Style Of Warfare Research Articles

GRAND STRATEGY AND MILITARY IMPLICATIONS OF NEW RUSSIA’S MILITARY DOCTRINE IN 21ST CENTURY: GEOSTRATEGIC ASPECTS OF HYBRID WARFARE STRATEGY AGAINST GEORGIA AND UKRAINE

: A paper reflects new dimensions of New Cold War geostrategic balance implications at pan-regional (European) and regional (Black Sea) levels that already has been transformed into classical hybrid warfare between the Russian Federation and NATO due to the Russia’s invasion into Ukraine. Currently adopted military doctrine of the Russian Federation envisages engagement into two military conflicts simultaneously and constructed its strategic operational framework founded on incorporation of three combat elements: military, non-military and information warfare measures and proper concepts. Hence, it means that Russia can begin war-game scenarios at the same time against two neighboring nations as it occurs at time being against Ukraine and Georgia. At that respect, the incumbent Russian military leadership in aegis of so-called “Gerasimov Doctrine” is promoting hybrid warfare as a key dominant grand strategy with relevant theater strategy and operational art elements (for instance, operational – strategic command HQ “South” and 5 Army Corp HQs). The military “muscle” could easily skew and twist European security environment that is much unprepared to the geostrategic challenge – Crimea occupation and annexation in 2014, war with Georgia in 2008, hybrid attack to Estonia in 2007 and very recently large-scale military intervention in Azov Sea and pending regional hegemony conditions in Caspian Basin. These military asymmetric challenges and risks deriving from the arms race derailed by the Russia’s incumbent authority, and security dilemma embroiled with by the elements of WMD are sufficient indications why the European security is plausible fragile against such challenges. From academic standpoint, the thesis deals in analyzing with the most dangerous threat targeting the European security architecture – asymmetric military challenge and realization of which is pursued in wagging hybrid war against Georgia and Ukraine. The new type of warfare is a probe stone perfected against these two post-Soviet nations indicates and poses real menace, mainly geostrategic origin, easily targeted NATO member-states, including Poland. The article predisposes reflection and understanding true meaning of so-called “Gerasimov Doctrine” and the whole new version of Military Doctrine of Russia and how it is implemented at the stage. A shift transformation takes place in realms of contemporary century warfare doctrinal planning and the transformation has already implicated of identifying new type of warfare strategy – asymmetric war with representation of hybrid warfare that contributing in re-shaping a grand strategy that allows policymakers to steer through the uncertainties of a complex international security environment; Elaboration real content and new definition of “hybrid war” and its dualfold implications how to quell and deal with asymmetric military challenges and risks and how to cause the challenges on its matter. Moreover, it describes and review reformatting modality in planning and wagging war due to the military technology development that contributed to a far more complicated strategic environment for war than that of previous century. In that respect is to be identified new style of warfare – Urbanistic warfare presented in 2008 August Russia-Georgia war as well as in war in Ukraine (Mariupol battle) new definition of the warfare in general matter.

“Savage War” as “People’s War”: Nineteenth-Century African Wars, European Perceptions, and the Future of Warfare

This article first looks at how British, French, and German officers assessed the specifics of nineteenth-century colonial warfare and how they distinguished it from wars in Europe. Part 2 explores, on the basis of war reports from the nineteenth century and secondary literature, the significance of specifically African war traditions from precolonial times and how these came into play when, in the second half of the century, within a few decades the European colonial powers divided the continent among themselves with enormous brutality in their “scramble for Africa.” In their mental baggage Europeans brought ideas about war as having to “take a different form in Africa,” to quote a Prussian observer of the Franco-Moroccan War. What did this imply for their own style of warfare? Part 3 intervenes in the politically charged debate about how the European experience of nineteenth-century colonial warfare shaped war, and genocide, in twentieth-century Europe. The wars in nineteenth-century Africa, both precolonial and colonial, were not “contained” (gehegt) wars, to use Carl Schmitt’s term. Following 1815, in most of Europe the containment of warfare—that is, the separation of combatants and the civilian population—worked for a hundred years. After that, no more. Why? Does the experience of colonial warfare offer an explanation? This article tests an explanation that hinges on an unconventional comparison of what Europeans called “savage war” in Africa and “people’s war” (Volkskrieg) in Europe.

Data Management of Indonesian Warship’s Electronic Support Measures in Supporting Naval Operation

The development of science and technology is very influential in all fields of life, including the military sector. This encourages countries throughout the world competing to compete in the sophistication of military defense equipment. Competition in the military field has the potential for a new style of warfare so there was a new threat. One such threat is Electronic Warfare, this is a war model in the era of modern technology. Electronic Support Measure is part of the Electronic Warfare that is passive, but very decisive in excellence in battle. Data of Electronic Support Measure processed in a Big Data that can be used in Indonesian Naval Operation. For this reason, a good Electronic Support Measure Intercept Data Management is needed in the context of readiness of Indonesian fleet command in naval operation. Keywords: Data Management; Electronic Support Measure (ESM); Naval Operation; Electronic Warfare (EW), Big Data. DOI : 10.7176/IKM/10-1-03 Publication date: January 31 st 2020

Anglo-Irish Tomb Effigy Armour: An Experiential Study

This work examines two related armour types unique to Ireland and found only on tomb effigies dating to the late medieval period. The aim of this paper is to establish how the armour may have been constructed, whether it was practical and usable compared to better-known armour types, and how it may have fitted into the Irish style of warfare. Within this work the most likely construction methods and layout of the armour have been tested by making armour segments, using modern materials, to test the ability of the armour to move at joints and rivets, while retaining its protective functions. With documentary sources these results make it possible to come to conclusions as to the armour’s use on the battlefield. The paper also aims to show the contribution that can be made to academic research with the incorporation of experiential knowledge gained from disciplines such as Combat Re-enactment and Western Martial-Arts.

The Edge of Mosby's Sword: The Life of Confederate Colonel William Henry Chapman (review)

Reviewed by: The Edge of Mosby's Sword: The Life of Confederate Colonel William Henry Chapman Joseph M. Rizzo The Edge of Mosby's Sword: The Life of Confederate Colonel William Henry Chapman. Gordon B. Bonan. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 2009. ISBN 978-0-8093-2932-8, 220 pp., cloth, $29.95. John Singleton Mosby left an abundance of writing covering the exploits of his Confederate Partisan Rangers, which helped establish the battalion's legacy in Confederate lore. While much has been written about Mosby and his battalion, less is known about the officers who served under him. In The Edge of Mosby's Sword, Gordon B. Bonan examines the life of William Henry Chapman, who became one of Mosby's most trusted officers. Through the examination of Chapman's military and personal life, Bonan also illuminates social and political conditions prevalent during the rise and fall of the Confederacy. Chapman attended the University of Virginia during the secession crisis, and [End Page 281] Bonan recounts the pro-secessionist atmosphere cultivated on campus by both students and professors. Like many of the young students, Chapman volunteered for a military company raised at the university and assisted in an excursion to Harpers Ferry to capture its arsenal. After Harpers Ferry, Chapman returned home and volunteered for service in the Confederate army. Realizing the best way to procure a commission as an officer was with the artillery, Chapman helped raise a company that became known as the Dixie Artillery. The small and poorly equipped Dixie Artillery was not present at the Battle of First Manassas, but thirteen months later, in August 1862, it played a significant part in the Battle of Second Manassas. On the last day of the battle, the timely arrival and placement of the Dixie Artillery helped decimate a large Union attack. While the Dixie Artillery had an important role in the repulse of the attack, accounts of the battle did not give it the credit it deserved, and Chapman spent the rest of his life defending his battery. The Dixie Artillery was not in existence much past the battle; it disbanded in the fall of 1862 during a reorganization of the Confederate artillery. Chapman lost his command and looked for another avenue of fighting the war. In the spring of 1863, Chapman joined with Mosby and his newly formed battalion of Partisan Rangers. Although he would fight in no more large-scale battles, Chapman was attracted to this new style of warfare, which consisted of constant raids and action, rather than the long periods of inactivity with the regular army. Chapman quickly became one of Mosby's most trusted officers, the second in command at the age of twenty-four. While historical accounts often romanticize the actions of Mosby's Rangers, Bonan shows how the violence by the rangers and Union forces attempting to suppress them intensified as the war dragged on. Union forces instituted a harder war on the Confederacy and began burning the homes and materials of civilians whom they believed harbored the rangers. Union forces also began executing captured rangers. In retaliation against this new style of warfare by the Union army, the rangers also began to execute captured Union soldiers. When Robert E. Lee surrendered the Army of Northern Virginia, there was uncertainty whether the rangers would receive the same terms of surrender, because of their irregular style of warfare. Deciding not to surrender, Mosby disbanded the battalion. In his final act as an officer, Chapman led roughly two hundred rangers to the Union army and arranged for terms of surrender. Following the war, Chapman spent much of his life working for the federal government, which many southerners saw as treachery. Despite this, Chapman still attended soldier reunions and wrote his recollections of wartime events, [End Page 282] particularly trying to give the Dixie Artillery credit for its role in securing a Confederate victory at Second Manassas. Understandably, Bonan mostly focuses on Chapman's life during the war, but it would have been useful if he had given more attention to the compelling story of Chapman following the conflict. Despite this minor critique, Bonan has written an excellent account of an obscure, yet...

Apaches Without and Enemies Within: The US Army in New Mexico, 1879—1881

When attempting to confront hostile Apache guerrillas in New Mexico between 1879 and 1881, the US Army encountered a style of warfare which took merciless advantage of its weaknesses. However, the failure of the army to defeat its enemies can be only partially ascribed to this factor. Its efforts were further hampered by the political context within which it had to operate. Nevertheless, these factors occasionally worked in the army’s favour. When these political constraints did undermine efforts to defeat the Apaches, the US Army demonstrated that it was sometimes capable of turning this political context to its advantage.

Information in the Western Way of Warfare: Too Much of a Good Thing?

The proponents of Information War (IW) have mesmerized the public during recent years on the effectiveness and utility of this new style of warfare that ‘system of systems’, the network of sensors, communication and precision weapons, will bring power to achieve dominant battlespace knowledge, near‐perfect mission assignment, and immediate battlespace assessment which will lift the fog of war and bring victory home. However, the War in Iraq since April 2003 has delivered a sobering and salutary reminder that this is a seductive illusion. The actual practice of IW is tricky to pull off at the operational‐tactical level; there have been some real achievements nonetheless. On the Strategic level, however, the results are bad. Judging from the state of the current War on Terror, the insurgents are as adept as the West in waging IW, as they methodically employ unconventional ‘asymmetric’ tactics, manipulate media and make their opponent bleed. It is not only the West which can wage information campaigns; in fact it is not at all certain that the West is actually much good at this aspect of warfare in the strategic arena that really counts. While IW offers great advantages in information‐driven battlefield, there should be a realization the actual victory cannot be achieved with information alone especially on the strategic level. This is the dilemma which West has to address, in particular, in future struggles against unconventional opponents.

Reconquest and Crusade in Medieval Spain (review)

Joseph O'Callaghan offers a survey of military activity in Spain from the later eleventh century through the mid-thirteenth century, following earlier narratives such as Derek Lomax's Reconquest of Spain (1978) and that undertaken in my Society Organized for War (1988). However, the author has a very particular focus in this work, namely kings' endeavors to connect their combat enterprises to the emergence of the papal crusading program in the same era. He scrutinizes the ecclesiastical sources of the period to establish the importance of papal support through crusading bulls for Iberian royal war plans against the Muslim opposition to the south. The first chapter lays out the argument and outlines the case. The next three chapters narrate the assorted royal campaigns in the various Christian kingdoms, from Barbastro in 1163 to the conquest of Seville in 1248. The last three chapters describe, in turn, the style of warfare, church assistance in campaign financing, and the liturgies connected to the reconquest and crusading. During the course of the book's development, O'Callaghan makes some comparisons to the Crusader Near East, and argues on behalf of an expanded concept of the Crusades that would include the kingdoms of the Iberian Peninsula. The case has never been laid out before with such detail and skill, and includes detailed analysis of royal and papal documents as well as a considerable number of chronicle accounts testifying to the religious motivation involved in the peninsular conflict. Moreover, the first chapter offers an interesting survey of the emergence of a militant bellicosity within Christian Europe prior to the Crusades, and its later role in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries.

The privatisation of military force: Economic virtues, vices and government responsibility

The article examines aspects of privatisation in the process of defence production and supply from an economic point of view. It argues that the scope and rationale for the privatisation of military output has expanded with the changes in the mode and style of warfare and the decline of defence budgets evidenced in the post‐Cold War era. The article proposes that limited private production can be both cost‐effective and efficacious, provided that the contracts for that service, and the duties described therein, are sufficiently specific. Privatisation is not, however, a panacea for resource misallocation and not necessarily an organisational structure that provides appropriate incentives to firms, consumers and the state. Viewed from the perspective of economic theory, the article concludes, privatisation of military outputs seems to have some, but quite limited, viability.

The New Strategic Environment

CHALLENGES TO THE FRENCH FRAMEWORK The Soviet revolution of 1989, the reunification of Germany, the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the Gulf War all led to a serious alteration of the reality upon which the Gaullist synthesis was built. Not surprisingly, reality has changed more rapidly than recognition that the Gaullist assumptions and approaches do not fit easily into the new post Cold War world. The unification of Germany happened more quickly than most observers expected. With the emergence of the new Germany, the French had to adjust their policy and sort out their instincts toward the building of a common policy with the new Germany. For the French, the Germans are central to the formers defining of their own role within Europe. The French must deal with a new Germany. Would the new Germany be a partner with France as the old West Germany had been? Was there a psychology of national renewal that would lead to German national egoism and an inability to Work psychologically with the other Europeans? Or would the new Germany define its role in a more adversarial manner? Would it seek to become an overtly national competitor with France? Would such nationalism, torpedo the West European construction process? Soon after the new Germany emerged, the Soviet Union collapsed. There was a close connection between the two processes. The Soviet Union was an empire directed from Moscow. With the collapse of communism in Germany, the weakness of the Soviet system became exposed. Gorbachev assumed that Soviet communism could be reformed from within. He miscalculated. Soviet communism rested upon the maintenance of empire. Its collapse was linked to the pulling apart of the empire by the elimination of Berlin as the Western capital of Soviet communism. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of a new Germany reopened the European question. Eastern Europe disappeared; Central Europe reemerged. How would the new states of Central Europe and the former Soviet Union relate to West European and Atlantic Institutions? With the collapse of the Soviet Union what would be the role of the United States in Europe writ large? Rather than assuming that the task was to counterbalance the United States within the Western Alliance, how could France be certain the United States would remain constructively engaged in European affairs? As the United States embraced the new opportunities in the wake of the Revolution of 1989, the French administration worried that the Americans might leave Europe too quickly, and thereby undercut the European construction process. The United States is perceived as critical to nurturing further success in the European development process, but French policy has frequently been at odds over how best to deal with the United States and Europe simultaneously. The Soviet upheaval challenged both France's transatlantic relationship and the approach to the West European construction process. How would France deal with the new Germany, cope with the Americans redefining themselves and address the challenges posed by the new states of Central Europe and the former Soviet Union? The classic Gaullist approach has provided no easy answers to such core questions. No factor has been of greater significance in pushing the French over the barrier to discuss the necessity for change than the Gulf War. The United States led a Western and Arab coalition in the war against Iraq. This military coordination was central to success in the Gulf War and showed the importance of having exercised forces in common within the Alliance. The performance of new technologies and the new concepts of the American forces (notably air-land battle) brought home to French officials and the public that the old style of warfare was pass& It is not enough to have tanks, airplanes, and isolated pieces of military equipment; modem, warfare is integrated and systems-oriented. …

The New Military Revolution: Post-Industrial Change

Abstract : In a lecture delivered at Queen's University in Belfast in 1955, historian Michael Roberts argued that in the one-hundred years between 1560 and 1660, a number of critical changes and innovations had occurred in tactics, strategy, army size, and sociopolitical institutions, which taken together amounted to a in Early Modern Europe. Roberts held that Gustavus Adolphus's combination of linear formations and improved firepower had revolutionized tactics, which in turn created fresh strategic possibilities. The broader range of strategic options then led to the need for large standing armies, which ultimately forced states to develop political and social institutions to oversee and supply them. Together, these changes wrought a revolution in the Early Modern style of waging war. With its publication three years later, Roberts' lecture captured the interest of the historical community and excited further research into the nature and effect of military change in the 16th and 17th centuries. Over the years a number of historians of Europe's Early Modern period, notably Geoffrey Parker and J. R. Hale, have modified and added to Roberts' original thesis. Despite these changes, however, Roberts' basic argument has stood the test of time. In a similar manner, contemporary soldiers and scholars are struggling to appreciate the significance of the Persian Gulf War in terms of its critical tactical, strategic, and sociopolitical aspects and its impact on future wars. Simply put, the question has become whether the Gulf War represents a new style or form of warfare and, if so, what effect this new style of warfare is likely to have on future warfighting. At the heart of this question lies, once again, the issue of military change.

The Killing Ground: The British Army, the Western Front, and the Emergence of Modern Warfare, 1900-1918

This books explains why the British Army fought the way it did in the First World War. It integrates social and military history and the impact of ideas to tell the story of how the army, especially the senior officers, adapted to the new technological warfare and asks: Was the style of warfare on the Western Front inevitable? Using an extensive range of unpublished diaries, letters, memoirs and Cabinet and War Office files, Professor Travers explains how and why the ideas, tactics and strategies emerged. He emphasises the influence of pre-war social and military attitudes, and examines the early life and career of Sir Douglas Haig. The author's analysis of the preparations for the Battles of the Somme and Passchendaele provide new interpretations of the role of Haig and his GHQ, and he explains the reasons for the unexpected British withdrawal in March 1918. An appendix supplies short biographies of senior British officers. In general, historians of the First World War are in two hostile camps: those who see the futility of lions led by donkeys on the one hand and on the other the apologists for Haig and the conduct of the war. Professor Travers' immensely readable book provides a bridge between the two.

The Chinese cultural style of warfare

Abstract An examination of Chinese history, stretching back over the centuries, reveals that certain themes recur sufficiently often and are sufficiently distinct from Western modes of military thought and action as to constitute a Chinese style of warfare. Among these themes are: an emphasis on stratagem over brute force; attacks on military as opposed to economic targets; a willingness to end a conflict once essential political goals have been met; and an emphasis on man as opposed to machinery (i.e., technology) as being the most vital element determining military strength.

The American style of warfare and the military balance

(1979). The American style of warfare and the military balance. Survival: Vol. 21, No. 2, pp. 57-60.

Guadeloupe, savagery and émancipation : British comment of 1794-1796

This article deals with British reaction to the first years of Victor Hugues' regime on Guadeloupe during the Revolutionary Wars, as expressed in official correspondence and certain influential publications of those times. The article points out how Hugues' implementation of the abolition of slavery on Guadeloupe — and his use of slave rebellion as a major weapon elsewhere — caused consternation in British circles, by occasioning fears that the whole colonial structure of the West Indies would be undermined. Within such a context, Hugues' regime became something «savage» and «diabolical» in British eyes. Moreover, consideration is given to the immédiate economic threat posed by Hugues' governorship. In that regard, it is pointed out that Hugues' extraordinary commerce raiding campaign of 1796-98 (vide : H.J.K. Jenkins, «The Heyday of French Privateering from Guadeloupe, 1796-98», The Mariner's Mirror, 64, 1978, p. 245-250) came as something of a relief to the British, in that it marked a return to a more familiar (though still very damaging) style of warfare.