Sub-discipline Of Law Research Articles

СОЦИАЛЬНЫЙ ПОРТРЕТ, РЕПУТАЦИИ И МЕЖДУНАРОДНАЯ АКТИВНОСТЬ РОССИЙСКИХ УЧЕНЫХ-ЮРИСТОВ

The article proposes an analysis of professional reputations, social characteristics and scientific practices of the academic community of Russian lawyers. The authors give a detailed social portrait of the community: demographic characteristics, mobility, teaching load and involvement in legal practice. The study provides drawing on the representative survey the rankings of the most authoritative figures who have contributed to the Russian legal science in general as well as to particular sub-disciplines of law. In the article, the authors analyse how reputation correlates with formal indicators — the number of publications and citations in Russian and international journals. The article specifically addresses the issue of the involvement of Russian legal scholars into the international academia and their preparedness to use empirical methods and interdisciplinary approaches.

Once more with feeling: queer activist legal scholarship and jurisprudence

ABSTRACTScholars and activists concerned with eliminating violence and discrimination against lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and intersex (LGBTI) people have generated passionate conversations about pursuing law reform to make injuries, intimacies, and identities visible while challenging how legal systems continue to marginalise queers. My paper contributes to these conversations by using emotion as an analytic register to navigate the ways case law seeks to ‘progress’ the intimacies and identities of LGBTI people from positions of injury. In doing so, I introduce a new approach to queer activist legal scholarship by reading emotion in law on two levels: I target its enactment in what I call ‘pro-LGBTI cases’ and it forms the register in which I pursue my evaluation of those cases. Rather than develop this analysis around specific doctrines or jurisdictions, I create my own activist-scholarly narrative by reading emotions through their enactments in pro-LGBTI cases that cross various sub-disciplines of law. From hate crime laws to marriage equality cases, this paper navigates competing emotions, such as hate and love, which simultaneously structure legal progress. Reading emotion enables us to address how legal recognition and visibility can work, paradoxically, to cover the queer injuries, intimacies, and identities they seek to address.

Legal Education xMOOCs – A Mirage in the Australian Regulatory Environment?

Legislative studies are a sub discipline of law that explores legislation, as a process and as a product, including the legislative environment in its widest sense. Within this context, the nature of legislative drafting as art, craft, science or mere process has been much debated. Nowadays, legislative drafting is considered a ‘phronetic’ area of law that combines elements of art and science and requires at the same time creativity, innovation and knowledge of theory. Taking a bottom up approach informed by the profile, role of drafters and educational theories, this paper proposes a ‘phronetic’, approach to the teaching of legislative drafting that combines three main elements: theoretical training on acknowledged drafting rules and conventions; practical experience to familiarize the trainee drafter with the decisions that need to be made in the process of designing a specific legislative text; and experimentation and reflective practice that allow the drafter to become creative and independently thinking.

Law and Knowledge - remarks on a debate in German legal science

The relationship between law and knowledge is a new topic in the field of legal science, and it is dealt with in particular in public law as sub-discipline of law. The topic is definitely not new with regard to other scientific domains. Thus law might be seen as a late comer. This article intends to outline some aspects of the current discussion to provide the essential groundwork on the topic, initially by explaining why the interrelation between law and knowledge might be important. This article does not cover aspects of knowledge as an object of law, which is often discussed under this headline but focusses on more basic aspects of the relationship between knowledge and law that may summarized in the hypothesis that law shapes knowledge but also that knowledge shapes the law. Following an introduction on how ‘knowledge’ is to be defined as a term, the discourse moves on to examine law as a practice through which knowledge is constantly generated in multiple manners, while, immediately afterwards the different typologies of knowledge, from the most tangible (through experience and conventions) to the most articulate ones (through European administrative networks) are presented. It reveals an important requirement of creating a European Administrative space, which is a shared knowledge base where administrative actions are embedded in. Even if it may come as a surprise to some, ignorance, as the opposite of knowledge, can also be a process or element that plays a role in law generation, as the article further argues. Last but not least, an analysis of the preconditions necessary for observing the law and knowledge conundrum either under conditions of awareness or of ignorance is provided.

Competition Law Fragmentation in a Globalizing World

This is a review essay of Caron Beaton‐Wells and Ariel Ezrachi (eds.), Criminalising Cartels: Critical Studies of an International Regulatory Movement (2011); David J. Gerber, Global Competition: Law, Markets, and Globalization (2010); and Ioannis Lianos and D. Daniel Sokol (eds.), The Global Limits of Competition Law (2012). It explores the fragmented nature of national competition laws in the context of globalization and several harmonizing trends: the defining role of economics, the strong influence of US antitrust economics and law internationally, and the relative insularity of competition law from other subdisciplines of law. The recent emergence of competition regimes, especially in the BRICS countries, challenges these harmonizing trends, reducing US hegemony. Economics will remain central but cultural and institutional factors that reflect societal values will become more significant. This leads to a contradiction of convergence as to the benefits of competition law internationally and continuing fragmentation along national lines.

New Bearings in the Sociology of Law

Conventionally, normative and analytical philosophical approaches (i.e., those of Rawls, Dworkin, Alexy, etc) occupied an unshakably dominant position in constitutional theory. Theories of constitutional rule typically isolated the aspect of constitutionalism concerned with fundamental rights from other constitutional functions, and they usually revolved around the attempt to explain constitutions as documents expressing rationally defensible norms to govern the distinctively public exchanges of society. This dominance of analytical theory in constitutional inquiry was flanked and reinforced by the fact that ‘sociolegal’ analysis – with its own particular methodologies and emphases – had retreated from, or in fact had never really taken occupancy of, the sphere of constitutional debate, and it tended to concern itself with questions located in the sphere of private law, in regulation, or in criminology; the primary overlap of sociolegal analysis with a particular subdiscipline of law is clearly still now with criminology. In the rare cases in which more conventional sociological reflection placed a focus on constitutional law, for instance, in the works of Gunther Teubner and other theorists influenced by him, it usually located constitutional law on a continuum with private law. Indeed, the connection between constitutional law and private law was already anticipated by the very earliest sociotheoretical reflections on constitutional law – for instance, in the writings of theorists as diverse as Savigny and Marx. In contemporary debate, the indifference of legal sociology toward constitutional law (construed categorically as public law) is no doubt in part attributable to the fact that the field of sociolegal studies evolved in tandem with the development of research on legal pluralism and with the growth of attendant theoretical and explanatory models. In the spirit of Eugen Ehrlich, analysis of legal pluralism was historically associated with the sphere of private–legal relations, which meant that sociolegal inquiry into constitutional norms was also directed toward the domain of

Information Law: From Discipline to Method

In the European debate has so far mainly been discussed as a discipline or a sub-discipline of law. Three such disciplinary concepts are identified: Information Law as information technology law, information law as an exercise in self-reflection on the function and performance of law in the age of computing, and information law proper looking at the way in which law deals with information as such regardless of the technology applied. These discussions are supplemented by a new approach this paper describes in broad sketches: information law as a method rather than as a discipline. Borrowing from elements of information law proper this method perceives law as a set of mechanisms addressing social information flows. The method assesses these mechanisms by first evaluating their performance using models of functionally optimal information flows and then by testing these insights against inherent legal assumptions on the proper handling of information. After presenting two examples to clarify this approach the paper concludes with some critical comments on the future of information law as a method.

Legislative drafting: a new sub-discipline of law is born

Professor Helen Xanthaki (Academic Director of the Sir William Dale Centre for Legislative Studies at IALS) explains how legislative drafting has been transformed from a skill often associated with government lawyers to a new sub-discipline of law and subject for legal research and scholarship. Her paper describes the creation of a dynamic process with new doctrines, new questions, new answers in the field. Some have been there for a while, others are being introduced or are being borrowed and applied by other disciplines of law and other social sciences. So, is there a new discipline? And what is its place in the study of law? And what is its main philosophy? And what are its main elements?

Realizing Utopia through the Practice of International Law

This article understands Antonio Cassese's Realizing Utopia as an invitation to reflect about idealist international scholarship and its method. In Realizing Utopia and Five Masters of International Law Cassese proposed critical positivism as the adequate method for the international lawyer to interpret international and to suggest legal reform in order to bring international better in line with the values of the international community. While I agree that critical positivism allows the practitioner of international to pursue his utopian vision when interpreting and applying the law, I argue that legal scholarship that engages in proposals on what the is or should be needs to go beyond critical positivism. On the one hand, it has to venture into other disciplines, such as moral philosophy, political theory, or economics, to justify its choices. On the other hand, it must take account of other subdisciplines of law, in particular private and law & society studies, in order to benefit from their insights into the relationship between law, markets, and society. These reflections, to me, do not diminish the value of Realizing Utopia, but rather suggest that it should be read as an instance of utopian international practice.

On the past and future of European constitutional scholarship

This comment takes issue with three claims made by Armin von Bogdandy about the role of “doctrinal constructivism” as it relates to the European public law tradition. First, the rise of constitutional law as a subdiscipline of law is not plausibly explained by the adoption of a conceptually focused positivist method. Its successful institutionalization within the law faculties has depended, first and foremost, on the establishment of a relatively stable constitutional settlement. The nature of that settlement, rather than the virtues intrinsic to any particular methodology, is the most influential factor in determining what kind of methodology becomes dominant. Second, it is probably misleading to characterize mainstream contemporary European legal scholarship as doctrinal constructivism. If the varieties of legal scholarship that count as mainstream in Europe today have a common core, it consists of a rejection of the reductivism that has classified law and legal scholarship as either formal/conceptual, moral, or empirical/factual. European legal scholarship seeks, for the most part, to integrate the formal, empirical, and moral dimensions of the law into a distinctively legal point of view. In that sense, it has always been-even in Germany-far more open to interdisciplinary and theoretical work than von Bogdandy's account suggests. Third, while he correctly describes an interesting and deep difference between contemporary European and American cultures of legal scholarship and teaching-a difference that is apparent to anyone who has experienced both-von Bogdandy has overlooked the salutary effect of American elite law school culture on European scholarship. It has encouraged European scholars to overcome the residual habits of a conceptually focused positivist complacency and more widely reembrace the study of law as a theoretically ambitious, internally multidisciplinary exercise.

The New Black's

The recently-released eighth edition of the venerable Black's Law Dictionary is the second edition to be completed under the editorship of Bryan Garner. This review examines Garner's claim that the dictionary has been thoroughly rewritten in light of modern lexicographic principles. It turns out the most recent editions of Black's do indeed represent a substantial improvement. For one thing, the newest version of the dictionary has benefited from being reviewed by a large array of legal experts. Moreover, as opposed to the previous practice of simply adding words to new editions, while retaining verbatim just about all previous entries and definitions, the seventh and eighth editions have begun to systematically revisit existing definitions, updating them where necessary and purging entries that are not really legal terminology. These points are illustrated by a close examination of the history of the word mitigation in the various editions of the dictionary, in light of the insidious impact that an earlier definition in Black's had on California death penalty law. The scope of the new Black's appears to be quite comprehensive, including terminology from the many subdisciplines of law, and also including a great deal of historical terminology as well as recent coinages. In fact, one aspect of its coverage (an appendix of legal maxims) arguably covers more territory than is really necessary. As to the definitions themselves, they have not only been reexamined, but have been organizationally improved by distinguishing information of an encyclopedic nature from the definitions proper. They also include citations and illustrative examples. Unlike the practice in earlier editions, however, most quotations in the new Black's come from secondary sources (treatises, hornbooks, etc.) rather than from statutes and judicial opinions. Garner and his staff will no doubt continue to improve future versions of the dictionary. So, the question for owners of previous editions is whether to upgrade now or wait for an even better dictionary to appear a few years down the road. Unlike new versions of software, which often add new features that you don't need and deprive you of old features you liked, there is no downside to buying the newest edition of Black's.

Good Economics, Bad Economics, and European Economics

The editors of Kyklos have asked the question: Is there a European economics? This short essay tries to give an answer by first trying to provide a framework for a sensible answer in economics, and then following suit by illustrating how in the context of this frame-work, the answer can be given. In so doing, the essay touches on theories of regulation, the ORDO-approach, the sub-discipline of law and economics and the problem of European institutions as they are different from American ones and different from those typically assumed but never explicated in textbook renditions bearing on economic policy.

Ethics, efficiency, Coasian property rights, and psychic income: A reply to Demsetz

In his seminal article, Coase (1960) turned the world of economics upside down. I t might even be said that with one (longish) stroke of the pen, he created the entirely new sub-discipline of Law and Economics; and that he did so out of the ashes of a t least one part of the traditional field as i t stood before his onslaught: that occupied by Pigou (1932). Previously, the view of the profession regarding invasions against another person or his property was the classical liberal one of cause and effect. A was the perpetrator, B the victim. To be sure, there was some equivocation amongst the Pigovians as to whether the proper public policy response to this was to tax A in a n effort to force him to stop his depredations, or to give him a subsidy so as to entice him toward this end (ibid., p. 184). But the