggregated drug utilization data from public hospitals' dispensing systems and clinical data from the national electronic health record database, respectively. An audit was conducted to evaluate sustained virological response rate 12 weeks post treatment (SVR12). Use of sofosbuvir-velpatasvir increased sharply since its subsidy listing and dropped subsequently, whereas the utilization of comparator drugs remained low. Prescribing rate of sofosbuvir-velpatasvir increased from 13.7% in the pre-subsidy period to 90.2% in the post-subsidy period; 39.1% of patients previously on pegylated interferon and ribavirin switched to sofosbuvir-velpatasvir following its subsidy listing. In the audit, 365 out of 375 patients (97.3% [95% confidence interval: 95.1-98.6%]) achieved SVR12. The subsidy decision led to increased accessibility to patients and intended changes in clinical practice. Sofosbuvir-velpatasvir was also clinically effective in the real world. These findings augur well for the continued eradication of chronic hepatitis C infection in Singapore.

MT13 Measuring Real-World Impact of Subsidy Decision on Sleep Tests Utilisation for the Diagnosis of Obstructive Sleep Apnoea

Lab-based polysomnography (PSG), for diagnosing obstructive sleep apnoea (OSA), is a subsidised inpatient service in Singapore’s public healthcare institutions (PHIs). The alternative, home sleep test (HST), is cheaper and can be prescribed in the outpatient setting. Following health technology assessment performed by Agency for Care Effectiveness, HST was listed as a subsidised service in PHIs in May 2019. This study aims to assess the impact of the subsidy decision on sleep tests utilisation.

Welfare maximization with the least subsidy: Pricing model for surface water loop heat pump PPP projects considering occupancy rate growth and coefficient of performance

The surface water loop heat pump (SWLHP) is a renewable energy technology applied to support heating, ventilation and air conditioning (HVAC) systems to address the threat of global warming. However, the operation of SWLHP-PPP projects is challenging because the demand uncertainty brought by occupancy rate growth (ORG) affects SWLHP systems' coefficient of performance (COP), leading to cost uncertainty of the SWLHP-PPP projects. In this paper, we propose an analytical framework to examine how ORG (characterized by the initial occupancy rate, IOR, and the pace of occupancy rate growth, PORG) and COP affect the private sector's and government's pricing and subsidy decisions, respectively. Our findings identify two critical coefficients, the ORG-related coefficient and the COP-related coefficient, which influence the optimal price and government subsidies. Specifically, the optimal price declines with the former but increases in the latter, while the variation patterns of the optimal unit subsidy with respect to these two coefficients are just the opposite. Furthermore, the optimal price's sensitivity to the IOR is relatively stable, whereas that to the PORG decreases in PORG; the optimal unit subsidy and the total subsidy behave similarly. These results caution the private sector and the government to not blindly improve the forecasting accuracy of the PORG as the value of accurate forecasting diminishes with the PORG. Finally, the comparative results show that the lowest total subsidy is afforded by the government when both the COP and ORG are considered.

Government Subsidy Decision‐Making for Waste Tire Recycling under the Coexistence of the Retailer and the Internet Recycling Platform

The low efficiency of the closed‐loop supply chain in waste tire recycling has hindered the green development of China’s automobile industry. Additionally, the government subsidy decision has a huge influence on green development. This study focuses on a closed‐loop supply chain system that consists of five members, namely, manufacturer, retailer, Internet recycling platform, and government. It aims to investigate the effect of the government’s subsidy mechanism on the decision‐making process of recycling units, as well as to reveal the optimal strategies under different conditions. Under the coexistence of the retailer and the Internet recycling platform recycling programs implemented simultaneously by themselves, a two‐stage Stackelberg game model is developed to explore the optimal government subsidy decision and the optimal pricing decision of manufacturer, retailer, and network platform in the closed‐loop supply chain. At the same time, this paper investigates the effects of government subsidies on social welfare and the profits of supply chain members under different scenarios and then verifies the optimal government subsidy decision with MATLAB software through numerical examples and sensitivity analysis. The results show that the government subsidy coefficient is positively correlated with social welfare under four subsidy scenarios. To maximize the economic profit and social welfare of the members of the closed‐loop supply chain, the government should appropriately select different subsidy objects within the range of different subsidy coefficients. When the subsidy coefficient γ ∈ [0, 15] and the government chooses consumer as the subsidy object, the social welfare will be maximized when γ > 15 and the government chooses Internet recycling platform as the subsidy object. It is recommended that the government directly subsidizes the Internet recycling platform. However, in order to maintain the manufacturer’s core position in the closed‐loop supply chain, the subsidy coefficient for the Internet recycling platform should not exceed the critical value of 18. These results provide managerial insights for the government, manufacturer, and the third party to make decisions in the field of waste tire recycling. This paper presents the different subsidy conditions under which the government should appropriately select different subsidy objects. It also provides a theoretical and practical basis for improving the recycling efficiency of waste tires.

Optimal Pricing and Green Product Design Strategies in a Sustainable Supply Chain Considering Government Subsidy and Different Channel Power Structures

Green product design is a vital measure to support sustainable development in a circular economy era. This paper studies the multi-product pricing and green product design strategies under different supply chain structures and government subsidy strategies. Considering different channel leadership, we establish the centralized (C), manufacturer-led (MS), and retailer-led (RS) supply chain models, respectively. By applying a game-theoretical approach, corresponding equilibrium pricing, green product design, and government subsidy decisions under different supply chain structures are obtained. Through comparison and numerical analysis, we find that: (1) the different subsidy strategies of the government have an important impact on green product development. When the government provides a uniform subsidy strategy, a RS supply chain can bring greener product, more market demands, more profit, and more social welfare; (2) when the government provides a differentiated subsidy strategy, MS and RS supply chain structures can bring greener product and more market demand than the centralized supply chain. They can also bring the same social welfare and the same product to the green design level. However, the MS supply chain structure can bring more profit for the firm; (3) the consumers’ green awareness positively impacts the design and development of green product. Therefore, it is beneficial for the firm to adopt reasonable measures to boost the environmental awareness of consumers in order to realize the sustainable development of our society.