Submarine Program Research Articles

Nuclear-Powered Submarines and the Global Nuclear Order

The nuclear propulsion of submarines has never been raised as a source of controversy since the countries operating nuclear-powered submarines are only the five Nuclear-Weapon States recognized in the NPT, plus India, which is not a signatory to the NPT. However, with the advancement of the Brazilian nuclear-powered submarine program and the announcement that Australia will operate and develop nuclear-powered submarines, this issue has become a hot spot on the non-proliferation agenda. In this context, two questions arise: What are the perceptions of the main actors involved with the issue of nuclear energy use for the propulsion of submarines of Non-nuclear Weapon States? What are the impacts of these perceptions on the global nuclear order? This article argues that a new normative inequality would be in the formation process, in which there would be the “have” and “have-not” users of nuclear energy for the propulsion of submarines.

Safeguards and the Nuclear-Powered Submarines of the NNWS: there is no gap; there is a first time | Submarinos de Propulsão Nuclear dos NNWS e as Salvaguardas da AIEA: Não Há Lacuna; Há Uma Primeira Vez

Is there a gap in the Nuclear Weapons Nonproliferation Regime related to nuclear material for the propulsion of submarines by Non-nuclear Weapons States? This question arises with the steady advancement of the Brazilian nuclear-powered submarine program and within the AUKUS strategic partnership. This article argues that there is no such gap since the IAEA’s Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements (CSA) addresses this issue. What happens is that no Special Procedures models for this kind of nuclear material have yet been elaborated. The article proceeds in three steps. Firstly, it focuses on the discussion regarding the existence of such a gap. Then, it addresses the CSA signed by Australia and Brazil. The final remarks present the inferences regarding this kind of gap. Received on: 30 Apr. 2023 | Accepted on: 18 Nov. 2023

A Constructivist Analysis of the Establishment of the AUKUS Security Pact and its Implications for Regional Stability in the Indo-Pacific

This article attempts to shed light on AUKUS formation based on constructivist perspective and its implications for regional stability in the Indo-Pacific. Using a qualitative approach with a case study method, this article found that the formation of AUKUS is strongly influenced by two fundamental elements of constructivism: identity and interests. Identity refers to the shared ideas among the Anglo-Saxon nations (including Canada and New Zealand). Nevertheless, New Zealand tends not to join AUKUS due to its commitment to non-proliferation, while Canada seems to contribute nothing to the nuclear submarine program. The interests of the AUKUS alliance are: the US desires to strengthen its hegemony in the Indo-Pacific and rebalance China’s domination; the UK craves to become the first European country to enhance alliance cooperation in the Indo-Pacific after Brexit; and Australia’s willingness to modernize its military capability and affirms its commitment to which allies it counts on in the future. The implications of establishing AUKUS might include: undermining the status quo in the region concerning a nuclear-free zone, weakening existing cooperation agreements and reducing mutual trust between traditional allies, and bringing catastrophe to the region by triggering an armed race. Keywords: AUKUS; China; Constructivism; Indo-Pacific; Regional Stability

Taiwan’s submarine-building plan

Taiwan has been attempting to expand its small submarine fleet for 20 years, first by trying to purchase submarines from the United States and Europe, which failed, and now by building the submarines itself. The so-called Indigenous Defense Submarine programme seeks to build eight modern diesel-electric submarines over roughly the next decade. While the programme faces several technological and political challenges, if it succeeds, Taiwan will significantly increase its ability to resist a potential invasion by China.

Cybersecurity for Allied Future Submarines

Cyber has become a supposedly cheap first-strike weapon of political choice by potential adversaries in a milieu placing insurgency, terrorism, international crime and state-based influences in close un-regulated proximity. The merging of electronic and cyber warfare means that not even submarines, however unconnected or firewalled they may be, are immune. The quantum attack surface of submarines is as much in their past, as they are in their designs today and their operations tomorrow: they must survive to be credible and ideally they should even be a contemporary offensive cyber deterrent. Such critical defensive systems require robust security systems engineering and cybersecurity test and evaluation to build and sustain their cyber-resilience. This paper uses Australia’s future submarine program [1]1 to outline key facets needed in a submarine program to achieve cyber resilience, including how to adapt U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) best practices to engineer, test and sustain cyber-resilient submarine systems. Strategies are needed that provision sovereign-owned and operated land-based test sites to design, build, demonstrate and sustain critical submarine systems. This work is most relevant to countries allied to the U.S. and importing submarine capabilities, such as within lesser European powers and also in the Indo-Pacific where both cyber warfare and submarines are proliferating.

Evaluating Australia's most complex system‐of‐systems, the future submarine: A case for using new Complex Systems Governance

AbstractAs many systems grew in complexity and connected to other existing systems, the concept of Systems of Systems (SoS) was developed to explain the behavior, operation and design of these more complex and inter‐connected systems. Early research recognized the difficulty in classic testing and evaluating (T&E) for these SoS. Much effort has been expended attempting to predict the emergent behaviors in SoSs, developing and executing T&E programs involving more sophisticated multi‐factor and multi‐response statistical techniques, and then recovering when some unpredicted emergent behaviors were discovered despite these efforts. Recently, an emerging concept of Complex System Governance (CSG) has been developed as yet another weapon in the armory for managing development of complex interdependent capability architectures. CSG is based on a firm grounding in System Theory and Management Cybernetics. The potential application of robust CSG structure to reduce or mitigate emergent T&E surprises is proposed in this paper. Using Australia's Future Submarine (FSM) program as an illustration, this paper has examined the need for such an application, examine several of the governance propositions focused on the developmental T&E regime and provided potential areas to leverage the efficacy of this approach to such major development programs.

German Navy sonar development during the two world wars and interwar years

In the German Navy, as in the UK and America, the development of underwater acoustical detection was shaped by institutional, political, and technical constraints and in response to tactical events. German hydrophone development in WWI was less advanced than that of the Allies, who focussed on combating an all-out U-boat war. The German Navy did not develop the variety of hydrophones developed by the Allies in particular the towed hydrophone array of the American Navy, which nevertheless inspired their passive sonar arrays known as “Gruppenhorchgerät” (GHG), German for “group listening device” in the interwar years, developed for the long-range protection of their capital ships, until 1935 with the signing of the Anglo German Naval Agreement when they commenced their submarine building program. For strategic reasons, Germany continued to concentrate on pro-submarine research so that at the start of WWII the German Navy had developed sophisticated GHG systems available which they improved further into the “Balkon” system of the later high-speed U-boats, Type XXI and XXVI. Their operational echo-ranging Asdic equipment was tactically inferior to that of the Royal Navy, and some interesting prototypes in development did not reach active service.

The Brazilian Navy's nuclear-powered submarine program

ABSTRACTThis article discusses the main aspects of the Brazilian Navy's nuclear-powered submarine program. It first discusses the Brazilian perception that the restrictions imposed by the world powers related to so-called sensitive technologies are a tool to maintain the status quo and hamper the technological progress of developing countries. The article then focuses on the political, economic, technological, and strategic reasons behind the creation and maintenance of the autonomous nuclear-propulsion submarine program. Next, the article examines strategic aspects of the program and their institutionalization in high-level defense documents, informing Brazil's opposition to adopting additional nonproliferation measures. Finally, it discusses Brazilian policy toward the South Atlantic Ocean and the role of the nuclear-powered submarine. The article seeks to shed light on the main reasons that led Brazil to build and maintain such submarines and maps the program's phases of development.

External perceptions of Brazil's nuclear policy: views from Argentina and the United States

ABSTRACTBrazil, a developing country with an advanced nuclear program, presents an interesting case for observers of nuclear politics. Brazil is one of a handful of countries that possess uranium-enrichment technology, one of three countries in Latin America that produce nuclear power, and the only country without nuclear weapons to pursue an ambitious nuclear-powered submarine program. Among external views on Brazil's nuclear politics, the perceptions of Argentina and the United States matter most. With Argentina, Brazil shares responsibility for regional security. The two countries’ commitment to a bilateral nuclear safeguards arrangement contributes to a peaceful environment in the region. The United States will continue to set the tone in global nuclear matters and thus its views of Brazil's role in the nuclear field will continue to matter to Brasília, even as Brazil's political and economic crises have thrown the country’s nuclear future into uncertain territory.

The Canary in the Nuclear Submarine: Assessing the Nonproliferation Risk of the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Loophole

ABSTRACTThe Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) allows states to exempt nuclear material from international safeguards for use in nuclear submarine programs. This material, however, could be diverted for nuclear weapons purposes without the knowledge of inspectors, creating a potentially dangerous loophole in the treaty. This article argues that exercising that loophole today would amount to admitting a nuclear weapon program, making it a particularly poor pathway to a weapon for a potential proliferant. Still, if states like Brazil ultimately exempt nuclear material from safeguards for a nuclear submarine effort, they could set a dangerous precedent that makes it easier for others to use the loophole as a route to a nuclear weapon capability. There are several policy options available to mitigate the damage of such a precedent; most promising is the prospect of a voluntary safeguards arrangement that would allow international inspectors to keep an eye on nuclear material even after it has been dedicated to a naval nuclear propulsion program.

Brazil's Nuclear Submarine Program

ABSTRACTNarratives about Brazil's nuclear program are distorted by supporters and critics alike. In Brazil, the national nuclear infrastructure is undergoing a period of expansion, with plans to build new nuclear power plants and industrial-scale fuel production facilities. While Brazil's leaders herald the nuclear sector as a triumph for indigenous science and technology, foreigners view the nuclear program as a dangerous legacy of the military regime. This discrepancy becomes even more apparent in discussions about the ongoing construction of Brazil's first nuclear powered submarine. Brazil's military touts the submarine as a symbol of political status, economic growth, and military might. But from abroad, the military's involvement in nuclear development is considered unnecessary, worrisome, and even irresponsible. These narratives—often incomplete or selective—have polarized discussions about Brazil's nuclear submarine program and caused considerable political antagonism during safeguards negotiations. This article works to dispel myths, highlight legitimate concerns, and explain historical perspectives that shed light on some difficulties that can be anticipated in future negotiations.

Visões civis sobre o submarino nuclear brasileiro

O artigo tem como objetivo entender o programa do submarino nuclear de ataque brasileiro, partindo da ideia de que, em certos casos, a adocao de determinada tecnologia militar pode provocar efeitos importantes na politica. Inicia-se com uma breve historia dos submarinos nucleares e procura explicar as principais caracteristicas tecnicas desses equipamentos. Faz um historico do desenvolvimento do programa brasileiro desde sua concepcao, no fim dos anos de 1970, para mostrar que, apesar de ter passado por periodos de dificuldades, o projeto sobreviveu ao regime militar e ao periodo de cortes orcamentarios dos governos Collor (1990-1992) e FHC (1995-2002) ate ser retomado como projeto estrategico no governo Lula (2003-2011). Enfim, o texto apresenta e analisa visoes de especialistas em defesa sobre o tema.

Innovation decision making in high-risk organizations: A comparison of the US and Soviet attack submarine programs

Decision-making about innovative change in high-risk networks is exceptionally difficult because system failure may result in catastrophe. We adopt a historical method to compare the US and Soviet choices in their nuclear attack submarine programs between 1970 and 1996 and to surface their complex political, technological, and operational relations. One program achieved high reliability in the face of innovation while the other did not. Actor network theory (ANT) helps illuminate the interactions and resulting innovation paths and dependencies. We study how (i) open communication and power dispersion across high-risk networks influence system reliability, (ii) individuals spanning multiple groups within the network generate dominant coalitions, and (iii) strong safety advocates impact the network.

The Chinese Navy's Submarine Arm: Lynchpin of ‘Active Defence’

In broad pursuance of the goals of China's national defence in the new era, the People's Liberation Army Navy has been mainly tasked with the defence of its maritime rights, interests and security, safeguarding its economic development and serving its peaceful diplomacy. The Chinese submarines figure prominently in their military strategy of “Active Defence.” The blistering pace of submarine modernisation, supporting infrastructure and intensive training regimen bear testimony to their centrality in the Chinese ‘Offshore Defence’ maritime thought process. With their nuclear attack submarines particularly capable of far-ranging missions of long durations, the United States as the predominantly present maritime power in the western and central Pacific Ocean will invariably stand to be affected. A real possibility of their deployment into the Indian Ocean in the medium to long term will also impact on the Indian maritime security scenario. Hence, it is prudent to carefully assess the Chinese nuclear submarine program.

Australia's Next Defence White Paper

Benefiting from the relatively benign environment of the Asia-Pacific of the past sixty years, Australia's government has been able to go beyond its stated ‘Defence of Australia’ policy to undertake military operations outside of its immediate neighbourhood, in support of its allies. As austerity begins to bite, however, Australian defence planners no longer have the luxury of creating a ‘balanced force’ – and this at a strategically critical time in the region, as major powers rise and the US calls for greater support from its partners. Andrew Davies analyses what the future may hold for Australian defence, with key decisions about the submarine programme to provide the first test.

O projeto do submarino nuclear brasileiro

O artigo procura reconstruir a trajetória do programa do submarino nuclear brasileiro desde suas origens, no governo Geisel, aos dias atuais. Lançando mão do conceito de oportunismo tecnológico, procura analisar a atitude dos diferentes governos federais sobre o projeto, mostrando que os governos neoliberais de Fernando Collor, Itamar Franco e Fernando Henrique Cardoso cortaram radicalmente verbas para o programa, sem, no entanto, suspendê-lo por completo. Surpreendentemente, parece haver uma continuidade entre os governos militares e o governo Lula, quanto ao apoio decidido à ideia do submarino nuclear. Quanto às relações de força na Marinha, o texto conclui que não há divergências significativas sobre a relevância do programa, o que não exclui choques de personalidades navais, em virtude do caráter autárquico assumido pelo projeto e da dificuldade de continuá-lo apenas com verbas da própria força. O artigo utilizou entrevistas recentes com atores-chaves do processo.

It is Not Just Hardware and Software, Anymore! Human Systems Integration in US Submarines

AbstractUntil recently, the Navy's approach to designing, engineering, and acquiring complex weapon systems did not routinely or completely include the human “warrior” as an integral part of the system. Rather, the Navy viewed systems as combinations of hardware and software. The results were often less‐than‐optimal capability and high life‐cycle cost—and, sometimes, even mission failure. Given the high rate of technological change and the need to rein in cost in the face of increasingly constrained budgets, the Navy and the other services have increasingly embraced the need to consider human‐performance capabilities and limitations up front and on an equal footing with hardware and software—as integral elements in both new‐acquisition and technology‐refresh programs. The US Submarine Force has championed human systems integration (HSI). HSI is a specialized engineering discipline that takes human limitations and capabilities fully into account to influence system design and engineering early in the research, development, and acquisition process, thereby helping to ensure the highest overall performance at the lowest total ownership cost. Implementation of HSI has involved new partnerships with unlikely partners such as the audio equipment company Bose, game‐makers, the visual‐reality industry, physiologists, and psychologists. Nowhere has this been more apparent than in the Virginia (SSN‐774)‐Class Nuclear Attack Submarine Program.

Maximizing Platform Value: Increasing VIRGINIA Class Deployments

AbstractThe FY11 Report to Congress on Annual Long‐Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels (commonly known as the 30‐Year Shipbuilding Plan) forecasts that the Navy's Attack Submarine (SSN) force structure will fall below the requirement of 48 SSNs in 2024, and will remain below the requirement throughout at least 2040 (the limit of the current report). Operating the fleet with fewer ships than necessary to meet commitments around the globe makes it imperative to maximize the mission time provided by each platform. Accordingly, the VIRGINIA Class Submarine Program Office (PMS 450) has developed a plan to mitigate this shortfall in force structure by designing reductions in depot‐level maintenance, thereby improving operational availability and maximizing mission time. This plan is encompassed in the Program Office's Reduction of Total Ownership Cost (RTOC) goals. However, actions arising from pressure to reduce Total Ownership Cost (TOC) may have the potential to inadvertently limit available platform mission time if the full consequences, including indirect impacts, are not rigorously assessed and analyzed in advance. The VIRGINIA Class Submarine Program faced this challenge explicitly in implementing the RTOC program while simultaneously working through details of a class maintenance plan modification for later submarines that adds a deployment to the operating cycle. Reducing TOC, while making changes to both the maintenance plan and the platform design, requires an integrated analytic capability to assess the impact of potential changes to both cost and delivered mission time. Evaluating the impact of maintenance changes on mission time is complicated by interactions between multiple stakeholders involved in controlling and managing the lifecycle of the submarine—including those responsible for maintenance planning (and the ability of the maintenance facilities to execute the work), operations and training, and modernizations. An approach and analytic framework, which captures “TOC Effectiveness” (defined as Mission Time Delivered divided by Net Cost) is needed to balance divergent program and stakeholder goals. To capture TOC effectiveness, a time‐phased dynamic simulation of the lifecycle employment of VIRGINIA Class Submarines (including depot maintenance time) has been developed to determine the likely submarine employment consequences of the plans, policies, and constraints of the stakeholders involved, and to ensure that the lifecycle maintenance plan targets are achieved. The simulation was validated against historical performance of LOS ANGELES Class maintenance execution at public shipyards, explicitly adjusting for known differences in VIRGINIA Class work packages (the first VIRGINIA Class depot maintenance availability did not start until October 2010). Simulation analysis has identified likely results of alternative plans and/or policies and provided insight into where changes can be made across multiple stakeholders to efficiently and effectively achieve program goals for deployments. The simulation is integrated into the VIRGINIA Class RTOC program process to identify specific areas where changes have high leverage to increase mission time, evaluate specific changes proposed by the RTOC effort, and track progress toward achieving mission time goals.

Managing Change on Complex Programs: VIRGINIA Class Cost Reduction

AbstractToday's ship acquisition environment demands the delivery of more ship for less money. The VIRGINIA Class Submarine Program faced this challenge explicitly, with its mandate to achieve cost reduction of approximately $400 million per ship by FY 2012 as a necessary condition for increased production. For VIRGINIA Class, accomplishing this objective meant implementing a number of significant cost reducing changes to a mature design and hundreds of construction processes—ensuring that these changes enhanced rather than disrupted the “normal” learning occurring in the serial submarine construction. Managing these changes and their impact on ongoing efforts to achieve good learning from ship to ship (also known as the learning curve) was further complicated by interactions between learning and other factors like changes to production rate, funding profiles, construction schedules, and the workforce. Performance of the VIRGINIA Class Program was dynamically simulated to determine in advance the likely full consequences (including indirect impacts) of cost reduction actions in the context of evolving program conditions. The simulation of VIRGINIA Class Program performance captured individual factors whose improvement together drives the classic learning curve—for example, design maturity, material availability, staff experience, and so on—and was validated against historical program performance. This simulation capability was used to evaluate the full impact of potential changes, individually and in combination, along with sensitivity to a variety of different future scenarios. The analysis provided insights regarding the degree of disruption from different cost reduction changes, synergies between these changes, and interactions with other program conditions. This provided an independent “reality check” on the path taken by the VIRGINIA Class cost reduction effort, guidance regarding key sensitivities and risks to be managed, and data that supported contracting for the next block of ships.

Mapping the values in B2B relationships: A systemic, knowledge-based perspective

The management of an enduring relationship between provider and supplier has at its heart an implicit interaction between the valuation systems of the counterparts. We take the view that this interaction is conveniently understood through the lens of knowledge management. Knowledge management informs our treatment of business to business relationships through two mechanisms. It helps us manage better the dissemination and co-creation of knowledge in an organisation and new work in the mapping of knowledge allows us to represent the knowledge aspects of a relationship in a way which allows us to manage it better. We present, therefore, an approach to allow the specific representation of these valuation systems and their interaction, using a case study of the marketing of a nuclear submarine programme to a government. A conclusion is that structures which support the co-creation of knowledge between the companies is critical to winning the contract and we indicate how this co-creation can be engendered.